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CHIANG KAI-SHEK



Chiang Kai-shek: at the age of fifty.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

SOLDIER AND STATESMAN

AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY
BY
HOLLINGTON K. TONG

VOLUME ONE

SHANGHAI

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PREFACE

RECENT events in China have proved Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to be the greatest soldier-statesman of our time on the Continent of Asia. By general admission, China, under his leadership, has progressed more in the last ten years than in any previous century.

In these two volumes is related the life-story of the Builder of New China who has successfully evolved order out of chaos, having welded discordant elements into an effective national unit, and won respect for his country from without. They describe his childhood and his early youth—the days when he was mischievous, fearless, combative, and full of determination.

They record twenty years of intensive preparation for the important role which he is playing to-day. His tenacity of purpose in adhering to the revolutionary cause which at times appeared hopeless, and his unwearying loyalty to the late Kuomintang leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, which was shown during this preparatory period, are as graphically told as circumstances warrant. After remaining in comparative obscurity for nearly one-third of his life time, he emerged triumphantly as President of the Whampoa Military Academy and as Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Punitive Expedition. His life story from this time on became the story of China.

Through many vicissitudes he was able to carry out Dr. Sun's dearest wish to inspire the people with national consciousness by the gradual elimination of individual and

regional interests. Even those who were wont to refer to China as a mere geographical expression and unworthy of being regarded as a nation, now freely admit that a "new concept" of China is necessary. The Generalissimo has created a new China. Often thwarted by ignorance and jealousy, he patiently persevered. He has steadily extended the influence of the Central Government. He has simultaneously convinced the provinces by personal visits and by reforms that he initiated that their interests cannot suffer if national interests are advanced. The sketch of the Generalissimo in his middle age is largely the story of his eradication of provincialism.

He forged the dual instruments of the New Life Movement and the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement wherewith to extirpate the deeply-rooted callousness of the Chinese warlords and the age-long selfishness of Chinese merchants and landowners. Some impatient people desired to see a stately superstructure raised before the foundations were laid, but the Generalissimo realized that unspectacular preliminary work would expedite rather than delay the building of the national edifice. He therefore started these new movements to clear the ground of noxious and useless growths. He set the wheels of economic reconstruction revolving. He welded the Army into an efficient weapon for defence. He brought into public service the ideal of the abnegation of personal interests. By living a clean, energetic life he has set an example that has inspired the whole nation.

Thus he has become the acknowledged leader of those who have thrown themselves whole-heartedly into the task of guiding the nation politically, economically, and socially along the path of progress to the goal of national unity. Even his bitterest political opponents concede him the credit of being the heart and soul of the reform movement. Consequently an account of China's recent national progress in politics, economics, and social affairs must be mainly the Generalissimo's own life-story—the personal guidance of a leader placed by Providence in the vanguard.

The extent of his contribution to the development of the world's history will have to be left to future generations to determine, or to place in proper perspective. There is little doubt, however, that his achievement is bound to exercise profound effect upon the future re-alignment of international forces in Asia. With this his biographers of to-morrow will have to deal.

Knowledge of the Generalissimo from his early youth prompted the author to write these volumes. They are intended to assist towards a better and clearer understanding of the man who is guiding the destiny of 400,000,000 people and of the problems he has been compelled to solve. As long ago as the spring of 1905, Chiang Kai-shek was enrolled as a pupil at Lungching High School at Fenghua where the author was then a teacher. Although the future Generalissimo's stay there was brief, his personality made a deep impression upon the faculty. He was a serious-minded student. The rooms of Chiang and the author were on the same floor of the school building, and the latter had thus full opportunity to observe how the future Generalissimo occupied himself out of class-hours.

Chiang Kai-shek was an early riser, and, after his matutinal ablutions, it was his custom to stand erect on the veranda in front of his bedroom for half an hour. During this time his lips were compressed, his features were set in determination, and he stood with his arms firmly folded. It is, of course, impossible to say definitely what thoughts filled his mind at such times, but it was fairly obvious that he was thinking of his future. In fact it is clear from his own diary that during those few months at the Lungching School, he was formulating plans to go to Japan to study military science in order the better to equip himself for a career which was to be wholly dedicated to the nation.

Another thing that made a deep impression on the author was the avidity with which he seized upon the newspapers as they arrived from Shanghai. There was a little reading room for the use of the scholars, and there during the recess he

carefully studied them. In those days few newspapers penetrated to country districts like Fenghua, and when some found their way there they were highly prized, but to the writer's recollection no one was so keen to learn of the march of events in the outside world as Chiang. The Generalissimo to this day is an insatiable newspaper reader, feeling that it is an important part of his duty to keep himself well-informed of happenings in every part of China, and even of developments in other parts of the world.

Twenty years elapsed after he left the school before the author met him again. This was at Nanchang in Kiangsi, now famous as the birthplace of the New Life Movement. Their respective positions were reversed. No longer was the author the teacher, and the Generalissimo the pupil. Chiang was then the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Punitive Expedition, which he had led to the centre of the Yangtze Valley, and was already regarded as the foremost national leader, while the author was an ordinary newspaperman of no particular prominence.

Then there came an interval of four years. In the meantime, the author, who was then editing a daily paper in Tientsin, had followed the Generalissimo's career closely, and his political and military achievements had filled him with enthusiasm and pride. He felt that a man of that type would go far indeed. Chiang had devoted a score of years to training himself for the role of leadership. He had hardened his body, and had schooled himself to endurance. He had gained, not only book knowledge, but the knowledge of practical military and political affairs that had enabled him to graduate with honours from the University of Experience. There was no future position for such a man other than in front of the front rank.

In the winter of 1931 the author was invited by the Generalissimo to his Chikow home. During this visit he found the Generalissimo as simple and unaffected as if he had not become such an outstanding figure. As always, he was personally solicitous for the comfort of his guests and took

particular pleasure in accompanying them on walks among the pine-clad hills, and in calling attention to specially beautiful views. Indeed, consideration for others is one of the Generalissimo's outstanding characteristics.

Decision was made during this trip that some day the author would write a biography of the Generalissimo, who has achieved success not accidentally, but by dint of hard labour and high resolve. Even in those days it had already become clear that no Chinese in this generation would rise to such heights of greatness as the Generalissimo. Specially during the following six years was his life so full of movement that it would be a national loss if it were not accurately recorded and properly interpreted. Hence the author's present undertaking.

Aware of the value of self-revelation, the author has, wherever possible, let the Generalissimo reveal himself in his speeches and writings and by his actions. Realizing that, in many instances, by summarizing much of the essence of the original would be lost, many of his speeches and written appeals to the nation have been given in full. In brief, the author has humbly followed in the steps of Boswell instead of attempting to emulate the brilliant biographers who are the present—perhaps passing—vogue.

Though only a pedestrian performance, this biography claims to be truthful—some may think unnecessarily truthful. Certainly much that has been recorded of past events may prove to be distressing reading for some of those concerned. Particularly is it likely that references to a number of the Generalissimo's former or present colleagues who tried to destroy him politically in times gone by, will be criticized on the ground that no purpose is served by recalling past mistakes. This is not the view taken by the author. He has sought to tell the truth.

For reasons which were deemed to be sufficient, strict chronological sequence has not been preserved, and a certain amount of overlapping has been permitted. In many cases stress has been laid upon the reaction to the Generalissimo's

policy and personality by foreign correspondents in China and other foreigners. This was deliberate. In the nature of things, articulate Chinese are either pro- or anti-Chiang. The foreigner is able to take a detached and objective view of matters which are of vital personal concern to Chinese, and regarding which Chinese could hardly be expected to be entirely free from partiality or prejudice.

Minor mistakes are certain to be found in the following pages, but every care has been taken to verify dates, and to reconcile different methods of romanizing personal and place names. The collection of material from a great number of sources, and its reduction to reasonable dimensions, provided many opportunities for error, all of which cannot have been avoided. For such blemishes as may be found the author accepts responsibility and invites clemency.

It now remains to mention the magnificent assistance that the writer received from co-workers in the preparation of this biography. Indeed he felt some diffidence in permitting his name to appear as author, as, with the exception of a few chapters, his own contribution has been chiefly supervisory. Mr. F. L. Pratt, whose wide journalistic experience in China and elsewhere in the Far East and whose wise counsel have been freely drawn upon, has borne a large portion of the burden of getting the biography in shape. Mr. John B. Penniston and Mr. Z. B. Toong have also rendered invaluable assistance. They both unweariedly ransacked books, pamphlets, newspapers and manuscripts, documents, the Generalissimo's diary and his personal reflections, to obtain and assemble the material which has been condensed in the following pages. This tribute is due to them and is paid with gratitude and deep appreciation. The assistance and expert advice of the Printers also merit acknowledgment.

HOLLINGTON K. TONG

Shanghai, June, 1937.

SUPPLEMENTARY PREFACE

Publication of this book was delayed by the outbreak of the undeclared war thrust upon China by Japan which at the present time is being carried on with a degree of ruthlessness and disregard of human and divine law on the part of the Japanese that has brought horrified protests from every part of the civilized world. It would be unfitting to allow this book to pass to the hands of the reader without some reference to the enormous changes that the war of aggression brought about with almost incredible swiftness.

Almost overnight the life dream of the Generalissimo became an actuality. China is now in verity a united nation. In the fiery furnace of war all political and regional elements have been welded into a finely tempered instrument of defence. The Generalissimo had already brought the ideal of national unity much closer than it had ever been before, but it is doubtful whether, even in his most optimistic moments, he thought that it would be accomplished in his lifetime.

There were some who were still opposed to him on personal grounds and who were thought to be ready to seize any opportunity that offered to restore the regional semi-independence that had been the bane of the Republic since its establishment. The opportunity came when the Japanese began their campaign of subjugation. Instead of seizing it, those who were reputed to be the most inveterate enemies of the Generalissimo hastened to Nanking to put themselves and their troops at his disposal to fight an alien foe. All domestic differences disappeared like the morning mist before the sun

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

- 1887 Born at Chikow, Fenghua District, Chekiang Province (October 31).
- 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War.
- 1898 Chang Chi-tung publishes "Learn"; Emperor promulgates Reform Edicts.
- 1895 Father, Chiang Su-an, dies.
- 1900 Boxer Uprising.
- 1903 At Fenglu School, Fenghua.
- 1905 After studying at Lungching High School, Fenghua, pays short visit to Japan where meets Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Chen Chi-mei and other revolutionary leaders; Dr. Sun founds Tungmenghui.
- 1906 At military school (later Paoting Military Academy) at Paoting, Chihli Province.
- 1907 Admitted to Shin Bo Gokyo (Preparatory Military Academy) at Tokyo; joins Tungmenghui.
- 1909 Graduates from Shin Bo Gokyo and serves with 13th Field Artillery Regiment at Takada.
- 1911 Outbreak of Revolution at Wuchang (October 10); Chiang hurries to Shanghai; leads successful "Forlorn Hope" at Hangchow; organizes and trains infantry regiment at Shanghai.
- 1912 Dr. Sun becomes Provisional President of the Republic of China; Emperor Hsuan Tung abdicates; Kuomintang established absorbing Tungmenghui; Dr. Sun resigns Provisional Presidency in favour of Yuan Shih-kai; Chiang again visits Japan.
- 1913 Joins punitive expedition against Yuan; Yuan dissolves Kuomintang.
- 1914 Participates in rising at Shanghai and later seeks refuge in Japan; visits Manchuria.

- 1915 Takes active part in attempt to capture Shanghai Arsenal.
- 1916 Leads attack on Kiangyin Fortress in Lower Yangtze; Chen Chi-mei assassinated.
- 1917 Dr. Sun elected Generalissimo at Canton; Chiang proceeds to Canton.
- 1918 Appointed head of Field Operations at Generalissimo's Headquarters; takes active part in Chen Chiung-ming's campaign in Fukien.
- 1919 Appointed commander of Second Detachment of Kwangtung Army; resigns appointment.
- 1920 Defeats Kwangsi troops under Lu Tung-ying; in retirement at Chikow.
- 1921 Rejoins Dr. Sun (now elected President of China by Special Parliament) at Canton; mother dies; founds Wulin (Chikow) Academy.
- 1922 Fruitlessly warns Dr. Sun against Chen Chiung-ming; joins Dr. Sun on gunboat at Whampoa after Chen Chiung-ming revolts; escapes with Dr. Sun to Shanghai.
- 1923 Sent to Moscow by Dr. Sun; returns from Russia; Borodin appointed Adviser to Kuomintang.
- 1924 First National Congress of the Kuomintang; Chiang appointed member of the Military Affairs Commission; appointed President of the Whampoa Military Academy; Dr. Sun leaves for Peking to confer with Northern leaders.
- 1925 Dr. Sun dies; Nationalist Government established at Canton; Chiang defeats Chen Chiung-ming's forces.
- 1926 Second National Congress at Canton; Chiang elected to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang; becomes Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission; appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Punitive Expedition with emergency powers; takes strong measures against Communists at Canton; assumes active command of the Northern Expedition; his armies defeat Wu Pei-fu and occupy Hunan and Hupeh; hostilities against Sun Chuan-fang; Kiangsi and Fukien in Nationalist hands.
- 1927 Hangchow, Shanghai and Nanking captured by Nationalists; the Nanking Incident; Wuchang temporary capital; breach with Wuhan regime; Chiang resigns and visits Japan; married to Miss Mayling Soong in Shanghai; persuaded to return to Nanking; severance of diplomatic relations with Soviet Union; National Government established at Nanking.
- 1928 Resumes post as Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Expedition; collaboration with Feng Yu-hsiang; the Tsinan

- Incident; Peking captured and Northern Expedition brought to successful conclusion; proffered resignation rejected and appointed Chairman of State Council and Generalissimo; Nanking proclaimed National Capital; Chiang attends memorial services for Dr. Sun at Peiping; Chang Hsueh-liang pledges allegiance to National Government.
- 1929 Disarmament Conference opened; Third National Congress; Kwangsi clique revolt and are defeated; attempt to assassinate Chiang; Chang Fa-kuei, Shih Yu-san and Tang Sheng-chih successively revolt and are suppressed.
- 1930 Telegraphic duel with Feng Yu-hsiang; Yen Hsi-shan demands Chiang's resignation; Northerners start offensive; Yen Hsi-shan occupies Tsinan; Chiang retakes city and defeats Yen's forces; Wang Ching-wei returns from Europe and joins Northerners at Peiping; Chang Hsueh-liang occupies Peiping on behalf of the Government; revolt ends by Government capture of Kaifeng and Chengchow.
- 1931 Advocates leniency in dealing with defeated armies; breach with Hu Han-min over question of Provisional Constitution; Hu's resignation accepted; First National People's Convention adopts Provisional Constitution; Southerners demand Chiang's resignation; South prepares to revolt; Shih Yu-san rebels but is defeated; anti-Communist campaign progressing; Japan invades Manchuria (September 18); China appeals to League of Nations; Japanese continue aggressions; Conferences with Southerners; Kuomintang Congresses in Nanking and Canton; Chiang resigns all posts; resignation accepted and new Government formed; revival of student movement.
- 1932 New Government helpless; Chiang recalled to Nanking; the "Shanghai War"; part played by Chiang; takes charge of anti-Communist campaign in Kiangsi.
- 1933 Japanese seize Jehol Province; Tangku Truce signed (May 31); Chiang continues anti-Communist campaign; short-lived revolt in North; Feng Yu-hsiang announces retirement from public life; diplomatic relations with Soviet Union resumed; "People's Government" formed in Fukien; Nineteenth Route Army Revolts; Government Air Force active.
- 1934 Personally directs campaign against Fukien rebels; revolt suppressed; New Life Movement inaugurated; Communists defeated in Fukien; Chiang makes tour of North-west by air; with Wang Ching-wei issues message urging clear

demarcation between powers of Central and provincial administrations; Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the Kuomintang; Communists driven out of Kiangsi; Chiang's stern anti-opium measures.

- 1935 Communists driven out of Kweichow; Chiang's tour by air of South-west; reorganizes Kweichow administration; institutes sweeping reforms in Szechwan; establishes training camp for officials at foot of Mt. Omei; Sixth Plenary Session of Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang; attempted assassination of Wang Ching-wei; Chiang appointed President of Executive Yuan; Finance Ministry issues emergency order nationalizing silver and declaring Government banknotes legal tender; Plenary Session ratifies Finance Ministry's currency reform measures; Fifth Kuomintang National Congress; Japanese foment autonomous movement in North China; Yin Ju-keng declares demilitarized zone of East Hopei independent of Hopei; Japanese Ambassador warns Chiang not to suppress Yin by force.
- 1936 Chen Chi-tang expelled from all posts; South-western Political Council and South-western Executive Committee abolished; Chiang revisits Canton; Kwansi leaders accept office from National Government; Chiang explains situation to delegation of students and declares that he will never sign a treaty detrimental to the territorial integrity of China; protests lodged against Japanese military planes repeatedly flying in North China; tension on Suiyuan border; Chiang organizes People's Economic Reconstruction Movement; Communists driven from Szechwan become active in Shansi; defeated and retreat to North Shensi; Japanese demand for recognition of their "special position" in North China rejected by Chiang; nation celebrates Chiang's fiftieth birthday; huge military airfleet presented by the people as birthday gift and re-presented to nation; touching birthday address; Japanese-trained troops defeated in Suiyuan and expelled from provinces; Chiang visits Taiyuan and commends Suiyuan troops; German-Japanese anti-Communist pact; Chiang made captive at coup at Sian (December 12); released (December 25); resigns as assumption of responsibility but resignation rejected; Chang Hsueh-liang court-martialled for complicity in Sian coup; Chiang granted sick leave.

- 1937 Dr. H. H. Kung goes to England as Special Ambassador to the Coronation; funeral service for late Chiang Hsi-hou (elder brother); Wang Ching-wei returns from Europe; negotiations with Yang Hu-cheng; Chang Hsueh-liang's Army withdraws from Sian; Third Plenary Session of Fifth Kuomintang Executive Committee; Chiang announces resumption of office (May 27).
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CHAPTER I

Influence Of Early Environment—Chiang Kai-shek's Forbears—His Devoted Mother—Schoolboy Days In Chekiang—Determination To Be A Soldier—Military Training At Paoting And Tokyo—Chiang Meets Dr. Sun And Chen Chi-mei—Outbreak Of The Revolution—Chiang Hurries From Japan To China

AROUND the names of men who have achieved fame solely by reason of their own efforts and without the adventitious advantage of birth or patronage, inevitably gather legends which are apt to gain in picturesqueness and piquancy what they lose in veracity. Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Executive Yuan, and Chairman of the National Military Council of the Republic of China, has been no exception. It is, comparatively speaking, only a few years since he became known outside his own country, but directly this happened there was an insistent demand that it should be explained who he was, what he stood for, and why he had won to leadership.

The demand was immediately met. It was immaterial to those who hastened to supply the required information that they had to trust to conjecture and imagination rather than to knowledge. The result has been that a fictitious Chiang Kai-shek has been presented to Western readers. What purport to be sketches of his career and analyses of his character have often been marked by partial knowledge, over-emphasis of what is immaterial, and neglect of essentials.

When the task was faced of preparing an authentic biography to correct current fabrications, an almost insuperable difficulty presented itself—his baffling diffidence. He

naturally could, if he would, tell more about himself than any man living, but if the biographer were compelled to trust to information that he supplied, even after the most persistent and gruelling inquisition, the result would be meagre indeed. How true this is will be realized if a careful study be made of his public utterances. Therein can be found few autobiographical details. When he refers to himself it is almost invariably only incidentally, simply as one of the instruments employed by Providence in the rejuvenation and reformation of the country.

Psychologists might explain this modesty, diffidence, or whatever it may be called, by inherent mental attributes. No doubt such explanation is satisfactory as far as it goes, but the influence of early environment, topographical and social, undoubtedly played a great part. What was that environment and what were the more important formative influences which were responsible for the tenacity of purpose and other salient characteristics which make Chiang Kai-shek conspicuous among the leaders in China? Perhaps the three greatest factors in the formation of a person's character are: (1) family influence, (2) time of birth, and (3) early topographical surroundings. It need hardly be explained that time of birth should not be interpreted in the narrow personal sense, but as meaning the historical period into which a child is born. It is material, therefore, to ascertain to what extent the subject of this biography was helped or hindered by fortune in these three respects.

Chiang was extremely fortunate in the family into which he had the good luck to be born. For generations his forbears had been farmers. His grandfather, who was extremely fond of Chiang, continued the family tradition, but also attained local renown as a scholar. His son (Chiang's father) followed in his footsteps.

Stories are still told in Chikow and its environs of the public spirit that was unceasingly shown by Chiang Kai-shek's father—Su-an. If it be true that blessings rest upon the peace-makers, he must have been blessed indeed. When fellow

villagers thought of going to law, it became an established practice for them to go to Mr. Chiang to lay the matter before him. If the issue related to a dispute between neighbours, he appealed to them simply as men. He pointed out that they were akin to each other, or were bound by traditional neighbourliness, and asked what advantage would be gained by giving money to avaricious *yamen* runners when their differences could be composed by a little mutual forbearance and commonsense. Often his counsel, entirely disinterested and the outcome of the goodness of his heart, prevailed, and expensive lawsuits that would have left a legacy of poverty and embitterment were avoided. It is hardly too much to say that Mr. Chiang was accorded the position of an unofficial judge, whose decisions were accepted without reserve, and whose memory is venerated to this day.

Influences of heredity are questioned, but there is no doubt that a normal child, when he learns that the family of which he is a member has won esteem, if not distinction, in the past, determines that neither by thought nor deed will he disgrace his forbears. It may, then, be supposed that Chiang received one of the most powerful inspirations of his young days when he learned that on his shoulders rested the reputation of an honoured family.

Of no inconsiderable importance is the fact that his upbringing fell almost entirely to the lot of his mother, who came from a family of good repute. With some truth it is said that children, especially boys, who are brought up by their mothers are frequently self-willed and inclined to rebel against discipline. When the mother is disposed to allow maternal love to blind her to her boy's faults, or at least constrain her to leave them uncorrected, she is laying up sorrow for herself and for him. Fortunately this was not the case with Chiang's mother. She was endowed with practical common sense, besides being an affectionate mother.

This was the third marriage of Chiang's father, and his wife had to give a mother's care to the offspring of one of her dead predecessors. Those who knew her best highly

praised the affection that she showered upon those of the family to whom she was not allied by blood. The cruel shafts of wit often launched against step-mothers would have fallen pointless if directed against her. Two years after her marriage Chiang Kai-shek was born. Although he had no visible physical defect, it is related that in his childhood he was sickly; that on more than one occasion his life was despaired of. It was a matter of comment, however, that after being ill, he made rapid recovery, and that each illness was followed by periods of unusual liveliness and playfulness.

From stories which have been handed down it is evident that he was mischievous, and was a source of anxiety to his parents and grandfather. Occasionally his pranks nearly cost him his life. When only a little more than three years old he thrust a pair of chopsticks down his throat to see how far they could reach. They became stuck and were removed with great difficulty. The following morning his grandfather came to ask whether the vocal chords had been injured, whereupon the child jumped from his bed, crying: "I can speak. I am not dumb."

He was very fond of water. When he was six he frequently bathed in the mountain streamlet in front of the house, and in the swift current had several narrow escapes from drowning. In the winter of 1892 he was playing one day with a lump of ice in a large jar—these jars are usually placed under the eaves of Chinese houses to store rain water. He fell in, and extricated himself from the icy water only after much effort.

War games attracted him at this period, and it was remarked that when he and the children of neighbours played he was always the "Commander-in-Chief." He directed the mimic campaigns with wooden sword and spear. In the intervals of play he ascended a hillock and told the other children historical tales. His mother and grandfather were so worried over his tendency to get himself into dangerous scrapes that they decided to send him to a tutor before he had reached school age.

Though his mother guided and shielded him in his childhood with never failing devotion and affection, she early began to teach him to distinguish right from wrong, and to impress upon him that wrong-doing brought its own painful punishment. She was, according to Chiang Kai-shek himself, not so unwise as to risk spoiling the child by sparing the rod. If she learned that he had been inattentive and mischievous at school, she did not hesitate to use physical correction to emphasize her remonstrances. To this chastisement he submitted himself with good grace, recognizing, with that fairness of mind that has been a strong characteristic throughout his career, that it had been merited by his conduct.

In a touching panegyric which he wrote on June 25, 1921, after his mother's death, he gave a word picture of her. He laid stress upon the kindness that she showed to others who were in distress, particularly to widows and orphans. Although she was not well off, she gave freely to schools and hospitals, and was indefatigable in assisting work for public welfare. Although she had three living children of her own, she treated the girl and boy by a former wife with as much care and affection as she lavished on her own offspring.*

In her spiritual life, Mrs. Chiang was a devout Buddhist. She was a strict vegetarian, and never omitted to offer worship daily, becoming increasingly fervent as the years sped on. Some have believed that the immunity from harm which she and her son enjoyed was a divine response to her piety. Frequently Chiang listened to discourses on Buddhism by his mother, and he has himself recorded that he devoted some time to religious and esoteric study.

After the death of Chiang's father in 1895, his mother bore the burden of bringing up the family gallantly and uncomplainingly, and few knew the heavy sacrifices that she made in order that her son should receive as good an education as could be obtained in the locality. Perhaps no better indication

* A tribute to the Generalissimo's mother was paid in his Birthday Message of October 31, 1936, which is reproduced in Chapter XXVII.

of her character can be found than her intimation to Chiang that she desired for him neither the accumulation of great riches, nor the attainment of high rank. "All that I pray for you," she said, "is that you should love your country and preserve the good name of your ancestors, who were men of reputation."

Thus, like the great Chinese sage Mencius, was Chiang Kai-shek brought up by his mother, and like that famous woman, she also was a woman of exceptional character. She required her youngster to assist in the work about the house. Many years later he referred appreciatively to the disciplinary grounding that he received at this time. When addressing nearly 100,000 people at Nanchang in March, 1934, on the New Life Movement, he said *inter alia*: "When I was a little boy, I was required by my parents and teachers to do many tasks such as sweeping and mopping the floor, cooking rice and preparing food in general, and even washing dishes. If I carelessly dropped a few grains of rice, or failed to fasten my clothing properly, I was severely taken to task."

Having given a brief account of the family influences to which the future leader was subjected, the time of his birth may be considered. This took place on October 31, 1887, at Chikow, in the district of Fenghua, in Chekiang Province. Three years before he was born a war had been fought between China and France, in which the former was badly defeated. In those days means of communication were poor, and the news of China's defeat penetrated but slowly to outlying districts. Ultimately it reached his mother's ears in her rural retreat, and, high-minded and patriotic as she was, she was saddened by China's complete failure to prevail against Western prowess. Being a woman of education and more than usual susceptibility, it was natural that she should have shared in the resentment which was gradually arising throughout the Empire that the old order of things which had prevailed from time immemorial should have been rudely and successfully challenged. To what extent a child may be influenced

by the pre-natal thoughts of the mother has never been determined, but it is not without interest to know that, before Chiang's birth, his mother had been mourning over China's humiliation, and perhaps dreaming of the day when the deliverer would be at hand.

A second defeat awaited China seven years after Chiang was born. In this case she was defeated by Japan. Notwithstanding his tender years, Chiang must have been vaguely alarmed by the whispered laments of his elders that the misrule of the Manchus had subjected their proud old country to further humiliation.

It is material, when considering the time at which Chiang Kai-shek entered the world, to remember that there was then a strong and general reaction to the humiliations which China had suffered and the exposure of her weakness. This took the form of a desire for reform and for the adoption of Western culture. Naturally, there was a demand that China should, as speedily as possible, obtain the benefit of Western military training, and secure similar equipment to that which had been used against her with such terrible effect. A movement for the introduction of Western learning was launched in 1896, under official auspices, and it was given great encouragement by Chang Chih-tung, the Viceroy of Hupeh and Hunan.

The reform movement was undoubtedly much accelerated by a pamphlet, "To Learn," which this official wrote after the Sino-Japanese War. In the pamphlet he emphasized the significance of the lesson which the war should teach to the Chinese people. "Learn," he said, "the shame of being like Turkey (then the 'sick man' of Europe). Learn the necessity of becoming like Japan." At Chikow, the birth-place of Chiang Kai-shek, the pamphlet was eagerly studied by those who could read, and to the unlettered its contents were imparted by word of mouth.

Unfortunately, before the teaching of the enlightened Viceroy had time to become effective in arousing the people to their danger and the necessity of united effort, what looked like the dismemberment of the empire had begun.

Germany established herself at Kiaochow Bay in 1898, Russia secured a lease of Port Arthur soon after, then Great Britain obtained a lease of Weihaiwei, and extended, by lease, the sphere of the Crown Colony of Hongkong. At the same time France obtained the lease of Kwangchow Bay, on the southern border of Kwangtung. Japan had already, as a result of the Chinese-Japanese war, gained control of Formosa, and claimed a "sphere of influence" in Fukien. All these Powers demanded the non-alienation of certain parts of China's territory, in which they claimed to possess special interests.

The Chinese, though they had not yet been thoroughly aroused, naturally regarded the threatened break up of their country by its partition into alien spheres of influence with dismay and indignation. So came the reform movement led by Kang Yu-wei, the renowned scholar. The old system of literary examinations was to give place to schools, and many other new measures were contemplated.

In 1900 the whole country, however, was thrown into turmoil by the Boxer Rising. Those who took part in that uprising, although ignorant, were undoubtedly patriotic. They received indirect, if not direct, encouragement from the Empress Dowager. When the movement was suppressed by foreign troops brought from the ends of the earth, a monstrously heavy indemnity was imposed upon China. There could be no further delay for reforms, but they were half-heartedly undertaken by the Manchus. In 1906 a special commission was sent to Japan and Western countries to study and report on constitutional and other matters.

This may appear to be a digression, but it is material to record that, even in his childhood, Chiang breathed an atmosphere created by actual or threatened foreign aggression, and eager hopes for reform and national rebirth. Undoubtedly he early developed a belief that Western education was essential if China was to regain power and prestige.

Chiang saw the light of day in a hilly country. Chikow itself lies in a valley, though at some height above sea level,

and close to his home were precipitous and forbidding cliffs. Above the little town towered mountains, snow-clad in winter, down whose sides in due season raced torrential streams broken by waterfalls of severe beauty. Though the winter is austere the soil is kindly, and fertile valleys enable the dour mountaineers to win a meagre, but sufficient livelihood by raising the grains and vegetables which are the chief products of the district. Through these valleys flow mountain streams which afterwards merge in broader rivulets upon which float the bamboo rafts that carry the hard-won fruits of the soil to the markets.

In these limpid streams could be seen schools of fish unceasingly fighting their way against the downward current like soldiers advancing in formation towards a hostile force. Chiang was often observed watching them with rapt attention. Once he was heard to mutter, noticing that the fish, after being swept backward time after time by the current, unflinchingly renewed their efforts to win their way upstream: "In the same way men have to fight against the odds of life, often repulsed but never despairing." Some elementary ideas regarding pertinacity, and even of military formation, were certainly inspired in his mind during the hours seemingly wasted in contemplation of the fish in the mountain stream that flowed past his native place. It may be recalled that the great Bruce was similarly inspired by the example of dogged perseverance given by a humble spider.

The belief that leaders of men are usually born amid mountains and clear streams has always been professed by China's sages, and, as we have seen, it was in just such an environment that Chiang Kai-shek was born. Food for thought is supplied by the knowledge that most of the world leaders of to-day who won their way to pre-eminence by their own efforts, were born in similar geographical surroundings. Perhaps men born in physically elevated regions are generally of sterner mould, and consequently better fitted for leadership, than those born in the lowlands.

Men who breathe the higher, rarer air usually simple,

straightforward, honest and hardworking, but they are wont to be reserved, proud and tenacious of their opinions. The people of Chikow were of this description, and they also had the strong clannish instinct that is found among mountain dwellers. Many generations of Chiangs have lived in Chikow, and to this day many families of that name are found there. Class distinction is scarcely known, the population of this agricultural district, with the exception of a few merchants, being sturdy farmers.

Generally, the families won their way by hard and unremitting work on the land. Like the early settlers in midwest America, they fought nature with their hoes, and forced her to yield. It was from such stock that Chiang sprang. Perhaps, it would be worth the while of a thoughtful philosopher to determine to what extent the youth born in the city, who has only the works of men, which are necessarily impermanent, to contemplate, suffers in the battle of life in comparison with the young who are brought up amid the imperishable works of nature.

In order to understand why Chiang Kai-shek in after years had nothing of the shyness or awkwardness of a rustic, it is necessary to remember that Chikow is by no means an isolated hamlet—by the world forgotten. Actually, the town, which can now be reached from Shanghai by steamer and motor car in 10 hours, is the gateway of Ningpo and Shaohing. Daily through the town pass travellers from Ninghai, Tientai, Sinchang and Chenghsien. The residents of Chikow, therefore, are, in a sense, not wholly unsophisticated.

Having briefly touched upon the family influences, and the time and place of birth, we may speak of Chiang as a schoolboy. He early displayed attributes which differentiated him from his class-mates. Not that he showed any conspicuous ability in routine study—it must be admitted that, from all the evidence available, he did not at first make full use of the natural abilities that he possessed. It would appear from the testimony of those who knew him in those days that

he rather sought for leadership in the playground than in the study.

Ethical characteristics, however, soon showed themselves. Even at the age of seven, he was remarkable for the zeal with which he championed the cause of those younger and weaker than himself. The story is still current of the vengeance that he wreaked on the school bully who had maltreated one of the smaller boys. Chiang Kai-shek left the class-room early, waited for the bully and gave him a severe thrashing. This was reported to the master by a countryman who happened to be passing when the incident occurred. The teacher severely punished Chiang, who bore the punishment without a murmur, and made no effort to excuse himself by explaining his motives.

As a result he gained a kind of moral leadership among the other boys, even among those older than himself. It is said that he was always ready to support his leadership with his fists if it were challenged. There is, however, no suggestion that he was domineering or bombastic. He undoubtedly loved to excel, and was always ready to play a part, and not a discreditable one, in the games in which young boys engage all the world over.

But there was no organized physical training in Chekiang—nor elsewhere in China for that matter. At that time the shadow of the past still lay over the playground. Athletic prowess was not actually despised, but the importance of training the body as well as the mind was not recognized. In that simple little school among the mountains, physical instruction had never even been heard of. The country youth, however, suffered less from this defect of an educational system handed down from the past than his fellows in the towns. Breathing the pure air of the mountains, swimming in the cool, clear streams, and learning to be sure of foot while engaging in boyish adventures by fell and field, young Chiang unconsciously built up that physical fitness which in after days stood him in such good stead amid the rigours and hardships of campaigning.

An incident which occurred when he was attending the local school has been cited to show his early leaning towards democracy on the one hand and his fearlessness on the other. One of the teachers lecturing about America pointed out that the Presidents of the United States considered themselves as servants of the public and led simple lives without pomp. All the other students were astonished, but Chiang stood up and said: "The President of the United States of America is a man. There is nothing strange in his living in as simple a fashion as an ordinary citizen." A statement of this kind by a boy of ten, in a country where the head of the State was held to be semi-divine, naturally astounded the teacher.

After completing his studies at the village schools, Chiang was sent to the city of Fenghua for more advanced tuition. At the Fenglu and Lungching High Schools he seems to have devoted more attention to his studies than before—at all events he succeeded in fully satisfying his examiners. Perhaps it should be noted that at this time a certain aloofness—that has often since been mistaken for pride—was manifested. Although he was ready to join in any game in which physical fitness was a requisite—he ran third in a race at the first inter-school athletic meet in Ningpo—he was averse to spending his time in empty talk. Often, while others were engaging themselves in the "tremendous trifles" that preoccupy schoolboys, he wandered away by himself and was evidently ruminating deeply. It was known, even at this period of his life, that he was determined to adopt a military career. He removed his queue to show his determination to go abroad for a higher education with the intention of ultimately helping to overthrow the Manchus. His relatives were alarmed as his action in the eyes of the authorities at that time seemed almost sacrilegious.

His mother had high ambitions for him—like Dr. Samuel Johnson's mother "she had too much good sense to be vain of her son, but she knew his value." Quite possibly she felt some disappointment that he did not decide to follow civil life as a scholar, but that she was quite resigned to his adoption of the

career of a soldier was shown by the financial assistance she gave to her son during his military studies in Japan.

His farewell to civil school life dates from May, 1906, when he went from the Lungching High School to Japan to study military science. There he met Chen Chi-mei, a noted revolutionary leader, for the first time, and was initiated into revolutionary activities. He discovered, however, that he could not be admitted to a military academy in Japan as Chinese students were only admitted upon the recommendation of their Government. Consequently he returned to China and started to prepare himself for the competitive examinations for admission to the Paoting Military Academy.

He passed his examinations with distinction and was admitted to the Academy in 1906. All the students except Chiang wore queues, a fact that naturally attracted the attention of the school authorities, but no disciplinary action was taken, though the absence of a queue in those days was supposed to indicate the possession of "dangerous thoughts."

The offensive behaviour of a Japanese instructor one day led to a scene. This man, who was lecturing on hygiene, placed a cubic inch of earth on his desk, and pointing to it said that it could support 400,000,000 microbes. He added that the lump of earth could be compared to China whose 400,000,000 people were like the 400,000,000 microbes in the lump of earth.

This degrading comparison so angered Chiang that he dashed up to the desk, broke the lump of earth into eight parts, and shouted: "Japan has 50,000,000 people. Are they like the 50,000,000 microbes living in an eighth of a cubic inch of earth?" The instructor was taken aback, and asked: "Are you a revolutionary?" To be a revolutionary in those days was to invite death, but Chiang calmly replied: "I wished to know whether your comparison was apt. You should not beg the question by raising another issue." The discomfited instructor was unable to reply, but later he asked the Director of the Academy to punish Chiang severely. The Director, however, knew that the Japanese instructor was in the wrong

and he, therefore, merely ordered that Chiang should be given a mild reprimand.

At the Paoting Academy, Chiang threw himself enthusiastically into his studies, and his zeal and aptitude speedily won recognition from his instructors. His progress was so rapid that within a year he was selected, on merit alone, to be one of the carefully chosen students held to be qualified for more advanced study in military science in Japan.

When he arrived in Japan in 1907, he first attended the Shinbo Gokyo (Preparatory Military Academy) in Tokyo, which had been specially instituted by the Chinese Ministry of War to prepare Chinese students for later study at a Japanese military academy. At the school he found it difficult at first to accommodate himself to the comparatively sparse and novel dietary. He learned that it was customary for the people of Japan to content themselves with one or two small bowls of rice, with the addition of tiny portions of fish and a small dish of cabbage or *daikon* (a species of radish). This, it may be supposed, was far from satisfying, but he determined to suit his system to the new conditions. By adopting the old expedient of tightening his belt, he accustomed himself, little by little, to the meagre fare. Ever since then he has been a moderate eater, and to this no doubt is attributable his freedom from the type of illness due to excess in this respect.

There were at this time more than 60 Chinese studying military science in Japan, but Chiang Kai-shek does not appear to have formed really close friendships with them. The aloofness to which reference has been made earlier, when speaking of his school days in Chekiang, was highly noticeable during his stay in Tokyo, and was resented by some of his classmates who failed to understand him. They made the mistake of thinking that his dislike of ordinary social amenities was due to pride, whereas from his earliest days he has been serious-minded and, while not averse to recreation, was impatient of time wasting.

He graduated from the Shinbo Gokyo in 1909, and joined the 13th Field Artillery (Takada) Regiment of the Japanese Army

as an expectant cadet for the Japanese Military College. He worked hard while doing regimental duty. The winter was very severe, but he always turned out promptly for early morning parade. Very often the parade ground was deep in snow. During this time Chiang performed all the menial duties of an ordinary recruit, from grooming horses to blacking his boots. He inured himself to hardship, fortifying himself with the thought that he would later experience much worse conditions on the battlefield.

The Japanese officers with whom he came in contact at this time do not appear to have been impressed by Chiang, except by his willingness to submit to rigid discipline. General Nagaoka, who was then commander of the division to which the Takada regiment belonged, a few years back published some reminiscences of Chiang Kai-shek.

He said: "I did not dream at that moment that Chiang would ever rise to the heights that he has attained. When I questioned his former regiment commander recently, the latter said that he had a premonition that Chiang would do well, but he never thought that he would become a great historical figure.

"I often wondered myself why what had appeared to be a commonplace cadet should have become such a great man. At last I hit upon the answer. In 1927, he resigned his posts in China and came to Japan. One afternoon I invited him to tea to meet his former regiment commander. In his civilian attire Chiang looked like a young diplomat rather than a great soldier and statesman. He still addressed me and the other guests as his superior officers, although of course he knew that we had then no right to expect him to do so.

"Prior to his departure from Japan, he wrote four characters on a scroll which he signed. They might be translated: 'Do not be ungrateful for the instructor's teaching.' I have helped many Chinese, but none of them can be compared with Chiang, who even now does not forget the assistance and kindness rendered to him so many years ago. So I have concluded that it is largely due to this trait in his

character that the young cadet who did not show any marked brilliance during his schooling in Japan has attained to his present position.

"When he came to Japan in 1927 he was under a political cloud. But he still cherished a high ambition and great hopes for the future. He was merely waiting for the opportune moment. To Chiang, who values friendship and kindness, I will ever pay respect."

Chiang, keen as he undoubtedly was to learn all that could be learnt in Japan of military science, spent much of his time with men of the Chinese revolutionary party who were working for the overthrow of the Manchu regime. He became a member of the Tungmenghui, which later was reorganized into the Kuomintang. His sponsor was Chen Chi-mei, the noted revolutionary hero already referred to.

Most eventful of all was his meeting in Tokyo with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Father of the Revolution. This took place at a meeting of the Tungmenghui, and it is greatly to be regretted that no artist was present to perpetuate the historic meeting of the great planner and the equally great executant. The two men were complementary, and Dr. Sun seems to have sensed immediately that the serious young man presented to him was destined to carry the Revolution on when nothing but action would suffice. After one of Dr. Sun's passionate addresses, the young cadet and he talked over the projected Revolution at length. That the Leader was deeply impressed is shown by an observation that he made at the time to Chen Chi-mei. Indicating Chiang Kai-shek, he said, "That man will be the hero of our Revolution: we need just such a man in our revolutionary movement."

At that stage of his life, he was disciplining himself, consciously and unconsciously, to play his part in the Revolution when it should break out. He was pondering without interruption over the plans that sped through his fertile brain. With the natural impatience of youth, he was anxious for action. The period of four and a half years that he spent in Japan, first at a military school and later attached for training

to an artillery unit, was far indeed from being wasted, but the day then seemed to be distant when actual use could be made of the knowledge that he had acquired, and of the patriotic impetuosity which was his by nature. He was, however, soon to have his dearest wish fulfilled.

The first shot of the Revolution which overthrew the Manchu Dynasty was fired on October 10, 1911, at Wuchang, but the echo was heard immediately at Tokyo. The moment had come. Chiang together with Chang Chun, (Minister of Foreign Affairs 1935-37), and one other Chinese cadet asked for 48 hours leave of absence and went to Tokyo where they raised a few hundred dollars as passage money. They bought cheap civilian suits which they put on in order to elude the gendarmes, who had already received instructions to search for them as they had not returned to the barracks upon the expiration of their leave of absence. Shortly before they sailed for China, they returned their uniforms and swords in good condition by parcel post to their regiment headquarters.

CHAPTER II

Chiang In Danger—First Time Under Fire—Hangchow, Shanghai And Nanking Captured—Sun Yat-sen Provisional President—Resignation And Succession By Yuan Shih-kai—Chiang Retires To Japan—Yuan Obtains £25,000,000—The "Second Revolution"—Back Again To China—The "Second Revolution" Fails

THE return of Chiang Kai-shek and 120 other revolutionaries from Japan in October, 1911, was attended by considerable peril, the extent of which they could well imagine. They had simply to take their chance. It must be remembered that at this time the revolutionary movement had not gained any noteworthy success. In Shanghai, where these men landed, as it was a port of entry, a strict watch was kept for revolutionaries returning from overseas. Chiang and his comrades were metaphorically putting their heads within the lion's mouth.

Their activities in Tokyo were not unknown to the authorities. The latter had no very efficient intelligence service, but the presence of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and other leading revolutionaries in Japan, and the prevalence of anti-Manchu sentiment among the military cadets studying there, could not have been overlooked by the representatives of the Manchu Government in Tokyo. Therefore it may well have been that the name of Chiang Kai-shek figured upon the Government's black list, and if he had been apprehended on his return he would probably have received short shift.

But fortune favoured him. He and his comrades landed in safety. His first step was to get in touch with Chen Chi-mei,



Chiang Kai-shek: at the age of 18.

who was then secretly directing the movement against the Manchu regime in Shanghai. Chen had been favourably impressed by Chiang Kai-shek directly he met him, and Dr. Sun himself had recognized in Chiang one of the rising hopes of the Revolution. Consequently, Chen eagerly accepted the assistance that Chiang offered immediately upon his arrival from Japan.

In the meantime, Chen Chi-mei paid a visit to Hangchow. He believed that it would be advisable to establish a revolutionary base in that city. The plan was first to capture Hangchow and then to seize the arsenal at Shanghai. Once Shanghai was in the revolutionaries' hands, which was assured directly the arsenal fell, he proposed to send troops to occupy Soochow and other cities along the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, and finally to take Nanking. This scheme, however, did not commend itself to the revolutionaries in Hangchow and other Chekiang cities, who maintained that the first objective should be the capture of the Shanghai arsenal.

Chen consequently returned to Shanghai, and with Chiang, who had by this time virtually become Chief of Staff, worked out a new plan of attack upon the arsenal. Meanwhile, the imperial authorities were fully alive to their danger. The defences of the arsenal were strengthened, special police forces in addition to the garrison were stationed there, and a gunboat was moored in the river so that it could take part in the defence. Similar precautionary measures were taken at the forts at Woosung. The scrutiny of arrivals at the wharves and railway stations became stricter than ever. Surprise visits were paid to hotels in the hope of apprehending revolutionaries.

The alarm of the authorities increased as the revolutionary newspapers published in the International Settlement and the French Concession became more virulent in their demand for the overthrow of the Manchus. Almost pathetic efforts were made to enlist men to defend the arsenal, and to convince the merchants and gentry that they would best serve their interests by supporting the Government, but

these frantic efforts were made too late. The men from whom they had most to fear were already working determinedly and untiringly in their midst. In the Chinese phrase: How could a cup of water extinguish a cartful of firewood?

The plan eventually worked out by Chen Chi-mei and Chiang Kai-shek provided for simultaneous risings on November 3, 1911, at Shanghai and Hangchow, though it was later varied. Chen was to direct operations in Shanghai and Chiang in the capital of Chekiang. Chiang left at the end of October for Hangchow to make the final arrangements for the capture of the city. The revolutionaries were very poorly equipped for the task they had so gallantly set themselves. Fortunately the local merchants corps was in sympathy with the movement, and willingly supplied them with 4,000 rounds of ammunition.

It was decided that the dare-to-die corps was to open the attack, and the question arose of a suitable leader. Chiang at once volunteered for this perilous post, and led a force scarcely exceeding 100 men from the Fenghua Guild at 2 o'clock on the afternoon of November 4 to challenge the immensely numerically superior and better armed military forces which the Manchus kept stationed at and near Hangchow. Notwithstanding the heavy odds against them, the intrepid body of dare-to-dies, who were accompanied by two women revolutionaries, attacked the yamen of the Governor. They were armed with bombs which they used to such good effect that the guards speedily became demoralized and sought safety in flight. The yamen was set on fire and, shortly after, the whole city fell. Following up their victory, the revolutionaries captured the headquarters of the Manchu Banners the next morning and set up a Provisional Revolutionary Government.

Upon retrospect it seems almost incredible that a handful of even grimly determined men could achieve success against the appalling odds that they faced. Their success was of the utmost importance to the revolutionary cause, but of equal interest from the point of view of a biographer is the fact

that on this occasion Chiang was for the first time under fire. That is generally regarded as a crucial test for a military man, and he emerged from it with honour and distinction. In a book called "The Record of the Independence of Chekiang," the writer, Ku Nai-ping, described the fight in detail, and gave chief credit to Chiang Kai-shek for the overthrow of the old regime in Chekiang. Ku's presentation of a copy of the book to Chiang elicited from him a characteristic letter. In this Chiang made it clear that he did not covet honours for himself, and asked that in a future issue full justice should be done to other dare-to-dies who had taken part in the attack of whom no mention was made. He specially indicated several who, he thought, deserved honourable mention. This insistence that credit should be given to others is typical of the disinclination to monopolize laurels that he has exhibited on many occasions since.

A day earlier than the rising in Hangchow, Chen Chi-mei had raised the flag of revolt in Shanghai. In accordance with the plans that he had prepared with Chiang, the revolutionaries on the afternoon of November 3 set fire to the police headquarters in Chapei, adjoining the International Settlement, and soon after occupied them. White flags were immediately hoisted on sub-police stations, and a band of some 100 dare-to-dies then forced their way into the walled city. Overcoming all resistance, they took possession of the gates, and at 6 o'clock the magistrate's *yamen* was in their hands. At the same time a fearless band of 50 of these men endeavoured to force their way into the arsenal when the main gate was opened to enable the day shift to leave, but the guards greeted them with a deadly volley which killed eight, including the leader. Nothing daunted they renewed their attack on the well defended stronghold and were again repulsed. In the meantime the *taotai's yamen* had been occupied by other small detachments of the revolutionaries who soon after took the *shoufu's yamen*, the local military office.

The arsenal, however, still remained in the hands of the defenders, and until it was captured further progress was impossible. As it appeared to be doubtful whether it could be carried by assault, Chen Chi-mei decided to try the power of persuasion. Unaccompanied, he entered the arsenal and urged the guards to join the revolutionary cause. They not only declined to listen to his appeal, but trussed him with steel wires to a chair, to be later handed over to the higher authorities for punishment. News of the fate that had overtaken their leader soon spread among the revolutionaries, and they immediately renewed their attempts to take the arsenal by storm and effect his rescue. All through the night they made attack after attack. At dawn the defenders ceased their fire and withdrew, and the revolutionaries triumphantly entered the arsenal and released their leader. The forts at Woosung fell a few hours later.

To return to Hangchow. When the Provisional Government was being formed, a high post was offered to Chiang Kai-shek. This he declined, because he felt that it was his duty to rejoin his chief, Chen Chi-mei, in Shanghai. But the Chekiang officers who had espoused the revolutionary cause, though they had declined to join the dare-to-die corps, reaped an immediate reward. Thus General Chu Jui (who was prominent in the capture of Nanking, November 30—December 2, 1911) became *tutuh* of Chekiang, Ku Nai-ping, Defence Commissioner, Hsia Chao, Police Commissioner of Chekiang and Chou Feng-chi and Tung Pao-hsuan, divisional commanders.

Upon his return to Shanghai, Chiang was made a regiment commander by Chen Chi-mei, who had become *tutuh* of the Shanghai Army, and entrusted with the task of training the troops that would be required to carry on the next stage of the Revolution. The recruits whom Chiang was to train were not promising. Success for the revolutionary cause was not thought possible except by the ardent leaders. Money, moreover, though not entirely lacking, was none too plentiful. For these reasons the inducements that could be offered were not

sufficient to attract to the revolutionary ranks, many men either of high character or good physique, and it was extremely difficult in the circumstances to inspire those who were recruited with a sense of discipline. Nevertheless, with the spirit that enabled Cromwell to forge his Ironsides into the irresistible force that—in Macaulay's words—"marched to battle with the precision of machines," Chiang welded a conglomeration of rowdies, loafers and riffraff into a regiment that gave a good account of itself.

Money was a serious problem in those days. Chen said at a meeting called on December 2 to consider financial matters: "The Minchun or People's Army has adopted 'blood and iron' as its slogan. I can supply blood, but I hope that you will find means of supplying the iron." By iron, of course, was meant finance. Chiang eloquently supported his chief, and the meeting appointed Chang Ching-kiang, popularly known as the crippled statesman, and Huang Fu to head an organization to provide finances. It was from this source that the funds were obtained for the recruiting and training of three battalions, a task which was undertaken by Chiang.

The barrack-yard duties which fell to Chiang's lot at this period, were far from fully taking up his time. He was still a young man of 24, but he occupied himself in organizing the Tungchihui, a kind of mutual aid or co-operative society, to obtain funds for military purposes, to look after the supply and transport of food and ammunition. This is interesting, as it shows that even as a young officer he had thoroughly grasped the truth of the dictum attributed to Napoleon that an army moves on its stomach.

While these volumes do not purport to be a history of the Revolution, it is necessary that some reference should be made to the main events which followed the outbreak at Wuchang on October 10 in order to understand the movements of Chiang. Moreover it is desirable at this stage to explain references which will be made hereafter to the second and

third "revolution." The Occidental regards a revolution as being what the name implies, a complete turn. The Chinese, however, consider that the overthrow of the Manchus did not complete the Revolution. Although, for reasons of expediency, Yuan Shih-kai was made President of the Chinese Republic, it was recognized from the outset that he did not represent republican ideals, and until the reactionary elements of whom he was representative were finally overthrown, it would be impossible to say that the Revolution was at an end. Consequently they do not regard the risings against Yuan Shih-kai as rebellions, but as legitimate efforts to complete the Revolution. This may help to enable the foreign reader to understand allusions to a succession of revolutions that would possibly otherwise be puzzling.

After the capture of Hangchow and Shanghai, an attack was made upon Nanking on November 30, and, despite a determined resistance by the garrison, that city fell into revolutionary hands on December 2. A Provisional Parliament was convened and its first act on December 29 was to offer the Provisional Presidency of the Republic to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who was abroad when the Revolution was started. He returned to China on Christmas Day, and Chiang was among those who welcomed him when he landed at Shanghai.

By a coincidence, on the evening of his arrival, the church bells in Shanghai were ringing out Christmas peals. It was almost as if they were welcoming back the man who was primarily responsible for the deliverance of his country from the yoke which it had endured for so long. On New Year's Day, 1912, he was solemnly inaugurated at Nanking as Provisional President of China amid the greatest possible enthusiasm. Cannon were fired, fireworks displayed, and long and ornate lantern processions traversed the streets.

Although Nanking was ablaze with illuminations, and New China abandoned itself to a delirium of joy, the revolutionary leaders were under no illusion in regard to the difficulties that lay ahead. The Provisional Government was short of money and munitions, and its forces were in no shape

to engage in major military operations. This was well-known to Yuan Shih-kai, who had been recalled by the Manchus upon the outbreak of the Revolution. He sent a well-equipped and disciplined army to retake Hanyang and Hankow, and this was accomplished without much difficulty, but he refrained from following up his advantage. Yuan, in point of fact, had no great cause to love the Manchus. He had been dismissed in disgrace when they thought that they could do without him, and was only recalled when it was felt that he alone could save the situation.

When Yuan received the command to go to Peking, he at first refused to comply. Eventually he agreed to go if funds were provided wherewith to carry on military operations, and he telegraphed to Tong Shao-yi (then in Peking trying to negotiate a loan with Belgian bankers) asking if funds were available. Tong optimistically replied in the affirmative, being convinced that the loan would be forthcoming. It failed to materialize, and when Yuan arrived he soon discovered that there were no funds. He eventually appealed to the Manchus to contribute their treasures to the cause of their salvation. They refused, and Yuan then sent Tong Shao-yi to Shanghai for a peace conference. Tong, as he travelled down the Yangtze, seeing the hold that the Revolution had on the people eventually sided with the revolutionaries. Though Yuan repudiated him, he instructed Tong to negotiate with Dr. Wu Ting-fang. Not till then did Yuan decide that the Manchus were not worth saving.

Instead of crushing the revolutionaries, Yuan's Armies became militarily inactive. He reported to the Throne that the republican forces were unexpectedly strong and that there was no course open but to compromise. In the circumstances it was essential, he advised, that the young Emperor should abdicate in favour of the Republic, otherwise the gravest misfortunes would overtake the nation. The Throne, after protracted discussion, accepted this far from disinterested advice, and the Abdication Edict issued on February 12, 1912, empowered Yuan to form a republican government. Being

sincerely desirous of restoring domestic peace, and having accomplished his main life-object, the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, though he had little or no trust in Yuan Shih-kai, tendered his resignation to Parliament two days after the edict of abdication was issued and recommended that Yuan should succeed him.

With considerable misgiving, the Provisional Parliament accepted Dr. Sun's resignation, and entrusted the future of the Republic to the hands of Yuan Shih-kai. When this arrangement was made the whole of China appeared on the surface to have adopted the republican form of government. The Tungmenghui, the revolutionary society which under Dr. Sun Yat-sen had been responsible for the overthrow of the monarchy, was at once given a new name--the Kuomintang, or People's Party. The change was necessary, as the former name was too narrow in its meaning to meet the needs of a national party.

When Yuan became Provisional President, he immediately ordered the reorganization of all the revolutionary troops, and new commanders, chosen by Yuan himself, were appointed to replace those who had been trained in Japan and others who were ardent republicans. Chiang anticipated this move, and having moreover no desire to serve under the Yuan regime, resigned his command. He retired from the political scene, as one writer poetically put it, "as the morning star into the clouds." For the moment it looked as though the Revolution, while it had succeeded in overturning the Manchu Dynasty, had merely changed one reactionary regime for another. Foreseeing that the struggle for freedom would soon have to be resumed, Chiang returned to Japan for higher military education and to await the summons that he was sure would come.

During his twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth year Chiang published a military science magazine and wrote articles which were not only remarkable for their number, but for their wide scope. He discussed military matters with

authority, but he also wrote soundly on China's international relations, boundary affairs, and politics. A collection of his articles was published subsequently in a volume entitled "Self-Examination Records." In the preface he referred laconically to a passage in the works of Mencius in which the philosopher Tseng is reported to have said: "If, on self-examination, I find that I am not upright, shall I not be in fear even of a poor man in his loose garments of hair-cloth? If, on self-examination, I find that I am upright, I will go forward against thousands and tens of thousands."

Though the temptation to quote at length from these early writings is great, it has had to be resisted in view of the necessity of keeping the volumes within the bounds originally contemplated. But these articles are important in that they show that Chiang, even while he was a junior military officer, was able to foresee the problems which were shortly to arise. They also show that he had a very fair knowledge of China's relations with foreign Powers, and realized that the retention of Tibet, Mongolia, and Manchuria would call for the most consummate diplomacy on the part of China. There was much talk at this time of a military adjustment after the Revolution, which to many people meant only the disbandment of troops. That was admittedly a serious problem. It is comparatively easy, provided rifles and ammunition are available, to create armies, but it is not so easy to reverse the process and absorb the fighting men into the civil population. Chiang quite realized this, and he gave due consideration to the expedients proposed—disbandment, maintenance of the armies at their existing strength, the transfer of troops to the border lands, or the employment of the soldiers for development purposes.

Consideration of these expedients, he contended, should be deferred pending the adoption of a fundamental national policy. Until that had been decided, it was impossible to determine the size of the Army that the country required, or to order its distribution. The size of the Army was not the only point to be considered. National defence was all

embracing. It included both the power of offence and defence, national and local security, and both naval and military arms. Naval defence was important because the South-east was vulnerable by sea, while in the North-west and the North itself land operations had to be taken into consideration.

In a penetrating analysis he dismissed the British menace to Tibet as not sufficiently grave to demand immediate consideration. But Russian designs upon Mongolia and those of Japan upon Manchuria could not be disregarded. There was, for the present at all events, little danger of invasion from the sea, and it would be well, therefore, to confine attention to the defence of the North-west. In brief, he concluded that Great Britain was not the potential enemy, and that Russia and Japan were the possible foes. Hence he proposed that the minimum force that China should maintain should be eight divisions stationed in Manchuria, eight in Mongolia, three in Sinkiang, and three in Tibet. For the North-east five cavalry brigades would be required, making a grand total of 250,000 men. For offence this strength would not be adequate, but for defence it would be sufficient. After estimating the requirements of provinces in Central and South China, he arrived at a total of 600,000 men as the minimum military strength necessary for the defence of China.

In his view, which was supported by references to the fact that a defeated country has in reality to pay for the formation and upkeep of the troops by which it was defeated, it was obviously necessary, in fact a duty, to expend money on national defence. Such expenditure was in the nature of an insurance premium for the protection of the national honour and property. If military expenditure were regarded in that light, it was justified.

At the same time, it had to be remembered that the national resources had limits. Chiang suggested that one third, or perhaps even one half of the national revenue should be devoted to defence purposes, but he was strongly opposed to such expenditure being in excess of 50 per cent. It would be impossible, with the existing financial limitations,

to develop the Navy and Army simultaneously. If that were done neither arm would be powerful in a decade's time, but if attention were concentrated upon the Army it would become strong enough to hold the forts along the coast and prevent a hostile landing. If the whole of the sum available for military purposes were expended on the land forces, in ten years China would have an army whose efficiency and fighting strength would be equal to that of any in the world. He did not propose to abolish the Navy, but to maintain it as it then stood without increasing its strength.

One of the most important recommendations that he made in his articles was in connection with the powers of a *tutuh*,—as the head of a province was styled at that time. With almost uncanny foresight, he dwelt upon the grave danger of continuing to permit a *tutuh* to hold concurrently civil responsibility and command of provincial forces. Were this to be perpetuated, each province would tend to become an independent state with the *tutuh* as President. He pointed out that, even in a country like the United States of America, where democracy held full sway, military power was not given to the Governor of a State. The danger of aggression from without in which China stood made it imperative that military power should be concentrated in the hands of the Central Government. Otherwise, if provincial Governors were given control of troops, there would be a succession of domestic disturbances resulting from their ambitions, which would cause great distress to the people, and endanger the country.

The plan which he proposed was based upon that adopted by the United States of dividing the country into military districts, irrespective of State boundaries, and placing each of them under the control of a high Federal officer. The troops stationed in military districts to be created in China would be directly under the control of the national Ministry for War. A genuinely national spirit would be developed in the troops when they were no longer under the control and direction of provincial chiefs. The unification of training and weapons could much more speedily be brought about, and the

tutuh could devote his whole time to the duties of civil administration. In Chiang's opinion, the unification of the Army was an utter impossibility if the system were continued of encouraging the *tutuh*s to consider the troops as private armies.

The policy of dissociating the head of a provincial administration entirely from military matters has not yet been quite put into practice throughout the country, but the situation is infinitely better now than it had been. Few would deny that most of the internal disturbances that have convulsed China in past years—and which incidentally so weakened her that she was exposed to relentless pressure by a powerful neighbour—have been due to the military character of the provincial administrations, which encouraged the establishment of satrapies practically independent of the Central Government.

The advice given by Chiang nearly a quarter of a century ago might well have been followed and China saved from years of sorrow and distress. Still, as we have said, the situation is infinitely better than it was, and it may be supposed that his writings had some influence in convincing the public that the subsequent clipping of the warlords' wings in which Chiang took a prominent part, was necessary.

Many foreigners, who possessed knowledge of China's military and financial weakness when Japan began to bring heavy pressure upon the National Government in 1932 and succeeding years, are inclined to believe that his greatest service to his country was his refusal during those anxious years to be hurried into hasty and ill-considered, and, probably, fatal action. It is of interest to observe that, even as a young man, he was prepared to take an unpopular attitude if it were justified by reason.

After the Revolution, Mongolia declared a qualified sort of independence, and there was a demand among some sections of the Chinese people that it should be subjugated by force of arms. Chiang looked at the question from a commonsense point of view, and took issue with these enthusiasts. He

invited those who had demanded the subjugation of Outer Mongolia to explain whether they had considered that this meant nothing less than war against Russia.

The advocates of the subjugation of Outer Mongolia, he pointed out, had offered no suggestions in regard to preparation, communications, distances, strength of military units required, provisions, arms, probable fields of battle, climate, public opinion, and all the other factors connected with the conduct of a military campaign. They demanded war, but never gave a single thought to the manner in which it should be conducted, nor to the preparation that was necessary if it were to have the slightest prospect of success. It was an unwise assumption that because eight years previously Japan had defeated Russia, the Chinese could be equally successful.

With uncompromising candour, he said that the Chinese were quite ready to believe that Russia was weak and proud, but they did not realize that they themselves were conceited and weak and unprepared. If matters came to an issue, Russian units on the borders could easily be mobilized and moved directly war was declared. With China it was quite different. From Peking to Urga was 3,300 *li* (roughly about 1,000 miles) and transport facilities were poor in the extreme. Supply of food, ammunition, and reinforcements would be slow.

Then he contrasted the main force of China and Russia. The peace strength of the Russian Army was 1,150,000, and on a war footing it was 2,300,000, while in China the total effective force was only 400,000, and of these only 30,000 were in or around Inner Mongolia. In every respect China was inferior, and if she went to war she would be certain of defeat.

Considerable courage was required to tell his countrymen these unpalatable truths, and they were especially unwelcome to the military caste, who, as he declared unequivocally, were blinded by their conceit. The advice that he gave the nation was undoubtedly sound. It would avail nothing, he said in effect, to put faith in military prowess which did not exist except in imagination, but time could be gained by fighting

delaying actions on diplomatic battlefields. Success was dependent upon complete preparedness.

Here then we find a junior military officer outlining a fundamental foreign policy for his country, warning it against entering upon adventures when there was a strong element of doubt as to the outcome and indicating the correct size and disposition of the National Army—in a word essaying the advisory role of an Elder Statesman.

The most amazing thing is that, although he may have made mistakes of omission and commission, the unrolling of the scroll of time has shown that his vision was clear and his judgment sound. The march of the years has placed him in a position to put his theories into practice, and this he is able to do without subjecting them to much modification.

Before passing on to the period in which Chiang became involved in the "second revolution" of 1913, a further reference may be made to his mother. While he was training troops in Shanghai he was anxious that she should join him, as he thought that he could make her more comfortable than at Chikow. Only after repeated persuasions could she be induced to take the trip, and when she did go it was only for a short visit of ten days.

Before his mother left on the return journey, she abjured him to be increasingly diligent in serving the country and never to blemish the accumulated virtues of his ancestors. After her return home she continued her simple mode of life, and never gave any indication by word or deed that her status had in any way altered because her son had already begun to ascend the ladder of success.

Leaving Chiang further to study in Tokyo, some attention must be given to the contemporaneous development of events in China. It has already been suggested that the elevation of Yuan Shih-kai to the presidency in the stead of Dr. Sun Yat-sen was considered by many to be a false step. The fear was freely expressed that the fruits of the Revolution would be plucked by unsympathetic hands, and that the lot of the people

would be in no wise bettered. When he first became President, Yuan was in no position to defy popular opinion. In fact it is not overstating the case to say that he was in almost as precarious a state as that in which the revolutionists found themselves. Yuan, however, had one invaluable asset in the loyalty of such powerful military leaders as Tuan Chi-jui and Feng Kuo-chang. Equally valuable, though less tangible, was the belief generally held by foreigners, even by the diplomatic corps, that Yuan was the "strong man" who could bring order out of chaos. This belief, which had its excuse if not its justification, in the fact that Yuan was undoubtedly a shrewd and accomplished administrator, was exploited to gain for Yuan the financial backing in which he was deficient and to which extended reference will be made later.

Some of the methods adopted by Yuan to consolidate his position have already been touched upon—such as the replacement of revolutionary commanders by men who were known to be personally loyal to him. In times of national upheaval, control of the Army is all-important, and this Yuan, as has been recorded, took immediate and effective measures to gain. Another important step taken to maintain himself in power was the conclusion of an enormous international loan which provided him with adequate sinews of war.

An international Consortium had been organized to control foreign loans to China. Theoretically, the Consortium was to act as a kind of well-disposed financial guardian to China, and prevent her from borrowing money except for development purposes. The Consortium was also designed to prevent any loans being made to China by private foreign agencies without the consent of the Powers concerned, which at one time consisted of six, namely, the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Japan. The terms upon which a loan was to be granted, however, were so onerous that the then President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, declared that the American financial group would receive no national support as the terms proposed seemed "to touch nearly on the independence of

China." The American group consequently withdrew. In theory the intentions of the Consortium were excellent—it would "save China from herself," declared one of its perfervid supporters. In practice, however, it proved to be a powerful check to the development of republicanism in China as was shown by the subsequent events.

A Parliament, in which the Kuomintang possessed a majority, met in Peking in January, 1913. Sung Chiao-jen, one of the leaders of the Party, had strongly advocated a Party cabinet and after the election he toured Hunan, Anhwei and Kiangsu speaking in support of his views. Yuan was strongly opposed to the organization of a Party cabinet, as this would considerably curtail his own power. It was common knowledge that the Kuomintang intended to propose Sung for the post of Premier, and in consequence he became a marked man—marked for destruction. On March 21, he went to the Shanghai railway station, actually to proceed to Peking as the Kuomintang candidate for the Premiership and was there fatally wounded by an assassin, passing away the following day. The murderer was arrested two days after Sung's death, and in the house in which he had been staying was found evidence in the form of telegrams from Peking which involved Yuan.

This political murder created deep indignation, especially in the South. Dr. Sun on April 9 sent the following denunciatory telegram to Yuan Shih-kai: "You are betraying the country. I must oppose you in the same way as I did the Ching Dynasty." Unperturbed, Yuan went on with his negotiations with the Consortium for a loan—called with subtle, if unintended, humour, the Reorganization Loan. The agreement was finally signed on April 26. The loan was successfully floated in six capitals on May 21 and Yuan was placed in possession of £25,000,000. The Provisional Constitution, which he had sworn to support, made the legality of a loan conditional upon the assent of Parliament being obtained.

The foreign Governments knew this, but they were so convinced that only a "strong" Central Government could

save China, and that only Yuan could successfully head such a government, that they winked at the flagrant illegality and violation of principle involved, and professed to believe that the proceeds of the loan were to be used for economic development. In reality the money was mainly devoted to the upbuilding of Yuan's personal Army and the furthering of the dynastic ambitions, which he had already been persuaded to entertain. Increased purchases of arms and munitions were made from abroad, and Yuan strengthened his relationship with some of the provincial military leaders by giving them a portion of the proceeds of the loan—in plain English by distributing bribes.

Strong protests against the conclusion of the loan were made by Li Lieh-chun, *tutuh* of Kiangsi, Po Wen-hui, *tutuh* of Anhwei, and Hu Han-min who held a similar position in Kwangtung. In June, Yuan, having previously moved bodies of his troops to various strategic points throughout the country, contrary to his agreement with the revolutionary leaders, retorted by issuing a mandate dismissing the three *tutuh*s from office. The challenge was promptly accepted.

Declarations of independence swiftly followed. Li Lieh-chun, having attacked Yuan Shih-kai's troops as they advanced into Kiangsi Province in defiance of warnings, declared independence in that province on July 12, Huang Hsing in Nanking on July 15, Po Wen-hui in Anhwei on July 17, Chen Chiung-ming in Kwangtung the following day, and on July 20 Hsu Chung-chih and Sun Tao-jen in Fukien and Tan Yen-kai in Hunan, joined the independence movement. This was the beginning of the "second revolution."

At this time Chiang Kai-shek was making preparations to go to Germany to complete his military education. He abandoned these preparations immediately he heard that the gage of battle had been thrown down to Yuan, and hurried to Shanghai where Chen Chi-mei was directing matters. Shanghai was held by Yuan's troops. Once again Chiang, in the capacity of a staff officer, collaborated with Chen in

working out plans for the capture of the arsenal. On this occasion they had the advantage of intimate personal knowledge of the interior lay-out of the fortification, and the points where an attack could be launched with most prospect of success.

In accordance with these plans, Chen Chi-mei, who had declared the independence of Shanghai, on July 22 ordered the revolutionary troops which had been assembled at Lunghua, to advance upon the arsenal. But Yuan's forces were on the alert. Heavy fighting went on during the afternoon, and after sunset a searchlight from the gunboat Haichuan, which was moored in the river opposite the arsenal, enabled the defenders to repulse the attackers. Eventually the searchlight was put out of action, but repeated attacks upon the arsenal were beaten off.

Fighting was continued until the evening of the 29th when a last desperate attack from three points was made upon the arsenal by the revolutionary troops. The defenders, however, greatly outnumbered the attackers, and the former, moreover, were aided by the fire of the gunboats in the river. The revolutionaries retreated, defeated but not disgraced. With the failure of this last attack, the "second revolution" was at an end as far as Shanghai was concerned.

Although the cause that he espoused had suffered eclipse, Chiang's personal reputation had been enhanced by these events. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in particular, was greatly impressed by his courage and perseverance and unquenchable passion for truth, and declared that the good opinion of him that he had formed in Japan had been more than confirmed. On his part, Chiang felt increased respect, even reverence, for the man who had devoted his life to the people, and who was still struggling against immense odds to free them from the rule of the reactionaries.

From this time may be dated the close friendship between the two men, which later had a distinct bearing on the course of events. The reliance that the veteran revolutionary felt in his young colleague did not pass unobserved, and it may be

concluded that from this period also dated the jealousy of his associates towards Chiang Kai-shek, which in later days obstructed his efforts on behalf of the nation. At all events, companions in misfortune, disappointed but with an undiminished belief that a brighter day would dawn, the two friends sought refuge in Japan.

CHAPTER III

Dissolution Of Kuomintang And Hamstringing Of Parliament—Steps Towards Dictatorship—Chiang In Manchuria—Another Attack On The Arsenal—The “Third Revolution”—Death Of Yuan Shih-kai—Reign Of Warlords—Dr. Sun’s Canton Government—Intrigues Of Kwangsi Clique—Chiang Returns To Shanghai

THE collapse of the “second revolution” strengthened Yuan Shih-kai’s hands in every way. He represented the *de facto*, and as far as the foreign Powers were concerned, the *de jure*, government of the country. Possibly, if he had, even from this time, shown a disposition to work with, instead of against, those who were republicans by principle as well as by profession, he might have lived and died an honoured leader of the nation. Yuan’s character forbade this to be. After he had suppressed the “second revolution” by military means, he began to root out his civil opponents.

As the majority of members of Parliament still belonged to the Kuomintang, he issued, on the night of November 4, 1913, three long mandates, countersigned by the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior, in which he ordered the immediate dissolution of the Kuomintang throughout the country, reciting the documentary evidence which, he pleaded, justified him in regarding the Kuomintang as a seditious organization, and instructed the Minister of the Interior to deprive all members of Parliament who had not dissociated themselves from the Kuomintang before the outbreak in July of their election certificates and badges.

It is noteworthy that it was not until after he had used the Kuomintang majority in Parliament to elect him President

under his own Constitution—or part of it—to give him a semblance of constitutional right to occupy the Presidential position, that Yuan belatedly recalled the seditious actions of the Kuomintang. In fact the delay was due to the time that it took the “Temple of Heaven” sittings to prepare the election section of the Constitution.

Thus Yuan had dissolved the Kuomintang, the main opposition party, and had torpedoed Parliament. The Presidential Mandate, however, conveyed no hint that Parliament was abolished—it only suspended Kuomintang members from exercising their parliamentary functions. The result, however, was the same. The suspension of the Kuomintang members made it impossible for a quorum to be obtained, Parliament ceased to be a working organ, and in a few months painlessly slipped out of existence.

Both military and civil obstacles having been removed, Yuan proceeded more openly to the restoration of autocracy. The first step was the creation, early in 1914, of the Chengchihhui-i, or Political Council, the members of which were appointed by Yuan himself. This body was to act in an advisory capacity to the President. It immediately recommended the summoning of an elected assembly, which it considered could give a colour of constitutionalism to the acts of the President.

In compliance with this advice, another body, called the Yofahui-i, or Constitutional Council, was organized with a membership of 56. Four of these were elected in Peking, two in each province, eight by Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang and four by Chambers of Commerce. The duty of this body, that is to say, the purpose for which it was created, was to enable Yuan to exercise autocratic control behind a facade of constitutionalism. It quickly produced what was called the Constitutional Pact, or amended Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, supplanting the Provisional Constitution adopted by the Nanking Parliament.

This provided for an elected house of legislature, the Lifayuan, and for a Council of State, the Tsanchengyuan.

The latter body was appointed by Yuan, and it was provided that until the Lifayuan was functioning it was to combine legislative duties with its advisory functions. It may be mentioned that for months past the Monarchy Movement had been developing. It began when an academic discussion, based upon the emasculated Goodnow Memorandum, was started regarding the relative merits of the Monarchical or Republican form of government. These discussions were at first of the nature of private polemics, but the formation of the Chouanhui in the summer of 1915 (referred to later) brought the matter to public attention.

The crumbling of the Republic had been watched with horror and dismay by the authentic revolutionaries. The failure of the "second revolution" had necessitated the withdrawal to Japan of the more prominent of these men, including Dr. Sun, General Huang Hsing, Chen Chi-mei and Chiang Kai-shek. The Kuomintang was for the time being paralyzed. The leaders were political refugees with scanty means and uncertain prospects, but they did not despair. They felt that the vast majority of the people of China was on their side, and they sensibly began to investigate the causes of the failure of the "second revolution."

Chen Chi-mei firmly held the view that they had failed because they had confined their attention to the South. In his opinion, revolutionary foundations should be laid in the Northeast of China, and particular attention should be paid to Peking, the hot-bed of reaction. If this were not done, and all the emphasis should again be laid upon the South to the exclusion of the North, the sole result, he concluded, would be another failure and the same weary path would have to be trodden over again.

Counsels of this kind could not have been altogether palatable, but their cogency was indisputable. Moreover, Chen Chi-mei pointed out that Yuan Shih-kai had stationed troops loyal to him in every strategic point in the South. (This was, in fact, what provoked the "second revolution" referred to in the previous chapter.) After Chen's proposals had been

thoroughly discussed by the leaders, of whom Chiang was now one by general consent, Chen and Tai Chi-tao were sent to Dairen by Dr. Sun to establish revolutionary organs and arrange for simultaneous action when the opportunity arose. They did some useful groundwork, but the watchfulness of Yuan's military intelligence agents made their task difficult, and they had to be content with comparatively meagre results. They returned to Tokyo after spending six months in Dairen.

The position in Manchuria, a little later, became more favourable for the revolutionaries, and the Kuomintang agents there reported that two commanders of troops were anxious for Chen Chi-mei to proceed thither to head a rising. Chen was unable to go, but, as it was evident that the situation required the despatch of some responsible leaders, in June, 1914, he asked Chiang and Ting Kung-liang to go to Harbin, Tsitsihar and other cities in Heilungkiang to gain first hand knowledge of the conditions.

There was a large element of danger to Chiang in a mission of this kind. He spoke only indifferent Mandarin, and had no personal knowledge of Manchuria. Furthermore, the authorities in the North-eastern Provinces had been warned to keep a vigilant lookout for revolutionaries. Another deterrent was the fact that at this time Russia was well-disposed towards Yuan Shih-kai on account of the concessions that he had made in regard to Outer Mongolia. Russia had complete control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and Heilungkiang Province was to all intents and purposes a Russian sphere of influence.

The perils of the mission only served to make it more attractive to Chiang. He eagerly embraced the opportunity to further the revolutionary cause in a region in which it had made little headway. Although well knowing that a false step would mean death, he and his companion visited all important points in Heilungkiang, and discussed plans with those who were in favour of an immediate uprising. Chiang, however, having thoroughly studied the problem, reluctantly came to the con-

clusion that an uprising at that time would have no prospect of success.

The mission returned to Tokyo, and Chiang submitted a comprehensive report on the situation in Manchuria. It was arranged that he should stay in Tokyo to attend to unfinished business while Chen Chi-mei returned to Shanghai. Chiang saw him off at Yokohama, and said when bidding him farewell: "If you should meet with mishap at the hands of Yuan, I shall live to carry out your aspirations."

Prospects at Shanghai were not unduly inviting. The Defence Commissioner, Cheng Ju-cheng, was an alert and capable officer, and as he had served previously in the Navy, he was reasonably sure of the loyalty of the warships if another rising were attempted. The Revolutionary Party decided that it was essential that Cheng should be removed, and his assassination was decided upon. Three points had to be settled, the human instruments to be used, the time and the place. Selection of the men to carry out the sentence of death which had been passed, presented but little difficulty. Among the dare-to-dies were men whose revolutionary ardour was fanatical, and who were, moreover, thoroughly efficient marksmen. Ten of these were selected and provided with bombs and revolvers.

It became known that the Defence Commissioner of Shanghai, as the highest local Chinese official, would attend a reception at the Japanese Consulate-General on November 10, 1915, in honour of the Japanese Emperor. Cheng, who perhaps had received some warning of the plot, travelled down river as far as the Hankow Road jetty in the International Settlement by steamer instead of by road, and thus evaded eight of the dare-to-dies who had been awaiting him at points suitable for the purpose in view.

But from the Hankow Road jetty to the Japanese Consulate-General, he had to proceed by motor car and cross over the Garden Bridge. On the bridge two of the most intrepid dare-to-dies had been stationed. They, though unrelated, both

had the family name of Wang. If Cheng had passed these two in safety the plot would have failed. But the heavy traffic over the bridge led to a block. Wang Ming-shan threw a bomb at Cheng's car. He missed his aim, and immediately the crowd scattered in terror. He then threw another bomb which killed Cheng's chauffeur. Simultaneously his comrade, Wang Hua-feng, fired ten shots at Cheng, killing him instantaneously. No attempt was made by the assassins to escape. They handed themselves over to the police, and declared that their action was thoroughly justified, as Yuan had attempted to subvert the Revolution, and Cheng was one of his aides.

This affair caused the greatest apprehension to Yuan Shih-kai. He quite realized the importance of Shanghai as a focal point, and had selected Cheng as Defence Commissioner largely because he could be relied upon to keep the Navy loyal. Yang Shan-teh, who took Cheng's place, had neither the ability nor the influence of his predecessor. Chiang urged that advantage should be taken of this, and an attempt made to gain the support of the warships in the Whangpoo. His advice was followed.

The commander of the cruiser Chaoho, Captain Huang Ming-shu, was won over to the revolutionary cause, but the other commanders remained loyal to Yuan. On December 5 the Chaoho hoisted the revolutionary colours and opened fire on the arsenal. The other warships immediately began to shell the Chaoho, and although she fought gallantly and the unequal fight was kept up until the following morning, at last the Chaoho was compelled to withdraw.

In the meantime, Chen Chi-mei, directly the Chaoho had opened fire on the arsenal, led his followers, among whom were Chiang Kai-shek, Wu Chung-hsin, Hsu Lang-hsi and Ting Ching-liang, to Nantao, in the belief that land operations in conjunction with the naval attack would prove irresistible. He was painfully disappointed. Yuan's forces were prepared at every point, and the revolutionaries were compelled to retire and disperse. The headquarters of the revolutionaries in the French Concession were raided by the French police.

Altogether 20 persons were killed in the desultory fighting that accompanied the attempt to disprove the adage that divine aid is given to the big battalions.

The last incident in which Chiang took a personal part while Yuan was still in power was the daring capture of the Kiangyin fortress on the southern bank of the Yangtze River between Shanghai and Nanking. In the spring of 1916, Chiang, with the assistance of Yang Hu—who is now in command of the Shanghai-Woosung Garrison—attacked and captured the fort with the object of making it a base for operations in the Yangtze Valley. Five days after the capture of the fortress a mutiny broke out among the troops. Although all his associates made their escape as best they could, Chiang remained firm. At midnight, however, two soldiers prevailed upon him to leave, and with their help he got clear away from the fortress and returned to Shanghai.

Dr. Sun became convinced that these successive failures were chiefly due to the imperfect organization of the Kuomintang. It was abundantly clear that the intelligence department did its work poorly, and there was no central control. He consulted Chen Chi-mei and Chiang Kai-shek and decided upon a basis of organization, which included swearing an oath of fealty to himself, that, it was believed, would eventually enable the Kuomintang to prevail against Yuan. To perfect the organization, Dr. Sun toured the South, delivering addresses and infusing a new spirit into the Kuomintang in the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan. Hu Han-min was appointed Chief Secretary of the Party and Liao Chung-kai Financial Agent, while Chen Chi-mei served as Chairman of the Executive Committee with Chiang Kai-shek assisting him.

At this time occurred an event which, for a time, almost prostrated Chiang. Between Chiang and Chen Chi-mei had developed a friendship which verged upon that love:

“—most wonderful 'twixt man and maid,
But Christ-like, more divine, 'twixt man and man.”

Their affection was based on mutual admiration for each other's qualities. They had on several occasions felt the shadow of death pass over them, and each had observed that the other did not flinch. Like the knights of old, ere chivalry was dead, they "shared purse and borrowed blade." The wonderful friendship between the veteran revolutionary and his youthful supporter was to be summarily ended.

For a long time Chen Chi-mei had been a thorn in the side of the supporters of Yuan. They apparently feared him much more than they did Dr. Sun Yat-sen, holding that the latter was a visionary, while Chen, as they knew to their cost, was a man of action. Consequently, they secretly plotted Chen's removal, but he had devoted bodyguards, and it was difficult to devise a plan whereby the assassins could get an opportunity to carry out their murderous plan. This difficulty was solved by turning to account Chen's zeal for the Revolution.

One reason for the successive failures of Kuomintang risings was that the Party suffered chronically from a lack of funds. Contributions came both from within China and from the Chinese overseas, but in the nature of things these contributions had to pass through secret channels, and were made available intermittently and not in sufficient volume to finance any major undertaking. They had insufficient financial backing, and the revolutionaries were slow to learn the lesson that enthusiasm and courage can seldom, if ever, compensate for an empty war-chest.

Yuan's military intelligence agents contrived that a suggestion should be made to Chen Chi-mei that a considerable addition to the revolutionary funds could be secured provided Chen would arrange a loan with a mine as security. If Chen could obtain the loan from a Japanese firm, he was told, 40 per cent. of the proceeds would be donated to the cause. Suspecting that there was a sinister plot behind this seemingly innocent proposal, Chiang did his utmost to persuade Chen to have no personal association with the business. But Yuan's agents adroitly placed negotiations in the hands of

Li Hai-chiu, a member of the Kuomintang, whom they had bribed to further their plans.

Not suspecting that Li was a traitor, Chen Chi-mei, after Li had eloquently represented the advantages that would accrue to the revolutionary cause if these funds could be secured, agreed to make arrangements with the Japanese financiers. As a preliminary, Li said that he would prepare an agreement, and, with representatives of the mining company, bring it to Chen Chi-mei on May 18 to be formally signed. On the day fixed, Li with four men who were supposed to represent the mining company, but who were actually the deputed assassins, went to the house of a Japanese friend, where they were to meet. After some preliminary conversation between Chen and Li, the latter, on the pretext that he had forgotten to bring in the agreement, opened the door, and as he passed out two of the assassins shot down Chen Chi-mei in cold blood.

When this crime bereft the Kuomintang of one of its most energetic and competent leaders, Dr. Sun was in Japan, and Chiang, grief-stricken though he was, had to take up the burden of leadership. As soon as possible Dr. Sun returned to Shanghai, and from this time on Chiang became one of the most trusted lieutenants of the Party Leader. Dr. Sun now, even more than before, realized that the organization of the Party had to be tightened up if anything was to be accomplished, and to this end he devoted himself, with Chiang's unremitting assistance.

After the death of Chen Chi-mei, several attempts were made from time to time to assassinate Chiang, the next important lieutenant of Dr. Sun at Shanghai. One was very nearly successful. A revolutionary named Wang Ching-fa, professedly a friend of Chiang, was suborned by Yuan's agents to secure his assassination. Wang's detectives followed Chiang to the house of a friend in Shanghai, but as the friend was absent Chiang went away unseen by the detectives. They surrounded the house, and when Chiang returned later he saw them and made good his escape.



Chiang Kai-shek: at the age of 25.

The presentation of the notorious Twenty-one Demands to Yuan in January, 1915, must be mentioned, not because it had any direct bearing on Chiang Kai-shek's career at the time, but because it shattered for good and all the belief that Japan's indirect assistance to the revolutionaries was single-minded. The presentation of the Demands proved that Japan was simply desirous of obtaining control in China and of reducing her to the status of a tributary to the Island Empire.

This had no immediate effect upon the revolutionaries' plans to oust Yuan, but it warned them that they would have another, and perhaps even greater, menace to meet when they had accomplished their primary object. The Twenty-one Demands are the background of the tussle which is going on, as these lines are being written, between Chiang Kai-shek, the champion of China, on the one side and the dominant military caste of Japan on the other.

Sporadic and unsuccessful risings as has been mentioned earlier, had occurred all through 1915, but after the formation of the Chouanhui, masquerading as a Peace Preservation League and in actuality an organization for placing Yuan on the Throne, the anti-Yuan sentiment was accentuated. When he was declared Emperor in Peking, in December, 1915, after a farcical vote in a "Parliament" surrounded by Yuan's troops, the storm burst. Tsai Ao, whose escape from Peking would afford the material for an interesting story if space were available, inspired the declaration of independence by Yunnan.

The response from the nation was emphatic, and practically unanimous in the South. Kwangtung, Kweichow, and Kwangsi successively declared independence, and a number of other provinces were ready to follow their example. Yuan then became alarmed. He cancelled the monarchy and proposed to restore the *status quo ante*. Repentance came too late. The whole South united in demanding his resignation of office, and, foreign medical attention being forbidden by his family, Yuan succumbed to nephritis in the Forbidden City where he had been cajoled into the belief that he could found a new dynasty.

Yuan had been deserted by the generals upon whom he had relied for support, as they felt that the reinstatement of imperial rule would diminish their own power and importance. The Japanese, to whom Yuan believed that he had given a satisfactory *quid pro quo*, were far from desiring that a general who had fought against them in Korea should succeed in establishing a strong Central Government in China. That was the last thing they wished, as it would spell the end of their policy of fishing in troubled waters. He died practically friendless.

"Rarely," says Arthur N. Holcombe, Professor of Government at Harvard University, "has the folly and wickedness of a strong man—for Yuan Shih-kai was a strong man and, confident in his strength of intellect and purpose, stopped at nothing to gain his ends—led so fatally to his destruction. His very ruthlessness, a source of power as long as his enemies remained intimidated, instantly became a source of weakness, once they had the temerity to turn openly against him. And his scorn for the moral elements in the foundations of authority left him as helpless as the Manchus when his physical forces were dissipated and spent."

The passing of Yuan by no means brought peace. A period succeeded in which men who had all Yuan's lust for power without a tithe of his ability, contended for power. Li Yuan-hung became President when Yuan died, in accordance with the Provisional Constitution which provided for the Vice-President succeeding in case of an extraordinary vacancy, but the country was really ruled by the *tuchuns*, or Military Governors, who had been appointed by Yuan. Tuan Chi-jui, who had been invited by Yuan to become Premier when the latter renounced his monarchical aspirations, reconstructed his Cabinet on June 30, 1916.

Within a year Li Yuan-hung was forced out of office by General Chang Hsuan, who became notorious for his vain attempts to restore the Ching Dynasty, and was succeeded by Feng Kuo-chang. After the death of Feng, Hsu Shih-chang was elected President. The latter attempted to carry out a

policy of reconciliation with Dr. Sun, but was forced to abandon it at the behest of Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian warlord; Tsao Kun, the Governor-General of Chihli; and the latter's subordinate, Wu Pei-fu.

This group also eventually compelled Hsu Shih-chang to retire and the Anfu clique to relinquish office after the exposure of their intrigues with Japan and the negotiation of the notorious Nishihara Loans. This step was taken, not because of any devotion to principle on the part of the militarists, but because they feared that Tuan Chi-jui might also strive to make himself too powerful with the support of the Japanese. Even in the South, the stronghold of the Kuomintang, successful militarists dominated the situation. Apparently the "third revolution," which had laid Yuan low, had only made room for other adventurers.

Dr. Sun had observed with growing concern the frittering away of the fruits of the Revolution by the Northern militarists after Yuan's death. He realized that drastic action was necessary when President Li Yuan-hung illegally dissolved the Parliament at Peking on May 31, 1917. After consulting with Chiang and other prominent revolutionaries, he decided to organize a Parliament in Canton. Fortunately Dr. Sun had the support of Admiral Chen Pi-kuang, and the squadron under his command took Dr. Sun and his followers to Canton. The southern provinces declared their independence, and an Extraordinary Parliament was summoned. A Military Government was formed which elected Dr. Sun as Generalissimo, with Tang Chi-yao and Lu Yung-ting as his assistants.

Dr. Sun's first act was to issue a proclamation declaring Feng Kuo-chang, who had become President, and his associates, traitors to the country. There were many who agreed with Dr. Sun that the Revolution could not be completed until the Northern militarists were overthrown, but in the South as in the North, petty jealousies and intrigue were rife. The climax came when Lu Yung-ting, who had been secretly negotiating with Feng, had Admiral Chen Pi-kuang assassinated and thus deprived Dr. Sun of his only powerful

supporter. The land forces were controlled by Lu, and others were antagonistic to Dr. Sun, or at all events indifferent towards him.

The Kwangsi clique, under Lu Yung-ting's direction, steadily gained power in the Canton Government, and Dr. Sun found it impossible to carry out his policies. He was thwarted at every turn, and on May 4, 1918, he tendered his resignation as Generalissimo to the Extraordinary Parliament. The Government was then reorganized. The opportunity was taken by Dr. Sun's enemies to humiliate him by electing Chen Chun-hsuan as Chairman of a Commission of Directors which was to administer the affairs of the Government. The Commission of seven included Dr. Sun, Wu Ting-fang, Tang Chi-yao, Lu Yung-ting, Tong Shao-yi and Ling Pao-tiao in addition to the Chairman. It is not recorded that Dr. Sun ever condescended to sit on this Commission.

The former Chairman of Kwangtung, Chu Ching-lan, had turned over to Dr. Sun 20 battalions which he placed under the command of Chen Chiung-ming—a disastrous choice as was proved later. Chen was ordered by Dr. Sun to attack Chaohsi in the southern part of Fukien. In March, 1918, Chiang accompanied the expedition in charge of the Field Operations Department, and later in command of the Second Detachment. During these military activities it became evident that Chen Chiung-ming reposed great confidence in his young colleague. This may have been because he soon realized that Chiang was not the type of officer who considered that his duties were simply concerned with leadership in the field. A letter, which is still extant, was written to Chen by Chiang, in January, 1919, and gave detailed plans for suitable quarters for soldiers.

These were most comprehensive, and were really amazing in their completeness when it is remembered that Chiang was neither an engineer nor an architect. Furthermore he strongly urged the reform of paying soldiers by roll-call. Chinese generals were accustomed to turn in a list of soldiers, many of whose names were fictitious and their pay went into the

pockets of their commanders. Chiang wished to eliminate this abuse. In his letter to Chen he singled out this item for special mention.

The Army under the command of Chiang, numbering about 1,000, rendered a good account of itself in this campaign. It defeated the Fukienese troops three miles from Sungkow, south of the city of Yungtai in Fukien. After pursuing the enemy to Yungtai, Chiang's forces occupied Sungkow. An armistice was arranged, but the enemy commanders treacherously brought up reinforcements, and suddenly opened an attack.

Succour was expected from the forces under the command of Chiang's subordinates Chiu and Liang, but they did not obey orders and Chiang with his hopelessly outnumbered troops had to cut his way out. In his own words: "From this I learned a big lesson. When an unsupported army penetrates too far, the only safe plan is for it to press on to its goal before it stops fighting. Never cease fighting midway, nor depend upon the enemy keeping faith."

Li Hou-chi, Governor of Fukien, against whom the campaign was conducted, was a greedy official and corrupt to the core. As a result the people in southern Fukien were very much against him, and they organized what was called the Minchun or People's Army, which worked under Chiang and took his orders. One of the reasons why his 1,000 men could penetrate so far into the interior of Fukien was the support that he received from the People's Army.

While the troops under Chiang's command undoubtedly gave a good account of themselves, it was evident that his rigid views on discipline and his singleness of purpose, did not gain him personal popularity. Furthermore, the Commander-in-Chief, Chen Chiung-ming, was of a vacillating disposition, and sometimes spoke of fighting to the last and at others of the advantages of making a peaceful compromise with the enemy.

The indeterminate policy of Chen undoubtedly was the cause of the serious predicament in which Chiang had found himself at Yungtai. Proof that Chiang was discouraged and

found it difficult to get on with the Kwangtung officers under him is supplied by a letter that he wrote to Teng Keng, Chen's Chief of Staff, on June 21, 1919. He was on terms of warm friendship with Teng, who was an able military commander and a loyal Party member. Chiang wrote thus:

"We treat each other with faith and in sincerity. What we know we need not keep to ourselves. What we say to each other must be exhaustive. Our friendship cannot be compared to that of a worldly nature. I am thinking of returning home. What I may say here may not be respectful, but you who know me well will, I believe, excuse me.

"After I assumed command of the Second Detachment, I found that there was no hope of reforming it. The pay for the soldiers was merely wasted, and they had no enthusiasm at all. I feel ashamed of myself. There are two principal reasons why it is not possible to reform the detachment. The first is that the detachment had been fully organized before I took it over. For this reason I could not choose my officers, and was unable to give the soldiers thorough training. So my ideas of reform could not be carried out. In time of peace the officers and soldiers might listen to my ideas about reform, but this could not be expected of them in time of war. When I tried to introduce reforms, I met with obstacles. Up to the present, the conditions in the detachment are deplorable.

"The second reason is that when I took over the detachment I was not able to get together my old comrades, and officers were collected at haphazard. After their appointment, although I tried to change them later, I could not do so. As a result there was lack of co-ordination in the detachment. The only alternative in my opinion is to abolish the detachment altogether.

"In spite of the fact that I exercised rigid economy in the administration of the detachment, still there have been criticisms directed against me."

A second letter from Chiang to Teng was dated July 9, 1919:

"I have already told you of my desire to quit. What I

said came from the depth of my heart. I hope you will excuse me for my frankness. For more than one year I remained in the Kwangtung Army. At the beginning you held me in high esteem, and Chen Chiung-ming likewise treated me with respect. I did my best to assist Chen, and in assisting Chen I helped the Kuomintang. I now believe that what Chen did was neither beneficial to the Party, nor to the country, and was contrary to Dr. Sun's wishes. In such circumstances, if I should still try to remain here, it would hurt my conscience.

"In 1918, I left because of my anger, and later returned after second consideration. It looked as if I had attached only a slight weight to my duties, but such was not the case when the motives are examined. After my retreat from Yungtai, many jeered at me, but at that time I did not feel ashamed of the retreat. Only Providence knows my heart. I bore all humiliations that had been heaped upon me. I hoped that my friends would know this later, and had no desire to resign.

"Now it is different. I am both physically and mentally tired. I have no power to direct the affairs of the detachment, and in dealing with outside matters I have no power. I could not be of any assistance to the Kwangtung Army. In such circumstances, if I do not leave, people will say that I am loth to give up my position and that I am an adventurer.

"The Kwangtung Army is going from bad to worse. Formerly it suffered from insubordination. At present party politics have crept into the rank and file of the Army, and provincialism has again been introduced. If these two defects are not uprooted, nothing can be done for the Army in the future. We two have wished the Kwangtung Army well, but since such deplorable conditions exist it is useless for us to continue exerting ourselves in its interest. If fundamental reforms are not carried out, the Army will become beyond all hope of improvement.

"The Army has more than 100 battalions, numerically speaking, and the territory it occupies comprises Chwangchow, Amoy, Swatow and Chaochow and more than 20 districts. *Tufei* (bandits), however, are rampant in those districts, and

they have taken Yungchun and Anki. For two months, we have not been able to send troops to suppress them. There is no reason why we could not suppress them summarily. It is the lack of discipline in the Army that has been responsible for such a failure. There are internal dissensions, and those who take part in them have no time to fight outsiders.

"To all appearance, these two districts will remain in control of the bandits, while I am helpless and the only alternative is for me to resign. Since my return to army headquarters, my health has been badly affected. I wish to resign for medical treatment, and the detachment can at the same time be abolished. The dissolution of the detachment would be an economical move. It is especially desirable at a time when funds for military purposes are difficult to obtain.

"Dr. Sun Yat-sen wished me to go to Swatow to reorganize the troops there. I am not willing, however, to undertake this. All I hope is that I be permitted to return home as speedily as possible. I know for certain that he would not allow me to leave the Army if I approach him with such a request. The only method of getting away is to leave without his permission, but this I shall not do. I request you, therefore, to persuade him to let me go. If this cannot be done, do not let me be the commander of the detachment, but give me some other position."

Chiang's recommendation that the second detachment should be abolished was eventually acted upon, but he was retained at the Kwangtung Army headquarters.

The attachment between Dr. Sun and Chiang strengthened with the years. They had travelled about the South together stirring up opposition against Yuan Shih-kai's imperial ambitions. They had together had the gratification of seeing Yuan's pinch-beck Empire collapse almost as soon as it was created. They had together fought against the intrigues of the Kwangsi clique. This close association led to Dr. Sun attaching great importance to the ideas and suggestions of his young colleague, of whose loyalty and affection he had received signal proof.

One reason why Chiang found his position in the Kwangtung Army almost insupportable, was undoubtedly the prejudice against him because he was not Cantonese. Rightly or wrongly, it is claimed that the provincialism of the people of the Two Kwang—Kwangtung and Kwangsi—is more pronounced than that of the people of any other provinces. Be that as it may, it is certain that Chiang found it difficult to get on with his Cantonese associates. In the earlier part of 1920 he could endure his position no longer and returned to Shanghai, but later we find him rejoining Dr. Sun at Canton.

CHAPTER IV

Dr. Sun Disregards Chiang's Warnings—Death Of Chiang's Mother—
Chastisement Of Kwangsi Clique—The Northern Expedition—Chen
Chiung-ming Shows His Hand—Revolt Against Dr. Sun—With Chiang
On A Gunboat—Escape To Shanghai

FOREIGN nations which were sympathetically disposed towards China must have felt inclined to despair of her future at this period. The North was then at war with the South, but in neither the North nor the South was there genuine cohesion. The Northern militarists never ceased intriguing against each other, and, unfortunately, at Canton a similar state of things obtained. The shadows of coming events, which were clearly visible to Chiang and a few others of Dr. Sun's really devoted followers, were ignored by Dr. Sun, and he not infrequently rejected with some petulance counsels, which, if given the weight that they deserved, would have saved him, and those who threw in their lot with him, from much danger and distress.

Unlimited confidence was placed by Dr. Sun in Chen Chiung-ming, popularly known as the Hakka General. That this man was untrustworthy was early perceived by Chiang, Teng Keng and some others of the Leader's associates, but Dr. Sun persisted in believing in Chen's integrity until he headed the rising which caused Dr. Sun to flee from Canton in 1922. It could have been foreseen as far back as 1920, that something of the kind would happen. The Government of which Dr. Sun was the head was split into several factions. Many of them

united in a plot to reduce Dr. Sun to impotence. In October, 1920, Lu Yung-ting, the Kwangsi leader, and those with whom he had conspired, issued a circular telegram in which they announced that the Military Government had been abolished and that national unification would be sought by reconciling the North with the South. This meant in effect that they were prepared to compromise with the Northern militarists, and thus defeat the ends sought by the genuine revolutionaries—accomplishing what Yuan had tried to do.

This awakened Dr. Sun to his danger. He sent secret orders to Chen to subdue the Lu Yung-ting clique. After receiving these orders Chen betrayed his weak, vacillating and untrustworthy character. He tried to find excuses for not obeying them. With the Kwangsi clique he attempted to come to a compromise. Li Hou-chi, Governor of Fukien, however, was anxious to see the last of him and gave him arms and funds for his return journey. Chen's own junior officers let him see clearly that they wished to return to Canton.

Moreover, Hsu Chung-chih and others kept impressing upon Chen that immediate compliance with Dr. Sun's order was a duty that should not be disregarded. Reluctantly, Chen issued orders that the Army should move towards Canton. Chiang Kai-shek, who was then at Fenghua, was summoned to Shanghai and instructed by Dr. Sun to go south. He reached Swatow on October 5 and whole-heartedly assisted Hsu Chung-chih during the campaign.

A letter sent by Chiang to Hsu dated November 5, 1920, throws a curious light upon the attitude of the Kwangtung officers subordinate to him, and is a complete justification of his numerous suggestions that the bonds of discipline should be tightened. Chiang reported that a commander named Chang Kuo-cheng had failed to notify him (Chiang) of his movements; had secretly negotiated with the enemy; had sent in false reports; had appointed magistrates on his own responsibility, and had refused to permit another detachment of the Kwangtung Army to enter Tsingyun in which city Chang had established himself. Chiang was so disgusted with mani-

festations of unruliness on the part of the subordinate officers over whom he nominally exercised control, that he told Hsu that he had to resign. The following day he returned to Shanghai. Chiang was convinced that his resignation was thoroughly justified because he was unable, not receiving support from higher authority, to enforce the discipline that is essential in an army. But Tai Chi-tao, a fiery Kuomintang leader, who is now President of the Examination Yuan, took him severely to task for leaving his post and told him that he ought to return immediately. Tai seems to have clothed his advice in provocative, even offensive, language, and a breach in the friendship between the two occurred.

Chiang went to his home in Fenghua for a much needed rest. Before his departure, however, he sent a letter to Tai in which he deprecated the severity of the language that Tai had employed. Some acrimonious correspondence followed, but Chiang emphatically stated that he would immediately return to Kwangtung when Chen Chiung-ming made up his mind to take active steps against the Kwangsi clique.

Chiang also made it clear that in his opinion it would not be sufficient to drive the Kwangsi faction out of Canton. That preliminary step should be followed up, and the clique exterminated—otherwise they would certainly sooner or later stage a come-back. This is of interest, in that it shows that Chiang had a much better sense of realities than many of those who were then senior to him in the Party.

This was further proved by letters that he sent to Hu Han-min and other close associates of Dr. Sun in which he openly expressed his lack of confidence in Chen Chiung-ming. He predicted that the day would come when Chen would desert Dr. Sun. In these letters Chiang urged that it would be most unwise for Dr. Sun to leave Canton and take the post of Commander-in-Chief of the anti-Kwangsi troops. His advice was obviously sound, as Chen Chiung-ming had been quietly increasing the number of troops under his own control. Chiang also urged that the Kwangsi expedition should not be started until definite objectives had been fixed and a proper

plan of campaign drawn up. He then proceeded to give views upon objectives and outlined a general plan of campaign.

The view that the objective should be limited to the overthrow of the Kwangsi clique he strenuously opposed. Civil war, he said, had broken out in Szechwan, where there were many factions. That gave Kwangtung its opportunity. After the reduction of Kwangsi, Dr. Sun, in his opinion, should take Szechwan, which would not be difficult in view of the chaos prevailing there. The third phase would be to extend operations to the Yangtze Valley. Chiang predicted—and it is of interest to record that the prediction came true—that Wu Pei-fu, who was then training troops at Loyang, would seek to extend his influence over Hupeh and Hunan, but, as Wu was at the moment much more formidable than Szechwan, it would be advisable, Chiang urged, to subdue Szechwan before measuring swords with him. He was also of the opinion that internal trouble in North China would be accentuated in 1921, and as Wu would not be able, in consequence, to extend to the Yangtze Valley, the opportunity would be given for the advance of the Kwangtung forces to Central China.

Regarding the attack upon Kwangsi, Chiang proposed that it should be carried out by two corps of the Kwangtung Army. To guard against any move by Wu Pei-fu, though that was not likely, a corps should be stationed to repel possible attack from Hunan, and another corps should form a general reserve. The post of Commander-in-Chief should be taken by Chen Chiung-ming to ensure unity of control.

A little later Chiang went to Canton and there saw Dr. Sun, Chen Chiung-ming and other leaders. Plans for the expedition against Kwangsi were discussed, and Chiang was mainly relied upon for the solution of the military problems involved. But this tribute to his ability did not blind Chiang to the realities of the situation. He recognized that the secret purposes of Chen Chiung-ming might upset the best laid plans, and he was adamant in his refusal to take any personal part, at that stage, in army matters. His attitude of mind is shown in a letter that he sent to Teng Keng, who had been unable to

attend the conference. Chiang regretted that in Teng's absence the plans had to be drawn up by himself. He added significantly that he thought that he had come to Canton too early and desired to return north. Shortly afterwards, he left for Shanghai, and in March was again at Fenghua.

While he was in retirement in his home, he wrote a letter to Dr. Sun Yat-sen which is of considerable importance as it shows that Chiang had attained a standing in the Party which warranted him in frankly advancing his own opinions, even though, as in this case, they were not in accord with those of the Leader whom he revered. In this letter Chiang referred to his ill-health, but said that it did not prevent him from thinking deeply about the future of the Kuomintang. He expressed gratification at the acceptance by Chen Chiung-ming and Hsu Chung-chih of his plan of campaign against Kwangsi.

Then Chiang ventured to express open opposition to a pet project of Dr. Sun. This related to the election of the President by Parliament, which Dr. Sun strongly favoured. He pointed out that, though members of the Extraordinary Parliament had gradually gone back to Canton, they had not returned in sufficient numbers to form a quorum. Consequently, if they elected a President, the procedure would be illegal. It would be much better, in view of the palpable disunion in the South-west, to despatch the expedition against Kwangsi first and hold the election afterwards.

In these views, Chiang added, he did not stand alone. Hsu Chung-chih, whose loyalty to Dr. Sun was as unchallengeable as his own, also held that the suppression of the Kwangsi clique should be completed before the establishment of a constitutional organization was undertaken. With the fearlessness of perfect sincerity, Chiang pointed out that Dr. Sun was too attentive to foreign relationships. Dr. Sun desired to be appointed Extraordinary President, as he thought that that would put him on an equality with the Government at Peking, which was recognized by the outside world. As a matter of fact, every failure that the Kuomintang had met

with was attributable to the undue stress laid upon foreign relationships.

In the "second revolution" in 1913, and the "third revolution" in 1915, Dr. Sun had laid great emphasis on Japan's support and believed that Japan would help the Kuomintang. But Japan, Chiang pointed out, instead of helping the Kuomintang, assisted its adversaries and the Party failed to achieve anything. In 1918 America's support was relied upon to make the move to Canton and the establishment of a government there a success. That Government failed because Britain showed open opposition and America withheld assistance. From this it was clear that it was foolish to rely upon foreign support. Soviet Russia, although she had no support at all from outside, had managed to repel all alien interference with her domestic revolution. That was because the Russians were unified among themselves and possessed real military strength. Chiang advised that the Kuomintang should cease to rely upon foreign countries and should build up the power and prestige of China by its own unaided efforts.

What would be the position if the Extraordinary President were elected while the South-west was still distracted by factional rivalries? Chiang asked and he replied to his own question: Its position would become worse, and it would be impossible to overthrow the Government in Peking. In point of fact that Government was anxious that the South should go ahead with the Presidential election. Turning his attention to Chen Chiung-ming, Chiang was equally outspoken. He declared that Chen, whatever his professions of agreement with Dr. Sun, was in secret communication with Lu Yung-hsiang, Governor of Chekiang, and Chao Heng-ti, Governor of Hunan. He implored Dr. Sun to speak plainly to Chen and "guide him along the correct path." In spite of Chiang's advice, however, Dr. Sun was elected President on May 5, 1921.

At this period Chiang spent most of his time travelling between Canton and Shanghai on Kuomintang business. Early in June his mother became seriously ill, and Chiang hurried to Fenghua. He was fortunately in time to comfort the last

hours of the devoted woman to whom he owed so much. She died on June 4, 1921 and, in accordance with usage, he remained in his native district for the customary mourning period. For this reason he took no part in the expedition against Kwangsi which was started that month, though it was in accordance with the plans that he had prepared that the campaign was conducted. Towards the end of June, Wuchow was captured by the Kwangtung Army. In the following month Shen Hung-ying, one of the important Kwangsi leaders, surrendered with his 20,000 men to Kwangtung, and, by the end of June the campaign was over. Kwangsi had been conquered.

In spite of his well-founded distrust of Chen Chiung-ming, Chiang freely gave him his views on military matters. In a letter that he wrote to Chen on August 15, 1921, he reviewed the whole situation, particularly in regard to Wu Pei-fu. He pointed out that Wu had become Inspecting Commissioner of Hupeh and Hunan and was contemplating the establishment of a third government. In his opinion it would be unwise for Wu to attempt to establish a third government before he had conquered either the Government in North China or that in the South. The policy for the Kuomintang to adopt was either to work with him against the North, or to overthrow him.

If Wu showed a sincere desire to co-operate with them, Chiang said, the Kuomintang should accept him as an ally, and it might be possible to convert him to their political views. If Wu, on the contrary, opposed them it would not be difficult to defeat him. Wu could hardly carry out his plan of overthrowing both the Governments in the North and in the South. In the impending hostilities between Chihli and Mukden the Japanese might either secretly assist Chang Tso-lin, or openly interfere to postpone a fight between those factions in order to prolong civil strife in China.

If there were no fighting between Chihli and Mukden, each side would hold the territory it possessed at the time. In the event of Wu forming his third government and finding that he could not expand to the North, he would seek to

expand to the South. If he were assisted by Japan or another Power to fight Kwangtung and Kwangsi, the Southern Government's position would become difficult. Consequently, Chiang recommended opening hostilities with him if Wu refused to co-operate, and, in any event, immediately beginning preparations. In September, 1921, Chiang came to Canton to present his views in person.

As Kwangsi had been subdued and the Kuomintang was in control of both Kwangtung and Kwangsi, Dr. Sun was anxious to launch his long contemplated Northern Expedition, but Chen Chiung-ming intimated that he was not in favour of the expedition, so Dr. Sun decided to take command himself. The Army was to proceed from Kweilin in Kwangsi through Hunan. Chen Chiung-ming held aloof at Nanning, and Dr. Sun went thither to talk matters over. In their discussions, Dr. Sun treated Chen with perfect frankness and sincerity. He requested him to take charge of Kwangtung and Kwangsi and to keep the expedition provided with munitions and provisions. Chen was evasive, and showed a disinclination to co-operate in any way with the Leader to whom he still rendered lip-service.

The expedition began to take definite shape in November, 1921, when Dr. Sun went to Kweilin to reorganize the troops. He appointed Chu Pei-teh Commander-in-Chief of the Yunnan troops, Peng Chen-fan Commander-in-Chief of the Kiangsi troops, Ko Chen-lun Commander-in-Chief of the Kweichow troops, Li Lieh-chun Chief of the General Staff, and Hu Han-min head of civil affairs. Hsu Chung-chih and Li Fu-lin were in command of their Kwangtung troops who were loyal to Dr. Sun, and Chiang was Chief of Staff to Hsu. Teng Keng, Chief of the General Staff to Chen Chiung-ming, was to look after supplies in the rear. Chen, being aware of the route to be taken, secretly arranged with Chao Heng-ti, Governor of Hunan, to prevent the entrance of the expeditionary force into that province.

The expeditionary force slowly made its way towards the

border of Hunan and, in the meantime, negotiations were carried on by Dr. Sun with some of Chao Heng-ti's commanders, by which it was hoped fighting would be avoided. Upon arrival at Chwangchow, which is near the Hunan border, the expedition halted. Teng Keng, to whom all the arrangements for supplying and provisioning the expeditionary force had been entrusted, was assassinated on March 21, 1922, at the railway station at Canton. It was generally assumed that the assassination had been instigated by Chen Chiung-ming, who was aware that Teng Keng was devotedly loyal to Dr. Sun.

A decision was then reached that the troops should return first to Kwangsi and later to Kwangtung. Negotiations were carried on between Dr. Sun and Chen, which resulted eventually in Chen being appointed Minister of War. The post of Commander-in-Chief of the Kwangtung Army was abolished. By this arrangement Chen's troops were to be transferred to the army headquarters.

At this juncture Chen more clearly showed his hand. On March 25 he went to Waichow, and assembled the troops that he could control at Sheklung and Fumen. Waichow was a city that had never been taken by assault in the previous thousand years. Chiang urged that an immediate attack should be made upon Chen, and that, after overcoming his forces in Kwangtung, the remnants of his command in Kwangsi should be exterminated.

Once again, however, Dr. Sun rejected the advice of his devoted disciple. He absolutely refused to see what was evident to everyone else, and insisted that as Chen had not raised the banner of revolt he was to be trusted. Dr. Sun said that he would lead the expedition north again, and would leave Chen Chiung-ming in control of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. He also rejected the advice that he should get rid of Yeh Chu, an intimate friend of Chen, in whom Dr. Sun placed great trust.

Disappointed and, no doubt, deeply chagrined, that the advice he had given had been brushed aside, Chiang went back to Shanghai. From there he wrote an extremely frank letter

to Chen Chiung-ming in which he advised him to save his reputation by resigning his post of Minister of War and placing himself under the orders of Dr. Sun. If he loyally assisted Dr. Sun in making the Northern Expedition a success he would preserve his good name. To this letter Chen made no reply.

The military and political situation in the North at this time was rapidly undergoing a transformation. On May 3, 1922, the forces under Chang Tso-lin were defeated near Changsintien, and he was compelled to withdraw to Manchuria, whose independence he proclaimed. A month later Wu Pei-fu expelled Hsu Shih-chang from the President's chair and made his plans for evolving a new and better government. He recalled Li Yuan-hung to the Presidential position, convened a Parliament, and even won the support of certain conservative members of the Kuomintang such as Tsai Yuan-pei, at that time the Chancellor of the National University at Peking. Despite the fact that the changes in the North had brought Dr. Sun's enemies to the front, Tsai sent him a telegram urging him to give up the Presidency of the Canton Government inasmuch as Parliament had been restored.

This was the opportunity for which Chen Chiung-ming had been waiting. He threw off all disguise and rose in open revolt against Dr. Sun. Orders were given to Chen's troops stationed at the White Cloud and Kuanyin mountains near Canton city to attack the Presidential headquarters. The attack was led by the 2nd division, composed mostly of unruly troops under Hung Chao-lin, and, simultaneously, the vicinity of the residence of Dr. Sun was bombarded, evidently in the hope of killing him. Providentially, some of the Leader's followers succeeded in getting him through the rebel lines to a gunboat which had remained loyal. When this happened, Chiang was in Shanghai and he immediately hurried to Canton. At considerable personal risk, he made his way to Whampoa, where the gunboat was anchored, and rejoined the Leader.

Chiang wrote a record of the events of that memorable night when Chen overthrew Dr. Sun's administration, and sought to kill the Leader. Although, as has been stated, he was not present, he obtained his facts from the actual participants, and the account that he wrote deserves reproduction as it proves that Chiang was as ready and proficient with the pen as with the sword. The record refers to June 16, 1922:

"Military officers in Canton, after receiving a telegram from Chen Chiung-ming, met for a secret conference at the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief at White Cloud Mountain. Yeh Chu had received a lengthy telegram from Chen instructing the military officers who supported him to besiege the President's headquarters, occupy the offices of different bureaux and despatch troops to guard Chaokwan. At ten o'clock that night a certain officer rang up the President and tried to persuade him to leave headquarters in anticipation of disturbances that the Cantonese Army might cause that night. Sun did not believe the report.

"After midnight, Lin Chih-mien and Lin Shu-wei came back with a report on the seriousness of the situation, and requested the President to avoid terrible possibilities. The latter gave the situation the benefit of the doubt, and advised Lin and others not to be unduly suspicious. He expressed the belief that Chen Chiung-ming would not prove so disloyal, and that, even if he did, his subordinates, who had been with Dr. Sun through thick and thin and among whom there were doubtless prudent and loyal elements, would not take part in the conspiracy. Those who were endeavouring to save the President, frankly told him that he would be helpless in the event of an emergency which was only too likely to happen on account of the unruly character of the Cantonese troops.

"I have removed all my guards in Canton to Chaokwan," replied he. 'This proves that they have no idea of putting up opposition and are giving no provocation. If Chiung-ming really wished to do harm to me, he would not need to resort to the clumsy use of weapons. If he should be unscrupulous enough to revolt and press me by force, his crime would be

equal to that of a rebel and public opinion would denounce him. Moreover, I cannot leave my duties when faced by illegitimate force. If I should do so, I would betray the trust imposed in me by the people. Life and success are of secondary consideration, and I will put down rebellion at any cost so as to clear the nation of traitors.'

"When Lin and others saw that the President was adamant, they said good-bye to him and he went to bed. Shortly, telephone reports came in succession all predicting a *coup d'état* that night and begging the President to leave. But still he refused to believe.

"At last, about 2 o'clock in the morning, a certain officer came to report that the Cantonese troops had completed preparations and were awaiting orders for attack. He further reported that a sum of \$200,000 had been offered for killing the President, and the soldiers had been told that they would be granted a three-day holiday. (By 'holiday' was meant that the Cantonese soldiers would be given license to loot for three days.) The President did not wholly believe all this until he heard the movements of troops from afar. It was then about 3 o'clock.

"Lin and others came again to urge him to flee. 'If Chiung-ming rebels,' said he, 'it will be my duty to suppress him. I cannot leave here without justification, nor can I relinquish my duties. In case I fail to carry out my intention, the only way open to me is to die for the country.' Realizing that he would not yield to persuasion, his loyal followers forced him to leave the premises.

"By that time rebel sentries had been stationed in the streets. No pedestrian could come and go freely. Lin and others, after answering a few questions, were fortunately allowed to pass. When the President happened to be separated from the others he went alone, and near the Bureau of Finance office, he met a detachment of the rebel force coming in a westerly direction. He joined them, and, with much presence of mind walked along as if he were one of them. Not until he reached the end of Yunghan Road did he

manage to escape. Then he proceeded to the Bund and arrived safely at the Navy Headquarters. With Wen Shu-teh he went aboard the gunboat Chuyu, and summoned various commanders to discuss with him plans to cope with the revolt."

On June 25, Chiang proposed to Dr. Sun that the crews of the warships should be persuaded to become Kuomintang members, as this move would strengthen Dr. Sun's position. Commander Wen at that moment was wavering, because Chen Chiung-ming was making great efforts to induce the Navy to go over to his side. Fortunately, after they had joined the Kuomintang as members, the captains of the cruisers and gunboats and the crews were loyal to Dr. Sun. At one time they even refused to allow Wen Shu-teh to board any of the cruisers, suspecting him of co-operating with Chen Chiung-ming. The naval officers advised that the cruisers and the gunboats should proceed to Sikiang instead of being anchored at Whampoa. Upon the advice of Chiang, Dr. Sun, who had at first considered the proposal favourably, ordered them to remain where they were. Any move at this time might be a false one.

Chiang gave the following reasons for his decision.

(1) The water at Sikiang was shallow. If all the gunboats went to Sikiang, the three cruisers, Haichen, Haichi, and Chaocho, would have to remain in Whampoa, and their strength would be considerably reduced. If Chen should succeed in inducing the three cruisers to join with him, the peril to the Kuomintang would be greater than ever.

(2) Once the headquarters, which were then located on board the Yungfeng, were removed, the fort known as Changchow in the neighbourhood of Whampoa, where the Yungfeng was anchored, would be lost. In that event, there would be no landing place for the loyal forces.

(3) Although after the transfer of headquarters to Sikiang the territory would become larger, Whampoa was the throat to Canton, and its importance strategically was infinitely greater than Sikiang. As long as Dr. Sun remained at

Whampoa, although Canton was not under his control, its recapture would still be possible.

(4) If the Navy were moved to Sikiang, its return to Whampoa would be difficult. In the event of the expeditionary force returning to assail Canton, it would be deprived of the support which the Navy might accord.

(5) It was also uncertain whether it would be possible to secure a land region at Sikiang after having given up the Changchow fort by the bank near Whampoa. Furthermore, the attitude of the troops at Sikiang was uncertain. He therefore advocated strongly that they should remain where they were, awaiting the return of the expeditionary force that had been called back from Kiangsi.

On July 8, Dr. Sun received a letter from Hsu Chung-chih, written at Namyung and from this, both Dr. Sun and Chiang learned for certain that the expeditionary force was returning. Unfortunately, the three cruisers left Whampoa, having been bought over by Chen Chiung-ming. Once they had left Whampoa, the Fish Eye Fort was able to fire direct upon the Yungfeng on which Dr. Sun had established his headquarters. In the meantime, Chiang had sent engineers to survey the Haihsin Kiang which is situated behind Whampoa, where the ordinary depth was reputed to be six feet, and even shallow-draft warships were unable to enter. This survey showed that the water in the Haihsin Kiang was 15 feet deep.

On July 10, by order of Dr. Sun, the small warships sailed for the Haihsin Kiang. They had to pass a fort called Chewai, which was strongly defended, so Chiang ordered the Yungfeng to attack this fort. Six shots from the fort hit the Yungfeng, but in spite of this, the warship continued on her way, followed by others, and they safely concentrated at Pai-e-tan. Here they remained until August 6, when reports were received of the defeat of the expeditionary force by Chen Chiung-ming. Chiang insisted that until the news of the overthrow of the expeditionary force was confirmed, they should not leave.

On August 7, confirmation of the disastrous defeat was

received. The base at Namyung had been captured by Chen Chiung-ming. On August 9, a plot by Chen to kill Dr. Sun became known and Chiang insisted that the Leader should seek safety. A British warship undertook the task of escorting Dr. Sun and Chiang and other loyal supporters to Hongkong. They left the British colony after a short stay, and on August 14 arrived at Shanghai.

For two months following the *coup d'état* of Chen Chiung-ming and before going to Hongkong, Chiang Kai-shek had been with Dr. Sun Yat-sen taking refuge on the gunboat near Whampoa. The conditions were miserable. Provisions were short and the water supply scanty. But Chiang was always at Dr. Sun's side, ready to offer assistance and counsel. He sometimes swept the deck like an ordinary sailor, and sometimes, under cover of night, he went ashore at the risk of his life to fetch provisions for Dr. Sun.

The historian of the future, who always has to face the task of filling the gaps that are left by contemporary biographers, may attribute to Chiang's early knowledge of the story of the Prince of Yueh (to which he long afterwards referred in a speech at Hangchow) the example that he set of courage and perseverance when the face of Fortune seemed turned from his party. He discussed this well-known story with Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself when he shared with him those weary 56 days of waiting for the relief that never came, cooped up in the solitary warship that had remained faithful to the Leader.

Those days spent on the gunboat with Dr. Sun in a tropical climate marked a turning point in the life of Chiang. For ten years and more he had played an important, but comparatively obscure, role in the history of the Revolution. Dr. Sun had long ago learned to respect the abilities of his young subordinate, but the events leading to the perilous days spent on the warship convinced the Revolutionary Leader that he had not fully appreciated the capacity and wisdom of the trained soldier who had served him so loyally. From that time forth Chiang was even more fully appreciated by Dr. Sun, and shortly afterwards, as we shall see, Chiang was to start the

meteoric rise that was not only to make him a leading figure in China, but also to carry his renown throughout the world.

CHAPTER V

Dr. Sun And Chiang Return To Canton—Arrangements With The Soviet Union—Arrival Of Borodin—Whampoa Military Academy Established—Chiang Takes Charge—Cadets Disarm Volunteers—Death Of Dr. Sun—Chen Chiung-ming Defeated—Plotters At Canton Overthrown—Friction With Russians—The Shameen Incident—Anti-British Boycott

FOLLOWING their arrival at Shanghai, Chiang, who was suffering from illness brought on by the privations that he had shared with Dr. Sun, retired to Tientungshan and Puto, near Ningpo, to recuperate. While there he read in the Press an article which falsely accused Dr. Sun of secretly working with Russia and Germany. Recognizing that this was propaganda instigated by Chen Chiung-ming, Chiang wrote his account of the sufferings of Dr. Sun on the gunboat, part of which was given in the previous chapter and in which he refuted these slanders.

The time was soon ripe to challenge Chen Chiung-ming. His treachery towards Dr. Sun had caused a wave of sympathy for the Leader to sweep over the country. On October 13, 1922, Hsu Chung-chih, who had remained loyal, captured Foochow. Later an advance was made upon Canton by the Yunnan Army headed by Yang Hsi-min and two detachments of the Kwangsi Army under Liu Chen-huan and Shen Hung-ying respectively. These forces reached Canton on December 15 and Chen Chiung-ming fled. By January 26, 1923, the greater part of Kwangtung again came under the control of the Kuomintang, but Dr. Sun's troubles were by no means at an end. While the most important southern province was waiting to welcome him, it was still surrounded by hostile



Chiang Kai-shek: at the age of 30.

armies, while some of his own professed supporters were practically mercenaries and by no means loyal to him or to the Party. It was not until February that it was deemed safe for Dr. Sun to return to Canton. He arrived there on the 21st and immediately restored the Military Government.

Now began a phase in the Revolution during which Soviet Russia played an important part. In July, 1919, Leo Karakhan, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, issued a manifesto to the Chinese people in which the Soviet Government promised to return all territory wrongfully taken from China; to restore to China the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway; to renounce its claim to any share in the Boxer Indemnity; to give up the rights of extraterritoriality of Russians living in China, and to surrender all other special privileges inconsistent with the equality of nations.

China could scarcely have asked for more, and the most that the hard-pressed Soviets expected at that time was the recognition of their Government as a *quid pro quo*. Pressure, however, was brought to bear on the timid Government at Peking by the Diplomatic Corps, and the former only withdrew recognition from the Czarist diplomats and consuls who were living in China on funds paid to the Russo-Asiatic Bank as instalments on the Russian share of the Boxer Indemnity. Even that step provoked a howl of protest from the Diplomatic Corps.

Overtures were made from Moscow to Wu Pei-fu, who, however, offended the Soviets by his drastic treatment of railway strikers. Adolf Joffe, who was sent to China to negotiate an agreement, received the cold shoulder at Peking. He then went to Shanghai, where he met Dr. Sun in December, 1922, and the two agreed upon a joint statement which served as the basis of the entente between Moscow and Canton. In this statement it was agreed by both Dr. Sun and Joffe that the Soviet system could not be introduced into China, and that the paramount problem for China was unification and national independence. Joffe reaffirmed the readiness of the Soviets to enter into negotiations with China on the basis of a re-

nunciation of the unequal treaties, and to settle the problem of the Chinese Eastern Railway at a future conference. Liao Chung-kai, a veteran Revolutionist in whom Dr. Sun reposed much confidence, at Dr. Sun's request, travelled with Joffe to a hot spring resort in Japan, where the latter went for treatment, and in further conversations verified the willingness of the Russians to let the Chinese work out their own destinies under the Three People's Principles.

After hearing Liao's report when he returned to Canton in March, 1923, Dr. Sun was more than ever convinced that China should join hands with the Soviets in the struggle against imperialism. In August, he sent Chiang Kai-shek, who had been occupying the post of Chief of Staff at the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters, on a mission to Russia to study the Soviet system. He was armed with letters of warm recommendation from Dr. Sun addressed to Lenin, Trotsky and Chicherin (then People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs.)

When Chiang arrived at Moscow, he found that Lenin was too ill to receive visitors, but he had several interviews with other Soviet leaders. He discussed the Mongolian question with Chicherin, who told him that the people of Outer Mongolia inclined towards Soviet rule because they were afraid of the Chinese. Chiang explained that it was not the Kuomintang that the Mongols were afraid of, but the militarist Government at Peking. The Kuomintang advocated nationalism, and was contemplating friendly co-operation with the Mongols.

Chiang was very well received, and was given full opportunity to inspect military and naval training establishments, including one devoted to the study of chemical warfare. He had an interview with Trotsky who said to him when bidding him farewell: "Patience and activity are the two essential factors for a revolutionary party, and the one complements the other." Chiang's subsequent career shows that he attached full value to the implied counsel of the Russian leader.

On October 10, Chiang delivered an address to the Chinese students in Moscow, in which he narrated the history of China's

revolutionary party. The next day he learned that one of his hearers had criticized the address on the ground that Chiang had fallen into the error of worshipping the individual—because he paid a loyal tribute to the work of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Chiang was not perturbed by this criticism, but he expressed the opinion that some of the Chinese young men abroad were rather inclined to laud overmuch the accomplishments of foreign revolutionary leaders, while ignoring the wonderful work done by the Leader in their own fatherland.

After staying in Russia for four months, Chiang returned in December to Canton, where he made a favourable report on certain aspects of the Soviets, and suggested a reorganization of the Kuomintang along the line of improvements which his observations in Russia had suggested to him. He would have made a longer stay in Moscow had it not been for the receipt of news from Canton that the city was again in danger.

In the meanwhile, Leo Karakhan had arrived in Peking. His arrival caused consternation among the members of the Diplomatic Corps. They did all they could to prevent any arrangement being arrived at by China and the Soviets. Karakhan, who was an accomplished orator and a master of sarcasm, lost no opportunity of making speeches which were a source of embarrassment to the Ministers of other countries. He kept on emphasizing that it was the Soviet Union alone that desired to see China become a powerful independent country capable of defending its sovereignty. The offers that the Soviet Union made to China of equality of status and exchange of ambassadors were too tempting to reject and Karakhan was accepted as the first Soviet Ambassador to China in June, 1924. Although he was accredited to Peking, his denunciations of imperialism were of indirect, but material, assistance to the rising cause of Dr. Sun.

Now comes upon the scene a foreign adviser who, for some years, wielded an immense influence in China. This was Michael Borodin, alias Berg, alias Grusenbergh. He was educated in America, whither his parents had gone from Russia when he was a child. Changing his name to Berg, for

some time he conducted a business school in Chicago. A voracious reader of Communist literature, he abandoned his school and became a revolutionary agitator, under the name of Borodin. The Third International took him up, and he was sent to Mexico to propagate revolutionary doctrines. A mission of a similar nature on behalf of the Third International took him to Scotland, but evidently the Scots failed to appreciate him as he was arrested and deported from the country. In Turkey he found congenial employment as adviser to Mustapha Kemal Pasha, to whom he rendered valuable services.

Such was the man who called upon Dr. Sun in Canton with a letter of introduction from Karakhan in which the latter said that Dr. Sun could put implicit faith in Borodin. With such a recommendation and such a record, it is not surprising that he was warmly welcomed. Borodin, moreover, had a winning personality, and the charm of his manner and his evident sincerity speedily placed him in the good graces of the Leader. He won further favour by declaring himself a firm believer in the Three People's Principles, which in his opinion were all-sufficient for the needs of China.

Largely upon the advice of Liao Chung-kai, Dr. Sun appointed Borodin adviser to the Kuomintang. Borodin eventually succeeded in getting the Chinese Communists formally admitted into the Kuomintang by a Party resolution passed by the First National Party Congress in January, 1924. The condition was laid down, however, that the Communists would have to take an oath of obedience to the Party authorities. Even at that time there was some misgiving as to the extent to which the Reds might be trusted.

Discussions regarding the establishment of a school for the training of officers for the Kuomintang Army were first taken up by Joffe and Liao Chung-kai. Dr. Sun himself had long realized the need of a well-trained and dependable army to fight for the cause of the Revolution. He finally took steps to remedy the military deficiency in his work. The Congress

of the Kuomintang, held in January, 1924, under his leadership, made the decision to establish the Whampoa Military Academy which previously had not passed beyond the stage of discussion.

During his visit to Russia, Chiang had carried forward the previous discussions of Joffe and Liao and formulated plans for the school with the assistance of Red Army leaders at Moscow. He met General Bluecher on the train *en route* to Vladivostok, and later on selected him for his Chief of Staff at the new school, where Bluecher served under the name of Galens. After Chiang's return to Canton, plans for the opening of the new military academy were rushed to a conclusion—Chiang is always in a hurry when it comes to the point of getting things done. On June 16, 1924, the newly organized Whampoa Military Academy was opened by Dr. Sun. Chiang was appointed President and Liao Party Representative at the school. There were Russian instructors, of whom General Bluecher (Galens) was the chief. Borodin, as adviser to the Kuomintang, played an important part in the establishment of the Academy.

At the beginning, it was decided to limit the enrollment to 300, but 3,000 applications were received, and 500, after examination, were admitted. After a short, intensive course these graduated, and then 400 more entered for training. The curriculum was modelled along the lines which Trotsky had established for the Red Army of the Soviets. Drillmasters taught the young men first how to goose-step, and later they were introduced to all the technique of modern warfare. Political science was stressed in the Academy as well as military science. Wang Ching-wei, who at that time was the head of the Propaganda Department of the Party, gave lectures on the history and principles of the Kuomintang. From the beginning, the institution gave promise of being one of the most important creations of Dr. Sun, who, though he turned the work over to Chiang, deserves full credit for having given the right man a free hand in making the project a success.

Nevertheless, all was not plain sailing for the Academy.

It was starved for funds, the equipment left much to be desired, and the instructors were not all that they might have been. The brunt of the fighting against disabilities fell upon Chiang. He did not spare himself, and for the time being gave all his time and energy to the Academy, in which he lived and rose and retired with the students. At 5 a.m. he started work. Having cleaned up his own bedroom, he made a round of inspection. Those cadets who did not turn out promptly he admonished, reminding them that those were times of revolution and that they had serious duties to perform.

Testimony from many quarters shows that, in spite of his stern discipline, he was extremely popular among the students. This is hardly surprising, as he showed a genuine interest in them. To those who were not well off he extended assistance. Chiang desired the cadets to be not only good soldiers, but good Party members as well, consequently he also invited Hu Han-min, Liao Chung-kai and Tai Chi-tao to deliver lectures to them on economics, politics and the Three People's Principles.

One element of discord was present practically from the start of the Academy. Among both the professors and cadets were Kuomintang members and Communists. The differences between the two in ideology and objective were fundamental. The Communists formed an organization of their own, the Union of Military Youth, but an effort was made to reconcile them by the formation in January, 1925, of what was called the Sun Yat-sen Society. This well-meant effort was a failure, and it was found necessary to expel the Communist members from the Society. Later on, when Chiang organized the First Army Corps, which he personally commanded, he was careful to select as his officers men who had not been infected with extreme leftist ideas.

It was not alone from the extreme left that danger threatened. The extreme right of the Kuomintang was just as doctrinaire and uncompromising as the Communists. It had permitted the formation of a private army by the merchants of Canton for the protection of their interests. Possibly the merchants had a certain amount of justification as they had

been mercilessly levied upon by mercenary troops, but it was clearly impossible to allow an army, quite independent of the Government, to function at Canton. The Conservatives, both in and outside the Kuomintang, furthermore, hoped to use this Merchants' Volunteer Corps, as the body was called, to oust the Russian advisers and instructors. Chiang, with the aid of his cadets, nipped the movement in the bud by disarming the Volunteer Corps. This was the first time that the cadets had been called upon for actual service under arms, and they responded magnificently.

While the value of the cadets was proved, Chiang still had anything but an easy task in regard to financing the Academy. Yang Hsi-min and Liu Chen-huan, the commanders of the mercenary troops which occupied Canton, worked against him. Neither these commanders nor the troops under them really cared anything for the Party or the Revolution. They levied illegal taxes, and made the unfortunate citizens pay heavily for the "protection" that they afforded. Naturally, men like Yang and Liu were jealous of an Academy that was turning out quite a different class of soldiers from those under their command, but Chiang, whole-heartedly assisted by Liao Chung-kai, was able to continue the work. The Whampoa cadets had established their right to a definitely recognized role in the Revolution, and Chiang determined that they should play it with honour and distinction.

At the end of 1924, Dr. Sun went to Peking to discuss unification with Chang Tso-lin and Tuan Chi-jui. Little did Chiang think when he bade him farewell in November that he would next see his Leader in the majestic but mournful trappings of death at his temporary resting-place in the Western Hills of Peking. Before his departure, Dr. Sun appointed Hu Han-min acting Commander-in-Chief, but Chiang was really given full control in military matters. Hu Han-min was not a military man. Neither of these trusted lieutenants of the Leader had been given a sinecure. Factional disputes were still rampant. The Government that Dr. Sun

headed was internationally unrecognized, and there were few troops in Kwangtung itself that could be depended upon. Consequently Chiang, who had a much clearer vision of the difficulties ahead than his associates, set himself the task of organizing two regiments out of his cadets which he hoped would become a model for the Revolutionary Army of the immediate future. That hope was abundantly realized.

With Dr. Sun in North China, Chen Chiung-ming decided that it was opportune to make another attempt to regain Canton. He moved swiftly against Hsu Chung-chih's forces, but Chiang, although he was far from well at the time, with equal rapidity reinforced Hsu's troops. Defence was converted into attack, Chen was utterly defeated and his headquarters captured. Among his papers was found evidence that the mercenaries Yang and Liu were only awaiting the arrival of the Army of Tang Chi-yao to attack Hsu and Chiang. The latter immediately moved against the mercenaries and signally defeated them. The Kuomintang forces entered Canton on June 9, and the remnants of the troops of Yang and Liu, who were execrated by the civil population of Canton, were given short shift by the lynching parties which were organized by the infuriated citizens.

The outlook, however, was still far from clear. While these military operations had been going on, Dr. Sun's death occurred at Peking. He left a Will that has since been the inspiration of the Party, but he gave no clear indication as to the identity of the man who should carry on his work as leader. He left four outstanding lieutenants, namely, Chiang Kai-shek, Hu Han-min, Liao Chung-kai and Wang Ching-wei. In the absence of any direct guidance from Dr. Sun, the question of leadership was unanswered and theoretically it remains unanswered to this day, though only theoretically. Chiang alone of the four outstanding Chinese leaders of the period, was able to co-operate with each of the other three for long periods in the work of government.

A younger brother of Hu Han-min, Hu I-sheng, allowed his zeal to outrun his discretion to the extent of urging in

print that Liao, Wang and Chiang should be "removed." This infamous counsel was actually followed as far as Liao Chung-kai was concerned. On August 20, 1925, he and a companion were shot by a band of assassins near the headquarters of the Central Executive Committee and both mortally wounded. Hu I-sheng was implicated, but he could not be punished as he had made good his escape. The investigation that followed the death of the two victims showed that two army generals, Yang Chin-lung and Chang Kuo-cheng, were accomplices, and they were executed with the actual assassins.

The assassination of Liao, allegedly at the instigation of Hu Han-min's brother, caused a great outcry against that Kuomintang leader himself. Borodin believed that Hu Han-min had been concerned with the plot, and urged that he should be disciplined. But both Chiang and Wang refused to believe that Hu Han-min was guilty of treachery to his comrades. After he had been sheltered for some time at Chiang's house near the Military Academy, Hu went to Russia in September on a tour of inspection.

The unfortunate event and the subsequent departure of Hu Han-min for Russia threw the burden of leadership upon Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, with Michael Borodin playing the part of the *Deus ex machina*. This development was far from satisfactory to some of the "Old Comrades"—so called because of their long association with the Kuomintang and its predecessor the Tungmenghui—and they began an exodus from Canton for Shanghai and other points north. The members of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees, who left Canton, included Chou Lu, Lin Sen, Wu Chih-hui and Chang Chi.

In the meanwhile, though the revolt that was to have been heralded by the assassination of Liao had been suppressed almost before it started, plotting was still going on. Even Hsu Chung-chih, hitherto a trusted colleague, was reported to be conspiring with both Hu I-sheng and Chen Chiung-ming. Hsu had three divisions at his disposal, and his defection

would have been a serious matter. In justice to Hsu it should be recorded that the disloyal negotiations appear to have been actually carried on by some of his junior officers. Wang and Chiang agreed that as a matter of precaution Hsu's troops should be disarmed.

At this time, Chiang had only one division under his complete control, stationed at Whampoa and in Canton. On September 20, 1925, he ordered his Whampoa cadets to take the necessary action and this they did, taking Hsu's divisional commanders completely by surprise. One of the latter was absent in Hongkong whither he had gone to negotiate with the arch-traitor Chen Chiung-ming.

Practically no resistance was made to the disarming, and the soldiers were later reorganized by Chiang and incorporated into his First Army Corps. This proved practicable as most of the soldiers, and even a considerable number of the officers, were loyal to the Government. Hsu, who was held to have been ignorant of some of the worst intrigues of his subordinates and who previously had an excellent record in the Party, was permitted to leave Canton.

The next step was a reorganization of the Kuomintang Army. Various bodies of troops in Honam and in the west were organized into the Fourth Army Corps under the command of Li Chi-shen and the Fifth Army Corps under Li Fulin. Chiang himself commanded the First Army Corps, while the Second Army Corps was under Tan Yen-kai and the Third Army Corps under Chu Pei-teh. In addition, Chiang was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the expedition which was to clear the East River District of enemies. Early in October, Chiang had 12,000 men in the field and started to clear the Sheklung-Shektan area of opposition.

At this time General Hsiung Ko-wu, formerly *tuchun*, or Military Governor, of Szechwan, who had recently been defeated by Wu Pei-fu's forces, arrived on the scene. Nominally, Hsiung was a supporter of the Kuomintang, but he had seen fit to ally himself with the counter-revolutionaries. His treachery was known in Canton, and Hsiung was arrested

on his arrival in the city on October 3. Some of his troops were disarmed by Tan Yen-kai and Chu Pei-teh and incorporated into the Second and Third Army Corps, but most of them managed to escape into Kwangsi and Hunan.

Having disposed of the forces of Hsiung, Chiang's Armies pressed ahead regardless of casualties. After heavy fighting around Pingshan, an assault was made on Waichow. This city had been under the control of Chen Chiung-ming's rebel forces since the revolt against Dr. Sun in the Spring of 1922. As usual, Chiang's cadets bore the brunt of the fighting, and despite heavy losses they succeeded in breaching the walls of Waichow and capturing the place. This was the prelude to a complete rout of the rebels.

The fall of Waichow occurred on October 14, and by the end of the month Chiang's Armies were pressing forward on a wide front through Lukfung, Santin, Wongliutu and Laolung, while his advance guards were approaching Swatow. This city surrendered without a struggle, and by the middle of November the remnants of the rebel forces had been hounded out of Kwangtung, many of them making their way to Fukien and Kiangsi, while their commanders had fled from Swatow by steamer.

The rout of the enemy was not accomplished, however, without some bitter fighting. On October 27 and 28, the Kuomintang troops, 7,000 in number, under Ho Ying-chin and Tan Shu-ching, were actually defeated, but the following day Chiang personally led a furious counter-attack on Chen's forces which was successful, and the contingents of Hung Chao-lin, who were supporting Chen, were also disposed of. With the suppression of the counter-revolutionaries in Kwangtung, the military base for future operations against the Northern militarists had been consolidated.

Reference was made a few pages back to the "Old Comrades" who were disgruntled at the turn of events after the assassination of Liao, and departed from Canton. On November 3, 1925, a group of these men held a conference before

the body of Dr. Sun, which was then resting in a temple in the Western Hills near Peking.

Although they represented only a minority of the Kuomintang, the members of the Western Hills Conference, as it was called, arrived at several important decisions, resolving: (1) that the Communists should be expelled from the Party; (2) that the Political Adviser of the Canton Government, Borodin, and the Russian military advisers should be dismissed; and (3) that the seat of the Central Executive Committee should be removed from Canton to Shanghai. It was hoped that these resolutions would be adopted at the Party Congress which was to meet on January 1, 1926, but in that the "Old Comrades" were doomed to disappointment.

Chiang, who was then at Swatow after the capture of that city, when informed about the Western Hills Conference, denounced the participants. He was especially incensed at their suggestion that he would allow them to ally themselves with him in order to overthrow Wang Ching-wei. But he took no drastic action at this time against the members of the Western Hills Conference, as he was too much concerned in keeping harmony within his own military units which had been split into two antagonistic factions among the officer personnel, the Sun Yat-sen Society and the Union of Military Youth.

While Chiang was consolidating the position in the South and making final preparations for the Northern Expedition, an unfortunate event occurred which temporarily dislocated his plans. On May 30, 1925, the police of the International Settlement at Shanghai, during a demonstration, fired on a crowd of the demonstrators comprised of students and labourers. Several were killed. Strong feeling was aroused all over China as a result of this incident. On June 18, many thousands of workers in Hongkong went on strike as a protest against the Shanghai Incident. This was the beginning of a strike that lasted 15 months, causing tremendous losses to all concerned.

On June 23, a monster demonstration was staged at Canton

to protest against what was known among the Chinese as the "massacre" at Shanghai. Arrangements were made for the huge parade to pass along the Bund to Shakee, which is separated by a wide canal from the island of Shameen, the Anglo-French Concession at Canton. Protests against the parade were made by the Concession authorities, who feared that some untoward incident might break out. The Chinese gave assurances that the paraders would be unarmed, and the foreign consuls subsequently admitted that they believed that it was the intention of the Chinese leaders that the affair should pass off peaceably.

A British Lewis gun detachment and French marines were lined up along the Concession border as the demonstrators marched by. When about three-fourths of the paraders had passed the Concession boundaries, firing suddenly broke out. Of the Chinese paraders, including students, labourers, merchants and cadets, 52 were killed and 117 wounded.

By whom the first shot was fired is unknown. The Chinese accuse the British and French, while the latter in turn blame the Chinese. A third explanation is that the initial shot was fired by a Russian from an upper storey overlooking the procession. Whoever fired it, that shot started a battle between opposing bodies of riflemen, the Concession guards and the Whampoa cadets.

The Shameen Incident, or the "Massacre of June 23," as it is frequently called by the Chinese, greatly intensified the bitterness that had been aroused by the shooting of May 30 at Shanghai. A hundred thousand Chinese left the British colony of Hongkong for Canton. Assistance was given to the strikers by the Canton Government. In the end these strikers grew disorderly and domineering under the influence of Red propaganda, thus creating further difficulty for Chiang.

The brunt of the anti-foreign agitation on this occasion fell upon the British, though the French were equally involved in the Shameen Incident. It was considered good tactics by the Soviet Russians, however, to concentrate the attack by their propaganda organs upon the British. A boycott of

British goods that was nation-wide was declared. Economic losses in China, coupled with Britain's political difficulties in India, it was thought, would bring Great Britain to her knees. The Russians seem to have overlooked the fact that the economic dislocation effected by the combined strike and boycott was a two-edged weapon that hurt all parties concerned. The losses to the British were enormous, but the Chinese losses were also relatively great considering their economically weaker position.

CHAPTER VI

Friction With Communist Party—Northern Expedition Approved—Chiang Appointed Military Inspector-General—*Coup* Of March 20—Preparations For Punitive Expedition—Chiang's Plans For Army Reform—His Appointment As Commander-In-Chief—Northern Expedition Launched

THE impression that prevailed in certain foreign quarters that Chiang was friendly to the Communists was no doubt due to the efforts that he made at this juncture to prevent an open breach between the combined Russians and Kuomintang Left Wing and the Kuomintang moderates. He was careful in public addresses and writings so to express himself that the Communists could not take exception to his attitude.

Chiang undoubtedly felt that loyalty to Dr. Sun, who had grasped the hand of amity extended by the Soviet Union, made it incumbent upon him to work with the Communists as long as it was possible. He appealed to the Communists and Kuomintang members not to discriminate against each other and cause disunion. They should unitedly fight, he urged, under the Kuomintang flag for the consummation of the Revolution and the realization of Dr. Sun's Three People's Principles.

This notwithstanding, Chiang was not altogether enamoured of his Russian colleagues and those of the Revolutionary Party who had fallen entirely under their influence. He was appreciative of the assistance that the Russians had lent, but his intuition taught him that to allow them to become dominant would certainly not be in the best interests of China. To be prepared for eventualities, he was

Careful to appoint Kuomintang officers, whose loyalty was undoubted, to key military commands, while the Reds were allowed to take only the leadership in political matters. He laid great emphasis, however, on recognition by the Communists that the Three People's Principles were to continue to be the sole basis of the revolutionary movement. This was the rock upon which the uneasy alliance with the Reds was destined eventually to split.

The exclusion of the Reds from important military commands had clipped their wings, but they still retained considerable power. This was manifested at the Second Kuomintang Congress which was in session from January 1 to 19, 1926, under the chairmanship of Wang Ching-wei. The Congress adopted the Will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen as the permanent foundation of the Party, and the late Leader was declared President of the Kuomintang in perpetuity.

The First Congress had laid it down that the Communists were to be admitted to the Kuomintang as auxiliary members and the number of Communists on any committee or council of the Kuomintang was not to exceed one-third of the total number and this was re-affirmed by the Second Congress. But the Left Wing of the Kuomintang was in absolute control and, although Chiang was elected to the Central Executive Committee, the reorganization of the Revolutionary Government into the Nationalist Government apparently put the Communist Party firmly in the saddle.

Wang Ching-wei was chosen as Chairman of the new Government, but Communist Party leaders such as Mao Tse-tung, Tan Ping-shan, Wu Yu-chang and Ling Chu-han became heads of ministries. Party affairs at Canton were placed in the hands of Chen Tu-hsiu. Chen was a prominent Communist. The objective of the Communist Party was to gain control of the Kuomintang Party and destroy it from within. Their intention was divined by Chiang, but the time was not ripe for active interference.

At the beginning of 1926, the Kuomintang military forces in Kwangtung numbered 90,000, divided into six divisions. A

proposal to use these forces for the long planned Northern Expedition, made to the Political Council by Wang Ching-wei on January 27, was adopted. On February 1, Chiang was appointed Inspector-General of the Kuomintang Armies with the special mission of putting the forces on a war basis.

The Kwangsi leaders agreed to support the operations against Wu Pei-fu and the Northern militarists. On February 26 the Nationalist Government issued a manifesto denouncing Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu as the enemies of the country and agents of the foreign imperialists. At this time, it is important to remember, Chiang was Garrison Commander at Canton, and he was reluctant to take up his duties as Inspector-General of the Forces before Canton had been made secure.

In this he was well advised. The Kwangtung capital was full of disaffected militarists and out-of-office politicians, whose main occupation was plotting how they could recover power. The political atmosphere at Canton is at all times apt to become overheated. At this period, at all events, primitive expedients were most popular, and the favourite plan of overcoming political opponents was to remove them, a pleasant euphemism for assassination. Two attempts had been made on Chiang's life, the second in March when he was in his office at Whampoa, but the assassination of Liao Chung-kai had put Chiang on the alert. He improvised an efficient secret service which kept him well informed of the plotting and counter-plotting by the Reds and Whites. Before he took supreme control of the Armies he wished to complete his files of information relating to the identity of those in the ranks of sedition at Canton.

Singularly enough, although Chiang had been denounced in anonymous circulars for being over-friendly to the Reds, it was the commander of the cruiser Chungshan, Li Chih-lung, a Communist graduate from the Whampoa Military Academy, who first took open steps against him. This officer pretended that he had received instructions from Chiang, and brought his vessel to the vicinity of Canton. Chiang took prompt action. He superseded Li in his command, and sent troops

to maintain order at Canton which was in effect, though not formally, placed under martial law. The premises occupied by Borodin and his associates were surrounded by Chiang's troops. Wang Ching-wei, who was ill at the time, was averse to any drastic action being taken against the Communist Party, but Chiang recognised that strong measures were necessary. He disarmed the pickets of the Canton Strike Committee, a Red organ, and some of the troops that had been tampered with, and seized the Canton Ammunition Works. Most of the Russian instructors and advisers were placed under detention. Besides Li, nearly 80 prisoners were held in the school compound at Whampoa. The clean-up lasted three days and was effected practically without bloodshed. When the *coup* had been completed, Chiang reported the action that he had taken to the Political Council of the Kuomintang and offered to submit himself for punishment if he had exceeded his authority. Despite the misgivings of Wang Ching-wei, who thought the military authorities should act only under instructions of the civilian leaders of the Party in matters of that sort, his action was approved.

The Communist Party was highly incensed against Chiang, but was divided in opinion as to what could best be done. One section was for strong measures. It urged that Wang Ching-wei should be pressed by Borodin to dismiss Chiang, that a general strike should be called and the troops which were tinged with red should be instigated to revolt against Chiang. Another section considered that it would be much better to come to some accommodation with him. The latter counsel prevailed, and the Communist Party capitulated. Upon receiving assurances of their good behaviour, the troops were withdrawn from Borodin's headquarters and from the premises occupied by the Strike Committee.

There seems to have been some misunderstanding on the part of different writers as to the causes that led to the foregoing *coup* of March 20. One writer in a book on the Chinese Revolution, declared that it was a counter-stroke to the attempt to assassinate Chiang. Another ascribed the *coup* to

the antagonistic attitude of a large number of militarists at Canton, who suspected Chiang's motives. While it is not denied that there was a welter of intrigues at Canton at that time, the execution of the *coup* showed plainly that it was not directed against any particular group, but rather against all disaffected elements. The blow was administered with the utmost impartiality against members of the Right Wing, the Left Wing, Communists, disorderly workmen and disloyal officers and soldiers. It marked the final consolidation of Chiang's military base at Canton before embarking upon the Northern Expedition.

After this drastic action, a banquet was given to a number of the Russians, who were permitted to depart from Canton, but was not attended by either Chiang or Wang Ching-wei. On March 25, General Rogachoff, the leading Russian military adviser of the Kuomintang and officer in charge of the Soviet mission at Canton during the absence of Borodin, left for North China with several other comrades. Borodin, who had been in the North, arrived at Canton on April 29. At this point it becomes apparent that Chiang's *coup* is susceptible of another explanation. Borodin had strongly opposed the Northern Expedition being undertaken in 1926, contending that it was desirable to consolidate the rule of the Kuomintang in Kwangtung Province first, but during his absence, Chiang had actually accomplished the consolidation and Borodin was faced with the alternative of complying with Chiang's wishes, or of bringing an end to the co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communists. Borodin yielded.

Wang Ching-wei, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, remained ill—some were of the opinion that it was a political illness because he was not entirely in harmony with the steps taken by Chiang. But it was a real sickness. Indeed, it should be remembered that Wang, notwithstanding his youthful and healthy appearance, suffers from diabetes, and that overwork, excitement and mental strain invariably bring about an accentuation of the symptoms of his ailment, necessitating a long period of rest and quiet before he can

again take an active role. Wang was given sick leave, but he offered his resignation. Chiang, however, succeeded in inducing him to remain in office, and Wang did so until after the return of Hu Han-min, thereafter departing for Europe for recuperation. Not finding a prominent role cut out for him in Canton, Hu also left, but for Shanghai.

On April 30, 1926, Chiang called a conference of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the Kuomintang to consider the Northern Expedition, Party affairs and foreign policy. He pointed out during the Party meeting that the situation in the country had undergone a change after the Kuominchun, under Feng Yu-hsiang, had withdrawn from Peking. Practically all the foreign Powers, he said, were ranged against the Revolutionary Party in Kwangtung. He added that the Japanese would probably give financial assistance to Chang Tso-lin to enable him to destroy the Kuominchun in the North, and to Wu Pei-fu so that he could overcome the revolutionary troops in the South. Tang Chi-yao would send troops to hamper the Northern Expedition.

In such circumstances they should co-operate with the Kuominchun and ask Feng Yu-hsiang to retreat to the Northwest to preserve the strength of his forces. Chiang further urged that an understanding be arrived at with the leaders in Kweichow and Szechwan whereby they would prevent Tang Chi-yao from interfering with the Northern Expedition. With Tang Sheng-chih of Hunan and some of the military leaders in Kiangsi a defensive and offensive alliance, Chiang suggested, should be formed so that they would join in the Northern Expedition. Steps should also be taken to persuade Sun Chuan-fang to remain neutral, and the expeditionary forces should be equipped to take the field within three months. The Kuominchun should be able to remain in being for that period of time, and Wu Pei-fu would not have greatly increased his strength. If these plans were followed, the expeditionary force, Chiang believed, would capture Wuchang

and Hankow without much difficulty and the future of the Kuomintang would be bright.

Another proposal that Chiang made related to the military reorganization which provided in effect for the withdrawal of the Communists and Anarchists from any controlling positions in the Army. Only by the adoption of some such course could the success of the Northern Expedition and of the Revolution itself be secured. He recommended that the Soviet advisers should not be permitted to hold administrative or executive positions. In regard to the Soviet advisers in the Army, a definite understanding of the period of their service and the limitation of their authority was essential. The most important of his proposals was the reorganization of the headquarters of the Kuomintang so as to deprive the Communists of the important political positions they held after the Second Congress.

The Central Executive Committee at its Second Plenary Session adopted all of Chiang's proposals. The central headquarters of the Kuomintang were reorganized, and important portfolios were taken away from members of the Communist Party. Mao Tse-tung, who had been the acting head of the Publicity Board, was replaced by Ku Meng-yu. Chiang took the place of Tan Ping-shan as Chairman of the Organization Board of the Kuomintang, and was also elected Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee. As he was too absorbed at the time with preparations for the Northern Expedition and general military affairs to devote time to these civil matters he asked Chen Kuo-fu to act for him on the Organization Board and Chang Ching-kiang on the Standing Committee. He was elected concurrently Chairman of a board to attend to Party affairs in the Army. All the measures taken were designed to curtail the power of the Communist Party.

The agreement which was subsequently reached with the Communists theoretically removed the danger of a split. In the first place it was provided that there should be no criticism of the Three People's Principles by the Communists or any

other party which joined the Kuomintang. The Communist Party was to give a list of its members who had joined the Kuomintang to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and keep the latter informed of any additions to its ranks. No member of the Communist Party could be elected to the Chairmanship of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. It had already been provided by the First and Second Kuomintang Congress that the number of Communists on any of the governing committees or councils was not to exceed one-third of the total number. All orders of the Communist Party to its members, before their issue, were to be submitted to a joint committee of five Kuomintang members and three Communists. It was on this basis that Chiang made his last effort to secure the advantages that would accrue if there were the genuine and loyal co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party which Dr. Sun had envisaged.

Perhaps there was no vision of Dr. Sun with which Chiang Kai-shek was in fuller accord than the plan for a Northern Expedition. He saw as plainly as the Leader that the unification of the country was a sheer impossibility as long as the militarists exercised sway in the North. The militarists were fighting for no ideal. Even Wu Pei-fu had not clearly recognized what the Revolution meant. He was one of those unfortunate men who attain power without any very clear idea of their objective or in which direction their duty lies.

The Revolution could make no headway unless there were unification. This presented the alternatives that the Northern militarists should prevail—in which event the Revolution would have failed—or they must be eliminated. It was impossible for the militarists to prevail as they were divided among themselves, but, unhappily the South was also far from being of one mind. The reactionary elements in Kwangtung and Kwangsi had been openly or covertly opposed to Dr. Sun, and they succeeded in preventing any attempt by him to launch an expedition against the North from achieving success. Dr. Sun died without seeing his dream realized.

Chiang, however, started doggedly and methodically to remove the elements that had frustrated the efforts of his chief. As we have seen, he subdued the reactionaries and brought the Communists to heel. The plans that he proposed for organizing and launching the expedition showed a remarkable grasp of detail and broad vision. Nothing was too small to be considered unworthy of attention and nothing was too great in magnitude to be regarded from all angles before a determination was reached of the best method by which it might be accomplished. The proposals he placed before the Military Affairs Commission for military reform about this time, deserve to be given in detail:

“Towards the end of November, 1925, when unification of Kwangtung had been achieved, I resigned the position of the commander of the First Army Corps. The reason that prompted me to tender my resignation was my wish to set an example. An army corps commander is liable to become a militarist. In my opinion a division should be the unit in the ordinary military organization. All the divisions should receive orders from the Military Affairs Commission, and there is no need to have army corps to control divisions. The positions of army corps commanders might, however, be established when the Northern Expedition is being launched. I propose that all the present army corps commanders be invited to become members of the Military Affairs Commission.

“Secondly, it is imperative that, since military and financial unification in Kwangtung has been achieved, the number of troops to be maintained in accordance with the requirement of the time should be decided at once. The size of the Army is determined by finance. Another requirement is the attainment of our objective, namely, the Northern Expedition. If financial reforms are carried out, it will not be difficult to raise \$40,000,000 or \$50,000,000 annually in the province of Kwangtung alone. Seventy per cent. of the income should be devoted to military requirements. Fifty per cent. of this should be used for current military expenses, and the other twenty per cent. for military education, aviation, navy and forts.

"The Northern militarists are our future enemy. They are able to send more than 200,000 men against us. We cannot raise more than 100,000 men at the present time. I propose that Kwangtung should raise its military strength to 15 or 18 divisions, and upon each division \$130,000 should be expended monthly. Taking 15 divisions for calculation, the annual expenses would not reach the sum of \$24,000,000. Even a military strength of 18 divisions would not be sufficient for both the Northern Expedition and the maintenance of order in the province of Kwangtung itself. It is necessary, therefore, to divide the army into two kinds, namely—a standing army of from 15 to 18 divisions, and a self-defence army of 100,000 men to be composed of students and farmers. The standing army should be completely organized in a period of five months.

"Thirdly, I propose that, as is the system all over the world, a Commissariat Board under the Military Affairs Commission, should be given an independent status. Beginning from the next month, soldiers' pay for various divisions and regiments should be obtained direct from the Commissariat Board. Each division commissariat should be entrusted with the duty of supervising the distribution of soldiers' pay in that division. The divisions and regiments should not be permitted to raise funds in the territories in which they are stationed. Soldiers' pay should be given each month. A certain date for the giving of such pay should be definitely fixed. Each soldier should be given at least \$20 for the Northern Expedition. If there are not sufficient funds for the purpose, the number of soldiers might be reduced. Hygiene and security of mind on the part of soldiers should be insured, and this can only be done by the independence of the Commissariat Board.

"Fourthly, military education should be uniform. For one year, all the army corps headquarters maintained auxiliary schools for military education. This is an excellent system, but it lacks uniformity in courses of training. All the organs for imparting military education should be unified and co-ordinated. The standard of military training should



Chiang Kai-shek at the age of 34 with his mother.

be raised and the Military Affairs Commission should formulate a plan for this. Special courses should be introduced in the Whampoa Military Academy prior to the establishment of a military or staff college. They are commissariat, staff works, communications, chemical warfare, army medical service and artillery. These six courses are essential to military science and should be started at once.

"Fifthly, the arsenal should be improved. According to my investigations the arsenals under the control of the Northern Government, such as those in Hanyang, Kunghsien, Tehchow, and Mukden, are being expanded. Unfortunately in Kwangtung the arsenals are retrogressing. This problem is a weighty one in view of the Northern Expedition, and should not be neglected. The Military Affairs Commission should formulate plans for reform and improvement. More funds may be needed. Four Soviet experts should be invited to assist technically. Two of them should look after the material and two supervise the works. If Soviet experts cannot be obtained, then German experts should be employed.

"Sixthly, there should be strict discipline for the Army. Two reasons were responsible for the success of the campaigns against the rebels in Kwangtung and Kwangsi. In the first place, no quarter was given to the rebels. In the second place, the revolutionary troops were well controlled and highly disciplined. Those defeated soldiers of Chen Chiung-ming who were reorganized could not be expected to observe discipline. Those who once served under Chen Chiung-ming should be disbanded, but the best soldiers might be sent to our divisions to fill vacancies. Any commander who attempts to recruit without obtaining the approval of the Government should be considered as having disobeyed orders and should be sternly disciplined. The Military Affairs Commission has already ordered all the military authorities to observe this rule.

"I have found that the troops use flags on which are written the names of their commanders. This shows that the troops are regarded as owing allegiance only to their commanders

personally, and the practice should be stopped at once."

Chiang's memorandum on the reform of the Kuomintang Army illustrates some of his main characteristics as a leader. For one thing he is a master of detail. Everything bearing on military matters is given his serious study, from problems of finance and supplies to military training and the morale and health of the enlisted men.

At all times Chiang is a man of action. Even before he submitted his concrete plans for the Northern Expedition, he had enlisted the aid of the generals of doubtful loyalty in the provinces under the control of Northern militarists. One of these generals was Tang Sheng-chih, commander of the 4th division of Hunan. Tang was stationed at Hengchow near the border of Kwangtung, which was on the route to be followed by the expeditionary force. He was well aware that Chiang's troops were better trained and that his troops were no match for them. He also knew that the Three People's Principles were popular with the people, and anticipated that the fate of the Peiyang military leaders was being sealed. After a little persuasion on the part of Chiang, he secretly joined the Revolutionary Army.

Tang having agreed to throw in his lot with the South, Chiang recommended his appointment as commander of the Eighth Army Corps. An immediate consequence of the understanding with the Canton Government was a stiffening of Tang's attitude towards Chao Heng-ti, Governor of Hunan. He issued a circular telegram denouncing Chao for the employment of unprincipled men, corrupt financial administration and other political misdemeanours. A mediator restored relations between the two men for a time, but in March, 1926, Chao was driven out of Hunan, and Tang became Governor. An attempt was made by Yeh Kai-hsing, one of Chao's commanders, to oust Tang, but he was defeated. Subsequently, however, Yeh joined Wu Pei-fu, and, with his assistance, drove Tang to Hengchow, whence he requested aid from Canton. This could not be given immediately and Tang was forced to retire from Hengchow early in May.

Events in North China were so shaping themselves that the projected Northern Expedition began to gain support from many who had hitherto regarded it with indifference. In March there had been a stupid slaughter of students in Peking which led to the collapse of the Government headed by Tuan Chi-jui. The last vestiges of constitutional government ended in June when Dr. W. W. Yen's Cabinet left office. Then followed an undisguised military dictatorship under Chang Tso-lin over the provinces held by his Armies. Chang Tsung-chang ruled over Shantung; Yen Hsi-shan was still in control in Shansi; and Feng Yu-hsiang was at this time in Moscow, although he still held the allegiance of his military forces in the North-west. Sun Chuan-fang at Nanking claimed control of five rich provinces on the lower reaches of the Yangtze, while in Central China Wu Pei-fu held sway.

On June 4, 1926, Chiang called an extraordinary meeting of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the Kuomintang, and urged that the Northern Expedition be delayed no longer. The Soviet military adviser did not favour his proposal, declaring that the time was not opportune to launch the expedition, and that, if it were actually decided upon, steamers should be commandeered to ship troops by sea to North China to join the Kuominchun under Feng Yu-hsiang. His main idea was to prevent the adoption of Chiang's proposal for the expedition. The power of this military adviser was great, and had not Chiang previously paved the way for the campaign, his view would have prevailed. Chiang resolutely opposed the counsel of delay and insisted upon the despatch of the expedition. The members of the Kuomintang who attended the conference unanimously supported him. The Nationalist Government subsequently appointed Chiang Commander-in-Chief and practically gave him a free hand in the conduct of the campaign.

On July 9, 1926, he assumed his office and immediately issued a manifesto to the people. He pointed out that in the 15 years that had passed since the Revolution there had

been almost incessant civil warfare. This could be traced to the instigation of imperialists who used corrupt militarists as tools to further their designs, frustrate patriotic movements, deprive the people of their freedom and encourage mutual destruction within the country. The imperialists desired to monopolize China, politically and economically. In such a dangerous situation the only way to save the country was to carry the People's Revolution to its logical conclusion. The objective of the Revolution was to create a free and independent country, and to use the Three People's Principles to maintain the rights and privileges of the country and the people. To do this it was necessary for the people to concentrate their efforts. If they operated under the Three Principles of Dr. Sun, they could overthrow both the militarists and the imperialists who had supported them.

After the issue of the circular Chiang ordered all the troops to start within a specified time. The Kuomintang also instructed its members throughout the country to render him all assistance within their power. Even at this late hour, Chen Tu-hsiu, a prominent member of the Communist Party, opposed the expedition on the pretext that the time was not opportune, but Chiang ignored the opposition. Wishing to limit opposition to one enemy at a time, Chiang adopted the slogans: "Down with Wu Pei-fu," "Co-operate with Sun Chuan-fang," "Leave Chang Tso-lin alone." To make his base in Kwangtung secure, he ordered Li Chi-shen, commander of the Fourth Army Corps and concurrently Chief of the General Staff, to remain at Canton.

A comparison of the military strength of Chiang and Wu Pei-fu shows that, prior to the expedition, Chiang had under his command seven army corps or, including the troops under Tang Sheng-chih, eight army corps. These eight army corps numbered 100,000. The troops which Chiang took with him included Chen Ming-shu's division; Yeh Ting's independent regiment; Li Fu-lin's Fifth Army Corps; the 14th division of Li Ping-chang; Cheng Chien's Sixth Army Corps; Li Tsung-jen's Seventh Army Corps, and the Eighth Army Corps under

Tang Sheng-chih, of five divisions. These were picked units of the Kuomintang Army. The junior officers all came from Chiang's Military Academy, and were confirmed believers in the Three Principles for which they were ready to die. Their discipline was excellent, and after leaving Chaokwan, they received support from the people in the districts they traversed because of their excellent behaviour.

One of the reasons why the Revolutionary Army was consistently victorious was the adoption of a system somewhat on these lines: If a company of soldiers went out to fight, and retreated, the head of the company was to be summarily shot. This treatment applied to battalions, regiments, divisions, and army corps. In the event of a general retreat, if the commander of the army corps personally stood his ground and was killed, all the division commanders under him were to be sentenced to death. In a similar way, those who were below the rank of division commanders were to be shot if the division commanders stood their ground and were killed. This system devised by Chiang was enforced strictly, and no one could escape punishment if there were a retreat.

The political department attached to the Army was another factor which was responsible for the success of the revolutionary troops in their Northern Expedition. Its object was to give the military and the people a thorough political training. The training given to the Army stressed that the fighting now in progress was for the people and for the Party and for a principle. The training given to the people was to enable them to understand the Three Principles and that the Kuomintang troops were the People's Army. The object, which was successfully accomplished, was to secure co-operation between the troops and the people.

The third factor was the system of Party representation in the Army. Each army corps had Party representatives who had received military training. The power of Party representatives was great, and they had the authority to supervise and direct officers below the rank of army corps commanders. In cases of necessity, they could direct the troop movements

themselves. In addition to the Party representatives, each army corps had one special Party office, the function of which was to use Party discipline to assist in the maintenance of military discipline. Another important factor was the open treasury that prevented any squeeze in the Army.

The real strength of the forces which followed Chiang to the Yangtze was only 50,000 men. Opposed to the Revolutionary Army participating in the expedition were Wu Pei-fu's troops. He had under his command 100,000 soldiers. Wu failed to stem the advance of the Northern Expedition for several reasons, but chief among them was the under-valuation of his adversary. The Northerners undoubtedly despised the Kuomintang Army. Moreover, numerous as were Wu's troops, some of them were poorly trained, and above all there was no unifying sentiment such as devotion to the Three People's Principles. The generals under Wu thought more of carving out territories to rule themselves than of advancing the common cause. In fact, it is hardly too much to say that there was no common cause. Wu was absent in the North with his best troops when Chiang launched his campaign.

Chiang was unable to accompany the expedition when it started. In the first place, the General Strike at Canton, which had begun as a patriotic movement of protest primarily against the British, had degenerated practically into a "racket." The police were powerless to prevent the strike pickets and labour from committing acts of violence. General Wu Te-chen, who was Commissioner of Police in Canton, resigned and Chiang was given a free hand in reorganizing measures for the public safety of Canton, the military base of the Northern Punitive Expedition. Police patrols at Canton were reinforced by soldiers along the principal streets, and secret service men were detailed to watch the movements of professional agitators. Chiang had also to make definite arrangements for the financing of the expedition, using his personal influence to hasten the action of the General Chamber of Commerce of Canton in raising the sum of \$500,000 urgently needed for military supplies.

Finally, on July 27, Chiang was able to start for Hunan, after leaving the affairs of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee in the hands of Chang Ching-kiang and those of the Government Council to Tan Yen-kai. Before he left, however, the situation at Canton had greatly improved. Arrangements had been made for the Hongkong-Canton conference over the boycott issue, in which conference the Strike Committee was barred from participation. To give the strikers something to occupy their minds, Chiang had ordered their leaders to supply 4,000 coolies for the expedition. When he arrived to take over active command, he established headquarters in the Presbyterian Hospital at Hengchow on August 10.

CHAPTER VII

Advance Of Northern Expedition—Nationalists Occupy Changsha—
Battles At Pingkiang And Tingszekiao—Wu Pei-fu Takes Command—
Northerners Driven Back To Yangtze—Wuhan Cities Taken By Nationalists—Sun Chuan-fang Mobilizes—Fighting At Nanchang—Defeat Of Sun Chuan-fang—Chiang's Armies Ever Victorious

TO UNDERSTAND how it was possible for Chiang Kai-shek to establish his headquarters at Hengchow, it must be mentioned that on June 2 Tang Sheng-chih had been appointed commander of the Eighth Army Corps of the Revolutionary Army. In this capacity he attacked Wu Pei-fu's troops, by which he had previously been defeated, and regained Hengchow. Early in July, active movements on either side were delayed by weather conditions. The Revolutionary Army occupied one bank of the Lisiu river and Wu Pei-fu's forces the other. A mistaken belief on the part of Wu's commander that the Lisiu was impassable, was utilized by Chiang to hasten the advance upon Changsha. The attack was made by four routes and was successful. Changsha was occupied early in August by the Revolutionary Army, and a subsequent military conference was held there under the chairmanship of Chiang. Following the conference Chiang issued a manifesto in which he defined in detail the object of the Northern Expedition. A summary of this manifesto, which has historical values, reads as follows:

"The Revolutionary Army is about to have a decisive battle with the followers of Wu Pei-fu, leader of the Peiyang Party,

in Hankow and Wuchang. This battle is to determine the fate of the militarists, and to decide the issue whether the Chinese people can recover liberty and independence. It is a struggle between the people and the militarists, between the revolutionists and the reactionaries, between the Three People's Principles and imperialism. I hope that the people of China will arise and join in the struggle.

"Why should we launch a military expedition against Wu Pei-fu? I did not explain this in my previous declaration, but I will give the explanation in this manifesto. Since her defeat in the Opium War, China has suffered at the hands of imperialism for 80 years. At first the Powers used physical force to subdue us. When the Taiping Rebellion arose, the Manchu regime knew that the Han (Chinese) people could not be despised. Then they adopted the policy of using the Chinese people to subdue the Chinese.

"When they lacked sufficient military strength to put down the Taiping Rebellion, Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang utilized foreign troops to achieve their object, and especially enlisted the service of British officers like Gordon. The revolutionary influence of the Taipings was destroyed, but the Manchu realization of the potency of the imperialist Powers had increased. At that time the Manchu Dynasty pursued the policy expressed in its common saying: 'Rather than give the kingdom to our slaves we will present it to the friendly Powers.'

"When the First Revolution took place in 1911, we, the revolutionists, succeeded in giving to the people a republican form of government. Yuan Shih-kai used his despotic power and stole the Presidency from us. After having become President, he used the same tactics as the Manchus were accustomed to use by seeking co-operation from the imperialist Powers. His dream was to make the Peiyang militarists the central figures in Chinese politics. In dealing with the Powers he resorted to the policy of flattering them, and in dealing with the people, he never hesitated to employ harsh punishment to subdue them.

"He was fully aware of the fact that the policy he had been pursuing would single him out as a betrayer of the Republic and also as a 'running dog' of imperialism. He was ready to sacrifice everything for the sake of his personal interests. Thus, the imperialist Powers were enabled to continue using the Chinese to subdue the Chinese.

"Since the establishment of the Republic, the so-called leaders of the Peiyang clique, from Yuan Shih-kai down to Tuan Chi-jui and Wu Pei-fu, have been pursuing the same policy. Wu Pei-fu has risen to power, and his hope is to maintain his clique intact. He would not care a whit even if the country lost its independence and the people became slaves. The Peiyang clique succeeded the Manchu regime and took over the Government. So it always worked together with the imperialist Powers.

"The people's patriotic movement has already spread to labourers and farmers. The masses are working together to free themselves from fetters. Wu Pei-fu not only has refrained from assisting in the growth of the movement, but has also shot down workmen of the Peking-Hankow Railway. The imperialist Powers were formerly careful to keep themselves away from the patriotic movement, but since Wu's massacre of railway workmen, they have thrown away their restraint, using force to subdue us. As a result there was the May 30 outrage in Shanghai. This was the greatest disgrace on the pages of the history of our Revolution. Unless the people succeed in doing away with Wu Pei-fu, they will not be able to curb the activities of the imperialist Powers.

"Now Wu Pei-fu has proposed a Tariff Conference, a conference which Wu opposed when Tuan Chi-jui was at the head of the Government. He wishes to increase the tariff by 2.5 per cent. and with that to secure a loan for financing the war. He is willing to give up tariff autonomy, and has sought the assistance of the imperialist Powers to prolong civil strife, and at the same time increase the burden of the people. He is now supposed to be engaged in a campaign against Communism, but to him any movement for independence or for

equality is Communism, and opposition to militarism, in his eyes, is Communism.

"Entrusted with the duty of carrying out the Northern Expedition advocated by Dr. Sun, I am now concentrating my troops in Changsha and Yochow. As a revolutionist I am fighting for the people. Very soon our Army will arrive at Wuchang and Hankow, and I hope that the people there will give it assistance and simultaneously arise to save the country. The object of the expedition is in accordance with that announced by Dr. Sun in November, 1924, when he went to Peking at the invitation of Tuan Chi-jui and Chang Tso-lin. That object was to hold a People's Convention and give birth to a unified government based on the Three People's Principles and abolish the unequal treaties, in order to enable the people to lay the foundation for liberty and independence.

"If the military men, whether they live in North China or South China, are willing to surrender, I will treat them as comrades. Our Revolutionary Army belongs to the people, respects their wishes, and upholds their opinion. I hope that all military men in the whole of China will unite and join the Revolutionary Army against the enemy and attain the goal of Dr. Sun to save the country and the people. I will do my best to reduce the period of fighting and decrease the burden of the people if our object can be attained, but the Revolution must be thorough and evils must be uprooted."

On August 12, the military conference at Changsha decided that the Third, Sixth, and Second Army Corps should be stationed along the border of Hunan and Kiangsi to guard against the possible movement of Sun Chuan-fang's troops. Chiang ordered Li Tsung-jen's Seventh Army Corps to attack Pingkiang in Hunan on the way to Yochow. Li was to be supported in this campaign by Tang Sheng-chih's Eighth Army Corps. On August 18, the troops were mobilized.

Li Cho-chang, Chief of Staff, was in command of Wu Peifu's troops. The two armies opposed each other at three points. The eastern section was at Pingkiang in Hunan, the

western section in the western part of Hunan, and the central section was divided by the Milu River. Both sides concentrated their efforts in the eastern section. Chiang's strategy was to get behind the enemy's line on the farther side of the Milu River after the capture of Pingkiang in order to avoid an encounter with the Navy, and then the advance to Yochow could be made without much difficulty.

Wu's strategy was to advance from Pingkiang to attack Liuyang and, after effecting a junction with Sun Chuan-fang's troops, to surround Changsha. Three mixed brigades of chosen troops were sent as the vanguards for the Changsha drive. Once the strategy was decided, they concentrated at Pingkiang and Kintsing. They were double the number of the revolutionary troops. Li Tsung-jen had organized a Farmers' Association in the part of Pingkiang within the occupation of the Revolutionary Army, and used its members as the vanguard in fighting Wu's troops. Farmers also served as guides and military intelligence agents. They discovered in a certain village one brigade of Wu's troops under the command of Lu Yun, and Chiang sent 10,000 men to take them by surprise. Lu's brigade was surrounded and disarmed.

Farmers also discovered that Changlokai, the junction of the eastern and central routes of Wu's troops, was open to attack. Chiang sent troops to this place and occupied it. The volunteer intelligence men further learned that Wu's troops had left unguarded a mountain path between Pingkiang and Yochow of strategical importance, which Chiang was enabled to seize. Farmers also gave false information to Wu's troops, who advanced into a trap laid by the Revolutionary Army. As a result of the valuable assistance given by the farmers of the locality and of the rapid movements of the Revolutionary Army, Wu's troops in the eastern section began to encounter increasing difficulty in holding their positions. His troops in other sections were naturally affected, and in consequence there was great uncertainty and confusion. The Revolutionary Army, taking advantage of this situation, crossed the Milu River, and destroyed strong defence works

put up by Wu's men. In the meantime, the second squadron of the Navy remained inactive in the Milu River and did not participate in the fighting. On August 22, 1926, Yochow was captured and Wu's troops retreated to the border of Hupeh. The Pingkiang battle was of great importance to the Northern Expedition.

Another equally important battle took place at Tingszekiao. The loss of the Revolutionary Army in Hunan had been comparatively small owing to the inferior training of Wu's troops who opposed its advance. Although numerically they were superior to the Revolutionary Army, his troops were poor fighting material. The situation at Tingszekiao, however, was entirely different. Just a week before the Revolutionary Army's occupation of Yochow, the combined force of Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin had captured Nankow. Wu immediately left North China for Hupeh, and held meetings with the commanders of his troops stationed at Paoting and Chengchow along the Peking-Hankow Railway. It was decided to send the best troops to Hupeh.

On August 25, Wu together with Liu Yu-chun, commander of the 3rd division, arrived at Hankow. The following day he went to the front together with his bodyguards to direct the fighting. His headquarters were established at Hoshengkiao in Hupeh. On his way to the front he remarked in a confident tone that, as he was going to direct the fighting, his troops would turn defeat into victory. When his trained troops arrived, he would recover Hunan which was then occupied by the Revolutionary Army. Prior to his arrival at the front, the Revolutionary Army had captured Yanglousze and Tungcheng. Chiang's strategy was to follow up his victories as rapidly as possible, so that Wu would not have time to reorganize his troops. On August 23, Li Tsung-jen and Tang Sheng-chih met at Yanglousze and decided upon the capture of Tingszekiao, proceeding by four routes. The First Route Army under Chen Ming-shu and Chang Fa-kuei advanced to assail Tingszekiao from Chungyang and Tungshan. The Second Route Army consisting of the Seventh Army Corps was to attack Tingsze-

kiao from Puchi. The Third Route Army consisting of a portion of the Eighth Army Corps was to assist the Seventh Army Corps and attack Tingszekiao by the same route. The Fourth Route Army, consisting of the Eighth Army Corps, two divisions under Ho Chien and Liu Hsing, was to travel by the Yangtze River, first capture Kiayu, and then assail Tingszekiao. Chiang sent his best trained troops to attack Tingszekiao as he expected that Wu would personally direct the operations and would place his crack divisions at this front.

Before Wu Pei-fu arrived at the front, Tingszekiao had fallen into the hands of the Revolutionary Army for the first time as a result of Chiang's policy of sending his best troops there. Wu ordered nine brigade, regimental, and battalion commanders, who were held responsible for the loss of Tingszekiao, to be shot. He issued an order that a similar punishment would be inflicted upon anyone who fell back. Soldiers armed with swords were stationed by Wu at eight different places to supervise fighting, and they were ordered to kill any officer or soldier who retreated. As a result, Wu's soldiers fought desperately. On the evening of August 27, they recaptured Tingszekiao. The 3rd division under the command of Liu Yu-chun was added to the force which opposed the advance of the Revolutionary Army.

Chiang issued a peremptory order that Tingszekiao must be recaptured from Wu's troops. Before the reorganization of the Northern troops after the capture of Tingszekiao could be completed, he ordered his troops to attack and fighting continued for four hours. Wu used heavy guns and machine guns in resisting the advance of the Revolutionary Army and mowed Chiang's men down. One of Chiang's officers at the front telephoned to him saying that the sacrifice was too great and suggesting a suspension of hostilities for a short while. Chiang declined to accept the suggestion, and on the morning of August 28, the Revolutionary Army again captured Tingszekiao.

Shortly after the second fall of Tingszekiao, Wu's reserve, Ma Chi's Army Corps, in strength more than a division, arrived

at the front. It counter-attacked, and after heavy losses on both sides, recaptured Tingszekiao from the Revolutionary Army. As the troops of Tang Sheng-chih, Chen Ming-shu and Chang Fa-kuei were all at the front, participating in the fight, Chiang had to order the First Army Corps, the general reserve, to proceed to their assistance. His troops again counter-attacked. Bitter fighting took place between Tingszekiao and Hoshengkiao, and many were killed in this engagement. As one soldier fell another took his place, gaps being filled by soldiers without a thought of personal danger. The two armies fought in this manner for one whole day, but on August 29 the valour of the Revolutionary Army prevailed and Tingszekiao was recaptured for the last time, the Revolutionary Army having been considerably helped by the joint responsibility system introduced by Chiang, and the devotion of the soldiers to the principles for which they fought.

More than 3,000 of Wu's soldiers were disarmed during their retreat from Tingszekiao, but this engagement cost the Revolutionary Army dearly. Still, after the battles there, the fame of the Revolutionary Army as fighters was spread far and wide, and the Fourth Army Corps was then named the "Ironsides" for the first time. Wu had intended to transfer three divisions and nine mixed brigades from North China to the front, but it was too late. In 1920, when he was acting commander of the 3rd division, Tsao Kun being the commander, Wu won fame in an engagement with the Kwangsi troops at Tingszekiao. Seven years later he had met his Waterloo at the same place!

Wu Pei-fu's troops retreated to Kinkow on the southern bank of the Yangtze River, important strategically. It lies about 20 miles from Wuchang, and is, in effect, a gateway to the capital of Hupeh. Chiang resorted to an encircling movement to dislodge them from Kinkow, and after a severe engagement, Wu's troops further retreated. This time they were so badly beaten that they almost lost morale. They retreated to Chihfang, 20 miles north of Wuchang, and Wu made hasty preparations for the defence of Wuchang and

Hankow. By Chiang's order, the Revolutionary Army pushed rapidly forward, leaving Wu no time to formulate and execute his defence plans. At Chihfang the two armies came to grips and this was one of the decisive engagements. Wu's men fought hard, but could not withstand the onrush of the Revolutionary Army. From now on, the Northern troops began to beat a retreat directly they saw the Revolutionary Army advancing towards them.

On September 1, Wu's men retreated from Chihfang to Wuchang, a strongly fortified city, flanked by Hungshan—a hill on which there was a fort. In the defence of Wuchang the Navy could also render some aid. Chiang sent troops to attack Wuchang by three routes. The Central Route Army under Li Tsung-jen was to make a direct attack on Wuchang. The Left Route Army, supported by the Eighth Army Corps, was ordered to cross the Yangtze River and attack Hanyang. The Right Route Army with a portion of the Seventh Army Corps was also to cross the Yangtze and attack Hankow. Wu appointed Chin Yun-ao Defence Commissioner of Wuchang and Hankow, ordered the division under Kao Ju-tung and the division under Liu Tso-lung to defend Hanyang and Liu Yu-chun with his troops to defend Wuchang. As Hankow was the centre for reinforcements from North China, Wu himself established his headquarters there. During the day he stayed at Hankow, but at night, with the newly arrived reinforcements from North China, he crossed the river and assisted Liu Yu-chun in defending Wuchang.

The fighting in Wuchang was more sanguinary than on the other two battle fronts. Under cover of darkness the Revolutionary Army made three attacks on Wuchang with the dare-to-die corps scaling the city walls, but the heavy guns and machine guns firing from the city walls were effective in checking all progress. Dare-to-die corps members were literally mown down as they again and again attempted to scale the walls, but were powerless to effect an entrance. When the Revolutionary Army first arrived to encircle the city

of Wuchang, Wu ordered the evacuation of the Hungshan fort in the hope that it would be occupied by the Revolutionary Army. In that event he would be able to fire upon the Hungshan fort from the Sheshan fort outside of Wuchang, which was more powerful, and from the city walls of Wuchang. Then the Revolutionary Army would be compelled to retreat. This was another of Wu's miscalculations, as, after occupying the Hungshan fort, the Revolutionary Army held on to it and could not be driven off. It furthermore used the fort as the base for attacks upon Wuchang.

When the third attempt upon Wuchang was made, six out of the nine city gates were simultaneously under attack by the Revolutionary Army. Chiang personally directed the third attack, with his headquarters on the train at the railway station in the vicinity. The night preceding the attack, he expressed his intention of going to the first line of the Revolutionary Army which was directly under the gun fire of the enemy from the city walls and the Sheshan fort, to encourage his soldiers to put up a determined fight. His senior officers and the Soviet advisers urged him to abandon this intention, saying that the visit involved too much risk for a Commander-in-Chief, and suggested that he should continue directing the fighting from his train. Turning a deaf ear to these counsels, he went to the first line, and told the troops that at 1 a.m. the next day a general attack was to be launched and "you are expected to enter Wuchang. I will remain with you in the firing line." The attack failed, but Chiang henceforth travelled between the first line and his headquarters daily to direct fighting. On one occasion, when he was studying a map at the Hungshan fort, a shrapnel shell from the enemy lines burst in his vicinity. The Soviet advisers ran for cover, but he kept his ground thereby setting a good example to the soldiers.

Since Wuchang had not been captured after three attacks had been made upon it by the Revolutionary Army, Wu Pei-fu left Wuchang for Hanyang where there was a large arsenal. But in the meantime the Revolutionary Army had occupied the

Tapieh mountain outside the city of Hanyang, and Liu Tso-lung had surrendered to Chiang together with his men. On the evening of September 6, he opened the city gates and admitted the Revolutionary Army. Liu Tso-lung's men together with the Revolutionary Army then proceeded to attack the arsenal which was defended by Kao Ju-tung. Seeing that the situation was desperate, Kao with his division of troops retreated to Hankow. As Hanyang is of great importance on account of the arsenal being located in that area, Wu wished to recapture it, but Chin Yun-ao urged him to retreat to Hsiaokan along the Peking-Hankow Railway, and to let Liu Tso-lung occupy Hankow. Wu accepted the suggestions. By this time Liu Yu-chun was the only general under Wu who remained in Wuchang and he was surrounded by the Revolutionary Army.

Hanyang and Hankow having fallen, the Revolutionary Army advanced southward along the Yangtze Valley and occupied one important strategical point after another in Hupeh. In the meantime, Sun Chuan-fang's troops received orders to mobilize and the situation in Kiangsi suddenly became tense. Chiang promptly ordered Li Tsung-jen to defend the lower reach of the Yangtze River in Hupeh and also Pingkiang, while he himself with the First Army Corps returned to Hunan, and thence went to the Kiangsi border to direct the attacks upon that province. He ordered Chen Ming-shu with the Fourth Army Corps, the Eighth Army Corps under Tang Sheng-chih, and the newly organized Fifteenth Army Corps under Liu Tso-lung, to surround and capture Wuchang, and maintain order in the whole of Hupeh.

Learning of the departure of Chiang from Hupeh for Hunan, Wu at Hsiaokan ordered the division under Lu Chin-shan at Ichang and the division under Chang Lien-sheng at Chinchow on the border of Honan-Hupeh to recapture Wuchang and Hankow but, mindful of their personal interests, they showed unwillingness to obey the order. Then Wu ordered Yang Sen to send troops from Szechwan to attack Hankow and Wuchang, but as Liu Hsiang had already surrendered to the Revolutionary Army, Yang dared not move.

Next Wu wanted to reorganize the Northern troops preparatory to another attack, but these men also refused to obey his orders. Prior to his departure for Hunan Chiang had ordered his men to drive Wu from Hsiaokan and into the Wusheng Pass. Wu retreated to Sinyang in Honan, and in less than ten days the Wusheng Pass was captured by the Revolutionary Army. At the entreaty of missionaries, Chiang had agreed for humane reasons not to bombard Wuchang, though to have done so would have caused its early fall. The obstinate General Liu could not be persuaded to listen to reason, but on October 10, 1926, Wuchang was captured by the Revolutionary Army. Towards the end of September, all of Wu's troops in Hupeh had retreated into the province of Honan, and the Kuomintang flag flew over Hunan and Hupeh.

Attention must now be given to the campaign of the Revolutionary Army against Sun Chuan-fang, Commander-in-Chief of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Fukien, Anhwei and Kiangsi. When the Northern Expedition was first launched, Sun endeavoured to mediate between Chiang and Wu with the object of securing a peaceful settlement. Being convinced of the futility of his mediation, he then tried to hoodwink Chiang by pretending to be on friendly terms with him, while at the same time he urged Wu Pei-fu to repair from Nankow to Hupeh and take charge of fighting. Sun, however, was really jealous of Wu, and for that reason had been in no hurry to go to his rescue when Chiang's victorious Armies swept through Hunan and Hupeh. In fact, he viewed the *débâcle* of Wu's Armies with no small satisfaction, as he believed that he could easily check the advance of the Nationalists when he saw fit to do so. He was relying, of course, upon the greatly superior numbers of his Armies.

After the capture of Changsha and Yochow by the Revolutionary Army, Sun concentrated his troops in Kiangsi on the pretext of limiting his military preparation to the defence of his territory and the protection of the people. When defeated at Tingszekiao, Wu in a telegram to Sun sought military

assistance, and at the same time the other military leaders in North China urged Sun to mobilize his Army and join in the fight. Sun called a military conference at which Lu Hsiang-ting, *tupan* or Governor of Chekiang, and Meng Chao-yueh, a division commander, spoke in favour of war. Sun decided to send troops against the Revolutionary Army by two routes.

Notwithstanding the wish of the people to avoid war, Sun was determined to fight. Chiang still cherished the hope that Sun would join the Revolutionary Army and fight Wu Pei-fu, but, when one of Sun's divisions from Kiangsi reached the border of Hunan, he was convinced that there could be no peace between them. On September 3, Chiang issued an order instructing the Second, Third and Sixth Army Corps to attack Kiangsi *en masse*. He appointed Ho Ying-chin Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Route Army and ordered him to take Fukien.

On September 7, Sun sent an ultimatum setting a 24 hour limit for Chiang to withdraw the troops which had been sent to attack Kiangsi and to retreat from Hunan. The following day, Chiang sent a reply in which he urged Sun not to assist Wu, and undertook to recommend to the Nationalist Government that Sun be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the joint Armies in the five provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi and Fukien if he would join the revolutionary movement. Sun declined the offer, and in the meantime, detachments of the two armies on the border had clashed.

There were several reasons why Chiang was so anxious to induce Sun either to join the revolutionary movement or to exterminate him. Two of the five provinces under Sun's control, namely, Kiangsi and Fukien, are located on the border of Kwangtung, the base of the Revolutionary Army. If Sun's force remained intact, in spite of his refusal to become a member of the Kuomintang, the position of the Revolutionary Army would be endangered now that it had occupied Hankow and Wuchang and the whole of Hupeh. With Kiukiang and Hukow along the Yangtze under his control, Sun could attack the Revolutionary Army at any time. Moreover, Sun's ambition

was unbounded, and of this Chiang was fully aware. Since he refused to join the Kuomintang, he was certain to endeavour to increase his military strength, and when he had become sufficiently strong, it would be difficult for the Kuomintang to overthrow him. As a matter of policy also it was desirable for the Revolutionary Army to measure swords with the better trained troops of Sun. Wu's men had been either newly recruited or not thoroughly trained and hence their defeat was natural, but on the other hand, if the Revolutionary Army could defeat Sun's men, its fame would be permanently established.

Sun organized his troops into six routes, totalling more than 150,000 men, exclusive of the reserves in the rear. He had an elaborate plan of campaign, but when fighting actually began, it could not be carried out. Chiang's strategy was based upon the capture of Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi. He organized four routes in opposition to Sun, and personally commanded the 2nd division of the First Army Corps and the students from the Whampoa Military Academy.

On September 19, the Revolutionary Army, after a severe fight, occupied Nanchang for the first time. It received much assistance from labourers, students and others within the city, which facilitated its capture. Lu Hsiang-ting, field commander of Sun's Army, with his headquarters at Kiukiang, sent reinforcements along the Kiukiang-Nanchang Railway to counter-attack with the object of recovering Nanchang, and Sun also sent troops by a southern route to assail the city. Only 10,000 soldiers of the Revolutionary Army were in Nanchang, and although they fought courageously, as they were outnumbered they evacuated the city on September 21, after having suffered heavy losses. On September 22, the Sixth Army Corps of the Nationalist Government, together with a fresh division, again gained possession of Nanchang. On the same day, Sun arrived at Kiukiang and ordered the recapture of the city. Lu Hsiang-ting with fresh reinforcements made a vigorous attack on Nanchang. The Sixth Army Corps after having repulsed attacks with the loss of half of its strength killed and wounded, again withdrew from the

city. Chiang, with one division under Liu Chih and the students' army from the Whampoa Military Academy, had arrived at Kaoan, while the Second Army Corps reached Wanshowkung outside the city of Nanchang. At this time, Sun received a telegram from abroad, signed by 13 Chinese ministers accredited to foreign countries, requesting him to suspend hostilities. In reply to this telegram Sun issued a declaration in which he stipulated that the Revolutionary Army should leave Kiangsi within three days. This was disregarded. Chiang personally directed attacks upon Nanchang for the third time, but finding it impossible to take the city with the forces then at his disposal, he temporarily broke off active hostilities. Sun's men were, as a matter of fact, extremely glad of the respite.

Somehow or other, rumours got into circulation alleging that Chiang had been fatally wounded during the fighting. They were supported by a despatch from Sun, then at Kiukiang, stating that private information from Hongkong declared that Chiang had died of his wounds. Not to be outdone, Wu Pei-fu telegraphed to the Peking Cabinet on November 3 that Chiang had died of his wounds in the American Hospital at Changsha. Two Field Marshals having given the weight of their authority to these rumours, they received some credence for a little while.

Perhaps the respect and fear that the young leader of the Kuomintang Armies had inspired in the enemy is most strikingly proved by the eagerness with which they received and spread the canard about his death. A possible explanation of these rumours, which were shortly to be dramatically refuted, is the fact that one morning Chiang had been slightly indisposed, and did not appear until after 6 o'clock. Another and more picturesque explanation is given in a brief biographical sketch of Chiang Kai-shek written by Chen Tsung-chi, Wang An-tsiang and Wang I-ting. In this, on the authority of one of Chiang's comrades who had fought with him at Nanchang, the following story was told:

"One day, the Allied Army caught three of the Nationalists' spies. They were court-martialled. After the trial, the spies told the Allied generals that General Chiang was at his headquarters; and gave them the secret password for entrance. The Allied Army then sent 500 volunteers in Nationalist uniforms, who designed to enter the camp of General Chiang and murder him. But they were discovered at the second pass. General Chiang immediately sent his guards to attack the brave 500. Of the band only 30 odd of them returned, and they declared to their general that Chiang had been wounded and died."

Inasmuch as no mishap of any kind had occurred to the General, the whole fantastic structure of rumours and reports is useful mainly as material for the psycho-analysts who, no doubt, would tell us that the revolutionary Commander-in-Chief had apparently reduced the Northern militarists to the point where they took refuge in wish-fulfilment stories for desired results that they were no longer able to effect in reality.

Chiang, as already recorded, ordered the suspension of hostilities in Kiangsi for the time being, but brought from the rear two divisions under Chen Ming-shu and Chang Fa-kuei and also ordered Ho Yao-tsu's division from Hunan to join in the fight. Sun took the temporary inactivity of the Revolutionary Army as a sign of its weakness. He sent a representative to Kaoan offering conditions for peace, and the representative was also instructed to ascertain whether Chiang had actually been killed. Sun ordered his troops to hold their line in Kiangsi and not to advance, but instructed other troops to advance into Hupeh and attack.

After a lull, Chiang issued an order on November 1 that the two route armies should at once advance in the direction of Nanchang. He took charge of the Southern Route Army which was to attack Nanchang, while the Northern Route Army, in charge of the Chief of Staff, Pai Chung-hsi, advanced upon Te-an, which was eventually captured. On November 4, Chiang sent a division to occupy Mawailing along the

Kiukiang-Nanchang Railway, thereby opening the way for an attack on Kiukiang, which his troops occupied the same day. Sun's men within the city of Nanchang made an attempt to resist Chiang's attack, but when they learned of the fall of Kiukiang, their base, they withdrew from the city to avoid being encircled, and retreated to the east of Poyang Lake. On November 8, Chiang entered the city of Nanchang in triumph. This was the last engagement for the possession of Kiangsi by the Revolutionary Army. Six division and brigade commanders of Sun's force were captured, and the greater portion of the force was disarmed, scattered or destroyed. Kiangsi passed under the control of the Nationalist Government.

Sun Chuan-fang instructed Chow Ying-jen, *tupan* of Fukien, to attack Chaochow and Swatow, in the province of Kwangtung, the base of the Revolutionary Army, but Chow made various excuses for not complying with the order. On October 9, Ho Ying-chin issued orders to the Eastern Route Army to advance, having secured the co-operation of two brigade commanders under Chow. On December 2, Foochow was occupied without much fighting, and Chow retreated to Yenping. In order to compel him to give up Yenping and retreat to Chekiang, Chiang sent a division from Yushan in Kiangsi to advance into the border of Chekiang. For fear that he might not be able to return to Chekiang, Chow abandoned Yenping, and Fukien thus also came under control of the Revolutionary Army.

On November 7, Sun fled to Nanking. Chang Tsung-chang, *tupan* of Shantung, taking advantage of the defeat of Sun, sent troops southward along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, to attack him. Sun, being thus beset on all sides, decided finally to place himself under the orders of Chang Tso-lin. On December 1, Chang Tso-lin proclaimed himself Commander-in-Chief of the Ankuo (Chihli-Shantung) Army, assuming office in Tientsin. Chang Tsung-chang and Sun Chuan-fang were appointed Vice-Commanders-in-Chief. Chang Tso-lin's first plan was to despatch Wu Pei-fu, who made his headquarters at Chengchow along the Peking-Hankow Railway, to attack

Hupei from Honan; while Sun Chuan-fang was to advance from Chekiang to attack Fukien. The Fengtien troops under Chang Hsueh-liang were to assist Wu Pei-fu in the Hupei campaign, while Chang Tsung-chang's troops and the troops from Chihli would render aid to Sun Chuan-fang. But the plan miscarried. Fearing that the Fengtien troops might seize their territory, the troops under Wu refused to attack Hupei. Chang Tsung-chang would not send troops to join the expedition until he had secured control of Kiangsu and Anhwei. Sun then surrendered control over the northern portion of Kiangsu and Anhwei to Chang Tsung-chang.

Chen Yi, Defence Commissioner of Hsuechow, and commander of the 1st Chekiang division with Chow Feng-chi, commander of the 3rd Chekiang division, who had been sympathetic towards the Revolutionary Army, returned to Chekiang. Chen was appointed Civil Governor of Chekiang, and Chow's troops went to Chuchow where they were stationed along the Chientang River. Chiang sent one division to the Chekiang border. On December 11, Chow Feng-chi's men joined the Revolutionary Army upon its arrival at Chuchow, and Chiang appointed Chow commander of the Twenty-sixth Army Corps, and Chow took his troops to Hangchow, where various people's organizations suggested to Sun Chuan-fang self-government for Chekiang in order to avoid fighting. Sun's condition for his acceptance of the suggestion was that the Revolutionary Army must keep away from Chekiang.

On December 22, Sun's troops advanced by two routes to Hangchow whereupon those commanded by Chow withdrew from the city. Chen's troops in Hangchow were disarmed, but another portion of his force retreated to Shaohing and later was named the Nineteenth Army Corps by Chiang. It faced Sun's troops across the Chientang River. Sun's commander, Meng Chao-yueh, who took Hangchow, was appointed *tupan* of Chekiang. Four divisions and one brigade of reinforcements were despatched from Nanking to Hangchow. Sun was determined to destroy the Nineteenth Army Corps

and the Twenty-sixth Army Corps which formerly had been under his command and both armies were compelled to retreat farther away from Hangchow.

Being a native of Chekiang, Chiang naturally paid great attention to the military operations for the possession of that province. A severe engagement took place at Tunghu, and Meng's troops withdrew to Hangchow. There was internal dissension among Sun's troops in Chekiang, and, becoming aware of this, the Revolutionary Army immediately attacked and captured Fuyang, which is close to Hangchow. Meng, realizing that he could not hold Hangchow, retreated to Kashing along the Shanghai-Hangchow Railway, and his troops in Ningpo went to Woosung by steamer. Sun's other troops under Chow Ying-jen retreated to Shanghai along the railway. On February 19, 1927, Pai Chung-hsi occupied Hangchow, and disarmed those of Sun's troops which had not made good their retreat. Chekiang was completely occupied by the Revolutionary Army.

The Northern Punitive Expedition had traversed 700 miles, driving superior military forces before it and achieving a military victory worthy of chronicling among the notable campaigns of the great captains of history. In China itself, this victorious campaign of Chiang Kai-shek establishes a peak of achievement that has not been equalled in the history of modern warfare in this country.

CHAPTER VIII

Revolutionary Army's Moral Ascendancy—Tributes From Foreigners—"Silver Bullets" Canard—Chiang's Principles Expounded—Fighting Resumed And Shanghai Taken—The Nanking Incident—Communist Plot To Discredit Chiang—Generalissimo Takes Prompt Action—Breach With Hankow—National Government Established At Nanking

SOME reference should be made at this stage to the moral ascendancy which the Revolutionary Army had gained. This was even more important than its military triumphs. Long before the expedition started, while fighting was still going on in Kwangtung, it was generally admitted that the Kuomintang troops, particularly Chiang's personally trained divisions, were well-disciplined and that they fought with great bravery. The storming of almost impregnable Waichow was only one instance of the kind of fighting in which the new Nationalist Armies had proved their mettle. As the Kuomintang Armies swept northward, with a continuous chain of victories to their credit, foreign critics and Chinese alike read the news reports with amazement. The foreign Press in Shanghai in many instances wished to see Wu Pei-fu victorious in Central China, but, despite their personal predilections, they were compelled by the actual happenings to give a good report of Chiang's Armies. For instance, at the fall of Yochow on August 25, 1926, the "North-China Daily News" published a news item from its correspondent, who stated that he had nothing but praise for the way the 2nd division acted. They quieted the city, treating the people very well and paying for all they got. The thousands of refugees who were in the Mission compound sheltering from the Allies felt free to go to their homes again.

A message from another correspondent in the same publication under the date of September 1, from Wuchang, read: "The Southerners are well-disciplined and carry with them a good record, there being no instance of looting. Against this can be placed the fact that Marshal Wu is not a popular figure here. In the past he caused the dykes to be cut, pleading military necessity and it has not been easily forgiven. Wuhan (Wuchang and Hankow) has suffered pillage at the hands of the Northerners before and neither has this been forgotten." Rodney Gilbert, who is not regarded as over-sympathetic towards China, sent despatches to the paper named from Hankow, one dated September 18 reading: "In Hunan the Cantonese have certainly captured the popular imagination. Their behaviour has been excellent, and their demands upon the people have been light, all stories to the contrary notwithstanding."

Subsequent reports from Central China continued in the same strain. "To the evident delight of the people generally," wrote a correspondent from Changsha to the "North-China Daily News" on October 27, "the Southern soldiers are paying for what they get, are not levying such extortionate contributions as did the Wu Pei-fu appointees. The press gangs have been less objectionable and have been more fair. These are not mere inferences; I am repeating the things I am constantly hearing and, indeed, the only things I do hear. I do not doubt that I could get to hear a different tale; but this is the testimony of, not only coolies and working men, on whom the burden of petty oppression falls first and fastest, but of respectable citizens to whom Bolshevism is abhorrent."

To complete the picture let us add the appraisal of H. Owen Chapman, who viewed the campaign from Hankow. In his book, "The Chinese Revolution 1926-27," he paid the following tribute to the Nationalist Armies:

"Any soldiers who have long been in occupation of a district in China are generally sullenly disliked or hated by the poor people who have been subject to their high-handedness and exactions, so that it was only to be expected that

there would be a welcome for those who were driving out the Northerners. But it was found that the Nationalist soldiers never looted, and, broadly speaking, paid for everything they wanted at the market rate, and that only in urgent necessity did they impress the labour of carrying-coolies, and even in such a case usually paid for it. The villagers and townspeople rubbed their eyes in amazement: the propaganda was true after all that these men were 'one with the common people.' The people reciprocated this attitude with open cordiality, and it was not uncommon to see, a few hours after the occupation of a town or village, the soldiers fraternizing and chatting in a most friendly way with the shopkeepers and families on the street front. An indigenous intelligence service was thus ready waiting to assist the incoming army; reliable guides were available whenever wanted; in some cases, days before the army arrived, towns and cities were taken possession of by little groups of enthusiasts, perhaps with the aid of a handful of local militia, in the name of the Nationalist Government."

The testimony offered by foreign observers, in many cases by those who were sceptical of China's salvation by her own efforts, is quite unanimous as to the excellence of Chiang's Armies. The evidence shows clearly the high regard in which the common people held the Nationalists, deeming them to be their saviours. All this tended to raise immensely the prestige of the Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Armies, but at the same time it aroused jealousies and fears on the part of the Communists that led, as we shall see later, to a breach in the Nationalist front.

Desirous of preventing the sufferings of the people which would follow in the wake of active hostilities, Chiang did everything within his power to avoid fighting if he could attain his object by peaceful means. In fact, before departing from Canton on the expedition he announced that there would be both fighting and negotiations. Diplomacy, he intimated, would play a part in the drive north. And that is exactly what happened. Chiang fought battles and he also negotiated

with local enemy commanders, and he usually won both ways. Commanders who fought in the armies of the Northern militarists did so merely for the material benefits that came their way. There was little or no moral principle involved in their allegiance to the so-called Allied cause. Moral principle always has a strong appeal to Chinese, and it is not to be marvelled at that Chiang could persuade many of them to give their support to the Three People's Principles—already almost sacrosanct—and at the same time to join the winning side. As for bribery, which the enemies of Chiang as well as many disbelieving foreigners assert was used to win over many a minor militarist, that has been greatly exaggerated, if only for the reason that the Nationalist treasury had very limited funds at its disposal. Most of the financial support came from Kwangtung, and, wealthy though that province is, it could not provide what would be necessary to satisfy the money-hunger of the old-fashioned militarists of China. Besides it would have been poor economy to buy the doubtful allegiance of minor warlords when that of their districts, and even of the rank and file of their armies, could be won by propaganda. Moreover, it was always easy to beat the kind of leader who could be bought, on the field of battle. The charge that "silver bullets" were a potent factor in the advance northwards is, therefore, nonsensical, and probably has its origin in the hostility of personal enemies of Chiang among the Chinese and also in the "die-hard" attitude of "old China hands" among foreigners who were unable to realize that New China, as represented by the victorious Nationalists, was quite unlike the Old China of the Northern militarists. It has been said of Napoleon that he fought battles and then negotiated, and the victories he won in the field he supplemented with those he won by his diplomacy. The same is true of Chiang: he fights battles and then he negotiates; he is not only a tactician and a strategist, but is also a diplomatist of the first rank.

Towards the end of 1926, while the Northern Expedition

was still in full swing, Chiang gave a number of interviews at Kiukiang and Nanking to the foreign Press, in which he expressed his views on the policies and aims of the Nationalist Government. A signed statement that was obtained from him by one correspondent is so typical and so important as illustrative of the views that he held at this time that it warrants quotation in full:

"The imperialists, seeing the opportunity to control our financial arteries, are making desperate efforts to enrich themselves and to lengthen the duration of their hold. Their efforts in developing their special privileges are various and oppressive, both legally and civilly as well as financially. As a result treaty ports have been opened and foreign settlements have been established; the rates of our Customs have been dictated and finally unequal treaties have been forced upon China, whose purchasing power has been used for the disposition of the overproduction of the foreign manufacturers, and at the same time for buying needed raw materials in China. Economically, China is the market of the imperialists.

"In order to restrain the development of our own industry, the imperialists stand behind the Chinese militarists, and have been responsible for the incessant civil wars in China, which give opportunity for their own trade to survive. On the other hand, all the militarists, imbued with monarchical ideas, obey their orders and force the Chinese to make great sacrifices regardless of their own fate and the fate of their struggle for freedom.

"These foreign elements encouraged Yuan Shih-kai to proclaim himself Emperor, abetted Chang Hsuan in the attempted restoration of the Manchus, supported Feng Kuo-chang and Hsu Shih-chang in their disregard of the Constitution, and assisted Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-fu in their theft of the Presidency. All these incidents present China to the world as being in a hopeless state of feudalism and politically in the grip of the foreign Powers.

"The only aim of the National Revolution is to crush all that pertains to imperialism and militarism and at the same

time to establish an independent and free nation, so as to improve the standing of both the nation and the people. This was also the doctrine of our Leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, from the beginning to the end of his precious life, and was reaffirmed by the First and Second National Congress. It is my personal desire as well.

"As I have already said, the imperialists and militarists are co-workers. If the present Revolution is to succeed, the first necessity is to get rid of imperialism once and for all. This is the reason why Dr. Sun, even in the eventide of his life, worked so hard to consummate the Northern Expedition, not only to get rid of Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-fu, but also to assure himself that they never would return to power.

"In his declaration concerning the Northern Expedition, Dr. Sun clearly stated that, when he had won the day, he would utilize all the power and influence the Revolutionary Government might possess, first to put an end to all the opposing forces within the national boundaries so that the people could enjoy true liberty and have a government 'of the people, by the people and for the people.' Then, turning to the foreign Powers, all the unequal treaties would be considered as invalid, and new and mutual covenants made in lieu thereof. By that time our nation would be on the same footing with other nations in the world, and the following programme could be carried out:

"(1) Having obtained equal status internationally, China could fully develop her productive forces and become strong financially.

"(2) Improvement of the national industry would lead to the betterment of the condition of farmers and labourers and would make it possible for them to enjoy a happier life.

"(3) Full development of the productive forces would make it possible for labour to improve its own living standard, and would bring the labourers into closer communion with their fellowmen.

"(4) With the improvement of both agriculture and industry, the purchasing power of the farmers and labourers

would automatically increase and thus open the channel for the further expansion of trade.

“(5) The proposals regarding education and civilization would not become mere empty talk, as the general improvement would result in a demand for a higher grade of knowledge; and, following the increase of the national wealth through industrial development, enormous funds would be available for both education and civilization and, naturally, the problem of the employment of uneducated persons will be solved.

“(6) As a result of the cancellation of the unequal treaties, uniform laws will be applied in all parts of China. As soon as extraterritoriality and foreign concessions are abolished, the opponents of Nationalist China will lose their strongholds.

“To crush militarism and imperialism is our primary aim, to accomplish which is fundamentally necessary for national well-being. Therefore, always conscious of the distressing condition of our people and the international attitude of contempt towards us, I am now making an expedition to the North with the object of eliminating militarism and imperialism.

“I hope that the present expedition will not be regarded as like previous ones, which aimed at power and possessions. We are making this expedition solely for the purpose of applying the Three Principles of Dr. Sun. Wherever we place our feet I shall faithfully carry out, with all my heart and soul, the reforms necessary for the common good of the people. Based upon the Will of Dr. Sun and the mottoes of our Party, I propose the following measures to be put immediately into effect:

“First, as soon as military affairs are settled, a meeting preliminary to the People's National Convention will be called, and when the actual convention assembles national affairs will be readjusted and one strong government for China will be established.

“Second, regarding the foreign Powers, we shall nullify

all the unequal and unfair treaties and negotiate instead treaties of mutual respect, so as to place us on an equal footing with the rest of the world.

"Third, we will cause the withdrawal of all foreign armies quartered on Chinese soil, and all foreign navies operating in Chinese waters.

"Fourth, consular jurisdiction, as a result of the nullification of the unequal treaties, will cease for all nations now enjoying that privilege in this country.

"Fifth, we shall take back all the ports leased to foreigners.

"Sixth, we shall fix our own Custom Tariff rates.

"Seventh, we shall control all missionary institutions.

"Eighth, no citizen of another nation shall be permitted to own property, open banks or issue banknotes in China unless sanction is given by the Government.

"So much for our foreign programme and the recovery of our sovereign rights. Now, in regard to matters solely affecting the people of China, our programme is even larger.

"First, we shall establish a pure and honest government, and shall get rid of all dishonest officials and government employees.

"Second, we shall grant to the people liberty of assembly, liberty of speech, liberty of the Press, liberty of residence and liberty of creed.

"Third, we shall consolidate all revenues and abolish the *likin*.

"Fourth, we shall cancel all the taxes superimposed upon the land tax and all other illegal imposts. No advance payment shall be collected on the land tax, and no contribution levied on the poor people for military purposes.

"Fifth, the land tax in famine areas shall be entirely remitted, and unpaid taxes as well. A limit shall be placed on the rate of interest on loans made on real estate security.

"Sixth, we shall forbid absolutely the planting, transportation and marketing of opium.

"Seventh, we shall expedite co-operation between the people and the National troops. The latter shall not com-

mandeer labour for transporting munitions, nor be permitted to quarter themselves in residences or schools.

“Eighth, we shall make a proper inventory of all national and provincial assets, and assist in the development of industry.

“Ninth, the Government will raise funds for famine relief, will arbitrarily fix the price of rice and reserve the right to confiscate the property of those impeding the relief of distressed people.

“Tenth, we shall support all organizations of farmers, labourers, merchants and students, and promote their welfare. We shall remove all political hindrances to such organizations.

“Eleventh, we shall inaugurate in any province where peaceful conditions prevail, the system of self-government as directed in Dr. Sun’s ‘Principle of National Reconstruction.’ The Provincial Governor and the magistrates shall be elected by and from the people. Each town shall have its own controlling organization. The people shall be free to call Town, County or Provincial meetings to supervise their respective governments.

“Twelfth, we shall organize the farming districts and promote the cultivation of the soil. We shall fix a maximum rate for land rentals and improve the living standard of farmers.

“Thirteenth, we shall make labour laws, factory laws and labour organization regulations. We shall fix a minimum wage. We shall prohibit the exploitation of labourers by either Chinese or foreign factory owners. We shall improve factory sanitation and specially protect both child and women workers.

“Fourteenth, we shall assign special funds for country-wide education, and these particular funds shall be used for no other purpose. Tuition fees are to be reduced and salaries for primary school teachers increased.

“Fifteenth, we shall raise the living standard of soldiers and enforce discipline. Part of the proceeds of confiscated enemy property shall be distributed among the old, weak, and wounded soldiers as retirement allowances.

"Sixteenth, we shall fix the salary scales for all the lower employees of national, educational and other bureaux, and shall permit them to form associations.

"Seventeenth, we shall give women rights similar to those enjoyed by men. Women shall have the right of suffrage and of election to office.

"Eighteenth, we shall compile careful statistics of population. We shall have the land surveyed and the boundaries well defined. We shall organize town guards so that each community may have its own local protection. We shall improve the highways in each district. We shall devise systems of flood control. We shall begin afforestation. We shall unify the monetary currency and prohibit the over-issuance of banknotes.

"And, nineteenth, the Government will give financial aid for the erection of factories, and seek to improve both production and consumption.

"Now, though our Armies have occupied Wuchang and Hankow and have gained a strong footing on the Yangtze, we have broken but one of the many planks of imperialism and have curbed only a very small section of militarism by defeating Wu Pei-fu. Do not think that we believe that we have completely won the day. We are urging our countrymen to assemble and organize themselves under the flag of the white sun on a blue sky. We are urging all those who have not yet been brought under that flag not to hesitate to organize and to work secretly, so as to carry out their bounden duty to the nation. Only by such organization can the success of the Revolution be assured and the defeat of imperialism and militarism accomplished."

A careful study of Chiang's statement reveals that the aims and intentions of the Nationalist Government, according to his view and desires, were to bring about a democratic system of government, to improve the economic life of the people and accomplish the abolition of restrictions imposed on China by foreign nations. The regional warlord was to be suppressed and the Government of China was to be founded upon the

Three People's Principles instead of the passing whims of mere individuals. Chiang made clear the distinction between himself and the militarists, and at the same time revealed the aspirations of Young China.

On February 24, 1927, when the Nationalists again pressed northward, Sun Chuan-fang lost Chekiang, and he turned over control of Kiangsu and Anhwei to Chang Tsung-chang. His own troops retreated to Yangchow, Haichow and adjacent regions. In the meantime, some of Sun's commanders, notably General Chen Tiao-yuan and General Wang Pu in Anhwei, had surrendered to the Nationalists. Chiang appointed Chen commander of the Thirty-seventh Army Corps and Wang commander of the Twenty-seventh Army Corps. On March 5, Chen started an attack on Pengpu, along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, thereby threatening Chang Tsung-chang's line of communications.

On March 14, Admiral Yang Shu-chuang, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, also surrendered and assumed office as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of the Revolutionary Army. He ordered the warships at Amoy, Woosung and Ningpo to hoist the Revolutionary flag. In accordance with orders from Chiang, he sent three warships to Kiukiang from Shanghai. Simultaneously, the First National Army Corps under Ho Ying-chin was operating on the Sungkiang-Ihing front; Chiang in person was directing the drive against Nanking and Pengpu; and the Eighth Army Corps under Tang Sheng-chih was moving north along the Peking-Hankow Railway.

On March 15, Chiang issued orders that Nanking must be taken within ten days. The Nationalist Armies that had concentrated at Wuhu moved down both banks of the Yangtze towards that city, while at the same time another drive was started in the direction of Changchow. Chang Tsung-chang's troops retreated, leaving the way open for the victorious Nationalists. The threat to Shanghai had already caused a great panic among the foreigners in that cosmopolitan centre. Several thousand British soldiers, 1,500 American marines,

600 Japanese marines and landing parties from warships of other nationalities had organized the defence of the International Settlement and the French Concession. The only trouble that developed with the foreigners, however, was caused by panic-stricken and undisciplined Northern soldiers, who tried to force their way past the Settlement barriers and were fired upon. On March 21, a portion of the Revolutionary Army coming down the Shanghai-Hangchow Railway arrived at Nantao (one of the Chinese sections of Shanghai) where labourers hailed their arrival by joining them. There were some encounters in Nantao between the advance guards of the Nationalist Army and the remnants of the retreating Northerners. The city was occupied by the Nationalists on the afternoon of March 22.

On March 23, Soochow fell. The following day Nanking was occupied by the Sixth Army Corps under General Cheng Chien, whose soldiers were guilty of outrages that threatened to nullify the achievements of the National Revolution. At the head of the political department of these troops was Lin Tsu-han, who took his orders from Borodin and the Communists at Hankow. The Communists had learned that Chiang had departed from Kiukiang on a gunboat, presumably to meet his Armies at Nanking, a city of great importance to the Nationalist cause inasmuch as it was looked upon as the probable Capital of a New China. They regarded it necessary to prevent his successful entry into Nanking and at the same time to discredit him with foreign nations. They consequently decided to repeat the tactics that they had already used on numerous occasions, namely, to undermine Chiang through the political departments attached to the Nationalist Armies.

Lin Tsu-han, it was learned subsequent to the event, received orders to organize outrages against the foreigners at Nanking. He found a complaisant brigade commander who obeyed his command to carry out his plan. When the city was taken, several foreign men were shot and killed, and some half dozen more were wounded. Systematic looting began

early in the morning and continued all day. Most of the foreigners succeeded in reaching a small isolated hill just inside the city wall, on which was located the oil station of the Standard Oil Company. An assault on the hill was under way when a protective barrage was laid down around the hill by American and British warships. The Communists promptly ceased their attack after a few of their number had been killed. Other foreigners in Nanking, chiefly missionaries, were saved by the devoted efforts of their Chinese friends, pupils and servants, who concealed them in all sorts of hiding places while the Reds were committing their excesses and, later, enabled them to evacuate to the warships in the river.

Chiang learned of the dastardly attempt of his enemies to discredit him before his gunboat reached Nanking and consequently did not stop, but hastened on to Shanghai, which he reached on March 26. Realizing the seriousness of the situation and knowing that Shanghai would probably be the next scene of the machinations of the Reds, he lost no time upon his arrival there in taking preventive measures. Rightly or wrongly, the opinion existed in foreign quarters that the Communists planned nothing less than to make a shambles of Shanghai, the idea being to create disorders and organize demonstrations with the object of provoking the foreign troops of the International Settlement to fire upon them. The Communists expected to profit by the inflamed state of Chinese feeling that would result, but Chiang moved too fast for these plans to materialize.

As a preliminary, his colleagues changed a great Sunday meeting that was to start the demonstrations according to the Communist schedule into a demonstration for himself. He also got in touch with the Press and received nearly 20 journalists, to whom he declared that he assumed full responsibility for the Nanking outrages against foreigners, stated that he had already ordered an investigation to be made, and furthermore promised to punish any Nationalist troops that had been guilty of outrages. He explained his position, adding that there were several points that he wished to make clear:

"1.—It is the settled policy of the Nationalist Government not to use force or mass violence in any form to effect a change in the status of the foreign settlements. That has been repeatedly stated by the responsible Nationalist authorities, and I am here to repeat that the Nationalists will use only peaceful methods, namely negotiations.

"2.—The aims and aspirations of the Nationalist movement in foreign affairs are to secure international equality. We wish to be equal among the family of nations. This is clearly stated in Dr. Sun's Will.

"Any nation which is prepared and willing to treat us as an equal is our friend, and we are willing and anxious to work with it and associate ourselves with it even though it is a nation which has previously oppressed us."

The effect of Chiang's statement was instantaneous and favourable. His sincerity was at once recognized. An editorial in the "North-China Daily News" stated that there was no doubt of the breach between Chiang and the Hankow Government. It continued: "He (Chiang) himself has said that he wishes for the friendship of Russia, but that of some of her agents is another matter. Borodin will not forgive that, and the Communist Party which he has built up and directs will not cease in their efforts to lay General Chiang low. . . ."

Up to the time of the Nanking Incident, the Nationalist Armies had had an entirely satisfactory record in respect to their treatment of all foreigners. It was for that reason that more than 400 Americans, British and other foreigners were in Nanking when the Sixth Army Corps began its murderous work, but the immoderate actions of the rabid Reds at Hankow under the leadership of Borodin and Hsu Chien had so alarmed the Governments of foreign countries that thousands of armed troops representing America, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Holland, Spain and others had been sent to the International Settlement at Shanghai. A fleet of foreign warships lay moored in the river near the city. Most foreigners in the interior, especially after the Nanking affair, hastened to evacuate. Foreigners in

Shanghai had developed acute nervousness and made frantic appeals to their home Governments for additional reinforcements.

The foreign Governments promptly made protests to Eugene Chen, who at that time had charge of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Hankow Government, and received evasive replies. Great Britain was thoroughly aroused and suggested drastic action, but America and Japan, recognizing the cloven hoof of the Communists in the Nanking Incident, refused to follow Britain's lead. A little later the British Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons announced that Great Britain withdrew her demands because the perpetrators of the outrages had already met with drastic punishment for their misdeeds. And, indeed, that was the case. Chiang had collected such loyal troops as were available and, moving with his accustomed celerity, cut the railway near Nanking, thus isolating three divisions under their Communist leaders. After a short fight in which some 30 or 40 were killed, these were disarmed. Lin Tsu-han succeeded in escaping to Kiu-kiang. Those soldiers who had actually participated in the outrages were executed. The whole Sixth Army Corps were subjected to disciplinary measures so severe that a little later they deserted and made their way up river, eventually arriving at Hankow a bedraggled and decimated unit.

At Shanghai efforts were continued to unearth and counteract Communist plots. Chiang, assisted by Pai Chung-hsi, ordered raids by regular soldiers to disarm guerillas and armed labourers in Chapei. Some of these resisted and shooting occurred. There were many arrests, and a few were killed and wounded. Chiang issued a proclamation declaring martial law. He also prohibited the carrying of arms without a permit and ordered the arrest of rumour-mongers. Another proclamation forbade any molestation of foreigners.

Numerous conferences were held in Shanghai, attended in many cases by political antagonists who now discovered that they had in common with each other a bitter opposition to the Reds at Hankow. Much enthusiasm was aroused among the

middle classes for Chiang Kai-shek, and the merchants and bankers rallied to his support. A loan of \$3,000,000 was arranged for Chiang's immediate needs. Intellectuals like Tsai Yuan-pei, Wu Chih-hui and Li Shih-tseng joined his standard. Students in mass meetings declared themselves anti-Communist. Delegations of the Left Wing Kuomintang members arrived from Canton, urging Chiang to organize an anti-Communist government in Nanking. Even in foreign countries the reaction was in favour of Chiang. The "Asahi" and the "Nichi Nichi," the two leading dailies of Tokyo, declared the Nanking affair was a Communist plot to discredit Chiang. Clearly, the Reds were hoist with their own petard as a result of their criminal folly at Nanking.

The Communists, after they had reached Hankow and Wuchang, had become more aggressive. They instigated the leftists in the Kuomintang to work against Chiang. He was described as a new militarist. They expelled officials in Wuchang and Changsha who refused to oppose Chiang, or put them under arrest. Being then busily engaged with the military campaign, Chiang tolerated them temporarily.

CHAPTER IX

Chiang And The Communists—Borodin Makes Concessions—Continued Plotting By Reds—Capital Removed To Wuchang—Communist Excesses In Hupeh—Chiang Replies To Critics—Reds Routed In Shanghai—Soviet Embassy Raided—National Government Proclaimed At Nanking—Hankow's Impotent Fury

A REVIEW of the relations between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists becomes necessary if the drastic action against the latter that he was finally compelled to take is to be understood. Even before the anti-Communist *coup* of March 20, 1926, it had been recognized by those who realized the actual situation that Chiang was "anything but Red," as a special correspondent of a foreign paper put it in November, 1925. Occupying a middle position between the extremists of the Left and Right Wings of the Kuomintang, Chiang had dexterously contrived, by inducing the mutually hostile elements to yield to some extent, to get the practical work of the Revolution accomplished. His advocacy of moderation compelled him at times to oppose both classes of extremists. A statement issued in February, 1926, clearly showed his attitude. It was an appeal for co-operation within the rank and file of the Party and an attempt to remove the misunderstanding prevailing abroad that the Nationalist Government was under Soviet domination. The statement follows:

"The Canton Government and I have frequently been accused by our enemies of being entirely under the dictatorship of the Soviet Russians. Those who invented this story, and sought to spread it, either know nothing about

the situation in this province, or they are purposely doing it with the object of undermining us. They consider that this is the best way to betray the Nationalist Government, which will not submit to outside interference. Those who know us, those who understand what we are trying to do for the country, and those who understand the real situation, will easily realize the falsity of this allegation.

"Our aims are to fight for justice and to place China in her proper place among the nations. Naturally we are fighting for our liberty and we are approaching this end. The question of reform then comes up. We intend to go one step at a time. Reform Kwangtung and make it a model province and others will join us, or they will at least follow our example. We desire to see more cosmopolitanism, and in our eyes there is no such thing as racial prejudice or national discrimination. All can come and intermingle with us; we have no ill-feeling towards anyone. China is half dead and it devolves upon us to resuscitate her. It is necessary that all should co-operate and fight for liberty and justice so as to enable China to regain her position in the world. If we do not co-operate, our campaign will be meaningless, it will be a failure. Let all be patriotic and assist in carrying out the aims and principles of our late Leader (Dr. Sun). Mencius said that big things are not done, not because we are unable to do them, but because we do not do them.

"The Chinese are not inferior to foreigners in knowledge and ability, and are superior to them in many respects. If foreigners can do great things, surely we can do the same. Also we can do many things which they cannot do. The famous scholar, Han Yu, once said: 'The lazy do not do great things, but they are jealous when others do them.' Do not let us be jealous of others, but let us do these things ourselves.

"We are not pro-Russian nor are we anti-British. Our sole aim is to fight for China. If the nations of the world will render us aid, we shall appreciate it. We will be 'pro' any country that helps to put China on her feet. In order to reach this goal, let us put aside all differences and prejudices.

Let us work in harmony and combine in love, devotion, sincerity and obedience, and then we cannot fail to win."

While Chiang was trying to compose differences between various elements in the Party, Borodin, accompanied by Hsu Chien, secretly visited North China with the object of arranging with Feng Yu-hsiang, who was supposed to have very intimate relations with the Soviet Union, for the establishment of a new Communist base in Inner Mongolia. At Peking he also sought further support from the Soviet Ambassador, which would enable him to strengthen his hold on the Kuomintang in South China. During his absence, the *coup* of March 20, which he had not foreseen, took place. When Borodin returned to Canton, he was faced by *un fait accompli*, and he wisely made concessions to preserve a semblance of co-operation.

Emerging from the background of plots and intrigues on the part of Communists, and counter-revolutionary efforts by militarists and traitors to the Kuomintang, with matters further complicated by strikes, boycotts and labour disorders, Chiang, as we have seen, started on his Northern Expedition which within a period of six months brought half of China under Nationalist control. Bloody battles were fought and won, but it is undeniable that adroit propaganda had played an important role.

The Russians themselves seemed to be under the delusion that their role in the successful expedition was the most important one, and yet they were conscious that Chiang had become an—if not the—outstanding figure. Disregarding the pledges they had given as to the conditions of their co-operation with the Kuomintang, Borodin with his Russian assistants and Chinese satellites set to work to undermine Chiang. A deliberate campaign was organized to discredit him. They sought to set off Tang Sheng-chih against Chiang on the principle of divide and rule.

In the autumn of 1926, Chiang sent a telegram to the Nationalist Government at Canton proposing the transfer of the seat of government to Wuchang in the hope that this might

stop all such intrigues. A joint meeting between the Government and the Kuomintang was held, but no decision was arrived at on account of opposition in certain quarters. Towards the end of October, Chiang sent Tseng Yen-ta and Chang Fa-kuei by aeroplane to Canton to press for the removal of the Capital to Central China. Their mission was successful. The Nationalist Government sent Sun Fo, T. V. Soong, Eugene Chen, Madame Sun Yat-sen and Borodin to Hankow to ascertain whether it was opportune to move the site of the Nationalist Government. Towards the end of November, they arrived at Wuchang, and they telegraphed a recommendation to Canton that the Nationalist Government should be immediately removed to Wuchang.

In accordance with the wishes of Chiang, all the important members of the Nationalist Government went to Wuchang by way of Nanchang, as he desired to thrash out certain problems of major importance with them. On December 31, 1926, they arrived at Nanchang where Chiang was then making his headquarters. They, and this is significant, stayed at Nanchang throughout January and February, and on March 1, 1927, they left for Wuchang. From the outset in 1927, Communist plotting against Chiang began to gather greater headway and became more open. Hsu Chien, who had become completely a tool of Borodin, made a bitter personal attack upon Chiang. He was supposed to be Minister of Justice in the Government at Hankow, but actually he gave all his time to anti-Chiang propaganda, and was so enthusiastic on behalf of his Russian associates that he was usually referred to at the time as the leading Chinese Communist. Formerly, Hsu had been a Christian and had been employed by Feng Yu-hsiang to proselytize his Army, but he gave up his Christian religion for the worship of Marx and Lenin, whom in turn he later denied.

From this time on, the agitational arm of the Nationalist cause ran completely to excess under the insane leadership of the fanatics at Hankow. Strikes and anti-foreign movements became the order of the day. The unbalanced leaders ordered

that one parade be held every day, compelling different shops and trades to send participants. The Chinese, of course, quickly became satiated with these parades, which gradually degenerated into processions of small boys.

There was also the matter of slogans and posters. They greeted the eye at every turn and were in many cases of a sensational order, such as "Death to the Imperialists." Foreign commentators have declared that the work was undoubtedly that of the Russians, particularly in the case of the more objectionable posters. One foreign journalist at Hankow stated that he was looking at the anti-foreign slogans and posters on the hoardings when he observed that a small group of Chinese had been watching him with tolerant amusement. It would seem that the Russians were fooling themselves rather than the Chinese.

Borodin actively pursued his plans to overthrow the Kuomintang Government and destroy the leaders of the Party. Excesses in Hankow went from bad to worse. Twenty-seven native banks were forced to close, and the economic life of the city was disorganized. Confusion reigned. One by one the moderate members of the Kuomintang quietly left Hankow. Elsewhere, especially in Hunan, conditions were even worse. A foreign author said: "The arrest of Chinese was a common occurrence, to be followed by indefinite imprisonment without trial, but sometimes with torture, as a means of extorting money, or by summary execution with or without a brief mock trial. The usual charge was that the accused was an anti-revolutionary and this included every grade of offence, from espionage and intrigue as agents of the enemy to unwillingness displayed by a wealthy man to hand his wealth over to fill the Nationalist coffers.

"At Hankow executions were comparatively rare—perhaps two or three dozen in six months, but at Changsha in Hunan they were common. Even at Hankow there was an intangible nameless apprehension, almost of terror, hanging over the people, so that sitting quietly in his own home with one foreigner, an old and trusted colleague, as the sole guest

and the servants out of earshot, a Chinese host would sometimes be noticed instinctively to lower his voice to a soft whisper when criticizing the actions of the Government."

Chiang and the moderates, upon realizing that the Communists were firmly in the saddle there, opposed the moving of the Nationalist Capital to Wuchang which they had previously supported. They knew that the Government would quickly come under the control of the Communists. Nevertheless the Capital was moved to Wuchang before the end of the year. Subsequently, controversy over the site of the Capital was reopened, Chiang now wishing to locate it at Nanchang, where he would be able to curb the activities of the Reds.

Finally, an acute crisis came over the holding of a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, which was scheduled by Chiang and his associates to commence at Nanchang on March 1, 1927. This was the signal for a violent outburst of abuse on the part of Hsu Chien, who characterized Chiang as a militarist even worse than Chang Tso-lin. Seeking to smooth things over, the members of the Central Executive Committee, who favoured Nanchang, yielded and the meeting was held at Hankow on March 10. Chiang refused to attend the meeting which was completely dominated by the Communists who proceeded to release Chiang from all his committee assignments, reducing him to the rank of merely an army commander. The Communists disregarded all the rules concerning their relations to the Kuomintang and placed a majority of their persuasion on all the governing committees and commissions so that the Hankow regime thenceforth could be considered as almost purely Communistic. Hsu became a member of the Military Commission which was to give orders to all army commanders.

In the meantime, Chiang watched developments from Nanchang. He began to lay his plans to meet the ever-increasing menace of the Red regime at Hankow. A Kuomintang gunboat was held in readiness to take him down the river

should the need arise. The military situation in the Lower Yangtze had moved so entirely in favour of the Nationalist cause that Chiang had practically complete control of southern Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang and Fukien. On March 7, Chiang had made a final effort to stave off the break with the moderate elements in the Hankow Soviet Government by replying to his critics in a speech at Nanchang. Point by point he took up various slanders, such as that he was joining forces with Japan, that he was abandoning a pro-Soviet policy, that he was allying himself with Mukden, and that he was making no report of military expenditures.

In his speech he denied that he was antagonistic to Russia and favourable to Japan. The Soviet Union had shown readiness to deal with China on terms of equality and, as long as that policy was maintained, they should not forsake a pro-Soviet policy. Japan, on the other hand, he said, was imperialistic and China could not co-operate with her unless she was prepared to treat with China on equal terms. He was in no sense anti-Soviet, but some of Russia's representatives in China had tried to impede every movement of the Kuomintang. The charge of negotiating with the Northern militarists filled him with indignation. While the men whom he commanded were fighting and dying at the front, Kuomintang members who were in sympathy with the Communists were spreading defamatory rumours about them and their commander.

Adverting to the question of military expenditure, he emphasized that, while they had spent only \$18,000,000 on the war, they had taken five or six provinces in five months. He doubted if any leader, within or without the country, could utilize such a number of troops—at a sacrifice of over 30,000 lives—and secure several provinces in five months at an expenditure of scarcely \$18,000,000. In conclusion he said: "Is it that these mischief-makers are trying to lower others' estimate of me? An old proverb runs: 'There is no difficulty in finding words if one wants to pile sins on another.' These rumour-mongers are so bent on opposing the leaders of the Nationalist movement, that they are acting in an insensate

manner. They cannot understand that if the movement fails China cannot get freedom and equality. It is my earnest wish to make success possible, and though I may be single-handed I will still fight; I am prepared to be treated like Yo Fei.* I care not for the present, I aspire to be a personality in history, one about whom posterity will talk, and I sincerely hope that you will lend a helping hand."

The speech, it may be added, was intended to conciliate Left Wing Kuomintang members and not those who had completely gone Red. Chiang had before this earned a reputation for saying things in his speeches that the more timorous considered indiscreet. It was this quality, perhaps, that had led some of his admirers to call him the (Theodore) Roosevelt of China. After enduring for months the petty pinpricks of his Communist opponents, he delivered this scathing broadside at the intriguers. In the meantime, the gunboat in the river under secret orders kept up a full head of steam, while the anti-Communist Armies under Ho Ying-chin and Pai Chung-hsi were operating in Chekiang, Chiang's home province, and in Kiangsu. A new base of operations had already been prepared.

The attitude adopted by Chiang towards the Hankow regime could scarcely have been a surprise to those who had studied his career carefully. While still at Nanchang he had explained his position most clearly. In a lecture to Kuomintang members on February 21, 1927, he said: "Certain people allege that I have no more confidence in the Communist Party, and that I have even prohibited the introduction of Communist elements into the Kuomintang. As a matter of fact, I have never supported the Communist Party. As I said last year in the Whampoa Academy, I was only inviting other minor revolutionary organizations to join hands with us in the revolutionary movement. The Communist members were at first very frank in their relations with us, and we could not but admit them as their aims and ours were in common. At

* A Chinese patriot who was falsely accused by those jealous of him and cast into prison where he died.



Chiang Kai-shek: at the age of 38.

that time, I made it a condition of their admittance that we reserved the right to suppress the movement if they should go beyond limits and act with a view to endangering the Nationalist cause and Kuomintang interests.

"Now, these Communist people are adopting an aggressive attitude towards the Kuomintang, so, as a leader of the National Revolutionary Army, it devolves upon me to curb their movement. If the Right section of the Kuomintang should betray our cause, we would take similar action towards them.

"You must keep in mind that the success of the Nationalist cause depends upon unity, otherwise we shall never be able to realize our aims. The failure of the Nationalist cause means also the failure of the Communist movement, for they are inter-related. Therefore, in the interests of and for the welfare of the Kuomintang, I have to suppress the Communist movement as it has gone beyond the limits. In doing so, I wish the Communists to realize our responsibilities. I wish them to co-operate with the Kuomintang to the very last with an open heart in order to insure the success of the Nationalist movement. If they do not, then I am not responsible. I believe that all loyal members of the Kuomintang and all good citizens of the Republic of China will assume the same stand as I have assumed, and I hope that my fellow-members will understand my predicament and why I have been compelled to adopt such a stand."

Chiang's speeches at Nanchang, while they made his position clear, only served to increase the determination of the Reds to get rid of him. The deplorable outrage at Nanking on March 24, 1927, was the reply of the Communists. Thereafter affairs rapidly moved to a crisis in the political line-up of Kuomintang elements. Wang Ching-wei returned to Shanghai from abroad on April 3, and immediately had a lengthy conference with Chiang. As there seemed to be no serious differences of opinion between them, Chiang sent out a circular telegram to different military commanders, to

branches of the Kuomintang, to the Press and others, expressing his gratification that Wang was ready to play an important role in all Kuomintang matters relating to military, civil, financial and diplomatic affairs.

The man of action had been prompt, but Wang, while agreeing in principle, generally speaking, with Chiang, wanted to talk things over with Left Wing members at Hankow. He was worried about the legality of the steps that Chiang urged upon him, considering that conventions were of the utmost importance, even in dealing with an emergency situation such as had developed after the Nanking outrages. He had no objection to moving the Government to Nanking as Chiang urged, but he wanted to talk it over first. So he went to Hankow, and Chiang reluctantly saw him depart, realizing that events would have to move along without him.

And events did not wait on the talks at Hankow. At Peking, on April 6, the police, acting under the orders of Chang Tso-lin, raided the Soviet Embassy and seized a large number of incriminating documents. It was amply proved that Borodin exercised complete control over the Left Wing members of the Kuomintang at Hankow. As a result of the disclosures, the Nanking group under Chiang's leadership was greatly strengthened with the rank and file of the Party, who from that moment recognized the Communists as an element to be eliminated at all costs. After the disclosures based upon the documents taken in the raid at Peking, Chiang realized that it would be folly to wait longer, thereby giving time for the machinations of the Reds to mature.

At Shanghai the Communists put uniforms of the Labour Union Corps on hired local ruffians and they also included in the corps a large number of the bandit-soldiers of Chang Tsung-chang. Under the direction of the Reds, these rowdy elements, accompanied by their women and children, surrounded and attacked the headquarters of the Twenty-Sixth Army Corps on April 13. It was not the policy of the Kuomintang to use violence in dealing with labour organizations, and the Reds interpreted this as meaning that they would not be

harmed even though they themselves used violence. They were disillusioned when the soldiers fired on the mob. There were 100 casualties and 90 were taken prisoner. Forty of the latter were found to be disbanded soldiers of the Northern militarists. The Nationalist soldiers succeeded in capturing a large number of arms from the Shanghai Communists, including 3,000 rifles, 20 machine guns, 200 Mauser convertible pistols, 400 automatic pistols, 800,000 rounds of ammunition, 7 handcart loads of axes, and 2,000 long-handled pikes. On April 14, Communists were also rounded up at Nanking.

These events at Shanghai and Nanking were taken as a virtual declaration of war by Chiang against the Hankow Reds. In less than a week, the Hankow regime offered a reward of 250,000 taels to the man who could capture Chiang Kai-shek, or 100,000 taels for his assassination. A verbal attack was made on Chiang by Chen Tu-hsiu, considered by many to be one of the foremost leaders of the Communist Party. On April 15, Chiang himself went to Nanking where active preparations were being made for an immediate conference of Kuomintang leaders to oppose the Red regime at Hankow.

Not only were active steps against the Communist menace at Shanghai and Nanking taken at once but, acting upon his orders, an all-night raid was made at Canton on April 15, where 2,000 arrests were made, and several girl students and Whampoa cadets were executed. A number of labour union headquarters and Kuomintang headquarters, which were being used as centres of Communist intrigue, were sealed. All the Russian advisers were placed under detention. Communists in Canton were ordered to report themselves within ten days, in default of which they were to be arrested and shot.

No sooner had Chiang arrived in Nanking on April 15, than he called together a Party Convention, which, on April 18, proclaimed a Kuomintang Government with its Capital at Nanking. Chiang issued a long declaration to the Kuomintang members in which he reviewed the causes of the dissension in the Party, and showed how the Communists betrayed the Kuomintang, enumerating their intrigues against himself and other

Party leaders. He explained the absolute necessity of breaking with the Communists, in the first place because of the military situation, secondly, because the Communists sought to exclude the adherents to the Three People's Principles from the Party and, in the third place, because of the corrupting influence of the Reds on the farmers and labourers of the country, as well as of the fact that the misdeeds of the Reds threatened to involve China in dangerous complications with foreign nations.

Having dealt with these matters, Chiang's declaration then turned to the discussion of three misconceptions which had gained currency as the result of propaganda by opponents and which had to be corrected.

In the first place, he said, many believed that the people would never desert the Kuomintang as it was struggling for the welfare of the masses, but the Communists were doing all they could to keep the Kuomintang away from the labourer and farmer movements. Unless the people fully realized the real objects of the Kuomintang it was quite possible that they would withdraw their trust and support. Then there was the claim that the People's Livelihood principle and Communism were practically the same. That, he said, was quite erroneous. Dr. Sun distinctly laid it down that Communism might be a good thing for the future but not for the present. Finally, it was urged that there should be close co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communists. In refutation, he would like to point out that the Communists would not sincerely co-operate against the Northern militarists as they were not afraid of them. It was the Kuomintang that the Communists feared as, if the Kuomintang gained power, there would be no future for the Communists. As the success of the Revolution approached the bitter enmity of the Communists for the Kuomintang redoubled.

Declaring that it was the cardinal policy of the Communists to ruin the Kuomintang by underhand methods and extend their own influence, Chiang went on to urge Kuomintang members to work energetically for the Revolution. Until the Northern militarists were overthrown, the unequal

treaties cancelled, the Communist reign of terror ended and the country's economic problems solved their revolutionary task would be unfinished. He besought them to improve the lot of the toiling masses as the Revolution was for the people. Too much attention was paid to gaining control of the Government machine and too little to the betterment of the condition of the workers. Personal differences between Kuomintang members should be given up for the sake of the Party.

After again recommending a cleaning out of the Communists because they were now acting at variance with the Will of Dr. Sun, Chiang Kai-shek declared his personal beliefs as follow:—

“First, I strongly believe that the Three People's Principles are the only principles which can save China. They suit existing conditions in China. They are unitive, organic, and progressive and should not be interpreted in any other way.

“Second, I strongly believe that the people of China should decide their own destiny without foreign interference. For the last three years my experience has shown clearly that outside help is, after all, unnecessary. The Revolution in China is a part of the world revolutionary movement. Upon its conclusion, we cherish the hope of liberating others. We should participate independently and voluntarily in the world movement and should not be dragged into it.

“Third, I strongly believe that unless we break with the Communists the Nationalist Revolution will be hopeless. If we allow their horrible politics to prevail, all will be brought to nought. It is our responsibility to prevent them from intruding in China.”

Chiang then explained Dr. Sun's idea in admitting the Communists into the Kuomintang. He pointed out how the reckless youths and notorious politicians and Communist schemers at Wuhan (Wuchang and Hankow) had nullified Dr. Sun's intentions. He called the attention of Party members to the fact that the Kuomintang Central Supervisory Committee is the highest authority in the Party, and how it had impeached the Wuhan Committee men and ordered them to cease func-

tioning. After an appeal for Party unity and a denial of the charges of his desiring to be a dictator that the Reds had hurled against him, Chiang related how Dr. Sun had told him personally that he expected Chiang to be as faithful, loyal and brave as Lu Hsiu-fu, the most loyal minister of the national cause during the Sung Dynasty. He urged every Kuomintang member to copy Lu Hsiu-fu. This long declaration closed with an assortment of 18 slogans to be used for the Kuomintang cause.

With this declaration, Chiang and his associates launched the new Kuomintang Government into existence at Nanking. Their position from the start was stronger than that of the thoroughly discredited Communist Government of the Wuhan cities. But, while the Nanking regime was in no immediate danger from the Communists, its establishment was by no means without threat of major impediments. Chiang's Armies controlled important areas in southern Kiangsu, Chekiang and Anhwei as well as the province of Fukien, and his allies the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, but, opposite Nanking on the north bank of the Yangtze River, Chang Tsung-chang maintained a large Shantung-Chihli force, while at Yangchow, opposite Chinkiang, Sun Chuan-fang's troops were attempting to reorganize in order to recover the Shanghai area. In Shanghai itself, thanks to the follies of the Communists, several thousand foreign troops patrolled the International Settlement. These facts throw light upon the question whether it was a time for action or for words.

The decisive step taken at Nanking threw consternation into the group of dissentients at Hankow. Wang Ching-wei, who had gone there in the vain effort to sweep back the Communist flood, was much annoyed at the action taken independent of him and his wishes. The Communist-controlled committee at Hankow took steps at once to meet the threat to their regime. Chiang was expelled from the Party, together with other important members who associated themselves with him at Nanking. The articles of expulsion accused Chiang of "notorious crimes" which were enumerated as: violation of

the late Dr. Sun's instructions; breaking up of the Party and dissipation of the revolutionary energies; destruction of the Party military system with the consequent infringement of the power and authority of the Central Party and Government; oppressive control of the Party and employment of unprincipled men; usurpation of governmental power in appointing high army commanders without authorization; violation of the resolutions adopted by the Central Party and opposition to the consolidation of the Party power; alliance with imperialists and compromise with militarists; persecution of farmers and labourers and murder of common people; smothering of political work among troops; the calling of an illegal conference against the Central Government; interference with local administrations and trampling down of people's rights; suppression of public opinion and interference with newspapers. "These are only a few of Chiang's crimes which we choose to point out," declared the Hankow regime, insinuating that there was worse behind. But, if the Wuhan politicians felt enraged, it was not surprising as national opinion had turned strongly against the Communists ever since the Nanking outrages. The man of action merely announced publicly the doom that had already been pronounced upon them by the Chinese people. In their folly, the Communists at Hankow had sacrificed the co-operation of the Kuomintang Centre of whom Chiang was the most outstanding member, for the uncertain support of Tang Sheng-chih. He proved to be a broken reed to lean upon.

CHAPTER X

Three Governments In China—Northern Expedition Resumed—Chiang And Feng In Alliance—Typical Speech By Chiang At Shanghai—Japanese Troops At Tsinan—Financial Difficulties Of Nationalists—Retirement To Nanking—Wang Ching-wei Disillusioned—Pen Picture Of Borodin—Purge Of Reds At Hankow—Borodin Departs For Russia—Chiang Resigns To Restore Harmony

WHEN Nanking launched the ship of state the waters were far from being untroubled. Moreover, there were two other ships of state in the offing. The opposition Nationalist Government—that at Hankow—claimed priority of title. Then there was the Government of the Northern militarists at Peking. Two of the three rivals had obviously to disappear if the country was to be unified, but the question was—which? As if the position were not sufficiently complicated, the intentions of Feng Yu-hsiang, with a powerful army at his disposal, were surrounded by mystery.

Towards the end of April, 1927, the Chihli-Shantung troops, who were in force just across the river from Nanking at Pukow, became menacing. In the meantime, Chiang had summoned a conference of all high military and naval officers at Nanking, and his plans for an immediate resumption of the Northern Expedition were unanimously adopted. They provided for the advance to be continued by three routes. Ho Ying-chin was in command of the First Route Army and Li Tsung-jen headed the Third Route Army, while Chiang himself led the Second Route Army. With characteristic swiftness, Chiang crossed the Yangtze, expelled the Ankuochun (Chihli-

Shantung) forces from Pukow and drove them northward. Yangchow was captured by the First Route Army. Before leaving Nanking, Chiang had expressed the belief that the city would be subjected to attack from the Hankow forces unless he quickly took Pengpu, an important point on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. He occupied Pengpu on May 21, and, pushing rapidly on, entered Hsuechow on June 2, the Northerners proving no match for the forces under Chiang's command. The Army under Ho had also reached the southern boundary of Shantung the same day.

For the first time since the Northern Expedition started from Kwangtung, the foreign Press realized that the operations were of sufficient importance to warrant the appointment of "war correspondents." Consequently, when Chiang left Pukow for Hsuechow he was accompanied by three newspapermen, a Dane, A. Krarup-Nielsen, and two Americans, Robert Pickens, representing the "Chicago Tribune," and Henry Misselwitz, of the "New York Times." They managed to bluff themselves into the General's special train and hung outside their carriage a placard which had been given them to protect their hotel quarters at Nanking from intrusion and which stated that they were under the protection of the Nationalist headquarters. The record of the adventures of these correspondents, though interesting enough, does not enter into the purpose of the present work except when it throws some light upon Chiang's character and activities.

The Danish correspondent, in spite of a few geographical blunders—he places Hsuechow in Shantung—is responsible for some interesting sidelights. He wrote: "At Pukow, General Chiang Kai-shek came slowly along the platform, accompanied by some 20 staff officers. He was wearing a plain khaki tunic, with no signs whatever of his exalted rank. Passing our compartment and seeing us 'three musketeers' at the window, our faces immediately above the inscription on our doors 'Death to all Imperialists,' he smiled and bowed most amiably; it was evident that he had grasped the humour of the situation."

Krarup-Nielsen also described the typical reception given to Chiang at an important railway station close to Hsuehchow. It was here that the last decisive battles were fought, forcing the Ankuochun Armies to fall back on Shantung and leave the way into Hsuehchow open to Chiang's troops. He wrote: "Thousands of people had come out to hail the victorious leader. Summer sun and gay colours, flags and banners everywhere. Four or five bands (all brass) were playing at the same time, each their own different melody, their shrill music helping to swell the chorus of cheers greeting the General as he stepped out of his compartment on to a small temporary platform nearby, from which he made a short speech. His voice was clear and carried well, his features were strong and intelligent, and he looked alert and full of energy. There was something convincing about Chiang Kai-shek when he spoke from a platform. But the task he had taken upon his shoulders of uniting the 400,000,000 people of China in one ideal, which in itself would mean peace and independence to all Chinese subjects—such a task required a leader of quite super-human qualities.

"A couple of hours later, he drove past the railway station outside Hsuehchow, through the old city gates and into the festively decorated city itself. Flaming inscriptions greeted him from every house-wall, from temple doors and gates. Flags and banners and streamers everywhere. All the inhabitants of the town and several thousand soldiers were out to cheer the conquering hero on his entrance into their city; it was quite difficult for the man himself to get through the crowds. At last, however, Chiang's car was seen entering the gates of the military headquarters, and the triumphal procession had reached its destination."

The following day was a festival in Hsuehchow. The banner of the Revolution was seen everywhere. A large mass meeting, at which Chiang was to speak, was arranged just outside the city walls. After expressing the opinion that Chinese voices were not meant for platform speaking as they were too high pitched and frail as a rule, Krarup-Nielsen said:

"This was the case with Chiang Kai-shek's voice, but, all the same, there was power and authority in his whole appearance as he stood there on the platform haranguing his audience; besides, his fame and popularity just at that moment had reached a pitch when it was only necessary for him to show himself for the enthusiasm of the crowd to break out in thunderous applause."

Chiang on this occasion called upon his listeners to carry on the struggle for the liberation of the country and for the Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. He also vigorously attacked the Japanese, who had just sent troops to Shantung with the apparent intention of securing this province for themselves and preventing the advance of the Nationalist Army. In addition, he denounced the rumours then being spread by the Communists that he was an opponent of the doctrines of Christianity and of Confucius. Religion, he declared, was a matter of private conscience. As he finished his oration, he led the crowd with the traditional cheers for the Principles of Dr. Sun. The people cheered, flags waved, streamers fluttered and the meeting was at an end.

Leaving Chiang for the moment at Hsuehchow, it must be mentioned that the authorities at Hankow had also decided upon an advance against the North. If they could win a striking success, they thought they might offset the "defection" of Nanking from their standard. Each grouping undoubtedly hoped that the split in the Party might be healed, though, of course, in each instance at the expense of the other. The Fourth Army Corps started movements from Hankow on Honan on April 22, and a week later were joined by units of the Eleventh Army Corps. The command of the Hankow expeditionary forces was placed in the hands of Tang Sheng-chih. On May 14, these troops were successful in a fierce engagement against the Northerners near Chumatien, and a week later their vanguard was pressing forward north-east of that town, threatening Kaifeng on the enemy's eastern line of railway communications. Feng Yu-hsiang on April 26 captured Loyang for the Nationalist cause, and advanced on

Chengchow which was taken on June 1. The defeat of the Northerners degenerated into a rout, and the conditions became worse for them owing to the defection of two of Wu Pei-fu's generals. Yen Hsi-shan, Governor of Shansi, shortly afterwards declared for the Nationalist cause, hoisting the Kuomintang flag at Taiyuan on June 5.

The movement of the Hankow Armies and that of Feng Yu-hsiang favoured the operations of Chiang Kai-shek. He had made his plans to meet the military menace of Hankow, but the threat of the Ankuochun forces, on the Tsinpu line had directed his attention toward them. He had already made an advance northward in Anhwei. For a month or more, his attention had been chiefly occupied in consolidating his position and getting the regime at Nanking under way. Fortunately, he had been able to obtain the services of Hu Han-min, who was considered one of the Big Three of the Kuomintang, the others being Wang Ching-wei and Chiang himself. Besides the organization of the new Government, there was the immense task of perfecting the commissariat for the troops.

The anomalous situation now developed of two rival and mutually hostile Kuomintang military organizations making a drive for Peking. The one that could reach there first would gain enormously in prestige at the expense of its rival. Taking advantage of the difficulties of the Fengtien forces under Chang Hsueh-liang in Honan, Chiang, as already recorded, crossed the Yangtze at the end of May, occupied Pukow, opposite Nanking, and then pushed back the Armies of Sun Chuan-fang and the Chihli-Shantung forces beyond the Huai River.

In the meantime, Feng Yu-hsiang, whose troops from Shensi advanced to Honan, fighting all the way, became an important political factor. The leaders in Hankow tried to prevent him from co-operating with Chiang.

On June 14, Feng Yu-hsiang, Tang Sheng-chih and other Hankow generals, Borodin, and representatives of Yen Hsi-

shan met in conference at Chengchow. As a result of the discussion, Feng was appointed Chairman of the Sub-Political Council for Honan, Shensi and Kansu and also Chairman of the Honan Committee, and his Army was to be incorporated into the Kuomintang.

It may be recalled that Feng had let the spring of 1927 go by without joining any of the fighting parties. When the Hankow Armies had suffered a loss of 20,000 men in the fierce battles around Chengchow early in June, he suddenly appeared on the scene with forces estimated at 150,000, of which 10,000 were fiery Moslem cavalry. With the assistance of Moscow, he had created a really powerful army. He seized the railway junction at Chengchow. Thus he was in a central position, in which he had the choice of three different allegiances, the Communist-controlled Hankow Government, the Moderate Nationalist group at Nanking, or the Northern Allies. His first step, as we have seen, was to line up the Hankow regime behind himself. An eminently practical man, Feng now apparently had in mind the extension of the scope of his activities. "Chiang Kai-shek is a young man," he reasoned, "and it ought not to be too difficult for a wily old campaigner like myself to bend the less experienced man to my will." As a result of this line of reasoning, he made his plans to repeat his victory over the conference table at Chengchow at another conference—this time at Hsuehchow, where, much to the consternation of the Hankow regime when they learned of it, he arrived on June 19, accompanied by a bodyguard of 5,000 soldiers. Chiang showed every courtesy to Feng, setting out in his private train to meet him and to escort him back to Hsuehchow. After conferring all the morning, the two leaders met at lunch, after which the inevitable photograph was taken. The Danish correspondent was present with his colleagues Pickens and Misselwitz.

Feng told the foreign correspondents that he had come to Hsuehchow as a mediator between the rival Governments at Nanking and Hankow. He skilfully evaded declaring in which direction his sympathies lay. The conferences between Chiang

and Feng continued at Hsuehchow for two more days. Hu Han-min and Huang Fu, coming up from Nanking, joined in the discussions. From early morning till late at night the talks ran on. After three days of negotiations, a big state banquet was held. Both Feng and Chiang made long and ardent speeches, according to Krarup-Nielsen, in which they expressed their wish to fight for the Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and against imperialism and militarism. There were still more conferences about military co-operation, and Feng then returned to his headquarters at Chengchow.

After this series of conferences with Feng, Chiang started on his return to Nanking to make further plans for the Northern Expedition. By his kindness the three correspondents were enabled to travel in his own private carriage. At lunch he chatted freely with them on the political situation. Again to quote Krarup-Nielsen: "Chiang Kai-shek spoke all the time in a calm, deliberate way; it was clear that he considered every reply before expressing it. He wanted us to believe in the friendly co-operation of his Party in finding a pacific solution of the foreign problem in China and the many intricate controversies still pending.

"'An alliance has just been concluded,' said Chiang Kai-shek, 'with General Feng Yu-hsiang, who is willing to join the Nanking Government in fighting the Northern party; however, if Chang Tso-lin should show any inclination to acknowledge the Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and fall into line and subserve the purposes of Nationalist rule, we, on our part, shall be quite ready to meet him in a pacific spirit and thus avoid the last phase of the war of revolution being fought to its bitter end. So far, however, we have seen no signs of any such inclination on the part of Chang Tso-lin.'

"Regarding the Hankow Government, Chiang Kai-shek affirmed categorically that the possibility of co-operation with the Communist element at Hankow was entirely out of the question; on the other hand, it appeared to him quite possible that the more moderate wing would join the Nanking Government sooner or later, and he promised in this connection to

show us, in the course of the afternoon, the verbatim contents of the manifesto, or rather, ultimatum, to be sent to the Government at Hankow as a result of the alliance between himself and General Feng, giving a clear account of their joint attitude."

These journalists had their doubts about the permanence of certain political alliances in China, particularly when one of the parties to a bargain was Feng Yu-hsiang. They expressed their doubts to Chiang, asking if Feng might not fail him in turn when it was least expected. They reminded him that only a fortnight earlier the Communists at Hankow had believed in Feng as their ally. Chiang replied, full of confidence, that he believed in the integrity of Feng in this particular case.

Later on in the day, the three journalists received a copy of the document to be sent to the Hankow Government, and Chiang's English-speaking secretary obligingly translated it for the trio who took it down on their typewriters. "It was a declaration," said Krarup-Nielsen, "in the form of an argumentative ultimatum, wherein General Feng Yu-hsiang, on his own behalf as well as on the behalf of his ally, General Chiang Kai-shek, demanded the immediate deportation of Borodin and his Russian assistants, and the expulsion of all the Chinese Communist leaders, at the same time calling upon the moderate elements of the Hankow Government to join the Nanking Government in fighting against the mutual enemy in the North."

"There is no doubt," Krarup-Nielsen went on to say, "that this ultimatum, revealing to the Hankow leaders their trusted ally, General Feng, as an uncompromising opponent and fervent advocate of the Nationalist principles, would be a great shock to 'Red' rule at Hankow. Turbulent waves would rise in the waters of political controversy when it came to replying to this document. The main point of importance in the whole note was of course the expulsion of Borodin, who had been the man 'behind the scenes,' or the motive power in the revolutionary movement, ever since the days of Sun Yat-

sen at Canton." The Danish correspondent decided to go from Nanking to Hankow, as he wished to forestall the official intimation of the Chiang-Feng ultimatum, having a quite natural journalistic desire to see how Borodin would react to this unexpected development.

A short proclamation was issued by Chiang upon his return to Nanking which read:—

"As Communism and militarism are serious hindrances to our revolutionary aims, I sincerely exhort you, officers and soldiers of the Nationalist Revolutionary Armies and my comrades, to co-operate effectually and fight for the success of our aims and for liberty and the salvation of the Republic of China. Don't let this opportunity pass. Let all see your bravery and patriotism. Fight on. Victory is ahead of us."

Modern methods of propaganda have definitely proved that the Chinese people readily respond to both spoken and written appeals, though by no means can it be asserted that they accept everything that they hear and see. In Chiang's appeals it may be noted that there is an absence of such extreme catch-words as "Death to all imperialists!" and the like. And invariably he appeals for adherence to general principles and sentiments rather than allegiance to himself.

During the first part of July, 1927, Chiang went to Shanghai where he installed Huang Fu as Mayor of Greater Shanghai. His presence there was the occasion for the delivery of a number of addresses in which he reported the results of the three-day conference at Hsuehchow with Feng. His moderation is shown in the discussion of foreign relations before the officers of the Twenty-sixth Army Corps at Shanghai on July 13. On this occasion he said:

"If foreigners are friendly towards us and show a disposition to support us, then we must unite with them, but we must do all we can to overthrow their imperialist governments. Our late President, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in his policy of equality, aimed at the release of China and refused to tolerate overbearing. But we must not be overbearing ourselves, nor must we look down upon others, or ill-treat foreigners. We want real

independence, so we have organized the Revolutionary Armies to fight for the people, and even sacrifice their lives for their principles. We must fight on, comrades, we must be ready to die, and we must be of one mind. Let us love each other, let us die together to overthrow the enemy. After that, none will dare to look down upon us or ill-treat us. We will then attain peace, freedom and equality. Let our mottoes be: (1) don't fear death; (2) don't covet riches; (3) love our country; (4) love our people; (5) keep up our discipline; (6) obey our superiors; (7) put into practice the principles of the Kuomintang; (8) enforce the Three People's Principles and the Will of our President; (9) fight on and attain ultimate victory; (10) never retreat; (11) protect the people; and (12) press forward. Always obey orders, and never retreat under any circumstances without explicit orders from your superiors. Always push forward and, above all, protect the people. Wherever you go, press forward, despite fire and water, and keep up your good reputation. Put into practice the ideals of our late President and you will succeed. Don't fail him."

This might be regarded as a typical example of the speeches, prepared on short notice or else extemporaneous, which he uses in addressing the officers and men of his Armies. Owing possibly to its brevity, this particular speech is lacking in an allusion to characters in Chinese history with which he likes to interlard his speeches, but the moral fervour is there, as it is always in his addresses of this nature. This was due to the strong religious influence in the early home life of Chiang Kai-shek, and he still remembers with filial piety the Buddhist sutras and mantras recited by his mother. To the concept of Chiang Kai-shek, the soldier, the diplomat and the statesman, must now be added that of Chiang Kai-shek, the preacher and leader in the moral and spiritual regeneration of China.

The advance of Chiang's Army up the Tsinpu Railway had led to apprehensions for the safety of Tientsin and Peking. The ascendancy of his troops over the enemy was complete. The anti-Nationalist troops had been thrown into a panic,

but out of this grew a measurable degree of co-operation of the Northern warlords under the leadership of Chang Tso-lin.

In order to hold up the advance of the Nationalists, Chang Tso-lin about the middle of June issued a statement to the effect that he was unable to protect Japanese nationals, and the next day 1,500 Japanese troops were sent to Tsinan, where they constructed a barbed wire barricade on a front of several miles and established what they called a neutral zone. This action was very significant, in that the zone lay in the direct line of the Nationalist advance. Japanese troops also poured into Tsingtao. A boycott against Japanese trade began, and the foundations were laid for future trouble between Japan and China.

The soldiers of Chang Tsung-chang had continually retreated before the advance of the Nanking forces. The latter were nearing the capital of Shantung, Tsinan, when a new factor appeared against them, the fresh, well-equipped and well-disciplined forces of Chang Tso-lin, now acting as Generalissimo of the anti-Nationalist Armies. These troops made a counter-attack on the Nationalists south of Tsinan on June 18, inflicted heavy losses on them and compelled them to retreat. A subordinate of Sun Chuan-fang, Chen I-yen, went over to the Nationalist cause at Tsingtao, but was defeated by the troops of Chang Tso-lin. A diversion was also made by the reorganized forces of Sun who attacked Chiang's lines of communication on July 5. Sun claimed a victory, but really seems to have accomplished very little, as two days later Chiang's advance was renewed.

There was every indication that the Northerners were to be definitely defeated, but, unfortunately, evidence at this point of the reality of the threat by foreign imperialism in China was supplied by Japan. A large force of Japanese soldiers, as already mentioned, had entrenched at Tsinan athwart the line of Chiang's advance. Much larger Japanese forces were in reserve at Tsingtao, which is only two days' sail from Japan. No other nation had thought it necessary to send troops to Tsingtao. The Nationalist advance was brought

abruptly to a halt south of Tsinan, by a complication of difficulties, perhaps the most important of which, apart from Japanese hostility, was the shortage of funds and supplies for Chiang's invading Army. At this time, Chiang was greatly handicapped by a lack of rolling stock for moving his troops, and also by a serious shortage of ammunition. Nevertheless he pressed on and was able to capture Lincheng and Hanchwang on June 24, but Lincheng was lost to the enemy in a counter-attack on June 29.

The Armies of Chiang Kai-shek in Shantung were 350 miles from their base. Difficulties from the beginning of July, 1927, had begun to multiply for these troops who had swept everything before them in their advance northward. First of all there were financial troubles. The Nanking regime was yet too recent to have thoroughly organized its revenue-producing sources, and the Northern campaign had proved a severe strain. In the second place, there were diplomatic entanglements that were embarrassing. American, British, French and Japanese troops had been sent to reinforce the garrisons in Tientsin and Peking. Thirdly, Chiang's new ally, Feng Yu-hsiang, failed to assist him by a flank movement against the threatening Northern Allies. But the decisive factor that turned the scales against Chiang was the continued hostility of the Left Wing leaders at Hankow.

The radical armies under Chang Fa-kuei and Cheng Chien had assembled at Kiukiang towards the end of July. Chiang Kai-shek had no option but to move a considerable number of his troops to meet the new threat. This gave the Northerners their opportunity. Previously, negotiations between the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Tso-lin had been entered into for the purpose of effecting an armistice that would have been much to the interest of the former. Premature and inaccurate reports of the negotiations had been denied, but the fact was that terms had practically been agreed upon when the action by the Wuhan Armies changed the situation, and Chang decided to wait and see if the differences between the factions in Central China would not settle his

problems for him. Any question of an armistice was finally ended by Sun Chuan-fang, who attacked and defeated Chiang's forces. The latter fell back 50 miles upon Hsuehchow. Here they made a desperate stand against the superior and better equipped forces of Sun, but again disaster overtook them. Early in August, Chiang's Armies were in full retreat before the combined forces of Sun and Chang Tsung-chang. The Kuominchun under Feng made a few feeble attempts to create a diversion from Honan, but were easily pushed back.

The retreat of the Nanking Armies southward was at no time a rout, however, despite the fact that they were closely pressed by the Northerners. In fact, the latter could have been checked were it not for the fact the Chiang was racing for the Yangtze River in order to avoid being outflanked by the Hankow Armies. Chiang's troops suffered considerable depletion, largely owing to the deficiencies of the transport, but in turn losses of 6,000 were inflicted upon the pursuing enemy. Despite the prediction of foreign military observers to the contrary, Chiang safely transported his Army across the Yangtze River, and the Nanking-Shanghai Railway was held in strength. The retreat was at an end and Chiang had won the race, though not without heavy losses of men and material. Still, the situation in Nanking became increasingly dangerous, as the troops of the Hankow regime advanced to the border of Chekiang.

Simultaneously, Soviet influence had become less dominant, which eventually led to the compulsory return of Borodin to Moscow. Accurately to envisage the situation, it is necessary to turn back a little. On June 1, 1927, M. N. Roy, the Indian Communist who had been sent to China as the special representative of the Third International at Moscow, invited Wang Ching-wei to meet him in regard to certain important matters. When Wang went to Roy's quarters at Hankow, he was asked whether Borodin had shown him a telegram from Stalin addressed to Borodin and Roy. Upon receiving a negative answer, Roy said: "Borodin does not

like to show you this telegram, which is a secret resolution by the Moscow Bureau. I, on the other hand, think that it is most advisable that you should know what it is about, as I am quite sure you will approve of it. Here it is."

Reading the message, Wang found that the Third International had adopted an entirely new programme in regard to China. The substance of the telegram was that Borodin was to organize a hundred per cent. Communist regime at Hankow, and use whatever force was necessary to destroy all Kuomintang opposition. There were said to be five points in the new programme, namely:

1. Land in Hunan and Hupeh is to be confiscated by the peasants without any reference to the Government, the peasants acting through the Communist Party.

2. A new leadership is to be created within the Kuomintang consisting entirely of Communist members; the Left Wing of the Kuomintang is to be suppressed.

3. The Kuomintang is to be reconstructed along more radical lines with the intention that in the end it will disappear and the Communist Party will take its place.

4. A court is to be created of persons of known reputation as revolutionists, which is to judge all counter-revolutionaries opposing the Communists and punish them if guilty.

5. An army of 20,000 armed Communists and 50,000 labourers and peasants is to be organized, drilled and armed in Hunan and Hupeh.

It appears that Wang had been labouring under the delusion up to this time that co-operation with the Communists was still possible in accordance with the terms laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. He reminded Roy that the conditions for co-operation of the two bodies had been arranged in 1923 in conversations with Joffe and Borodin. Roy suggested that the conditions were now to be changed, and that the telegram from Moscow was in the light of an ultimatum. Wang stated that he was not interested in the new terms, but only in the old conditions.

Borodin, of course, was much too astute not to realize that

this telegram, if shown to the Left Wing members of the Kuomintang, would mean the expulsion of the Communists. To do Borodin justice, it must be admitted that he was continually hampered by impractical and visionary instructions from the doctrinaire enthusiasts at Moscow who managed the Third International. The Chinese Communists had agreed with Borodin in his attitude at this time, but Roy, who was in high favour at Moscow, insisted that the extreme Left Wing members could be forced to yield to the Reds. Roy's indiscretion led to his being driven back to Russia by the Hankow Reds. But even this step did not entirely clear Borodin. The fact that he had concealed the telegram from the Wuhan Committee was regarded as double-dealing on his part. The Left Wing leaders at Hankow grew much concerned over the situation, and began to take steps to defend themselves, but they acted with none of the celerity shown by Chiang Kai-shek when the latter finally came to a decision that a break with the Reds was inevitable.

The Hankow regime dallied until the Chiang-Feng ultimatum was served upon them near the end of June. The fact that this ultimatum came as a complete surprise to the regime at Hankow is revealed by one of the journalists who had accompanied Chiang. Krarup-Nielsen had arrived at Hankow to study the effect. Borodin admitted to Krarup-Nielsen that he and his office staff were in doubts as to the authenticity of the telegram that they had just received. It was not until Krarup-Nielsen submitted his own verbatim copy of the ultimatum that the news was really believed. It appears that Feng had completely misled the leaders at Hankow as to his intentions. A little later, Borodin received a confirmatory telegram from Feng in regard to the ultimatum.

Krarup-Nielsen gave a word picture of this man—Borodin—who played such a remarkable role in China's Revolution and who had before this time become the leading antagonist of Chiang Kai-shek. According to the Danish journalist, the man before him did not at all correspond to the picture that Chinese gossip and the international Press had led him to

expect. He said: "I saw before my eyes a strongly-built, well-proportioned man of some 45 to 50 years, with self-possessed, deliberate movements, calm and reflective of countenance. His voice was full-throated and agreeable, and he spoke slowly as if weighing every word. His expression was haggard, and the whole face was governed by a pair of deep, intelligent eyes, belonging, so it seemed to me, to a man of a studious nature rather than to a red-hot fanatic and destroyer of established ideals. His deliberate ways and slightly ponderous appearance, his quiet, self-poised manner, together with the soft English moustache, reminded one most of all of an English labour leader risen from the people, but trained and schooled during the years of a long and hard political career."

Whatever opinion may be held of Borodin and his work in China, it cannot be denied that the interview with this foreign journalist revealed him as a most exceptional character. When asked for his opinion of Chiang Kai-shek, at that time his bitter political foe, Krarup-Nielsen reported him as saying: "He and I were friends from the very first day we met at Canton four years ago, and I am not going to abuse him in any way. I am convinced that he is honest in his fight for the Nationalist cause, but he is not enough of a personality to carry his work through alone, to take upon himself the gigantic task of liberating and reconstructing China and the Chinese Constitution, and he is surrounded by men whose interests are altogether selfish; they are just wanting to further their own personal plans. It is lucky chance, a chain of coincidences only, which have made him victorious so far—not his military genius by any means. I don't for one moment think he will be able to capture Peking now—even with the assistance of Feng Yu-hsiang—should Chang Tso-lin decide to defend the city instead of retiring towards Manchuria." Subsequent events have shown his judgment to be in error, but that in no way detracts from the strength of his personality.

Shortly after receipt of the Chiang-Feng ultimatum,

the Eighth Army Corps at Hankow enforced at least half of the demands. They broke up the various picket corps in the city, occupied the headquarters of the Labour Unions and forced the leaders to flee. The Hankow Government had no alternative but to accept the results, and they may in truth have wondered at the fruits of their leadership of the masses in Hankow that had led to a series of strikes and lockouts which had paralyzed the economic life of the city and dried up the sources of their own revenues. There were riots in Changsha where the Reds had stirred up trouble by their land appropriation programme. Tang Sheng-chih, after an investigation there, expelled the Communists from the Party.

On July 13, a meeting was convened at the house of Wang Ching-wei in Hankow for the purpose of declaring the Communist Party and Communists outlawed. Another meeting was held on the following day at which the decision was made that Borodin should return to Russia, that all radical movements should be prohibited, and that a delegate should be sent to Moscow to explain the reasons for their action, but the political members of the Hankow regime were too dilatory in making their break with the Reds, as by the middle of July the military acted. General Ho Chien, who had executed a number of Communist labour leaders at Changsha in May, now descended on Hankow and drove Borodin and Eugene Chen to Kuling. A few days later, General Galens (Bluecher) was also expelled. Hsu Chien, who had formerly been a violent pro-Communist among the Left Wing leaders at Hankow, had instantaneously recanted, and at the time of the Chengchow Conference was making violent anti-Communist speeches in Feng's sphere of influence, but Feng did not want him around his Army, and he disappeared from the political scene.

Before the end of July, Borodin was on his way to Russia by way of the motor transport route through Inner Mongolia. He left a broken man, his body racked by fever contracted in South China three years before. A year later, Professor Holcombe, the author and historian, found him in

Moscow, "unhonoured and without employment, a virtual prisoner in the Soviet Capital."

On July 30, the Communists executed a *coup d'état* at Nanchang. The Twentieth Army Corps under Ho Lung and Yeh Ting's division of the Eleventh Army Corps had withdrawn to Nanchang where they declared their independence of Hankow. A reign of terror was inaugurated in the city. Chu Pei-teh, a Hankow Commander, defeated the Reds and later Chang Fa-kuei rushed to the scene with all available troops and by August 5 had definitely suppressed the revolt. This uprising by the Communists had, in the complicated situation at the time, proved an unintentional diversion in favour of the Nanking Armies which were consolidating their defensive line along the Yangtze.

The Wuhan politicians, however, were as adamant as ever. The Red menace that had raised its head at Nanchang had by no means convinced them of the absolute necessity of a reconciliation with Nanking. They wished to heal the split in the Kuomintang, but desired to do so on their own terms. Sun Fo, as well as others, had for months past inclined towards the Nanking regime, but most of the Wuhan politicians could not forgive Chiang Kai-shek for discovering the Communist menace ahead of them. Overtures from Nanking were made on August 8 for healing the breach with Hankow, but the latter in its reply insisted on its own supremacy and the need for a "Fourth" Plenary Session, refusing to recognize the meeting at Nanking under that designation. On July 14, Dr. H. H. Kung and Feng Yu-hsiang sent to the Government at Hankow and Chiang at Nanking a joint telegram urging them to refrain from fighting each other, and suggesting a conference at Kai-feng in Honan. The Government at Wuchang declined to consider such a suggestion. A conference at Anking was, however, held. It was decided to make Nanking the Capital of the Nationalist Government and to call the Fourth Session of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the Kuomintang. Co-operation was arranged and all agreed that the Northern Expedition should be completed as early as

possible in order to remove the menace of the Northern militarists.

Realizing that his own person constituted the only real obstacle to a fusion of the two factions at Nanking and Hankow, Chiang Kai-shek settled the prime difficulties with a sudden and dramatic gesture by his resignation on August 12, 1927.

The first campaign of the Northern Expedition was against Wu Pei-fu, the second was against Sun Chuan-fang, and the third was the attack upon Shantung. The third stage failed because of two factors. The first was the despatch by Japan of troops to Tsinan under the pretext of protecting her nationals. The second was the split between Nanking and Hankow and the despatch of troops by Hankow against Nanking.

CHAPTER XI

Reasons For Retirement—Communists Trying To Wreck Party—Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Example—Borodin A Double-Dealer—Purge Of Party Necessary—Nation Dismayed By Resignation—Chiang Withdraws To Mountain Home—Visited By Foreign Correspondents—Proposed Trip Abroad—Return To Shanghai—Visit To Japan—Marriage To Miss Mayling Soong

CHIANG's decision to retire from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Armies was announced at a conference of the Military Council in Nanking on August 12, 1927. A statement he issued on this occasion is of decided value to an understanding of the motives that inspired his action. Speaking of the reasons for his retirement, he said:

"Being a man of no scholarly attainments, but fortunate enough to have been taught by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, I have made two resolutions which I will never abandon. The first is that I acknowledge that the Party is above everything, and when the interests of the Party are at stake each and every member should follow the Party principles without heeding his personal feelings or private interests. The second is that I hold it the highest duty of a member of the Party to consolidate the foundation of the Party at all costs, and for this reason I shall mobilize all available resources for the purpose of suppressing those who resort to clever ruses and hypocritical methods to shake the foundation of our Party and pollute our principles—in a word, all those who attempt to make of the Kuomintang a dead Party, one without a soul. According to the first resolution, life and death mean the same to me, all depending

on the good that will be done for the Party. If I can be of use to the Party by being active, no task, however Herculean, would prove distasteful to me, while on the other hand if my retirement is deemed helpful to the Party I am willing to retire immediately. In the past I have gone ahead because I must obey the orders of the Party, but if my retirement would at once heal dissension I should like to make it clear that I could be perfectly at home as a recluse. As to my second resolution, if I find that China's sovereignty is impaired and that the Party is being ruined, as has been attempted by the Communists, I expect every member, in spite of minor differences of opinion, to live up to his duty to defend the Party. This is why I have been unyielding on one point only, namely, I will not rest until I see the suppression of the Communists effected, for they are scheming to wreck the Party."

He then made reference to the example of the Great Founder of the Party, Dr. Sun, and his efforts to follow Dr. Sun's teachings in the Kwangtung campaign. He added, "Contrary to expectations, the Communists were Machiavelian." Again he referred to the "uplifting influence of our principles," and he unmistakably indicated his own consciousness of where the strength of his prestige lay when he said, "I claim no credit as I deserve none, for the secret of my successes lies in the undivided authority vested in me by the Central Executive Committee which enabled me to co-ordinate the efforts of my team-workers." He reverted again to the subject of the Communists, their jealousies of the success of the Nationalist Armies and their intrigues behind the lines while men were fighting desperately at the front.

A considerable faction of Left Wing Kuomintang members had clung to the Soviet orientation for no other reason than that Dr. Sun Yat-sen had led them to it in the first place. With this in mind, Chiang went on to explain why he had turned against the Communists.

"For several years," he said, "I have been credited with advocating the policy of seeking Russia's friendship and co-operating with the Communists. When I returned from a



Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek.

tour of inspection through Russia, I had very clear-cut views as to the essential differences between the two policies. This was known to both Liao Chung-kai and Wang Ching-wei. I was unable to convert the learned doctor (Sun Yat-sen) to my views, but I learned his. He said, 'China has no room for the co-existence of Communism and the Kuomintang. We must admit the Communists and convert them, and the Three People's (*san-min*) Principles will serve as a melting pot.' This is more than enough to indicate that in admitting the Communists into the Kuomintang's fold, Dr. Sun had no intention of doing so at the expense of injuring the Party, but, by professing Kuomintang principles in a half-hearted fashion and by adopting deception, they have tried their best to disorganize our military and Party affairs, besides calling a halt to the whole expedition. In my opinion, these plotters would not rest until they had sapped the very vitality of our Party. The fact that I am a Kuomintang man makes it impossible for me to look placidly on; I must be firmly resolved to wage war on the Communists.

"Dr. Sun's policy of Sino-Russian co-operation rests on the fact that Russia has renounced her unequal treaties with China. Borodin has shown himself as a hypocrite, trying to make the Party serve as a scapegoat for his schemes. Since the launching of the expedition, he has treated our leaders in a very overbearing manner, surpassing even the imperialists in this respect. I favour Sino-Russian union, but I demanded without hesitation the expulsion of Borodin. I have no personal bias against him. I must be outspoken against him for the sake of the prestige of our Party. My firm opposition to the Communists springs from my desire to save the Three People's Principles and to face that greatest problem: the survival or ruin of our race. If Dr. Sun could have seen the recent conduct of the Communists and of Borodin, he would surely have insisted on their expulsion from the Kuomintang long ago.

"In these circumstances, then, all the pain and suffering I have endured since the start of the Northern Expedition

may be relegated to oblivion; neither is there any necessity for me to deny the unfounded charges hurled against me by the Hankow faction at the instigation of the Communists. From first to last, all that I demanded was the expulsion of Borodin from China, and non-co-operation with the Communists. Since Borodin has been expelled from China and is now on his way to his own country, and since the Wuhan authorities, as well as those in Kiangsi and Hunan, have undertaken of their own accord to oust the Communists, there need be no further proof that the execution of my views is vital to the existence of our Party and nation. If sincerity and faithfulness could forever be our only guide, so that no outside influence could ever blind us to our noble cause, happiness would be mine as regards the future of Party and nation, and all the more would I realize the greatness of the doctrine of our late Leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen."

But Chiang's retirement was by no means unconditional, as he clearly indicated three things that he expected of his comrades. These were:

"1. I desire that members of both factions will hereafter turn a deaf ear to all ill-prompted words, that they will sink their differences and cast aside this spirit of mutual suspicion. I wish the Wuhan comrades to come to Nanking and help direct the future of our Party. If I am regarded as the cause of the split in the Party, I am willing, as I have repeatedly stated, to make any sacrifice for the Kuomintang; and if any punishment is needed for my crime in order that it would add to the solidarity of the Party, I will regard whatever punishment is meted out to me as a mark of extraordinary honour.

"2. I desire that my comrades under arms who are now stationed in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi will immediately advance northward and concentrate along the Tsinpu Railway in a drive toward Peking. Such has always been our aim from the beginning of the expedition, and I believe that we could have reached our goal had it not been for the intrigues of the Communists. But no effort in that direction is too late. Let all of us exert every ounce of our energy and recover

whatever chances we have lost. The capture of Peking by the Nationalist forces has long been the object of reverent prayers throughout the entire country. What justification can there be if we hesitate, and thus give rise to endless speculation? Let every round of ammunition be fired only at our common enemies; let every drop of blood spilt be spilt only for the cause of the Three People's Doctrine. If ever we let our personal ambitions and self-interests dominate our motives, and if ever we suffer ourselves to be led astray by our enemies at the expense of our own solidarity, such cannot but be regarded as the blackest stain in the history of our Revolution. Quarrels within the Party can serve only to weaken our position as a whole and lengthen the days of the militarists and Communists. Should such a state of affairs come to pass, we would no longer be fighting for the cause of the Party, but struggling among ourselves toward an end that inevitably follows internal dissension. We would not then be striving for the welfare of the people, but simply adding to their suffering by indirectly strengthening the hold of the militarists and Communists. It is almost unimaginable that I, who led my comrades through the most trying days of the Revolution, should now be the cause of their suffering, which would come about through a struggle among ourselves. The Revolution should not, and cannot, end in personal strife. We have launched the Revolution at the cost of great sacrifices, and we must not now strangle it by a scramble for power, else how can we face Dr. Sun and all our late leaders in the hereafter? This is why, despite continuous reports about the situation in the central provinces, I have done my best to calm the tension in the Army and have carefully refrained from strengthening our forces in Anhwei, having never for a moment relaxed the drive against the militarists along the Tsingpu Railway. Comrades in Wuhan, why do you hesitate? Let us all act together and wipe out the tottering militarists!

“3. I hope that the authorities in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi will effect a thorough cleansing of the Party. The

intrigues of the Communists are well known to us. The fact that those who have been under Communist influence are now alive to their danger is an indication that our nation is still sound. Though I do not credit the report that the present anti-Communist campaign in Wuhan is not being conducted with sincerity, nevertheless in view of the terrible suffering that the people in Wuhan have endured under the Communist regime, it is not uncalled for that a pledge should be given by the authorities to the effect that no effort will be spared to prevent Communism from being revived in the region where it once reigned supreme."

These were the three courses of action upon which Chiang had placed all his hopes. He added the customary self-condemnation that is usually appended to statements made by public men in China upon their retirement. It might be noted that in this statement Chiang revealed himself again as a preacher to his people—a role that seemed to be growing on him. And there was a deepening of the note—the religious one—that was discernible in his declaration. It is undeniable that Chiang's statement, coupled with his resignation, was a powerful appeal to the masses of China. He was given full credit for having made a personal sacrifice for the good of the nation, and his prestige, far from suffering from his renunciation, rose to greater heights. For example, C. Y. W. Meng, writing in the "China Weekly Review," said:

"... Where is there any man who has been willing to give up his hard-fought-for post and voluntarily retire to private life, for no other reason than the preservation of the Party and the salvation of the country from further bloody internecine warfare? That for 16 years the civil war has been going on uninterruptedly in China is just because such a spirit is lacking. General Chiang's retirement sets the first example of this kind. His retirement is being praised as an act of unexampled heroism. The act of the Nationalist Generalissimo, as such, has undoubtedly surprised and dismayed most people, especially sympathizers with the Nationalist movement, who could not but burst into tears to see such a great

leader, after having rendered so much service to the Party and country, retire to private life; but at the same time, they cannot but wonder why such a leader who is so much needed by China to-day should retire at such a critical moment."

The reader, particularly the Westerner who has subscribed to the belief that the Chinese as a race are impassive and entirely lacking in emotion, may be inclined to doubt the accuracy of Meng's description of the reaction on the part of his fellow countrymen toward Chiang's resignation. It might be well to remind sceptics that it has been the custom, especially among the older generation, to regard a display of emotion as bad form, but that is not quite the same as saying the Chinese lack emotional depth. Meng in no degree overstated the feelings of his fellow nationals toward Chiang Kai-shek at this epoch in his life.

Rumour had it at that time that this step had been forced upon Chiang by Feng Yu-hsiang, who, finding himself in a central position in respect to the various factions, had decided that Chiang must go in order to appease the restless politicians at Hankow, but it must be remembered that Feng sent a telegram to Chiang urging him to come back, in which he said: "You are the pillar of China to-day. Upon you China, as well as the Party, rests her hopes of salvation." He added: "Should you disregard all this, and insist upon retiring, I, Yu-hsiang, cannot but do the same." Of course, this does not entirely answer the question as there was at that time some doubt as to whose interests, besides his own, Feng served.

Chiang left Nanking for his native village near Ningpo, accompanied by a bodyguard of 200 men. He travelled by way of Shanghai where he stopped to confer briefly with friends, and to see Chang Ching-kiang. He was followed to Shanghai shortly afterward by almost the entire personnel of the Nanking regime.

The morale of the Nationalist Armies was seriously affected by Chiang's retirement, but the consternation created by his sudden decision was by no means confined to

the troops. Civilians in Kiangsu, especially in Shanghai, heard the news with dismay and the Chinese Press on August 14 was full of statements containing requests of various organizations for Chiang's return to his post as Commander-in-Chief. Some 200 representatives of the several sections of the Kuomintang in the city held a mass meeting on August 17, at which it was decided to send Chiang a telegram asking him to withdraw his resignation. A huge demonstration was held on September 3 calling for the return of Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Han-min. The latter had followed Chiang into retirement, as had Wu Chih-hui, Tsai Yuan-pei, Li Shih-tseng and Chang Ching-kiang. Indeed, the Government at Nanking had almost come to a complete standstill, although efforts were still being made to bring about the unification of the regimes at that city and Hankow.

Chiang retired to the supposed peace and tranquillity of the Hsueh Tou Temple, a beautiful Buddhist monastery isolated on a spur of one of the loftiest mountains in Chekiang. Although he was theoretically in retirement, a constant stream of visitors, including several newspaper correspondents, sought him out daily. "His 'seclusion,'" commented one foreign correspondent, "is a myth. Even in this far wilderness, General Chiang cannot get away from the affairs of state and war that he seeks to forget for a while." This was literally true. There is no doubt that Chiang was quite sincere when he told American visitors that he intended to spend the next five years abroad studying politics, economics and military tactics in the great nations of the West. He proposed first to visit America, but it was very generally realized that unless he could be persuaded to return to his post at the head of the Nationalist troops, there were but faint hopes for the success of the Northern Expedition.

The fine old Buddhist shrine, to which Chiang had retired, lies in a wooded, crater-like recess near the summit of a peak. A solitary guard stood at the temple gateway, the only indication of the presence within of the greatest military man of present-day China. His personal staff and his secretaries had

been quartered at Chikow, 17 *li* away in a valley some 3,000 feet below the rim of the depression that had been the crater of a volcano in ages past.

Two correspondents who visited him found their way down from the edge of the crater, following a winding trail that led through a grove of tall pines. Then they came in view of the temple in a vast clearing. The path widened, led over a stone bridge, and followed a sparkling mountain brook to the temple gate. It was an ideal spot for repose; beautiful, secluded and restful.

"The General was writing letters when we arrived," wrote one of the correspondents. "We were told that he carried on a vast personal correspondence. We were made comfortable and were served luscious grapes by a servant while we waited a few moments until the General came out to receive us. He made us welcome with a broad, friendly smile. He was the picture of health, showing every evidence of the good effects of his sojourn in this mountain retreat. Attired in a long grey gown, he might well have been a monk in this setting, but his steady eyes and stern, clear-cut features, added to his erect military bearing, indicated the soldier that he is.

"He suggested that we stroll out through the hills. The sun was setting beyond the pines that lined the crater rim. He said that he would show us the waterfalls and we could talk as we walked.

"Glancing back along the pathway as we left the temple we saw that we were followed by four or five bodyguards, armed to the teeth. We left the discussion of the temple and the scenic beauty of its setting, and asked our soldier-host of his future plans. War-torn China seemed far away below us; the Revolution, which bade fair to make her dreams real, was a thing of the past as its leader revealed his plans to spend the next five years abroad. He would study the life and observe the customs of other great nations of the world among which China might soon retake her rightful place. And when the five years had passed, what would have happened to China? He did not tell us what he thought, but we knew that

he must feel that by then China would be ready for him and the knowledge he would bring her.

"He was leaving soon for Shanghai, he said, where he could complete his plans. Whether he would go first to Europe or to America on his way around the globe would be decided then. We felt that America would receive most of his attention for he dwelt at length on all that he had heard of the industrial and economic development in that great land, and he expressed his desire to see these things for himself for he felt that the China of the future must follow along the same lines.

"Would the future political development of China follow the republican drift or was there likely to be a tinge of socialism in it? we asked. His eyes flashed and he turned them squarely on us and said: 'Most assuredly along republican lines.' Even the very name of the Communist Party as well as its influences must be erased from China's record, he added bitterly. It was evident that he felt deeply the ruinous effect that the Russian creed had worked in the Nationalist movement. His phrases came out sharply, concise and clear. There was no misunderstanding him. His words were never vague and one could not help but feel that his mind worked fast and clearly. Here indeed was a strong character, a leader of the type that China needs so badly, and one could not doubt his sincerity."

By this time the party had arrived at the brink of a precipice opposite a waterfall that dropped in a silvery stream a full thousand feet into the green depths below. It was a splendid sight, and the mountains glowed in the light of the setting sun. A full moon lighted the way back to the temple.

These observing writers seem not to have missed many details on their visit to the Hsueh Tou Temple. "In the evening we reclined in long chairs on the terrace before the temple," they told us, "and smoked and talked leisurely. We ourselves smoked, but the General does not; neither does he drink. We chatted lightly of many things until the talk

turned again to America. The General asked many questions about the United States. It was evident that he thought of his coming voyage. He told us of how the Chinese people had turned from the conservative friendship of America to accept the material aid which Russia offered, and of how Russia had betrayed her. 'Now the Chinese must look to America as their only real friend among the nations,' he said. 'I hope she (America) will continue to maintain the spirit of the Washington Conference.' 'She will,' we assured him.

"The temple drums were beating and the monks were chanting as we climbed the stairs to the second floor where we were quartered for the night. We retired early so that we might arise in time to start the long journey back to Shanghai in the cool of the early morning. The General usually retired at midnight and rose at five. He breakfasted with us in the morning and sent us on our way feeling that we had met a great man. There was something different about him—something different from the other military leaders who have come and gone in China's past. The world would hear much more of him, we concluded, as we trudged back down the mountain path."

Another correspondent who saw him during his seclusion in a report written at a later date said:

"General Chiang was bitter against the Japanese. He said that he believes them responsible for his defeat in the North and the failure of the Nationalists' Northern Expedition in July.

"'Their occupation of Tsinan and the railway blocked us,' he said. 'Our success was assured until Japan stepped in. They are responsible for the failure of the Northern Expedition.'

"Chiang said he did not want to talk any more about this, nor would he go into details about his quitting as Commander-in-Chief. He said: 'My reasons are in my manifesto given out in Shanghai. There are no other reasons.'

"He takes his position philosophically. There is a bit of the egotist in this young General, pardonable no doubt in view

of his achievements. He was asked if he did not think his leaving the Revolution at this time was bound to weaken the cause, and he said: 'Yes, I think so,' but he added he had to quit in view of what had gone before, and referred again to his long message of resignation. In this, it will be recalled, he said there had been too much opposition to him personally, and he thought until confidence in him was restored he had best get out. He bowed to the criticism of Hankow, it seems, and to the political exigencies of the moment.

"The Commander-in-Chief said that he might return to the Revolution. 'I am too much a part of it, it is too much a part of me, for me to get out for all time. I expect to return to the movement, but I do not know when. I would like to go abroad.'

"Where?" I said.

"To America first," Chiang replied. "You tell me they are sympathetic there. Well, I would like to go and see. After that to Europe and elsewhere. It is all indefinite, of course. But I need a rest."

"He intimated that there were overtures being made to get him back into the Party. He is undecided, but he intends to remain in his temple retreat for a time, in any case. He smiled when we referred to the many visitors he is having, even up here. 'Yes,' he said, 'one's real friends take the trouble to journey into a place like this to see one.' He said T. V. Soong was expected in a few days. Soong probably wants to urge Chiang's return. It may be, of course, that Soong has convinced his Hankow colleagues that Chiang is not such a militarist as the Communists in Wuhan made out in their anti-Nanking propaganda. In that case, if Feng Yushiang is agreeable (and it appears superficially that he is) Chiang may be urged to return—and he might do it. If he hasn't support, he will go abroad.

"I have been working steadily for the Revolution for four years," Chiang said. "I am tired. I would like to go abroad. But I am too much a part of the Revolution to quit it now. I shall do what seems best for the moment."

Now we come to one of the turning points in Chiang's career. At the present time an increasing, but still comparatively insignificant number of young Chinese insist upon choosing their own life companions, and the Western view of courtship and marriage without the advice of parents is being adopted. But in Chiang's young days the immemorial custom of the parents choosing wives for their sons held undisputed sway. Consequently, Chiang's mother, when he was 15, chose a wife for him from among the eligible young ladies in the district and the marriage took place in 1901. The lady in question had many admirable qualities, not least among them generosity as she showed later, but she was in no sense politically minded, and it was difficult for her to realize the intense devotion to the revolutionary cause that Chiang developed almost as soon as he could think. At the time of his marriage, though he was very young, he had definitely decided to adopt a military career and to study in Japan.

Even before he had entirely completed his studies in Japan the Revolution broke out, and Chiang immediately hurried back to China and threw himself whole-heartedly into the perilous activities of the revolutionaries. It will easily be understood that, with his time so fully occupied, he had little opportunity of visiting his wife except at rare intervals. Although one son was born of the union, and she was occupied in his care and upbringing, she found it difficult to reconcile herself to the prolonged absence of her husband, and repeatedly urged him to abandon his political and military activities. Naturally, advice of this kind was not acceptable to a young man who was almost fanatical in his enthusiasm for the revolutionary cause for which he was ready to sacrifice his life, as he showed on many occasions when he took a personal part in desperate adventures at Shanghai and Hangchow.

Eventually, his wife recognized that she was really a hindrance to Chiang, or rather to the career upon which he had embarked, and by an amicable arrangement a divorce on the ground of incompatibility was obtained and registered. Undoubtedly the wife was grieved, but she had the intuition

and generosity to realize that national were more powerful than domestic claims.

For 12 months after this, Chiang threw himself with redoubled vigour into the troubled politics which followed the rebellion of Chen Chiung-ming against Dr. Sun Yat-sen in Canton, but a year later in Canton, Chiang went to the home of Dr. Sun and there met a young lady named Mayling Soong, who had been educated at Wesleyan College in the United States. He talked with her and saw her frequently. The tide of the Revolution was rising again and Chiang was in the midst of it. His time was limited. He was a soldier and there was work to do. He was accustomed to making decisions and acting upon them with as little delay as possible. In Mayling Soong he saw a woman who could give him companionship, the companionship that a man seeks in a wife and which he had never had. He decided almost immediately that she was the woman he wished to marry, but when he told her of his own thoughts and of what he felt for her, she, as he himself later said, "was not interested."

Chiang was in the thick of the Revolution for the next five years. The Northern Expedition was launched and he went north with the troops, but he found time to maintain a correspondence with Miss Soong, and in his letters from the front he determinedly pressed his suit.

When Chiang retired from the post of Commander-in-Chief and sought sanctuary in a Chekiang temple, this correspondence was continued, and at that time the romance culminated in her agreement to marriage subject to the consent of her family. Chiang came down from the mountains of Chekiang and on September 23, 1927, arrived in Shanghai with a small bodyguard. He declared that his emergence from the temple had no political significance, and that he had come to obtain the consent of Mayling Soong's family to their marriage. If the usual family arrangements could be satisfactorily made, he said, they would be married in Shanghai and would then spend a year in travel abroad.

Mayling Soong was the daughter of Charles Soong, one

of the first Chinese to go to America for higher education. He studied at an early day in South Carolina, and remained there for some time after finishing his education, going into business for himself. Mr. Soong made considerable money as a manufacturer, but he was an ardent Christian, having embraced that religion while still a very young man, and his chief interest lay in propagating the Gospel. With this in view, he returned to China as an ordained Christian minister, and carried on his work in his own country. His wife was also a devout Christian, and there were six children.

The eldest of the three daughters became the wife of Dr. H. H. Kung, a renowned banker and a leading figure to-day in the Kuomintang and the National Government of which, as this is written, he is the Minister of Finance and the Vice-President of the Executive Yuan. The second daughter was married to Dr. Sun Yat-sen and took an active part in Dr. Sun's work, which she carried on after his death. To-day she lives in Shanghai.

The eldest son of this famed family, T. V. Soong, became the Minister of Finance of the Nationalist Government after the assassination of Liao Chung-kai, and held that position at the time Chiang came out of retirement from Chekiang. Two other sons, T. L. Soong and T. A. Soong, later became prominent in banking and industry in Shanghai.

At the time of which we are writing, the father of Mayling Soong was dead and his widow had gone to a place near Kobe, in Japan, for her health. Chiang sailed for Japan on September 28 to visit Mrs. Soong and obtain her consent to his marriage with her daughter.

Chiang also wanted to sound out Japanese opinion at that stage and see for himself just what political currents flowed beneath the surface in the land in which he had been a student. He did not know what kind of a reception he would receive; his outspoken denunciation of the Japanese Army as a prime factor in the breakdown of the Northern Expedition had been widely publicized in the Island Empire. On his arrival at Tokyo, however, he was accorded a very cordial

welcome by the Japanese, as well as by the Kuomintang members living there and the overseas Chinese in Japan. Fellow students from the Military Academy flocked to see him and congratulate him on the achievement of the Northern Expedition. The Japanese Press eulogized him to a gratifying extent, and the gist of its comment was that in a period of one year Chiang had made the Expedition a success. Such an achievement, Japanese papers remarked, could be rarely found recorded in the pages of either Chinese or Japanese history.

He then went to Kobe and called formally upon Mrs. Soong, who had no objections to Chiang Kai-shek becoming a son-in-law and marriage arrangements were soon made. Chiang was anxious to be back in China and, as soon as he gracefully could, he sailed again for Shanghai in company with Mrs. Soong.

He arrived in the Chinese commercial capital on December 1 and the marriage ceremonies were almost immediately performed. The first, a religious service and a Christian one, was solemnized privately in the home of the bride with Dr. David Z. T. Yui, a well-known Chinese Christian, officiating. The second ceremony, presided over by Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei, was held in the great ballroom of the Majestic Hotel. In view of Chiang's position as well as that of the family of the bride there was, of course, a large gathering. The entertainment, while well appointed and in good taste, did not rise to the point of vulgar display, as many foreigners in Shanghai had expected due to the fact that many wealthy Chinese are given to excessive and lavish entertainment on such occasions as weddings and funerals.

On the morning of their wedding day, Chiang issued a statement, the full significance of which was hardly realized at the time. In this he said, among other things; "After our wedding, the work of the Revolution will, undoubtedly, make greater progress, because I can henceforth bear the tremendous responsibility of the Revolution with peace at heart. . . . From now on, we two are determined to exert our utmost for the cause of the Chinese Revolution." The single-hearted

devotion with which the Generalissimo and Madame have honoured the vow made upon their wedding day is a matter of history. Ten years later, when the Generalissimo was detained at Sian, Chang Hsueh-liang referred to a letter that Madame had sent to the Generalissimo before his detention, in which she said that, in order to be worthy of the confidence that the people placed in them both, they should strive even more to fulfil the vow made on their wedding day to work for the people. There can be no doubt that the views of the captors underwent a decided modification when they learned how faithful the Generalissimo and his wife still were to the vow that they made a decade earlier.

Chiang and his bride spent their honeymoon at Hangchow and Mokanshan, that beautiful section of Chekiang famed for its wooded hills and lovely lakes.

CHAPTER XII

Message To Military Academy Cadets—Chaos Follows Chiang's Resignation—Wuhan Administration Abolished—Weak National Government—Fighting With Northerners—Strife Between Warlords—Chiang Again Becomes Commander-in-Chief—Soviet Consulates Closed—Manifesto Issued By Chiang—Three Outstanding Problems Considered—"Dictatorship" With Time Limit—Fourth Plenary Session—Chiang Resumes Command Of Northern Expedition—Strength Of The Opposing Forces

DURING his retirement Chiang had resolutely kept himself clear of direct dealings with his former comrades. But before he sailed for Japan in the autumn of 1927 to visit his future mother-in-law, he issued a farewell message to the graduates and students of the Whampoa Military Academy exhorting them, above all things, to continue working for the interests of the Chinese people and urging them to forego conceit, deceit, haughtiness and arrogance. He spoke of the bravery and self-sacrifice of Academy men during the Punitive Expedition, and declared that their duty was to purge their ranks of Communists and anti-revolutionists, uniting once more in the work of the Revolution. He reminded them that soldiers must work together for the common good and the true revolutionist could not afford to aspire to glory, riches or power in the vain effort to rise rapidly; men must start from the bottom. If, perchance, the young officer were favoured by fortune and rose to a position of eminence, he must not forget the aims of the Revolution.

As soldiers of the Revolution, Chiang said, the young men must not be discouraged by failures. Failure was the mother

of success. Quoting Dr. Sun: "I think of my past failures as a series of dreams—not sufficiently important to discourage me. From now on I am laying the foundation of a new Revolution upon which I have learned from the past to create a new Revolutionary Army." Chiang warned the students against rumour-mongers and the designs of destroyers of unity, and also against "our Party politicians." It was scarcely a chance reference that was made to these, for Chiang realized by this time that politicians can be as great a curse to a country as militarists of the blackest hue. He urged the students to co-operate with their teachers and officers, giving high praise to those graduates who were now officers in the Revolutionary Armies, whose loyalty had never been questioned.

Referring to his own retirement, Chiang told the students that his withdrawal from active participation did not really lose them a leader or protector, as the true revolutionary is self-reliant, and such action as he, Chiang, had taken would bring out independence in his followers. They must remedy the faulty methods responsible for the failure of the cause, which in turn was due to the breakdown of the Party system and to political scheming, plus a lack of ability. He exhorted them steadfastly to uphold the principles of the Leader, Dr. Sun. "We soldiers," he said, "as a rule do not understand the science of government and the laws of economics, and if we mean to bring our Revolution to a successful conclusion we must, first of all, acquire knowledge."

He made two pledges in conclusion: that officers and men who fell in the advance from Canton to the Yangtze would have fitting funeral services, a matter of extreme importance in the Chinese mind; and that dependents of these fallen soldiers should be given adequate compensation by the Government. These were pledges that were never lost sight of through the years, and were implemented when opportunity came.

This parting address reveals again the potent sources of the man's prestige. He appealed to principles: loyalty to the Party, devotion to the ideals of Dr. Sun, desire for efficiency

in the Army and in civil affairs, the inculcation of high moral standards and self-criticism. Not once did he suggest any personal allegiance to himself.

At this stage it might be well to review the chaotic situation that developed following Chiang's resignation and departure from Nanking for retirement in the Chekiang hills. Efforts to heal the Wuhan-Nanking split had begun as soon as it was realized that the Hankow faction was not completely under the Communist thumb. In August, a telegram urging co-operation was sent to Hankow by Chiang Kai-shek, Li Tsung-jen, Pai Chung-hsi, Ho Ying-chin, Hu Han-min, Li Lieh-chun, Niu Yung-chien, Tsai Yuan-pei, Wu Chih-hui and Li Shih-tseng. Prominent among those on the Hankow side were Wang Ching-wei, Tang Sheng-chih, Sun Fo, Cheng Chien, Chu Pei-teh and Chang Fa-kuei. T. V. Soong went to Hankow at Chiang's request to conduct personal negotiations. As soon as it appeared that personal animosities directed against Chiang were a major factor in preventing the healing of the breach in the Kuomintang, Chiang had cut the Gordian knot by his sudden resignation. Wuhan replied to the telegram in a conciliatory manner, expressing regret at the belated action against the Communists, but, when the message reached Nanking, Chiang had gone. On August 22, representatives met in Hankow and others at Kiukiang, completing arrangements for renewed co-operation. It was decided to abolish the Government at Wuhan. Troops of both factions which were concentrated in Kiangsi and Anhwei were withdrawn. Another conference was called at Shanghai on September 9 and most of the leaders were present, with the exception of Chiang, Hu Han-min who was absent for reasons of personal pique, Ho Ying-chin who was ill, Wu Chih-hui and T. V. Soong, the latter finding it impossible to work harmoniously with some of the Kuomintang politicians.

By the end of September, a unified Kuomintang Government was functioning in Nanking, though it was weak and failed to command the confidence of Chinese in general. Chiang, regarded by all as the outstanding member of the

Party, was not given a post in the new Government. Hu Han-min departed for Europe. Just as it appeared that the breach in the Party had been definitely closed, Wang Ching-wei resigned and retired to Canton, taking this course because he had promised to do so providing Chiang took the same step. Thus three outstanding members of the Revolution, Chiang, Hu and Wang, were not participating in the Government.

In arranging for Kuomintang unification, it was agreed that Party members would follow the principles and policies of Dr. Sun's Will; that all should obey decisions of Party authorities; that the Communists should be excluded from the Party and the Government; and that the Northern Punitive Expedition should be continued until the entire country had been brought under Nationalist control. Nanking was chosen as the permanent Capital of the nation. This last step was regarded as a concession to the powerful commercial and industrial interests of Shanghai, who feared the Hankow regime which had ruined capitalists and merchants there.

Meanwhile, Chiang, then in Japan, had written a friendly and conciliatory letter to Wang Ching-wei, with whom he had had major differences of opinion. This split could not be entirely closed, though Wang at Canton declared to officials there that the friction was largely his own fault, and that he would join again with Chiang. Nevertheless he continued to hold aloof after Chiang's return to Shanghai. Then came the Communist insurrection in Canton, as a result of which the policies of the Left Wing Kuomintang fell into complete discredit. This brought about a new crisis in the revolutionary movement, with political jealousies and rivalries continuing unabated. The prestige of the reorganized Government at Nanking quickly sank to a new low level, and Communist intrigue was revived. Civilian authorities at Nanking became thoroughly discouraged with the outlook and finally resolved to put their trust in the best military man of the Party. In this emergency Nanking again offered the supreme command of the Nationalist Armies and the leadership of the Revolution to Chiang, who had just returned to China and after his marriage with

Miss Soong had gone to Fenghua, his native place, to "sweep the graves" of his parents, a highly dutiful occupation for a filial son.

Chiang had kept his eye on the military situation after his retirement. His resignation caused much confusion among the military leaders professing loyalty to Nanking. The Nationalist Armies, nevertheless, had sufficient discipline not to become completely demoralized, and they still presented a strong front against the North. Ho Ying-chin was virtually in control of Chekiang. Pai Chung-hsi had ousted Chow Feng-chi from Shanghai when Chow made an attempt to seize control of that city. In the North there was fighting between the Fengtien Armies and the forces under Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi, who had declared in favour of the Kuomintang. Feng Yu-hsiang in Honan engaged in hostilities with Chang Tsung-chang's troops, though Feng's forces along the Lunghai Railway were later withdrawn in order to facilitate his support of Yen's Army.

During the retreat from Hsuechow, Sun Chuan-fang's Army had pursued the retiring Southerners. The resignation of Chiang Kai-shek greatly encouraged the Northern Allies, who now hoped that they might regain territory south of the Yangtze. The Nationalist troops retreated across the river from Pukow, which was occupied by Sun's troops on August 17. The Northerners then decided to launch an expedition against the Revolutionists, and on August 26, Sun moved 10,000 men across the Yangtze and occupied Lungtan on the south bank near Nanking. After severe fighting the Northerners were driven back with heavy losses. They were under shell-fire while re-crossing the river, and hundreds were drowned. This threat by Sun was the greatest peril which had confronted the Revolutionary Army since the launching of the Northern Expedition.

Heartened by victory, three days later the Nationalists by strategy lured 30,000 more of Sun's troops again to make an attack across the river and then mauled them badly before they could retire. Hankow troops next attacked Sun's flank

in Anhwei, and by September 1 the Nanking forces were able to counter-attack across the river and re-capture Pukow. Within a few days, Feng's troops in Honan drove in against the communication lines of the Northerners at Hsuehchow and Sun, in desperation, made a stand on the Huai River, which he was able to hold until after Ho Ying-chin's forces had taken Linhuai on November 14. Five days later Sun decided that the Southerners were too much for him and he retreated again, giving up Pengpu and withdrawing to Kuchin. He was finally forced back to Hsuehchow, where two divisions of Chang Tsung-chang's men arrived as reinforcements.

While this heavy fighting was proceeding in the North, a confused situation arose in the South, at Canton. After suppressing the Communist revolt in Kiangsi under Ho Lung and Yeh Ting, the forces of Chang Fa-kuei entered Canton. The city at that time was under the control of Li Chi-shen, and jealousies immediately began to develop between the rival leaders. On November 15, Li left Canton to attend a conference of the Kuomintang at Shanghai, and, a subordinate of Chang, took advantage of his absence to attack Huang Shao-hsiung, a supporter of Li. Fighting between the two broke out in the valleys of the West, North and East Rivers.

Further trouble was developing in another quarter. Friction between Tang Sheng-chih and Cheng Chien came to a head on October 18 in the Yangtze Valley when the Sixth Kuomintang Army Corps under Cheng attacked the Thirty-sixth Army Corps under Tang. Nanking immediately declared war on Tang and troops were despatched to the aid of Cheng. Ho Chien, commanding the Thirty-fifth Army Corps which was supporting Tang's Thirty-sixth Army Corps, gave up the fight in November and retired to Hankow. This was the end of Tang; he fled to Japan, and thus was eliminated the general whom the Hankow politicians had sought to raise to prominence at the expense of Chiang Kai-shek.

This bloody, extravagant and purposeless civil strife, breaking out between rival warlords in various widely

separated sections, seemed to be nullifying Chiang's achievements, and the country appeared to be rapidly degenerating into a chaos of destruction. The question was raised as to who could successfully meet this crisis, and who could carry the Northern Expedition to success. Chiang was the only logical person for this titanic task. This was, then, the state of affairs when Chiang returned to China for his wedding and honeymoon. It was not a cheering outlook for the man who had left struggle behind and had sought peace, first in a temple and next in marriage.

A little over a week after Chiang Kai-shek set foot again on Chinese soil and took a bride, he was created Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Armies of the Revolution. He was on his Chekiang honeymoon at the time. A Preliminary Conference of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang had been called at Shanghai and opened on December 3, just after Chiang's wedding. A week had been spent in acrimonious debate which threatened to disrupt the Party anew, but on December 10, Chiang was nominated to the highest military post and this action was unanimously approved. Actually the nomination had come about through the insistence of Wang Ching-wei. He and Chiang had been reconciled and had been co-operating anew; Chiang's efforts to reconcile the Old Comrades with the Left Wing leader had borne some fruit, but he had been virtually defeated in his attempt to overcome the hostile attitude of the Right Wing comrades.

This action of the Preliminary Conference, as a matter of fact, was not exactly a re-election inasmuch as Chiang's resignation in the previous summer had never been accepted. Chiang himself, when notified, said that he would probably not resume active military service at the head of the Army, though he might serve as Chairman of the National Military Council.

The election of Chiang to the military leadership of the

Nationalist Government was the only feasible way of bringing the Kuomintang factions together. If this had not been done, the Canton members of Kuomintang committees would have refused to go to Nanking to attend the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee. It was demanded that Chiang should agree to assume office and guarantee the personal safety of the delegates as well as freedom of discussion at the Session. The action of the Preliminary Conference thus had the effect of making Chiang Kai-shek take the responsibility of trying to bring the various factions together, as well as guarantee the sanctity of the Fourth Plenary Session and in addition be responsible for reorganizing the Nationalist Government.

At this Preliminary Session of the Party Committee, it was soon agreed that the Nationalist Government should be reorganized at once. Not only was Chiang to assume office as Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Armies, but new ministers were appointed, including Dr. C. C. Wu for Foreign Affairs, T. V. Soong for Finance, Wang Po-chun for Communications, and Sun Fo for Reconstruction.

One of the first actions taken by Chiang after his re-entry into official life was to declare that Soviet Consulates throughout China were simply hotbeds of Communist propaganda and that the immediate severance of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was necessary. This drastic move was made on December 14, and marked the final and definite split with the Russians. Chiang's mandate ordered steps to be taken to close the consulates of the U. S. S. R. as well as all Soviet commercial agencies in Nationalist territory, this to be accomplished within a week. Two days later, there was a general round-up of Russian Communists at Hankow, or rather those who had failed to see the handwriting on the wall—or ignored it—and had not fled, as so many of their comrades had done.

It had previously been planned to arrest all Communists in Canton and raid the Soviet Consulate there, but the Russians learned of this beforehand and, to forestall it, broke out in open insurrection in the southern city on December 11. Co-

operating with disbanded troops, the Communists succeeded in capturing the city of Canton itself while Chang Fa-kuei's troops were in the west and south campaigning against Huang Shao-hsiung. Bloody street fighting took place in Canton on December 12 and 13. The Nationalist troops were rushed back and attacked the Communists; after a bitter struggle Canton was wrested from them on the 14th. This was a period of turmoil in the South, which will long be remembered. The rebels fired the city in a number of places, and for a time Canton was in danger of being burned to ashes. The people in their terror turned against the Communists to such an extent that chaos reigned. The foreign concession, Shameen, was a beleaguered island in a sea of bloodshed and flames. The troops, in re-occupying the city, rounded up the Communists and, having once more gained control, summarily executed these men in wholesale lots, on the spot. The people themselves, running more or less berserk in the carnage, sacrificed hundreds of innocent persons. Eventually order was restored.

It was this crisis that caused Chiang to take the final step in purging China of all Soviet centres. Following the general clean-up, Chiang, in his capacity as a Party member, issued a circular letter in the hope that he might clear the political atmosphere. The situation was still so confused by intrigue and counter-intrigue that Chiang spoke plainly. He urged his colleagues to forget past differences and ill-feeling so as to pave the way for a successful solution of the Party's problems. He declared that the Kuomintang was facing the most severe task since its formation and that no sacrifice, even of the rights of individual members of the Committee, was too great in order to unify the Party and restore its former prestige. He warned fellow members that internal dissensions stood in the way of a successful Plenary Session, that differences were sure to spread to the rank and file and that the troops would become demoralized if the petty squabbles of the Party leaders continued.

"We have been and still are fighting the militarists," he

stated. "We have succeeded in suppressing Communism. Our most deadly enemies are our military commanders who refuse to obey the highest authority of our Party, as well as those civil officials who manipulate and take advantage of our internal strife for their own aggrandisement."

The chief cause of the Party split, he pointed out, could be traced to the question of the legality of the Nanking Central Special Committee and also to the question of the responsibility for the bloody outbreak at Canton. But those questions were not insoluble. "We must realize," he said, "that Canton is the birthplace of the Nationalist Revolution while Nanking has been made the seat of our Nationalist Government, in accordance with the desire of our late Leader. Untold numbers of precious lives have been sacrificed on behalf of both Canton and Nanking, and we cannot and must not allow thousands of our fallen comrades to have died in vain." In conclusion, he stated simply that this was the time for co-operation; the fate of the Party and the confidence of hundreds of thousands of men in the rank and file of the Party hung upon the ability of the leaders to rise above personal differences and work together for the good of the Kuomintang and the Chinese people.

Finally the trying and uncertain year, 1927, came to a close and in January of 1928 Chiang turned his attention to the coming Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee at Nanking.

On January 2, 1928, while in Shanghai, Chiang received a telegram from the Government at Nanking urging him to return immediately to the new Capital, resume his office and complete the task of the Northern Expedition. Other leaders sent personal telegrams of a similar nature, pledging their support and requesting him to return to duty. Several Kwangsi military men took the like action. On January 4, Chiang left Shanghai by train for the Capital.

The comparatively short journey to Nanking was made eventful by two attempts to wreck the train, both of which were frustrated in the nick of time. Despite these attempts

on Chiang's life, indicative of the bitterness against him in many quarters, it was, nevertheless, generally felt that opposition to his appointment was dying down. He was received with enthusiasm on his arrival at the Capital, with bands, cheering crowds, speeches and dinners. He had little to say, but what he said was to the point. Kuomintang members, he declared, had two cardinal faults, and these were lack of self-confidence and at the same time over-conceit. He had come to Nanking for two reasons: he wished to see completed a successful meeting of the Fourth Plenary Session so that the Party might start the work of reconstruction and complete the Northern Expedition; and he wished to bring about co-operation among the leaders so that assistance could be given to Feng and Yen in their drive to capture Peking. That was the immediate goal.

On January 9, Chiang Kai-shek formally resumed his post as Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Armies. On that occasion he issued a manifesto to the Kuomintang and to all fellow countrymen. This declaration deserves quotation:

"In the face of persistent demands from various Party organs and from all ranks of the Army," he wrote, "and due to repeated requests from the Government and the people for me to emerge from retirement in order to help to shoulder the common burden, all having pointed out that the stupendous task of the Northern Expedition may soon be achieved, but that I have not yet fulfilled my duty, I have become apprehensive of the consequences and hardly know what to do."

He had resigned in the autumn, he stated, in order to bring solidarity to the ranks of the Party so that there might be a spirit of unity. During subsequent months, however, in spite of strenuous Party efforts, the Party itself had been shaken to its very foundation, and internal quarrels had grown dangerous; while the troops had made tremendous sacrifices, the progress of the Northern Expedition had none the less been held up. Furthermore, the Central Special Committee had been dissolved, and now the Fourth Plenary Session was being prepared. The various departments had ceased to function,

temporarily at least. The Party's authority had broken down and the political atmosphere was charged with uncertainty; the people were afraid and the military situation had reached a crisis. In the face of such conditions, there must be no indulgence in personal aspirations in disregard of national obligations to China.

"Pursuant to the wish of the Central Authorities," Chiang said, "I came to Nanking and resumed what those authorities had entrusted to me—the duties and authority of Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army. I pledge myself to discipline, to encourage the Army to the utmost of my ability, and to direct personally the Expedition at the front. I pledge myself also to support the Central Authorities in order to strengthen the foundation of the Government, and to suppress all Communist activities in order to bring peace and order to the people. As regards all Party and Government affairs, I hold that the Central Authorities shall be solely responsible. I shall, as a member of the Central Executive Committee, follow the lead of other members and share the responsibility."

On the one hand, he added, he would submit himself to the direction of the Central Authorities in the administration of the Army in order to improve the military position. On the other hand, he would share the task of preparing for the meeting of the Fourth Plenary Session so that the Conference might be convened and the Party foundation be once again firmly established. With the position of the Central Authorities restored and the Party unified, the complete extermination of the enemy might be accomplished. When the Northern Expedition should have been completed, he would immediately tender his resignation to the Central Authorities.

"I dare not forecast the result of my reappearance at this critical moment in the history of our Party and country," he said in conclusion, "when both are on the brink of collapse and the people are in a despairing state. I only know that the Northern Expedition cannot be further delayed and that the progress of the Revolution cannot be further interrupted. We must hasten to unite and make up our loss. I want my

comrades to join together and my fellow countrymen to lend support to us. I am sincere in my purpose, although incapable of making it manifest, and I crave your advice and guidance. The future of our Party and country depends upon you."

It was recognized at this period that Generalissimo Chiang had, for the first time and to all intents and purposes, been made a dictator—at least, a dictator for the duration of the Northern Expedition. It was, then, a qualified dictatorship, inasmuch as the Central Executive Committee tentatively fixed a date for the opening of the Kuomintang Congress, supreme authority of the Party, namely, August 1, 1928, at which time it was hoped that the expedition would have been successfully concluded.

This decision was intended to place a time-limit on the military dictatorship, as Dr. Arthur N. Holcombe has since pointed out in his study of the Chinese Revolution. Chiang could not prolong his power beyond the date of the Party Congress without the consent of the Party leaders, and he could not dispense with the Congress without defying the Party and forfeiting the confidence of those Revolutionists who believed in a Party dictatorship during the second or tutelage period of the Revolution. Meanwhile, by conforming to the established processes of government in his conduct of affairs at Nanking, he was helping to build up habits of political behaviour more favourable in the long run to a Party than to a personal dictatorship. Before the Revolution, as Dr. Holcombe indicated, the nature of procedural limitations upon the power of public officials had been well understood at the Imperial Court and among the mandarins. The traditions of the governing class regarded the practice of the official rites in much the same way as public opinion in Western countries with systems of constitutional government regards compliance with the requirements of due process of law. By submitting to prescribed forms for the exercise of his power, Chiang was transmuting the dictatorship in a way politically-minded Chinese would understand, from a personal enterprise into a

public institution. Such an institution falls far short of satisfying those who understand also the Western methods of deriving governmental power from the consent of the governed. But it was an appreciable advance over the crude type of military dictatorship maintained by Chang Tso-lin at Peking.

Those who have bitterly opposed Chiang and taken a critical view of his actions in the years since then have often raised the cry of "dictator!"—though not infrequently the same individuals will in almost the same breath declare that he is a mere figurehead. This cry has been heard widely in the West, where it has gained much credence. It must be admitted that great power has been placed in Chiang's hands; nevertheless it has been in strict accordance with prescribed forms, and, important to note, this power then had a time-limit. The same criticism might accurately be applied to the Presidency of the United States of America. That Presidency is nothing less than a "transmuted dictatorship," and parallel to the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek of the Nationalist Government of China at that time, though, of course, the forms of law and periods of time involved are different. He had specifically accepted this status early in 1928, promising to resign at the conclusion of the Northern Expedition. It was decidedly a proposition to appeal to the Chinese.

Toward the end of January, Chiang issued to the nation a document of great significance. This document, a manifesto, may be regarded as a platform of Party principles, and its importance was at once recognized in China and abroad, containing as it did a proposed change of foreign policy. The Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang had originally been scheduled to open about the first of January, but it was postponed for various reasons for about one month. The Chiang manifesto was for submission to the Session, and it received wide publicity in both the Chinese and foreign Press.

Chiang tackled three outstanding problems of the Kuomin-

tang in this manifesto: the Party's foreign policy, China's internal issues, and popular movements.

As regards the first, and most important, Chiang declared that the formulation of all foreign policies of the Kuomintang and the Nationalist Government should be guided as formerly by principles laid down in the declaration of foreign policies announced by the First Plenary Session of the Kuomintang with a view to bringing about, within the shortest possible time, a position of freedom and equality for China in the family of nations. The abrogation of all unequal treaties should, whenever possible, be achieved by peaceful negotiation, though in an uncompromising spirit. Negotiations should be entered into simultaneously with all countries with which China had treaty relations. Should some countries decline to enter into these negotiations, or, in case the negotiations produced no result, then the Nationalist Government should, in accordance with customary international practices and under the pressure of changing circumstances, take it upon itself to nullify all those treaties. All popular movements against foreign Governments should be placed under the supervision of the Central Authorities, and all such movements should be orderly, well-planned and well-organized, rather than disorderly and scattered. A formal declaration as to the reasons for having changed the Kuomintang policy regarding Soviet Russia should be issued, with the stipulation that only after the Soviet Government should have indicated its decision to discontinue its programme of internal agitation in China and produced conclusive proof of this change in its policy, could Sino-Soviet friendly relations be resumed. To the various colonies and dependencies and their "oppressed peoples" China should continue to extend her assistance for their liberation in the spirit of the Three People's Principles.

Turning to internal problems, Chiang stated that, when the Northern Expedition had been completed, a National People's Convention should be called within the shortest period of time possible. The Kuomintang's political administration of

the country should be guided by the principles as laid down by Dr. Sun in his plans for the reconstruction of China. Based upon these principles of the late Leader, the three successive periods of military supervision, political tutelage and constitutional government should be immediately and clearly divided for the information of the people. All officials of the various districts should be trained for self-government; an examination of specialists should be held with the view to placing these men in their logical positions; and the interests of agriculture and industry should be rigidly protected.

As for the solution of the Party's problems, Chiang said that the constitution of the Party's Central Headquarters should be revised and the Party's slogans recast. In addition, the principle that within the Party there should be no factions should be carried out.

Regarding popular movements, Chiang concluded that errors of the past should be rectified; the Central Authorities should formulate new rules governing popular movements and the aims to be attained.

When these proposals were presented to the Fourth Plenary Session in February for action, the Session adopted them and passed the appropriate resolutions to make them effective. During this Session a Standing Committee was elected, as well as members of the Government and the Military Council. Decisions providing for a nation-wide re-registration of Kuomintang members were made, and it was arranged to call a Third National Congress in August. All previous proposals and resolutions in connection with the alliance with the Communist Party were cancelled, and it was decided that the Military Council should consist of about a dozen men under the chairmanship of the Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Armies. Following these more or less routine measures, the Session unanimously decided to concentrate all Party efforts on the successful conclusion of the Northern Expedition within a definite period of time. Generalissimo Chiang was appointed President of the National Military Council.

Chiang was busily occupied with the business of the Session at that time, and with getting his programme accepted. He spoke before that body once more, stressing the importance of solidarity in the Party, the uprooting of Communism and the abolition of unequal treaties. He then turned his full attention to preparations for a vigorous renewal of the campaign against the Northerners, which had hung fire since his retirement more than half a year before.

Early in February, at the close of the Plenary Session, Chiang went north along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway to Hsuehchow. Hsuehchow was "farthest North" for the Nationalists at that time, and the Northerners waited beyond. He inspected the troops at that important point, reorganizing a section of them. His return to the actual front was enthusiastically hailed by the soldiers who had waited in idleness and uncertainty for so long.

His first step was to get in touch again with the "Christian General," Feng Yu-hsiang, and the two conferred at Chengchow. Feng went on to Kaifeng and Chiang followed. There the conference was continued. The two military men discussed the plan for the continuation of the Northern Expedition, and a reorganization of forces was decided on. Feng's own veterans were made the Second Army Corps, and Yen Hsi-shan's troops formed the Third Army Corps. The Fourth Army Corps was composed of troops from Hunan and Hupeh. There were 17 divisions in the First Army Corps, 12 in the Second, supplemented by a large cavalry unit, and eight divisions and an artillery section in the Third. Four divisions of regulars and two of irregulars composed the Fourth Army Corps. These troops combined numbered about 700,000.

Following this conference with Feng at Kaifeng, Chiang returned to Nanking to work out the entire plan and to complete arrangements for defence in the rear. To this end he promptly ordered the troops left in Kwangtung and other Southern provinces to proceed directly to the front at Hsuehchow. Chiang had a thorough knowledge, gained through

bitter personal experience, of the intrigues that always boiled and bubbled at Canton, and he had no intention of allowing soldiers in the South to hinder him in attaining his major objective. By this strategy, he removed the source of danger from the comparative safety of the rear to the spearhead of the Nationalist drive, where he could observe what might be brewing.

Late in February, Chiang himself took personal command of the First Route Army, 100,000 strong; these were men who, for the most part, had formerly been under the command of Ho Ying-chin. Chiang offered Ho the post of Chief of Staff of the Nationalist Armies, but due to illness the latter was forced to decline, and he was subsequently given a less arduous position as Assistant Chief of Staff, with Li Chi-shen installed as Chief.

About the beginning of March, Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek went to Shanghai. Chiang inspected the troops at the Lunghua Garrison near the city. He had never had any great love for the cosmopolitan metropolis on the banks of the Whangpoo, and had spent time in the city only when duty made it necessary. Speaking to the officers of the Lunghua Garrison on this visit, Chiang again indicated this distaste for the city, the feeling being accentuated by the tension existing some time earlier between the Nationalist troops in the Chinese city and the foreign garrisons within the Settlements.

"Shanghai," Chiang said, "is a meeting place for the people of all nations. If our men here become disorderly our task will be doubly difficult. The environment of Shanghai is so bad that almost any army, stationed here for three months or at most for half a year, becomes demoralized and practically useless. Therefore we, the officers, must make up our minds to control these troops and guard them against temptations, curbing vicious habits and setting an example to our soldiers."

The soldiers, he added, should learn that they are not the troops of any individual, but of the Kuomintang, to which they must be absolutely obedient; they should be made to realize

that the Nationalist Army was fighting militarists and imperialists, working toward national freedom and better conditions for the masses. "Providing we can control ourselves and educate our men, we should succeed in the coming expedition, as we are consolidated and the militarists are divided among themselves."

Chiang's instructions to these officers were not empty words; he meant what he said and followed it up with swift action. Returning to Nanking a few days later, he had about 50 soldiers summarily executed for their part in the Nanking outrages against foreigners of the previous year, and many others were placed under military arrest. There was no question of executing these men merely to appease the wrath of foreigners, for the latter fully understood the role played by the Communists in that disastrous affair; but it was imperative to impose such punishment on violators of army discipline as an indication to others that Chiang was grimly in earnest in his demand for absolute and unfailing loyalty at that critical period.

During most of March, Chiang conferred with high military men at Nanking, and succeeded in incorporating Chang Fa-kuei's famed "Ironsides," the old Fourth Army Corps, into his own forces. These troops were also sent north.

Chiang was fully alive to the apprehensions of foreigners resident in China, who anticipated the outbreak of renewed hostilities in the North with considerable anxiety, particularly foreign businessmen with valuable stakes in the country, as well as missionaries and others. Before he went to the front, he reassured the Powers that there would be no anti-foreign movements, and in return he asked that foreign adventurers be restricted from selling arms and ammunition and making loans to the Northern militarists. In declaring for the self-determination of China, and speaking directly to the point, he said:

"During past years China's civil warfare has continued without cessation because the militarists have received much support from the imperialists. Arms and ammunition have

been imported into this country in a steady stream. Huge sums of money have been secretly lent to our enemies. One always hears about these affairs. The militarists dream of uniting China by force through oppression, but they are still in their sleep. They oppose the power of the Revolution and thus prolong civil war in this most unhappy country. This is the primary cause of manifold suffering among the Chinese people, and it has interfered with their rightful aspirations. Most foreigners living in China and others who love this country are discouraged because of this."

While deprecating assistance to the enemies of the Revolution, Chiang encouraged supporters of the Nationalist cause. The overseas members of the Kuomintang had always been very liberal in their financial support of the Party, because most overseas Chinese are Cantonese and thus had a personal interest in the success of the Party which originated in the South. Chiang sought their continued support, telling them that there were four chief factors constituting the reasons for the success thus far of the Northern Expedition: a strong Central Government with a now united Party membership; the aid of Shansi troops under Yen Hsi-shan, who were ready to attack the Northerners from the rear; the intensive training of the Nationalist Armies, and the general support of the troops from the people everywhere.

Generalissimo Chiang left Nanking for the front at the end of March, proceeding to Hsuehchow. He was now ready for action; the way was paved and there was no reason for delay. The final campaign of the South against the North was launched.

Chiang's Nationalist Armies spread out along a rough east-west line some distance north of the Yangtze River. Opposing him to the north were the forces under Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian warlord, who commanded altogether about 400,000 men. These Northern troops were armies incorporated under the Peking banner and led by Chang's son, Chang Hsueh-liang, Yang Yu-ting, Sun Chuan-fang, Chang Tsung-chang, Chu Yu-pu, Chang Tso-hsiang, and Wu Chun-sheng.

CHAPTER XIII

Nationalist Drive Northward—Gateway To Tsinan Opened—North-
erners Utterly Demoralized—Clash With Japanese At Tsinan—Tanaka's
Positive Policy—Absurd Japanese "Demands"—Chiang's Adroit
Handling Of Incident—Treacherous Conduct Of Japanese Troops—
Northern Expedition Proceeds—Revolutionary Army Takes Peking

THE Nationalist drive toward Peking began on April 7, 1928. Fighting immediately started in a number of widely separated sections. Within ten days, Chiang's own corps occupied Tengersien in Shangtung; the troops opposing him under Sun Chuan-fang and Chang Tsung-chang suffered badly and were forced to retreat northward to Taian and Kiehshow. Chiang, without giving them a breathing spell, rapidly followed, attacking the latter city. Chang Tsung-chang, battling desperately, threw all available men into the line to defend the position, and even sent a corps of police from Tsinan to reinforce his beleaguered regulars. In another ten days, however, Chiang dislodged the enemy and captured Kiehshow. With that city under the control of the Revolutionary Army, the gateway to the provincial capital, Tsinan, was open. The beaten and exhausted Northern Army retreated across the Yellow River and retired toward Peking.

Chiang's advance had been directly along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. In the general plan of campaign, the Second Army Corps under Feng Yu-hsiang executed a series of holding attacks to divert a considerable part of the Northern forces from the front and allow the First Army Corps to drive straight ahead. Sun Liang-cheng's troops captured Tsining

and assisted the forward movement of the First Army Corps. Yen Hsi-shan commanded the Third Army Corps. The Fourth Army Corps was under Li Tsung-jen; it did not take an active part at the start of the expedition.

Chiang's main Army, the First, was organized into four sections, and his plans worked out as he had expected, as they had been carefully made. One section remained at Hsuehchow as a base; the second operated from Haichow to the Grand Canal; the third advanced on Tenghsien and Peihhsien, and the fourth occupied Shanhsien and Chengwu. These operations were carried out successfully. The Third Army Corps, however, suffered reverses about the middle of April, its attack on Aiting and Yutai being repulsed by Sun Chuan-fang, who followed up his advantage by occupying Fenghsien, thus threatening Chiang's headquarters at Hsuehchow. Nationalist reinforcements were thrown into the breach, and at this critical moment a diversion was created by Sun Liang-cheng, who, learning that Sun Chuan-fang had advanced southward leaving only a small garrison at the strategic base of Tsining, made haste to attack that place. This move compelled Sun Chuan-fang to relinquish his hold on Fenghsien and withdraw to Tsining, which he defended stubbornly against heavy and continuous attacks, but other points along the line rapidly fell before the Nationalist advance and Tsining, becoming isolated, eventually fell. The troops hurried on, mopping up the territory south of the Wen River, capturing Taian and occupying Tsinan.

A brief halt was now called to co-ordinate the Nationalist Armies, as they had advanced so rapidly that they had lost touch with one another and with their bases. Early in May, after the Nationalists crossed the Yellow River, Generalissimo Chiang went across country to the Peking-Hankow Railway to organize the general offensive of the army groups operating along that line.

Chiang returned to Nanking, leaving Feng Yu-hsiang in charge of operations. Yen Hsi-shan's troops had been forced by a sudden offensive on the part of the Northerners to defend the mountain passes into Shansi on the north and east. Yen

met the enemy at Changteh, and after a sharp engagement drove them back. From then on it was clear sailing for the Nationalist troops on all fronts and they went forward without meeting any opposition.

The excesses and exactions of the retreating and thoroughly demoralized troops of the Northern Allies had completely alienated the conservative inhabitants of Shantung, who everywhere enthusiastically welcomed the advance of the invading Armies from the South. The march on Peking was in the nature of a triumph, made in a leisurely fashion through May and June. The Northerners continued to retreat toward the Great Wall, and the subsequent occupation of Peking on July 5, 1928, proved to be a mere formality.

Only passing mention has been made hitherto regarding what is now known as the Tsinan Incident. This affair, which occurred with little warning, was front-page news in Europe and America early in May, 1928, marking as it did a serious and significant clash between Chinese and Japanese troops in the provincial capital of Shantung. It had only a temporary effect on the success of the Northern Expedition, which at that time was advancing triumphantly toward Peking. But among other considerations, it definitely marked the changing relations between Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese. From the incident dates the open hostility of the Japanese expansionists toward the man who was uniting China under the Nationalists' flag, for in Chiang the Japanese saw a direct threat to their own plans regarding North China. Previously, they had looked upon him with some favour as an example of what a Japanese military education could do for an aspiring Chinese leader, but they were beginning to think that Chiang had possibly learned his lessons too well.

Tsinan, the capital of Shantung Province, is a large and important city on the Tsinpu Railway, and at that time many foreign nationals had valuable interests located in the city. The Japanese, whose influence had been spreading through Shantung for several years, had centred their attention on

Tsinan and Tsingtao. Tsinan lay directly in the path of the advancing Nationalist troops, and the Northerners had evacuated the city, retreating northward across the Yellow River. No Power except Japan desired to violate China's sovereign rights by sending troops to Tsinan to protect the lives and property of its nationals. But Japanese troops had already been sent to Tsinan, and a large garrison was stationed there when the Nationalists approached.

Generalissimo Chiang was well aware that there were Japanese troops in the city, and he had no wish to risk a clash with them. It was essential to the success of the Northern Expedition that nothing should happen that would involve him in serious military operations against the Japanese. He was still on the road to the goal, and it might be fatal if his progress was checked by any embarrassing incident. The world recognized this obvious truth, as did many well-informed Japanese. Afterwards Dr. S. Washio, a well-known Japanese liberal, stated openly: "We should be realistic and confess like a man that we acted like a fool."

There are many conflicting reports regarding this incident. It is well established, however, that Chiang, when nearing Tsinan, issued orders to the effect that Chinese troops were not to enter the city in order to avoid any friction with Japanese troops there. Occupation of the town was unnecessary as the Northerners had already retreated. Unfortunately, however, one general, Ho Yao-tsu, with the advance guard either misunderstood or disobeyed these orders, and his troops entered Tsinan on May 1. The First and Second Army Corps poured in after him. Seeing that this tactical error had been made, Chiang went immediately to Tsinan to direct subsequent operations, which to him then meant evacuating the Chinese troops as quickly as possible and getting them moving on the road to the North. The situation was tense and the atmosphere was pregnant with trouble. Chiang wished to get his troops out of the region in which the Japanese were stationed, and for two days laboured diligently to this end, so that the spearhead of the troops did actually get under way.

The change-over had occurred smoothly and the city was relieved. The Nationalist troops had dissipated all fears to the contrary by behaving with circumspection, and by showing a keen desire to avoid any appearance of anti-foreignism. Early on the morning of May 3, the Japanese Consul-General at Tsinan and the commander of the Japanese gendarmes called at the provisional headquarters where Chiang had established himself. They were greeted amicably, and they praised the discipline of the Revolutionary Army and its efficiency as a fighting unit, pointing to the lack of discipline on the part of the retreating troops under Chang Tsung-chang. They added that in sending troops to Tsinan, the object of the Japanese Government was to accord protection to Japanese residents in the city. Since order was being maintained by the Revolutionary Army there was no need for the Japanese troops and gendarmes to remain at Tsinan, and they were ready to withdraw their troops that afternoon.

The Japanese officers left. Chiang thought that there was now no possibility of any Chinese-Japanese friction. He was astounded, therefore, when within half an hour he heard machine gun firing in the streets. Taken aback, Chiang and his staff officers waited at headquarters while an aide-de-camp went out to see what was happening. He returned with the dismaying information that the city gates had been closed and that there had been fighting between Chinese and Japanese troops. Chiang immediately issued orders that all Chinese troops should return to barracks, and he telephoned to General Fukuda, commander of the Japanese troops at Tsinan, explaining that he had ordered his own men into barracks, and requesting that the Japanese troops be likewise withdrawn. He said that he was making an investigation of the cause of the clash, and that when results had been obtained procedure for a settlement could be arranged. Chiang despatched a courier to Japanese headquarters, but the courier never got there because, within ten minutes of the first shot, wire entanglements had been thrown out by the Japanese troops and the streets were barricaded.

The Chinese, since they had been raked by Japanese gunfire, were retaliating. Machine gun firing increased in a rising crescendo, grenades began exploding, and Tsinan was in a state of panic, civilians huddling in their houses or fleeing wildly toward the walls. Japanese armoured cars appeared and opened fire and the Nationalist troops here and there replied with vigorous rifle fire. Large numbers of Nationalist troops who found themselves caught within the Japanese areas endeavoured to fight their way out. Wild rumours flew from mouth to mouth and before long a battle royal was raging. An allegation has been made that the Chinese used bombs; each side declared the other used artillery. It is known definitely that the Japanese did fire several shells, but it is extremely doubtful that the Chinese could have brought their heavy guns into action even if they had wanted to. That Japanese artillery was used was clearly established by the fact that a Japanese shell struck and exploded on the roof of the Ford Automobile Agency.

All evidence points to the fact that there was no organized attack by the Chinese on the Japanese position, but rather sporadic defence by small groups of Chinese. Regarding the inevitable suggestion that the whole thing was a pre-meditated Communist plot, observers were unanimous in their conviction that the presence of a comparatively large armed Japanese force on Chinese soil, cheek by jowl with something like 50,000 Nationalists, created an atmosphere which rendered some kind of clash inevitable.

Chiang made every effort during the day to get his troops moving, ordering that all soldiers except those actually inside the city walls should leave immediately in order to avoid further trouble with the Japanese, but the fighting continued in the afternoon. Though Chiang showed all courtesy to Fukuda, the Japanese commander and made it clear that he wished to settle the matter amicably, the latter adopted an arrogant and truculent manner and capped his offensive behaviour by demanding that a Chinese representative be sent to Japanese headquarters to discuss the matter. Chiang replied

to the effect that this demand simply indicated insincerity in securing a peaceful settlement, that he was constrained to conclude that the cause of the clash was not an accident, but a deliberate act on the part of the Japanese and that Fukuda considered the Revolutionary Army as his enemy. Fukuda sent another message, saying that his staff officers dared not go to Chinese headquarters, and suggested a neutral meeting ground. A place was agreed on and three Japanese went there. Chiang sent Hsiung Shih-hui and several officers to represent the Chinese. The conference was held at night to the sound of heavy firing and the almost continual explosion of bombs. Fires had also been started in the city, and Tsinan lay under a red glow.

Meanwhile, further complications were arising. General Huang Fu was at that time Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government and had accompanied the troops to Tsinan, setting up a temporary office there. As soon as the fighting started in the morning, Japanese troops surrounded the office and raided it, taking away all documents and books, ignoring Huang's protests. After the raiders had left, Huang resolved to see Fukuda, as he knew him personally and believed that a talk might settle the whole trouble. He therefore went directly to Japanese headquarters. Arriving there he was seized by Japanese sentries and confined as a temporary prisoner, or hostage. He was unable to get a message out to Chiang until late in the afternoon, but when he did and Chiang sent a car to get him, the Japanese refused to allow him to leave.

His detention, it developed, centred around a document drawn up by the Japanese wherein it was stated that the clash was due to an attempt by Nationalist troops to rob Japanese residents and by violent attacks on Japanese subjects. Huang indignantly refused to sign the document. One Japanese officer threatened him directly with death if he did not sign, but Huang declared that as Minister of Foreign Affairs he would not be subjected to insults of this nature. A Japanese intelligence officer who intervened on Huang's behalf was

roughly ordered away as a meddler, and the argument continued, Huang steadfastly refusing to sign the document.

Changing their tactics, the Japanese sent a Japanese and a Chinese representative into the streets to attempt to ascertain the true position. Returning, the Japanese declared that he had seen Japanese civilians being killed by Chinese soldiers and that his Chinese companion had also been a witness. Intimidated, the Chinese agreed to this report. This was taken as proof, but Huang stubbornly held out, and finally as a compromise the Japanese arranged a report upon which Huang wrote the character "read," indicating that he had read the Japanese report, but had not signed it. Huang was then released, late at night, and returned to report to Generalissimo Chiang.

The conference between Japanese and Chinese officers sent by both headquarters was meanwhile proceeding. The Japanese demanded that the Chinese troops be prohibited from passing through certain thoroughfares in the commercial area outside the city, that the troops should not be transported on the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway or the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and that Chinese troops be withdrawn outside an area 20 *li* around Tsinan. Nothing was definitely decided and as the fighting increased in intensity toward dawn, the negotiators returned to their respective headquarters. About daylight Japanese troops raided the Chinese wireless station and destroyed the equipment there, and began systematically cutting telephone lines.

Hsiung, Chiang's chief representative at this more or less hectic and resultless night-session, was very bitter in his report to his chief. He, like many of the revolutionary officers, had received his military education in Japan. He had talked with former Japanese classmates during the conference, but their attitude had abruptly changed and he had found them cold and aloof. He was convinced that the Japanese intended to oppose the advance of the Nationalists and that there was no other course but to fight it out.

Chiang counselled patience. Some 1,000 Chinese—

officers, men and civilians—had been killed in the 24 hours of fighting. Although he urged calmness, the Generalissimo wired the news to Nanking, declaring that the Japanese arrogance was beyond description and that he could not bow to such bullying or deliberate brutality.

Similarly, Huang Fu, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Wunsz King, of the Shanghai office of the Ministry, and King sent a cable to Baron Tanaka, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs at Tokyo. This note represented the official view of responsible Chinese officials. It stated that the despatch of troops to Shantung by Japan had violated China's territorial sovereignty and that the Nationalist Government had twice protested against this action, declaring that, should unfortunate consequences result, the Japanese Government would have to bear the responsibility. The action of the day before was reported. Chiang had made every effort to avoid a clash, keeping his troops out of the neighbourhood of the Japanese, but the Japanese had swept the streets with machine gun fire, the Foreign Affairs Office had been attacked, and members of the staff of that office had been murdered in cold blood. The Japanese troops were charged with torturing these men first, it being declared that they had cut off their prisoners' ears and noses before killing them. Communications and business in the city had been brought to a standstill. The Japanese action, the protest declared, deliberately trampled China's rights underfoot and was contrary to every dictate of justice. The Japanese Government was requested to withdraw its troops from Tsinan and order the end of hostilities.

The fighting continued sporadically throughout May 4. The Chinese troops had been provoked to considerable bitterness, and there had developed an almost unanimous desire among them to wipe out the Japanese in the quickest possible time. That could have been easily done had the Chinese brought up their artillery and demolished the Japanese barricades. But Chiang was determined to have no foreign war on his hands, and thus rob the Government of its victory

over the Northerners. Consequently he resisted the pressure from his subordinates, and took steps to make the clash at Tsinan a local incident to be settled later by negotiation.

On May 5, the fighting had died down. Chiang sent a message to Fukuda in which he said that, as he was desirous of a peaceful settlement, he had ordered his troops to withdraw from the neighbourhood of the areas occupied by Japanese troops, and that all Nationalist soldiers had evacuated their posts and joined the Northern Expedition, only a small number of men being stationed in the city to maintain peace and order. He was likewise departing for the front immediately, he said, and therefore hoped that Fukuda would "order the cessation of provocative action by your troops similar to that of the last two days. . . "

Chiang's troops were ordered to march north and cross the Yellow River that evening. He wished to get his men away from temptation. The troops were orderly, evacuating Tsinan with rapidity, and before nightfall most of them were on the north bank of the Yellow River.

Fukuda had wired for reinforcements from Tsingtao and had tried to negotiate with Chiang while waiting for his men to arrive, the plan apparently being to surround Chiang in the city of Tsinan. But before this could materialize, the Revolutionary Army had departed. Chang Tsung-chang at Tehchow had learned of the fighting at Tsinan, and, taking heart, stopped his retreat temporarily with the intention of returning for an attack on Chiang, but his troops had been shattered too badly. He sent a plane south, and the pilot, seeing Chiang's troops crossing the Yellow River, dropped several bombs which killed a number of men. This, however, was the extent of Chang's resistance.

Chiang himself left Tsinan on the morning of May 6. The gates were guarded by a heavy detachment of Japanese, but one gate seemed clear and Chiang departed early in the day, leaving one regiment at Tsinan to police the city under the command of Captain Li Yen-nien.

Li bore the brunt of subsequent events. The following

morning, May 7, Fukuda sent to him a series of five demands to be transmitted to the Generalissimo. These called for the punishment of Nationalist officers involved in the previous fighting; the disarming of all Nationalist troops involved (this number was between 30,000 and 50,000); cessation of anti-Japanese agitation throughout the country; withdrawal of Nationalist troops outside a zone 20 *li* (seven miles) around Tsinan and along the entire 250-mile length of the Shantung railway; and evacuation of two villages in the vicinity of Tsinan where Chinese barracks were located. Fukuda gave Li 12 hours to comply with these demands, and this, of course, was entirely outside Li's authority or power.

The time limit having expired, Fukuda immediately ordered a concerted attack of Japanese troops upon Li's beleaguered men, isolated at Tsinan. Guns were brought up, and the small Chinese garrison was subjected to a heavy bombardment. The Chinese defended their position throughout the day, retaliating with machine gun fire, rifle fire and grenades. News of the renewed fighting sifted out of Tsinan with the refugees and reached Chiang at a small village called Tangkiachwang, some 30 *li* north of Tsinan, whither he had gone following the major body of his Army. In fact, the village was close enough to Tsinan for Chiang to hear the firing and the explosion of shells. Toward evening Chiang succeeded in sending a runner to Li with a message to the effect that if his troops could manage to retreat they were advised to do so. Li and his men, however, were in a tight place; they were surrounded by Japanese, and they could do nothing but beat off the attacks and wait.

The regiment grimly held out for two days. Finally, Fukuda, seeing that he was getting nowhere against this comparatively small, but obstinate, body of men, decided to compromise, inasmuch as his own casualties were growing heavy as a result of continual and vain assaults. He informed Li that he would open the city's east gate and allow the passage of his troops out to Tangkiachwang.

On the evening of May 9, therefore, Li led his troops under

the terms of a truce out of the designated gate and headed north. The weary men had covered barely a mile, however, when they were attacked without warning in the open country at dusk by Japanese troops who had laid an ambush along the way. This onslaught with machine guns and grenades, made suddenly from both sides, took Li's men unaware. There was nothing for it but to fight their way out. Only about 300 survivors succeeded in running the gauntlet and making their way to Tangkiachwang.

Chiang replied to Fukuda's demands, made three days previously. Regarding punishment of officers, he pointed out that Ho Yao-tsu had been cashiered for entering Tsinan in the first place contrary to orders. The demand that all troops be disarmed was ignored as being too utterly absurd. As for anti-Japanese agitation, Chiang patiently informed the Japanese commander that the Government had long before issued orders prohibiting such propaganda. With reference to the establishment of a demilitarized zone around Tsinan, Chiang said that his main force was on its way north, but he proposed that his troops should police the railway and a small force should be left at Tsinan to protect public utilities. The two villages mentioned in the demands had already been evacuated.

Meanwhile, Tsinan itself had become more or less a city of the dead. There had been a reign of terror in the city, all banks and shops had been closed, trade and commerce had come to an absolute standstill, and most of the foreign population, including Japanese civilians, had fled. Those who had remained at first were finally forced to leave because of a food shortage. The Japanese military made efforts to revive the economic life of the community, but they found that it was easier to destroy than to recreate.

On May 11, while proceeding northward, Chiang issued a communique explaining his actions at Tsinan. He particularly emphasized the fact that he had repeatedly given strict orders to guarantee the safety of foreign residents in the war area and he had striven to meet the wishes of foreigners wherever

possible, whether European businessmen, American missionaries, or Japanese nationals. If, then, foreigners suffered it was their own responsibility. As troops were urgently needed to conclude the Northern Expedition they would continue their advance, and men could not be spared to garrison Tsinan. "In this way," he said, "we shall demonstrate to the world that we have no hostile intentions. We have adopted a policy of non-resistance in this case, and the world will know that we are not responsible for international friction."

Every effort had been exerted to move the Nationalist troops out of the Tsinan region toward the North. Chiang had experienced considerable difficulty in effecting this because of the confusion that was incidental to the clash, but he had eventually succeeded in getting most of his men away from the city, the majority going north and a few being sent back south. It was not until Chiang summoned his staff officers to a point on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway and held a conference that he could determine just what the Japanese were trying to do. According to those who were present at the session and listened to the evidence, it was perfectly apparent that the Japanese, despite their declarations to the contrary, were trying to block Chiang's advance toward the North. The so-called neutral zone of 20 *li* around the commercial section of Tsinan, which the Japanese established, included the railway stations and the tracks of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway adjacent to the city. Later, the Japanese cut this railway both north and south of Tsinan and also blew up the bridge across the Yellow River. The purpose of this action was obvious—to block Chiang's further advance to the North.

Despite the fact that the Tsinan Incident was somewhat a setback to the Northern Expedition, progress had nevertheless been made in those chaotic days. The Third Army Corps had reached Shihkiachwang on the Peking-Hankow Railway, and the Second Army Corps, after passing Tsinan and crossing the Yellow River, pushed rapidly on as far as Tehchow on the Tientsin-Pukow line, driving the enemy out of that position.

Popular indignation over the Tsinan Incident was freely manifested throughout China, and an American journal in Shanghai expressed the opinion editorially that the Japanese commander at Tsinan had perpetrated "a case of barbarism directly towards Chinese civilians, men, women and children, which probably will go down in history as an act of brutality." It was generally felt that Fukuda's radical military action against the Chinese could never be condoned. The Chinese Press was filled with reports of the affair, and photographs were widely distributed to prove charges of slaughter and brutality. It was claimed that the Japanese had massacred some hundred wounded Chinese soldiers in a hospital, alleging that there had been sniping from a hospital window.

The Tsinan Incident was the direct outgrowth of the well-advertised "positive policy" of Baron Tanaka, then Premier and Foreign Minister of Japan. The results of the clash were by no means pleasing to the Cabinet at Tokyo, which proceeded to formulate demands upon China, including an official apology from Generalissimo Chiang and the issuance of instructions to the Nanking Government as to where in China fighting would not be permitted between Northern and Southern troops. An effort was also made by the Japanese Cabinet to thrust the negotiations into military channels in the hope that they might thus be kept secret.

It seems to have been recognized that Fukuda had made more or less a mess of things at Tsinan, thereby bringing the Japanese Army into disrepute. Consequently matters were taken out of his inept hands. Lieutenant-General Matsui, Chief Intelligence Officer of the Japanese General Staff, to whom the matter was referred, sent a private telegram to Chiang demanding that he should send a representative to Tsinan to meet him for the settlement of the Tsinan Incident, and threatening that if Chiang did not do so the Japanese would enlarge their zone of operations to include the town of Taian, 65 miles south of Tsinan. Without waiting for a reply, Matsui sent several Japanese planes to Taian where they dropped bombs. Realizing from this irrational behaviour the

seriousness of the situation, Generalissimo Chiang decided to treat with the Japanese. After consulting the Nationalist Government, he agreed to send a representative, General Chang Chun.

Chang refused to enter the military zone at Tsinan and instead met Matsui at Tangkiachwang. The latter was informed that the Tsinan affair was the direct result of the unwarranted intrusion of Japanese troops upon Chinese territory in Shantung and the demand was made that the troops be withdrawn. When Matsui, taken aback by the firmness of Chiang's representative, brought up the question of the five demands made by Fukuda upon Chiang, Chang Chun replied that unless Japan was prepared to negotiate upon the main issues through proper diplomatic channels and in a sincere spirit of justice, China would refuse to continue the conversations. After hours and hours of talk, Matsui yielded and agreed that formal negotiations should take place. Protracted correspondence ensued and the matter was finally settled on March 28, 1929.

Chiang had handled the Tsinan affair dexterously and well. Undoubtedly, he succeeded in gaining a victory over the Japanese military when he managed to isolate the incident and had it settled by diplomatic negotiations.

Tehchow had fallen to the Revolutionary Army on May 17, and the Chihli-Shantung troops and Sun Chuan-fang's troops retreated to Tsangchow. At the time of the Tsinan Incident, Chang Tso-lin had wired to Chiang offering to withdraw his troops south of the Great Wall into Manchuria, but after the fall of Tehchow he was influenced by the Japanese to remain, and he ordered all of the forces under his command to concentrate at Tsangchow and Paoting. Chiang sent the Fourth Army Corps northward along the Peking-Hankow Railway to assist the Second Army Corps in the capture of Chihli Province.

Chiang crossed from the Tientsin-Pukow Railway at Hsuchow to the Peking-Hankow Railway at Chengchow and

there met Pai Chung-hsi and Feng Yu-hsiang. At the end of May, Chiang arrived at Shihkiachwang to meet Yen Hsi-shan. While they were conferring on the campaign, Paoting fell to the Nationalists. Chang Tso-lin, realizing that he could no longer maintain his position on the south side of the Great Wall, left Peking for Mukden, where he was killed by the explosion of a mine as his train passed under a bridge of the South Manchuria Railway line. Shortly thereafter, Yen Hsi-shan entered Peking.

Following the occupation of Peking by the Revolutionary Army early in July, 1928, the commanders of the four Nationalist Army Corps, Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan and Li Tsung-jen, met triumphantly in the ancient Capital of imperial China. They proceeded to the Western Hills together on pilgrimage, and among the pines that whisper above the peaceful monastery of Piyunssu, they took part in a quiet ceremony in memory of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, whose remains rested there.

The Northern Expedition had come to an end, and the unification of China was apparently achieved by linking North China and South China together. The conclusion of the expedition was particularly noteworthy as, for the first time in history, a military expedition from Kwangtung and Kwangsi designed to unify the country had been a success. It is true that the Taipings, who fought their way north from Kwangsi, reached the southern boundary of Hopei, but they failed to get any farther. The Taiping expedition eventually collapsed because of ill-discipline on the part of the troops, and the lack of a commanding personality to lead them. Chiang's achievement in leading the Revolutionary Armies from the southernmost city to the ancient Capital in the North was an epoch-making event.

CHAPTER XIV

Memorial Service For Dr. Sun Yat-sen—Feng Yu-hsiang's Claims—Nanking Politicians Wrangle—Chiang's Pleas For Unity And Harmony—Formation Of State Council—Chiang Becomes Chairman—Feng Yu-hsiang War Minister—Trouble Begins—Manchuria Turns Nationalist Despite Japanese Opposition—Chang Hsueh-liang Joins State Council

CHIANG was thoroughly well aware that a considerable amount of the support that he had received from regional military chieftains had been dictated by their own transitory interests. Schooled in the hard and disillusioning academy of Chinese soldiering from the outset of the Revolution and through the years of turmoil that had followed, he thoroughly understood those feudal warlords with whom he came in contact, whether as allies or enemies. No sooner had the Northern militarists been eliminated—save for small bands of isolated troops—than the political and military situation in the North grew dark again, and complications began to arise. He was not surprised. The occasion of his visit to the temporary tomb of Dr. Sun in the Western Hills outside Peking provided him with an example of what he might expect.

Chiang had planned the memorial service at Dr. Sun's tomb, mentioned in the last chapter, and had asked the allied commanders to attend with him. Yen Hsi-shan and Li Tsung-jen were in Peking following the occupation of that city and accepted the invitation. Feng Yu-hsiang failed to respond, but sent a staff officer to represent him in the service on account of illness.

The service for the late Leader was held at Piyunssu, a beautiful temple nestling in the folds of the Western Hills. Chiang was accompanied by his associates and officers. In the middle of the ceremony, Feng, who had recovered from his illness, made a very dramatic appearance on the scene, marching into the temple in full uniform and surrounded by bodyguards. This interruption, however, was quietly ignored and the service proceeded. Feng remained until the solemn ceremony was over. Following the service, Feng and Chiang walked in the pinewoods, talking. Feng's chief desire was to obtain money to pay his troops. The Government was by no means wealthy, and nothing came of Feng's demands. Chiang advocated a unified Central Government and had no intention of weakening the central authority while strengthening the position of regional commanders. Chiang succeeded, however, in placating Feng during the consolidation of their position in Peking—which, incidentally, had been renamed Peiping while Chihli Province became Hopei—and harmony again reigned.

Late in July, Chiang returned to Nanking to attend the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. The Northern Expedition was finished, and Chiang, mindful of his promise at the start of the campaign, promptly submitted a petition to the Government to be relieved of his command. The Government with equal promptness rejected it, and the petition was referred to in some quarters as a "gesture" on Chiang's part, though it was admitted at Shanghai that it was an interesting move in the direction of civilian control. Moreover, it was noted that the success of the expedition had changed the zone of activity from military to political affairs. It seems to have been Chiang's desire at that time to give more attention to politics and national reconstruction, hoping that the generals would be able to care for the military needs of the nation.

The Plenary Session at Nanking was not a great success. While men had been fighting at the front, politicians had been running true to form behind the lines, wrangling and intriguing, plotting and quarrelling over petty trifles. The Session

could not open on the date scheduled for lack of a quorum. Many of the Elder Statesmen of the Kuomintang had taken a violent dislike to Chen Kung-po, then Left Wing editor of the "Revolutionary Critic," and they declared that if he attended the Session they would stay away. Chiang, harassed by this bickering, went personally to Shanghai and induced the majority of those who were sulking there to return to Nanking. Chen indifferently agreed to stay away from the meetings. Chiang by this time had become expert in the art of inducing at least a minimum of co-operation first from recalcitrant Leftists and then in turn from equally recalcitrant members of the Right. He himself belonged, more or less, to the moderates, who at all times were responsible for getting the practical work of the Party and Government done.

When the Session opened early in August, Chiang, Feng Yu-hsiang, Li Tsung-jen and Admiral Yang Shu-chuang were among the notables present. Yen Hsi-shan fell ill *en route* to Nanking and had to return to his stronghold at Taiyuan.

Chiang submitted a proposal for army reforms, which was unanimously adopted; a proposal that five Yuan be created in accordance with Dr. Sun's Will was also approved. Possibly the most important result of the Session was the promulgation of the Organic Law of the National Government of China which thereafter served as the basis of the governmental system. This was the five-power—or five-yuan—plan of government, and is based largely on Dr. Sun's scheme of the Five-Fold Constitution. The principal authors of the plan, however, were Chiang, Tai Chi-tao and Dr. Wang Chung-hui. Chiang had a major hand in the actual drafting of these regulations governing the five Yuan. This Law, in brief, marked the return of the system of government of the Revolution to a distinct Chinese model, and was comparable to a period of parliamentary experimentation and orientation.

During the Session, Chiang issued a memorandum of peculiar significance, bearing as it does on the overwhelming predilection of old-fashioned Chinese warlords to engage in civil war on the slightest pretext. As a means of avoiding

future conflict, he declared, those in whom was vested military authority should make a public avowal that, despite differences of political views, they would not resort to arms to fight one with the other. The National Army should thereafter be used only for the defence of the country and the suppression of bandits, never to fight internal wars.

Touching on other matters, Chiang said that there should be no direct interference with the executive department of the Government by Party members. Following the principle of government by the Party, the National Government was organized by the Kuomintang and, therefore, did not appear likely to come into conflict with the Party. This was true in theory only, however, he pointed out, for as a matter of fact differences had often developed between Government officials and Party members, but such members, when dissatisfied with any branch of the administration, should first advance their views amicably, and failing this they might try recourse to Party Headquarters. In the event of this measure also failing, pressure might be brought to bear upon the Central Executive Committee of the Party to reorganize the entire Government. The important principle was that on no occasion should a Party member attempt to interfere directly with the administration of the Government.

In spite of Chiang's counsel of moderation, however, the Plenary Session eventually was wrecked by the presence of men intent on having their own way regardless of the consequences to the Party and the country at large. The Right Wing clashed with the Left Wing over the question of branch political councils. The Leftists wished to abolish these councils at Canton, Hankow, Kaifeng, Taiyuan and Peiping, their view being that these bodies were, in the strict sense, illegal. The Elder Statesmen opposed this because they felt that their power lay in the branch councils. Believing that Chiang had gone over to the Left, the Elders departed for Shanghai in a huff. Chiang attempted to mollify them, but failed, and the Session came to an abrupt close by mid-August for lack of a quorum.

Shortly after the breakdown of the Plenary Session, Chiang issued a statement to the nation in which he summed up his own impressions of the situation at that particular time, and in it he restated clearly his own position in reference to the pressing problems of the moment.

"Our comrades in the Party as well as outsiders have lately directed various personal criticisms against me," he said. "Some say that I have become too weak, lacking in the thoroughness and courage required of a person determined upon the extermination of evil influences within our borders; others charge me with unfairness in the performance of my duties, saying that I have been unable to differentiate between right and wrong, the guilty and the meritorious. Still others allege that since the conclusion of the Northern Expedition I have been inclined to compromise and seemed to reveal a tendency toward steering a middle course and that I am disposed to be over-lenient with officials of the old regime. There are also those who maintain that I should not assume a policy of *laissez faire*, but my critics have failed to understand how I happen to assume the attitude I am holding now. I dare assert that I have never swerved from my revolutionary stand, nor have I overlooked our national and social welfare. I have maintained such an attitude because of convictions which have come to me through personal experience."

Chiang declared that the Revolution was directed primarily against imperialist aggression, which was fundamentally detrimental to China's interests and opposed to the tendencies of the time. In addition, internal solidarity was the fundamental condition to the successful progress of the Revolution. Not until the nation was united under the Three People's Principles could China strive for racial preservation, and not until solidarity was achieved within the Kuomintang could the Party lead the people along the path towards national salvation.

"It may be recalled before the commencement of the Northern Expedition that most of our comrades were at Canton," Chiang went on. "It was then possible for Borodin,

under instructions from the Third International, to incite the Communists, who were parasites of our Party, to create trouble and to intimidate and oppress our Party in various ways, and I bore the brunt of these machinations. After the capture of Wuchang and Hankow, the policy of Borodin and his group produced even worse results, and their intrigues became more conspicuous. Indeed, words are inadequate to describe the suffering I experienced under their tyranny and through their attempts to create differences among us. As a rule, whenever our solidarity was threatened, it furnished a fresh opportunity for further aggression by outside influences. Having discovered wherein lay the weakness and the strength of the Chinese Revolution, imperialism, as represented by Borodin, attempted to achieve its own ends at the expense of the National Revolution and of the Chinese people. It attempted, on the one hand, to destroy the solidarity of our Party and, on the other, to create trouble when solidarity was impaired. These events occurred about two years ago, but even now they remain as vivid in my mind as if they happened but yesterday."

In the course of this statement, Chiang had occasion to refer to the Tsinan Incident which was, at that time, still fresh in the minds of all, Chinese and foreigners. Chiang admitted that the incident of the preceding May was regarded by the entire nation as an unparalleled humiliation, but, he said, the humiliation which the Chinese had actually experienced at the front was beyond the imagination of those safely behind the lines. While realizing that Japanese provocations were conclusive evidence of the fundamental conflict between imperialism and the National Revolution, yet it had been necessary to bear them patiently in order to avoid the setbacks to the Revolution that the Japanese had planned. Not only had the Japanese failed to treat China as a sovereign nation, but they had not even treated the Chinese as human beings. The Chinese at that crucial time had been forced to restrain their passion and endure what was almost intolerable.

"Since that time I have keenly realized that the ultimate

opponent of the National Revolution is imperialism," he added. "The overthrowing of a few militarists in the course of the Revolution, in fact, does not mean much, for the final success of the Revolution lies in the thorough awakening and permanent solidarity of our Party comrades and in their full assumption of responsibility to carry on the work of the Revolution. Unnecessary destruction of military power and the financial ability and resources of the people should by all means be absolutely avoided. As to the Party comrades, it is not only their duty to lead and direct the Revolution, but also to exert their utmost to uphold the dignity and strengthen the solidarity of the Party. All differences within the Party should be sacrificed for the greater end. All conflicts should be smoothed out. All suffering and hardship should be patiently endured, and lastly, all unfairness and injustice should be calmly borne."

At that time, Chiang emphasized, the Chinese must at all costs stand united to defend themselves against foreign insult and wipe out their humiliation. Strict adherence to Dr. Sun's instructions with the least possible deviation was essential—apart from that, all other matters could be compromised and endured. Thus, Chiang concluded, when enemies criticized him as being too weak, not thorough, too much inclined to compromise or even be unjust, he could bear with them. He could only show by practical measures that he was devoting his energies to the cause of the Revolution.

Chiang had already won a reputation for being extremely plain-spoken when meeting the criticisms of his opponents, a frank bluntness unusual in Chinese and one that continually astonished old foreign residents in China. He also consistently returned to the theme of national unity. With few of the customary circumlocutions of the Oriental, he revealed exactly what was in his mind. Incidentally, this statement marked the progress which he was making in obtaining publicity for his views, something which in the early days of his public career was largely neglected in his scheme of things.

Upon the breakdown of the Session, Chiang set about the next obvious task, which was to secure co-operation from Party leaders such as Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, and Sun Fo. Sun Fo, who was in New York, cabled Chiang suggesting that Hu, Wang, Madame Sun Yat-sen and Eugene Chen be asked to return from Europe to participate in government affairs. Chiang followed this advice.

In September, Hu Han-min arrived in Hongkong, and with Chen Ming-shu proceeded to Shanghai where they met Chiang. The latter had just issued a statement in which he declared that the Kuomintang as a whole could not be held responsible for the Communist menace in Hunan and Hupeh and the trouble in Canton, and that these only demonstrated the necessity of the Party to get together its able members and establish a healthy Central Government.

Chiang, Hu and other members of the Central Executive Committee discussed plans for the establishment of the five Yuan, and later they travelled together from Shanghai to Nan-king where they called other meetings to put into action the resolutions passed at the Plenary Session. Cordial relations were re-established, and, in October, Chiang was elected one of the 18 members of the State Council, of which he was made Chairman. Names of men who had become prominent in the Kuomintang appeared in this council, among them being Hu Han-min, Tsai Yuan-pei, Wang Chung-hui, Tai Chi-tao, Lin Sen, Ho Ying-chin, Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, Tan Yen-kai, Sun Fo, Chen Kuo-fu, Yang Shu-chuang and Chang Hsueh-liang.

One of the first problems receiving Chiang's attention was in relation to opium addiction. He was bitterly opposed to the widespread use of the drug among the Chinese, for in it he saw the degradation of his people. He took a strong stand as soon as the Government had commenced to function, and outlined a policy by which they might combat the evil, one of the chief measures being a check-up on corrupt and conniving officials.

In November, he went north on a tour of inspection. He

reviewed the troops garrisoned at Pengpu and found their moral condition little to his liking. He ordered that all gambling and opium dens and disorderly houses in the vicinity be closed within three days, an order probably unprecedented in Chinese military history. He swung on through northern Anhwei, visiting the infantry and artillery at Hsuehchow, and the garrison at Haichow. The trip revealed to him conditions of which he heartily disapproved, and he called together all the district magistrates at Anking, where he emphasized the fact that they were now serving in a new era under a new Government. Motor roads were to be built in the backward districts, schools were to be constructed, and banditry was to be stamped out.

While Chiang was absent, discord again began to develop at Nanking. He returned to the Capital and took over the reins. He was angry. He said bluntly: "Since the death of Dr. Sun we have not had a single day of perfect accord and solidarity. The Communists, taking advantage of our internal dissension, carried on their machinations within the Party and temporarily checked the progress of the Northern Expedition so that it was not completed until last summer. . . . There can be no question that the younger members of the Party are patriots and enthusiasts, but they must not merely find fault with others and fail to reflect upon their own conduct . . . Before I left on the inspection tour I thought that during my absence a few of the important measures of the Government would be carried out, but upon my return I find that many things have been left undone. This indicates that our efficiency has not improved and I insist that all officials of the Government should strive their utmost to attain the desired ends."

Chiang has been referred to as "the man of push and go." As Chairman of the State Council, he lived up to his reputation. No sooner had he returned to Nanking than he turned his attention to improvement of conditions there, particularly to the municipal administration of the capital city, which he termed a disgrace to the Government and the local authorities.

He pointed out that there had been repeated cases of outright banditry and robbery in the city. The Communists had renewed their activities inside the walls. Though gambling and prostitution were prohibited, Chiang knew that the Government officials did not take the prohibition seriously. Moral and ethical considerations, Chiang declared, were needed to combat these social evils. "If we depend upon law alone for the successful accomplishment of our revolutionary aims," he said, "I am sure we will not succeed."

Chiang had little respect for the traditional privileges of the office-holder, and said so. "I have often observed," he stated, "that many of the staff members do not know the meaning of work. Organization is becoming worse and worse. Our office hours are short—only six hours a day—and we should be able to keep busy during those hours. Yet I have seen staff members lounging at their desks, gazing blankly into space, or reading newspapers, or sleeping. Such habits will change our offices into the old *yamen* in no time, the *yamen* of corrupt and worthless imperial officialdom. It is not enough to do what you are supposed to do to-day. It is necessary that you go over what you did yesterday and improve on it."

These straightforward remarks attracted much attention in China. They were in direct contrast to the type of utterance emanating from the average Chinese official. It was apparent that he said exactly what he had in mind, and there was a lot of squirming on the part of his audiences, composed as they usually were of important Government men. Foreigners at Shanghai and elsewhere were not slow in taking note of this characteristic, and Chiang's prestige rose still higher in consequence.

Prior to Chiang's assumption of office on October 10, he had been busy in the reorganization of the Party and the reconstruction of the Government. The outstanding result of the Plenary Session had been what amounted to a vote of confidence in his leadership. He had, in addition, become

Chairman of the Standing Committee of Nine, and those men were all either moderates or Right Wing members and could be depended upon to support the principal policies of the Government, but the lack of an influential Leftist on the Committee was a source of weakness, as it meant the loss of support by important elements in the Party.

While reorganizing the Government, Chiang declined the post of President of the Executive Yuan, confining himself to the Chairmanship of the State Council. He did, however, have considerably more power than this office conferred, as he was made Commander-in-Chief (Generalissimo) of the Army, Navy and Air Force in time of peace, and was also given authority to receive representatives of foreign Powers. The Presidents of the five Yuan were chosen by him with care. These were Tan Yen-kai, Executive Yuan; Hu Han-min, Legislative Yuan; Wang Chung-hui, Judicial Yuan; Tsai Yuan-pei, Control Yuan; and Tai Chi-tao, Examination Yuan.

On October 10, 1928, China's National Day, the unified Government with Chiang as its Chairman came into official existence. On that day, he was inaugurated as Chairman of the State Council, which in effect made him, from the viewpoint of the outside observer, the President of the Chinese Republic. On this occasion of the "Double Ten" (October 10) celebration of the 17th year of the Republic, Chiang offered four suggestions. These were to develop a strong national physique in order to avoid degeneration into a weak and feeble race; preserve the ancient Chinese virtues, uproot carelessness and selfishness; increase scientific knowledge, discard superstition, and become thoroughly conversant with the culture of the Western world in order to facilitate national and social progress. Chiang felt that the accomplishment of these aims would ensure the preservation of the nation and that they guaranteed the continued existence of the race and were imperative for a reconstructed China.

Shortly after he and the five Yuan Presidents were sworn into office at a ceremony in Nanking, Chiang issued a message to the nation in which he again reminded the

people that, while the Northern Expedition had been completed, the success of the Revolution remained to be achieved. To attain independence and liberty China must have unity of revolutionary thought to resist and discard the fallacy of the necessity of class-struggle, to crystallize the spirit of patriotism, and to put an end to internecine strife. Only by so doing could China hasten the realization of the Three People's Principles and accomplish the chief aim of the Revolution.

Chiang Kai-shek showed at this period, and later, that he was no mean diplomat. Those were still parlous times, and he did everything within his power to conciliate various elements of the Kuomintang which were working against the common interests. The State Council included Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yu-hsiang and Chang Hsueh-liang, three military men representing North China, whose admission into the Kuomintang was very recent. Their choice was due to Chiang, and clearly indicated that he was determined upon unification of the entire country. Feng was made Minister of War, Hsueh Tu-pi, a follower of Feng, Minister of Public Health, and Yen Hsi-shan became Minister of the Interior. The Right Wing was represented by Hu Han-min, Wang Chung-hui, Sun Fo, Lin Sen and Chang Chi.

The inclusion of the "Christian General" in the State Council, while highly tactical, was soon regarded as an unhappy choice. Feng Yu-hsiang was, in addition to being Minister of War, Vice-President of the Executive Yuan. This was generally considered as a sound political move because Feng's parsimonious ideas might serve to introduce much-needed economies in the Government's military system. Feng was a hard-bitten soldier of the old school, trained in guerilla warfare in the hinterland, and was a colourful character. On his own part at that time, he regarded his presence in Nanking as a God-sent opportunity to protest against the extravagances of officials and at anything else of which he disapproved, and there was a great deal in the Capital which found no favour in his eyes. He consistently wore an ancient, battered straw hat, a private soldier's uniform of faded field

grey, and hand-made cloth sandals. He rode about the city in the driver's seat of an army motor truck, and his chief delight was calling on high officials at unreasonably early hours.

If Feng had confined his eccentricities to these harmless manifestations all would have been well. Unfortunately he was unable to realize Chiang's unselfish intentions. During the period of his residence at Nanking, he crystallized his dissatisfaction in blunt terms. This did not make for peace or co-operation. When Yen Hsi-shan eventually arrived in Nanking it was thought that he would strengthen Chiang's position, but Yen was not happy in the Capital and soon returned to Taiyuan. Thereafter, he did not give Chiang that support which had been so valuable an asset in the Northern Expedition.

Chiang realized in those autumn days that the victory of the Northern Expedition had by no means solved all of China's major problems. Military operations, however, were for the time being at a standstill and he turned his attention more and more to the problem of the political and economic reconstruction of the nation. The Plenary Session, made possible only by his own efforts at conciliation between mutually warring elements, had shown anew the need of bringing about a greater degree of co-operation among those who professed support to the National movement and to the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

North China, in 1928, had been brought under control, but beyond the Great Wall were the Three Eastern Provinces composing Manchuria, and over that vast land for many years had reigned Chang Tso-lin. Manchuria had been more or less completely independent of China since 1922. Chang had retained the Manchurian Salt Gabelle revenues and the receipts of the extra-mural section of the Peking-Mukden Railway. He had waged war in association with Wu Pei-fu for the overthrow of the Central Government and had been established in Peking as leader of the anti-Southern Armies in North China.

He remained there until June, 1928, but with increasing difficulties as his Armies fell back before the advance of the Nationalists. Finally he left Peking for Mukden by train. On June 4, as related in Chapter XIII, while the train was passing under the South Manchuria Railway bridge just outside Mukden, it was blown up by a mysterious explosion under the rails, and Chang Tso-lin was so seriously injured that he died within a few hours. The cause of the outrage was never cleared up, though Chinese and Japanese made a thorough investigation.

Chang Tso-lin's eldest son, Chang Hsueh-liang (generally known as the Young Marshal) succeeded his father as ruler in Manchuria. When Peking was occupied by the victorious Southern Armies, the Young Marshal wired Nanking expressing the hope that the Government would from then on pursue a policy of peace, and he sent emissaries to visit Chiang at Peking, pledging his support to the Government and his desire to work for national unification. Chiang, therefore, sent representatives to Mukden to arrange for the consolidation of Manchuria with the rest of China and it was agreed that Manchuria, as well as Jehol, should come under the Kuomintang flag.

This arrangement was not at all to the liking of the Japanese, who had had a finger in the Manchurian pie for many years. The Tanaka Cabinet was greatly perturbed, and the Japanese Consul-General at Mukden was sent to Chang Hsueh-liang to urge him, in the strongest of terms, not to change over to the Kuomintang. Bickering and conferences resulted and went on for some time, and the Young Marshal eventually sent a message to the Generalissimo in Nanking explaining his difficult position. Chiang instructed the Chinese Foreign Minister to protest to Japan against the Japanese attempt to block national unification. The reply he received from Tokyo was to the effect that the Japanese had done nothing, it was none of their affair, and the entire matter was the business of Chang Hsueh-liang in Mukden, but no one was deceived.

The Young Marshal's determination to join the National Government, however, remained firm. Generalissimo Chiang was convinced that the announcement of Manchuria's definite adherence to the Nanking Government was only a matter of time, for he believed that the Young Marshal was a strong supporter of the Kuomintang. Chiang had predicted in the autumn of 1928 that Nanking would have no trouble with Mukden, for Chang Hsueh-liang had virtually accepted his appointment to the National State Council, and he felt that Manchuria would soon take her rightful place once again as an integral part of China.

Chiang was the butt of much criticism at this time due to his insistence that Chang Hsueh-liang be offered a seat on the newly organized Council. Some say that Chiang's attitude on this question had nearly cost him his position, but he was firm in his belief that the only way in which to make the Mukden leaders believe in Nanking's sincerity, was by offering Manchuria an absolutely equal share in the Government. His policy in regard to Manchuria had long drawn the fire of his political enemies at Nanking, but Chiang had remained firm throughout the whole storm.

He had repeatedly shown himself adept at making compromises between the Right and Left Wings of the Kuomintang, and through conciliatory measures in inducing recalcitrant leaders to take their share in the Government, but there was another side apparent in his nature that gained him a reputation for stubbornness because of his unyielding attitude on matters that he considered really important. His attitude toward the Manchurians was a case in point. Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi were eager to push on after the fall of Peking and bring Manchuria into the Nanking system by force of arms. Chiang vigorously opposed this move, and his resignation after the capture of the Old Capital was believed to have been partially for the purpose of blocking his subordinates who wished to advance despite the objections of the Commander-in-Chief. His action compelled Li and Pai to give way to his plan for conciliation.

Consequently, the Young Marshal showed a marked inclination to give heed to the aspirations of the Kuomintang to bring about the unification of the country. His appointment to the State Council was regarded as a master stroke by astute foreign observers who, from their detached position as neutrals, realized that some such gesture as this was the politic thing to do if the Central Government hoped to bring Manchuria into the fold by any means other than force of arms.

Chiang's chief critic was Li Tsung-jen, who stubbornly declared that he could never shake the hand of a Fengtien man. Others, less opposed to the Young Marshal, felt that he should have been offered a less important post, but in the end Li acceded to the Generalissimo's demand for Chang's appointment. On December 29, 1928, the Kuomintang flag was raised over the Manchurian capital, Mukden, and Chang Hsueh-liang announced his allegiance to Nanking. Thus was given to China that unification which Chiang regarded as essential to the consummation of Kuomintang policy.

CHAPTER XV

Problem Of Disbandment—Chiang's Plans Adopted—First Demobilization Scheme A Failure—Individual Warlords Still Recruiting—Disbandment Conference Summoned—Labour And Peasant Policy—Third Party Congress—Revolt Brewing In South—Central And Provincial Governments—Kwangsi Leaders Openly Defiant

CHINESE armies have, through centuries of warfare and bloodshed, been composed of men who did not fight for the love of fighting, for the Chinese is primarily a peaceful man. Soldiers fought because of economic necessity, being generally recruited from famine areas. They were clothed, fed and sheltered; occasionally they were paid if their particular warlords were in funds. Thus it is not surprising that in China in the old days the soldier was held in contempt by the majority of his countrymen.

The Revolution changed this to a great extent; men fought for freedom from the yoke of the Manchus and the foreign imperialists. They fought for an ideal, and in consequence the profession of arms gained a certain dignity, commanding respect. Not much, perhaps, but the change of attitude was apparent during the long and bloody years of conflict preceding the conclusion of the Northern Expedition. After the fall of Peking, the men under arms numbered approximately 2,200,000, the largest army in the world at that time.

When Manchuria came under the national flag, it was felt that there was no need to keep the armies at such abnormal strength. A long period of warfare had ended; there were

no more militarists to conquer; militarism, on the surface, seemed to be at an end. The armies were merely a liability, and a very costly one. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, facing this problem, realized that disbandment was necessary.

"I consider the two greatest problems of China to-day," he told a friend toward the end of 1928, "to be the demobilization of our vast armies and the beginning of the building of our nation. Although the Revolution is ended, we still have hundreds of thousands of men under arms in all sections of the country. I suppose that the armies directly under our control, totalled up, would show that we have nearly 2,000,000 men whose sole livelihood is, and has been for years, the sword." Chiang's estimate did not include wandering bands of men, and troops scattered here and there under a few generals who stubbornly maintained them for their own use.

After the Northern Expedition, the number of troops increased rather than decreased. The area over which the National Government actually ruled comprised only a few provinces. Feng Yu-hsiang was the strong man of the North and the great North-west; he held sway over Shantung, Honan, Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai and Ninghsia; his rival for power was Yen Hsi-shan, who, from his rugged stronghold in the Shansi hills, ruled Hopei, Chahar and Suiyuan. In the South, Li Tsung-jen controlled the destinies of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan and Hupeh. China was still broken up into regional spheres of influence, almost feudal states, and the situation was potent with danger.

Chiang turned his attention to the Herculean task of disbanding his Armies almost as soon as Peking was taken. Conferring with Feng, Yen and Pai Chung-hsi, it was tentatively agreed that not more than 50 divisions of the most efficient troops were needed and that, if a gendarmerie of 200,000 men were organized for police service, the remainder of the troops might be industrialized. Following this decision, Chiang proposed the calling of a special Military Rehabilitation Conference to work out a scheme whereby troops could be reorganized and trained, a constabulary could be organized

and plans could be made for a labour corps for disbanded soldiers. This labour corps could be put to work cultivating waste land, both in frontier regions and in war-devastated areas. The men, Chiang suggested, might profitably be employed on highway construction, river conservancy, afforestation, colonization, and development of mines. He recognized, of course, that he could not simply turn these hordes of men loose on a country already afflicted with a saturated labour market.

Demobilization of these men would cost money, but not as much by any means as it would cost to keep them under arms. Chiang thought at the time that the country might be divided into military districts, each to absorb 50,000 men. At his request the Government prohibited further recruiting after the conclusion of the Northern Expedition, and Chiang, after conferring with other commanders, declared that in those uncertain days the military expenses of the Government at most should not exceed 50 per cent. of the total revenue. That represented an extraordinary state of affairs in itself, considering China's great poverty and the crying necessity for reconstruction, but it must be remembered that the nation was still in a more or less chaotic condition and the National Government was not at all certain of its position.

Chiang did not waste time once he had decided that idle troops must be demobilized. Very shortly after the capture of Peking, he reorganized all the army corps then stationed south of the Yellow River and, in the process, disbanded 40,000 men. This was a very modest start, of course, considering the great number actually under arms. Those uniformed 2,000,000 men were costing the Government approximately \$300,000,000 every year. Actual maintenance was estimated at \$60,000,000 a month, but this figure was all inclusive, representing the expenses of allied Government enterprises. The annual revenue at that time was tentatively fixed at \$400,000,000; thus three-fourths of the income was devoted to the upkeep of the armies, and then there was the service of foreign loans, to say nothing of the ordinary expenditure necessary to maintain the

civil machinery of the Government. Nothing was left for reconstruction.

The pressing necessity for demobilization was thus brought forcibly to the attention of those in Nanking who supported the Generalissimo in his efforts. Following the disbandment of the first 40,000, he went about the business in earnest, and some 300,000 more men of the First, Second and Third Army Corps were disarmed and dismissed.

The ambitious plan for general demobilization, agreed upon in Peking after the first flush of victory, was doomed to fail. Chiang, Feng, Yen and Li had decided on a sweeping programme that was practically impossible to carry out, as subsequent events proved. They had hoped to reorganize the standing Army, dismissing the majority of the men; they had talked of a new standard for military training, they had planned ways and means of handling disbanded officers and men. They had fixed a maximum for the National Army, which would include infantry, cavalry, artillery and labour corps. The Navy was not affected by this scheme. Chiang wished Feng, Yen, Ho Ying-chin and T. V. Soong to head the proposed Disbandment Commission; he wanted to have the work well under way inside of six months. He desired to bring to a definite end the feudal militarism that had ravaged China for years, and to accomplish this it was necessary to strike at the roots of the evil—take armed forces away from the control of individual warlords who ruled vast areas by sheer weight of men. These men he designed to turn into instruments for public service under the Kuomintang and make of them assets instead of liabilities. He sought to build up an up-to-date military organization to take the place of half-disciplined soldiers.

In view of these far-reaching plans and of the urgent need to do something, it became quite the fashion in barracks for officers to speak loudly and long of the excellent progress being made toward disbandment of the troops, but talk was cheap and, despite the beginnings that had been made, the burden remained, as individual commanders continued to recruit men

almost as fast as others were demobilized, and there was apparently no really sincere desire in the Army to create a truly national defence force. Various commanders scattered about the country reported that they were cutting down the number of their troops; they outlined their plans for the benefit of Nanking, but then proceeded to strengthen their personal positions. This was particularly true of officers who had heavy casualties in their ranks during the expedition; some of the regiments had been decimated, and their leaders began to fill the ranks. A few commanders actually did turn their men to road-building and similar work, but this was simply to keep the men employed and avoid the dangers of discontent among idle troops, as well as to improve some strategic position of military importance to the commanders themselves. Chiang's first plans therefore came to nought due to the greed of warlords coupled with distrust, suspicion, envy and uncertainty.

The Generalissimo was determined, however, to see the thing through, and despite the defeat of his programme, he summoned a Disbandment Conference in Nanking during January of 1929. Although personal differences of opinion existed as to methods of procedure, he had sufficiently impressed the higher military officers of the Kuomintang with the gravity of the situation and the necessity for action, and most of them were ready to co-operate with him. They were beginning to realize the crying need for reconstruction in a land laid waste by war; that was the logical second step in the Revolution. Furthermore, the new year was beginning favourably—treaties had been made with a dozen foreign Powers, all of which had expressed a desire to aid the new Government to establish tariff autonomy; prospects seemed bright for the partial abolition of the unequal treaties. Chiang had urged the chieftains to unite and exhibit the same resolute energy and steady toil in the new tasks which they had shown in the bloody years of warfare from which China was beginning to emerge. The leaders were also beginning to realize that hating the Japanese would get them nowhere unless they

studied the ways and means by which the neighbour nation had become so powerful in so short a time. They were able to compare the self-sacrifice of the *samurai* in modernizing Japan with the selfish and blind greed of the warlords of China. The majority of the leaders, then, were ready to help Chiang, though they were doubtful as to where the money was to come from to carry out the gigantic disbandment programme. At the Disbandment Conference which lasted three weeks, a Central Disbandment Commission was created, and probably the most important decision made was to appropriate from the national revenue 41 per cent. of the total annual receipts for military expenses, which was about 10 per cent. less than Chiang had proposed six months previously. It was decided that the armed forces should be reduced to 65 divisions, totalling 800,000 men. Regarding officers, those who were now too old for further military service were to be retired on pension; officers above the rank of major who were properly qualified, and who wished to study military science might receive scholarships whereby they could go abroad for that purpose; and younger officers were to receive special training as supervisors in Government reconstruction work, which would be started with labour corps organized from disbanded troops. These decisions were approved at a full session of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the Kuomintang and were referred to the Government for prompt execution.

The disbandment of troops was not the only problem that confronted the young Government at Nanking. There were, primarily, questions of the increase of tariff and abolition of *likin*, both of which were held as essential to the success of national unification. It was then hoped that *likin* might be abolished by the end of 1930. The Peking Tariff Conference of 1926 had fixed new schedules which were approved by the Kuomintang, and these schedules came into force in February, 1929.

While this move drew forth pæans of praise for the

Government from China's merchants, it failed to satisfy the Leftists who voiced bitter opposition to the Kuomintang policy. In response, Chiang issued a declaration to the country explaining Party problems, in which he particularly took to task the young Leftists, whom he warned against what he called "leader lust." He condemned their political activities, feeling that these were of a separatist nature, and in this connection referred to the question of the return to China of Wang Ching-wei, who had gone to Europe. Chiang stated that "those who are demanding the return of Wang Ching-wei are really those who do not wish him to return; those who do not voice a desire for his return are really those who welcome him." Some of the politicians at Nanking feared that the Communists wanted Wang back in China to use him as a pawn in the game.

It was Chiang's enunciation of the Kuomintang's labour and peasant policy that stirred up the most virulent opposition on the part of the Leftists. He denounced the labour and peasant movements in the course of a declaration on the tariff situation. "Since economic development is the principal object of the movement for tariff autonomy," Chiang said, "we should seek something more than its recovery. Within a year or so after the enforcement of the national tariff, greater commercial prosperity may be expected, and agricultural progress will naturally follow. When China secures absolute freedom for her tariff, we are assured of still better results. But judging from last year, industrial and agricultural conditions have not kept pace with our commercial progress; the results of the Party's industrial policy were not as good as those of our commercial policy. This may be due to some extent to our brief enjoyment of peace, but the principal reason is that the labour and peasant movements which are being pushed in many sections are not in accord with the industrial policy of the Government."

Developing this theme, Chiang said that it had been the policy of the Government to protect the interests of labourers and peasants, the principal factors of the policy being to raise

the standard of living, increase the knowledge of the people and promote their power of production and efficiency. This was to safeguard their material interests, a policy, he added, which was different from the Communist tactics that called for refusal to pay land rentals and urged strikes and shorter working hours. Such tactics would only serve to curb production, "doom the labourers to perdition and bring great harm to the country."

Those who devoted themselves to labour and peasant movements, Chiang continued, might be actuated by patriotic motives, but whether consciously or not, they were following the policy of the Communists. The agitation for non-payment of land rentals and the encouragement of strikes and the demand for shorter working periods, he said, would not only decrease production, but also deteriorate the quality of Chinese products. He declared that the silk industry had already lost the American market. The sale of Chinese tea abroad was rapidly falling off and the excess of China's imports over exports was mounting day by day. China's commercial setbacks, he pointed out, would affect agricultural and industrial life and instead of protecting the interests of peasants and labourers, the Communist policy was a menace to them and endangered the existence of the entire nation.

"Now the national tariff has come into force," Chiang declared, "and a year from now China will, we hope, have absolute tariff freedom. Henceforth, the way to develop the economic life of our country will be to learn how to secure an excess of exports over imports. After the realization of tariff autonomy there need be no fear that there will be no market for our products and that there will be no remedy for our commercial drawbacks. The important point is how to increase the output of our products, and how to improve their quality. There lies the answer as to whether or not the Chinese people will be able to attain real equality in the family of nations."

This declaration of the Party policy by Chiang amounted to a gage of battle thrown down to the Kuomintang's Left

opposition. The Reorganizationists, as the Leftists styled themselves, accepted the challenge.

To start with, the rules for the re-registration of Kuomintang members as well as those governing the choice of delegates to the Third Congress, which had been adopted by the Central Executive Committee, were described by an ardent supporter of Wang Ching-wei as "ingenious." Their authorship was attributed to Hu Han-min and Chen Kuo-fu, the latter being then the Chairman of the Organization Department of the Party. It was declared by the opposition that these rules deliberately favoured the governing element in the Kuomintang. Despite these allegations, 60 per cent. of the delegates to the Congress were nominated and elected by Party members, while 40 per cent. were named by the Central Party Headquarters.

Shortly before the Congress was convened, Wang Ching-wei and a dozen other Leftists issued a denunciation of the way in which affairs were being conducted at Nanking and declared that they, the Leftists, would support only the "true principles of the Revolution." This manifesto encouraged other Leftists to the extent that they more or less actively combined against Chiang; many of them resigned as delegates or else declined to serve. As these vacancies occurred, the places were filled by other appointees, and this led to an immediate and bitter cry against a packed Congress. As it developed, it was in a sense a packed Congress, but it was a much more representative body than either the First or the Second Party Congress. The packing, however, was largely caused by the obstructionist tactics of the Reorganizationists who sought to defeat the Government by enforcing on it a policy of inaction.

When the Congress finally met in March, 1929, Hu Han-min served as Provisional Chairman and Tai Chi-tao as Chief Secretary. The challenge of the Reorganizationists was met by a vote of censure against Wang Ching-wei, and by expelling his principal lieutenants from the Party. Little was actually



Chiang Kai-shek with Madame Chiang leaving Piyunssu Temple, Western Hills, Peiping.

accomplished, however, by this Congress, for the open rebellion of the Kwangsi faction dominated the entire proceedings. Action against the rebels in Hunan, just north of Kwangsi, was urged in order to restore the authority of the Government over the central provinces.

During the Congress, however, Chiang Kai-shek seized the opportunity publicly to attribute the weakness of the Central Government to "feudalistic regimes" and "spheres of influence." He declared that the authority of the Government had never been respected, and its orders had carried no weight. He warned that, if such conditions were allowed to persist, the future of the Revolution was doomed.

"Some of our comrades," Chiang continued, "have cast aside the Three People's Principles, or they interpret them according to their individual ideas. Confusion of thought and differences of views have ensued, with the result that our comrades are at a complete loss as to the real meaning of our late Leader's teachings. The Three People's Principles are essentially a socio-political doctrine. They deal with the political life of the nation as well as the social life of the people. For example, it was the policy of Dr. Sun to bring about an equitable distribution of land and to curb capitalistic exploitation of labour, but he availed himself of every opportunity to explain that China should not seek equality with the rest of the world through the medium of a class war."

Looking at the situation from a political standpoint, Chiang said, it was perfectly clear that the Revolution led by the Kuomintang had been undertaken purely in the interest of the whole people. The leaders must acknowledge that hitherto the unfortunate people had suffered, but until the entire country was unified, mitigation of the people's suffering was well-nigh impossible. The question, therefore, was: Is China really united now? A cursory view of the situation, said Chiang, would show that she was not. The provincial governments were acting independently in financial matters in their respective areas. They were buying arms and ammunition without the sanction of the Government and they

were recruiting troops on their own account. The Government was powerless to exercise control over the provincial chieftains, and could not effectively stop them in their apparent determination to run their own show. What was even worse, Chiang asserted, was that these provincial governments, taking advantage of their new military strength, were attempting to dictate to the Central Government on questions affecting themselves, with the result that it had become necessary for the Central Government first to consult the provincial leaders before issuing orders.

Notwithstanding Chiang's efforts to avert it, another rebellion was in the making even before the Third Congress was held. The Kwangsi leaders, Li Tsung-jen, Li Chi-shen and Pai Chung-hsi, had firmly established themselves in the Wuhan cities and their influence had spread over a great area in Central China. It was their intention to increase their power until they could eventually overthrow the Central Government and organize a new regime. Chiang was determined to stamp out regionalism and strengthen the National Government, and in the Kwangsi movement he saw a serious threat to the unity he sought for the nation. The Wuhan Branch Political Council had been supervising the collection of national revenue in Hunan and Hupeh, the two rich provinces under its control, and such supervision amounted to the retention of this revenue. The split between Nanking and Hankow had widened during the winter, and the quarrel was accentuated by the dismissal from office of the Hunan governor, Lu Ti-ping, by the Wuhan Branch Council.

Lu was loyal to Nanking and had been remitting revenues from his province directly to the Central Government. The Wuhan chiefs demanded that he remit the funds through the Council, which would act, they said, as an intermediary body. When he refused, Lu was dismissed from his post, but Nanking was not yet ready to cross blades with the Wuhan faction and did not take a firm stand. Its only action was a half-hearted resolution denying the right of branch councils to appoint or dismiss officials without Government approval.



Leaving the temporary tomb of Dr. Sun at Piyunssu at the Western Hills near Peiping: The Generalissimo has General Feng Yu-hsiang on his right and General Li Tsung-jen on the left.

Unfortunately the arbitrary dismissal of Lu by the Kwangsi leaders at Hankow was followed immediately by the despatch of troops south to the provincial capital, Changsha, to enforce the order. Lu, whose troops were outnumbered, prudently retreated eastward into Kiangsi, while part of his Army was forced toward the west.

There was war fever again in the air, though no actual clash had occurred. Nanking continued to negotiate, however, considering discretion the better part of valour at that critical time, and for the moment the war scare faded. The Wuhan faction interpreted the overtures from Nanking as a sign of weakness and, wishing to secure definitely the military fruit of their *coup d'état*, they pushed on after those Hunan troops who had retreated to the west. War was again imminent, and Nanking troops began to mass along the border of Hupeh.

One of the three Kwangsi chieftains, Pai, was in the North at this time, his Army having stretched itself far beyond the Wuhan region, and detachments were stationed in Peiping. There were few Kwangsi men in this force, however, and Pai, seeing trouble ahead and himself more or less cut off in the North, settled his own problem by the simple expedient of going forthwith to Japan. His command was taken over by a Nanking officer, Tang Sheng-chih, who had formerly commanded these men during the Northern Expedition.

The second Wuhan leader, Li Chi-shen, indiscreetly went to Nanking to attend the Party Congress and was arrested there by Chiang, who had obtained proof of Li's plan to revolt against the Government. His arrest precipitated further quarrelling between Chiang and the Reorganizationists. The third leader, Li Tsung-jen, then went to Canton to fan the flames there and his influence resulted in a protest to Nanking from the Canton faction against the arrest of Li Chi-shen. An effort was made to organize an expedition from Canton to support the Wuhan clique. This was baulked, however, by two Cantonese generals loyal to Nanking, Chen Ming-shu and Chen Chi-tang, and Kwangsi forces in Canton were ordered out of the city. Thus the Kwangsi faction at Wuhan suffered

reverses at both extremities of their extended sphere of influence at the very outset of the rebellion. They had lost their Peiping detachments and they had been forced to evacuate Canton.

Generalissimo Chiang was alive to the danger threatening Nanking. At the beginning of the dispute he had been in Fenghua, his native place, on his annual pilgrimage to pay homage at the tombs of his ancestors. When he returned to Nanking, he found the Government faced with a problem it was desperately attempting to dodge rather than solve. Action was necessary, but the Government confined itself to empty words. The situation had rapidly become very grave and confusion prevailed in the Capital. There had already been fighting in western Hunan. The Kwangsi men had definitely disobeyed orders from Nanking; in their eyes there was no Government. Many in Nanking held that the outbreak was a regional affair, a simple fight between local malcontents with no bearing on the nation as a whole. Chiang realized only too well that the explosion was no accident, that disloyalty had its roots deep in the minds of the rebels. If this state of affairs were allowed to pass unchallenged there was little to prevent other warlords from taking their cue from Hankow, setting aside civil authority, seizing more territory and starting hostilities at their own pleasure.

Since the completion of the Northern Expedition, the Government had been turning its efforts towards unification of the country and prevention of further bloodshed. To this end the branch political councils had been forbidden to tamper with provincial officials appointed by Nanking, and all troops had been ordered to stand by for inspection prior to reorganization or disbandment, it being specifically stipulated that no troops should move from their stations. These safeguards had been provided to bring peace, and in Chiang's opinion, they could not be regarded lightly as orders to be broken at will. Now the Wuhan Council had set troops in motion against forces in Hunan and Kiangsi after removing the Governor.

The Kwangsi leaders had replied that, in a state of

emergency, the Council could act on its own discretion, but even if such powers were permissible, which they were not, Chiang could see no state of emergency justifying war measures. The Hunan authorities had not succeeded in suppressing banditry and Communism, it was also argued, but the Government had not been petitioned in the matter; if, as was claimed, the Hunan authorities should have given up part of their revenues for provincial budgets, the Government should have been called in to settle the matter. Neither of these reasons created a true state of emergency justifying an attack by the armed troops of one province on those of another. Chiang, therefore, branded the action of the Wuhan Council as outright defiance of the Government.

In referring to this aspect of the situation at the time, Chiang declared: "If to disregard the specific orders of the Government may be considered a local right, if wars—thus destroying the chances for unification of the nation—are held to be local matters, what cannot be committed in the name of local interest? May not, then, the seizure of territory be also regarded as a local affair? If so, then there is no end in sight for the sufferings of the people from civil war and military bondage. Can we not look back to the blood and treasure sacrificed by the people of China during the years of the Northern Expedition? As yet our people have only sacrifices to show for the cause of the Revolution; they have not reaped the benefit promised them. If we cannot achieve national unification and cessation of war we can rightly be regarded by the people as their foes, not as their deliverers. Every effort has been made toward peace and unity so that we may have a breathing space for constructive work. A ray of light had just appeared, dawn seemed at long last to be breaking. Deep is our disappointment to have our hopes so rudely shattered by reactionaries in Wuhan."

It is necessary to comprehend the attitude of the Kuomintang at this period to understand the motives that impelled the Party to enter into further strife. To Chiang himself, it was obvious that, since the Wuhan faction had openly

rebelled, it was the plain duty of the National Government to act decisively. To those who had followed the political situation in all its devious windings during previous years, it appeared that the Government had rarely interfered with the normal functions of provincial authorities. On the other hand, various local officials had often interfered with the functions of the Government, so much so that many of Nanking's officers in outlying regions had become mere nominees of the provincial chiefs. These latter obeyed orders from Nanking when it suited them, paid lip service, but constantly demanded that the Government carry out their mandatory petitions. The Central Government, endeavouring to achieve the effective unification of the nation by peaceful means, had patiently sought to placate their opponents, but this policy had apparently failed; patience was regarded in the hinterland as spinelessness and leniency was misunderstood. Nanking was not held in much respect in the provinces, for it was obvious in those days that the Government was not increasing its military power but was devoting its attention to reconstruction. The Wuhan leaders, therefore, had seized the opportunity to mobilize their troops and embroil the nation in another bloody conflict.

Speaking to his colleagues after his return from Fenghua, Chiang declared that further patience and leniency would be but meaningless sacrifice of the country's laws and the Party's fundamental principles. "This determined attitude on the part of the Government," he said, "must not be mistaken as implying the employment of armed force; the Government will exhaust all measures to settle the question by peaceful means, hoping that the political principles to which these rebels subscribe will not be considered as convenient mummeries. During the past ten years the ever-shifting wars waged by the militarists have caused untold suffering to the masses, thousands upon thousands have died of hunger, cold and disease. He must be indeed cursed who wishes to see his own country again wallow in the blood of civil war. Tsinan is still under the heel of the imperialists and the remnants of the

defeated warlords are scourging Shantung. In maintaining order and authority the Government will spare no pains to avoid bloodshed."

Armies had invaded neighbouring provinces, Chiang pointed out; who would dare to predict that they would stop short of overthrowing Nanking itself? The Government was thus in duty bound, he asserted, to take precautionary measures against the recalcitrants as well as against the Communists, "who are ever watchful for opportunities to start trouble." If the measures adopted by the Government were to be regarded as provocative, and the attack on one province by another as excusable, it meant that provincial authorities had the right to dictate and overawe the Central Government, while all the latter could do would be quietly to await its own destruction. Such an attitude could hardly be advocated by anyone who understood the principles of the Party, or held any love or reverence for the nation, Chiang said. The Government was willing and capable of guarding its trust.

Following Chiang's decision to try to avoid using armed force in dealing with the situation, rumours began to circulate that Nanking was negotiating with Wuhan. This subsequently proved to be unfounded, for the Government had offered no terms for a compromise. There were also rumours afloat that various politicians had offered to come forward and mediate—to their own advantage. These rumours were also ridiculed in Nanking. When these stories were mentioned to the Generalissimo he treated them with contempt. "I believe," he said, "that no one who understands the rudiments of revolutionary thought, or the necessity for real unity in this country, can think of employing the word 'mediation' in this situation. Against any transgressions on the part of provincial authorities the Government only knows how to administer the law; it can accept no mediation. Neither have those in rebellion the right even to ask for 'mediation.' If anyone thinks this situation calls for compromise he is badly mistaken. The Government will not be lowered to the level of the rebels, these compromisers regard the Kuomintang's Government in

the same light as the masquerade governments of the old warlords."

Chiang was convinced that the policies of the Government must be carried out and that the Government must not be endangered. In the conflict of principles, success or failure, he said, meant nothing; what mattered was that one should be on the right side. Instead of carrying on a mockery of government and subsisting on humiliating compromises that led nowhere, Nanking, he affirmed, must face the issue squarely, come what might.

CHAPTER XVI

Chiang And Kwangsi Warlords—Lukewarm Help From Colleagues—Reply To Criticisms—Wuhan Rebellion Crushed—Threatened Trouble In The North—Feng Yu-hsiang's Secret Parleys With Kwangsi—Sun Liang-cheng Wrecks Railway—Chiang-Feng Telegraphic Duel—State Funeral Of Dr. Sun Temporarily Postpones War

IT WILL have been seen from the last chapter, and it will be emphasized in this, that Chiang was facing almost insuperable obstacles. With few exceptions his colleagues either did not support him at all, or did so in a reluctant and sullen manner. The military satraps, generally known as warlords, were, of course, highly incensed with him, because he realized that, in the national interest, their power would have to be curtailed, and later brought to an end. But apart from them, the Government as a whole did not give him the support that he could reasonably expect, and many of the politicians at Nanking failed to realize that, if the Revolution was to be a success, the power and prestige of the National Government must be preserved and augmented, even, in the last resort by force. Chiang's appreciation of this fact is remarkable, in that most of his colleagues took the opposite view. They were in favour of compromise, even though it meant surrendering rights to the provincial, or rather regional, authorities that might never be regained. Chiang was himself in favour of compromise as long as the dignity and pre-eminence of the National Government were maintained, but he was grimly determined that the Central Government should be supreme,

and much as he detested civil war, he was prepared to administer military chastisement if no other course were open.

Chiang resolved, then, to fight. He planned to launch the attack toward the end of March, 1929. A few days before leaving the Capital for the front, the Generalissimo issued his last word on the subject. Pointing out that there were those who criticized the Nanking Government as being run by a few individuals, he said: "That was once the cry of the Communists, and now we hear members of our own Party repeating this slander. The Government is of the Party; the executives are appointed by the Party; the decisions of the Government are made in council. There is no room or possibility for a one-man government. Rather, the weakest spot with us lies in aversion to taking responsibility, and at the same time many are critical of those who are shouldering the burden. For myself and my colleagues it would be a genuine relief to be rid of those burdens, but we cannot give up the cause of the Revolution. If one man were running this Government, why was it that leaders came together in the Capital to discuss national problems? Military and political leaders have repeatedly assembled in Nanking, though many have neglected their duties, and it is these latter who criticize others, charging them with monopolizing control and power. I am to-day carrying on my office under orders from the Party, neither wishing to monopolize the powers of government nor scheming to hold my post, and on that point my conscience is clear. I would indeed be betraying our former Leader and the people and the troops who have given their blood and treasure to the Revolution if I neglected my duty so that by shuffling and scheming I could hold on to my position a little longer."

The Government, he said in conclusion, must not allow itself to be deceived by a few honeyed words. There were military men who were telegraphing their allegiance to the Government and advocating peace when they were planning and in some cases actually carrying on war. In the very act of professing to desire peace, Kwangsi chieftains were attacking Hunan troops. Their words were peace, their acts

were war. The Revolution was once more in danger. He, Chiang, would do what he could to maintain the authority of the Central Government and at the same time avoid if possible the use of force; but if the rebels continued to push on, then there would be bitter fighting.

At the end of March, the Generalissimo ordered a general offensive, but, when the fight started, Nanking did not go into combat with great optimism. The Capital envisaged the possibility of defeat, for the Wuhan Armies were strong and consisted of old campaigners wise in the ways of Chinese warfare. Chiang entered upon the war against Wuhan practically unsupported, for the Elder Statesmen of the Party, who formed the dominant group in Nanking, were favourable to the Kwangsi faction at Wuhan. In setting up a more or less independent regime in Kwangsi, Hunan and Hupeh, the Wuhan leaders had provided a good government from the point of view of some of the local people. It was purposely made a loose, *laissez faire* rule which was approved by the merchants and farmers, who resented official interference in their affairs. Such people, therefore, generally hoped for a Wuhan victory, but in the end the Wuhan leaders failed; their defeat was complete. That failure was chiefly due to the lack of real organization, an antiquated viewpoint regarding modern methods of waging war, Nanking's superior treasury, and the well-disciplined, trained and equipped Central Government forces.

From the outset of the hostilities, the Wuhan forces, unexpectedly, lacked unity of command. Their plan of campaign was not intelligently worked out. The Wuhan troops were waiting for reinforcements to march up from Kwangsi, but the Southern troops had been forestalled by rapid Government action. The Wuhan cities on the Yangtze had been converted into a great, entrenched camp in which the strongest divisions were concentrated and held for a concerted attack in the direction of Nanking. Only a few small detachments were stationed in northern Hupeh.

Faced with the necessity for immediate action, Chiang

struck without further delay. He left Nanking for the front, and, on the first of April, the offensive was well under way. The advance was rapid. That same day Hwangchow, a Wuhan garrison town, was occupied by Government troops. Gunboats of the Nanking Navy had been concentrated in the Yangtze and had proceeded up-river until they were within ten miles of Hankow. Several Hunan brigades, demoralized by this initial defeat, left their lines and came over to the Nanking side. The ranks of the Wuhan forces seemed about to disintegrate. Central Government troops pushed on into Hunan, meeting very little opposition.

By April 4, the Wuhan forces were retreating on all fronts. That night the Kwangsi men evacuated Hankow; the next day the National forces entered the city and the gunboats arrived in port. The capture of Hankow had come so abruptly, with scarcely a struggle, that the nation was stunned. Two Nanking columns took up the pursuit. Within ten days they had occupied Kingmen, and the following morning the gunboats were shelling Shasi, up the river. The Wuhan forces were routed and the Wuhan campaign was ended.

Even while he was suppressing the Wuhan Armies, Chiang had been keeping his eye on Kwangsi. By his orders, the Fourth Army Corps was formed under the command of Ho Chien to make an advance into Kwangsi if it became necessary. After having been forced out of Canton by Chen Chi-tang, the Kwangsi forces had occupied the rich districts to the east around Swatow and northward along the sea-coast towards Fukien.

It was not long before a large-scale enveloping attack on Canton was started by the Kwangsi troops. Brigades from Swatow were despatched to assail the city from the east, while the main body of Kwangsi troops advanced toward Canton in three strong columns. The first followed the West River to Takhing, arriving there early in May. The centre column drove obliquely down between the North and the West Rivers from Waitsap and Kwongning to Szewui and Samshui. The third column pushed through from Hohsien to the North River

and turned south. Canton was hemmed in on three sides, the field being open only to the south. Nor was the southern side devoid of menace, for the gunboats of the Navy revolted on May 8. Chen Chi-tang, holding Canton, acted decisively at this stage. He sent a squadron of bombers out over the flotilla. The gunboats were also under fire from shore batteries, and this, combined with the bombs, soon brought the naval rebels to terms, leaving Chen free to face the land attacks.

The second phase of the Wuhan rebellion, centred in Kwangtung where Canton was virtually besieged, began in the first week in May. Chiang and Chen were in close communication, and Chiang sent a division of Fukien troops south to attack Swatow, thereby relieving the tension on the East River. A small flotilla of Nanking gunboats also went south toward Swatow. Three more divisions were despatched by sea directly to Canton as reinforcements and, in the west, the Hunan troops under Ho Chien were advancing south into Kwangsi.

The attack launched against Canton from Swatow was repulsed with no great difficulty. The three columns from Kwangsi, however, came dangerously near to capturing Canton. This was due to an adroit manoeuvre. The Kwangsi forces advancing down the West River halted, and then feigned retreat. Encouraged, the Cantonese defenders were enticed out into the open, pursuing the troops westward. The other two Kwangsi columns then swiftly advanced on the city. Chen Chi-tang realized his danger just in time, fought desperately and then boldly launched a counter-attack. The Kwangsi troops began an actual and not feigned retreat, and Canton was saved.

Chen then sent a detachment eastward to attack Swatow. Chiang's Fukien men were advancing on that city from the north, and entered it without a struggle toward the end of May, thus establishing contact with the Canton detachment. The entire province of Kwangtung was now clear of Kwangsi troops.

Chiang and Chen did not waste any time. They followed

up their victory by organizing their combined Nanking and Canton forces for a counter-campaign into Kwangsi itself. This Army advanced toward Wuchow, in Kwangsi, from the east, while the Hunan Army under Ho Chien was rapidly advancing south into the province. The two armies converged and at the end of May besieged Wuchow. The city fell on the second day of June.

The Kwangsi forces, having lost two important strongholds in their own province, Wuchow and Kweilin, concentrated at Nanning. They spread out fanwise to await the expected attack. Ho Chien's Hunan troops, flushed with success, advanced too hastily against Nanning and met a strong detachment of Kwangsi men at the town of Liuchow. The Hunan drive was suddenly stopped and, after severe fighting, during which the troops suffered very heavy losses, they retreated. The Army under Ho Chien was so badly defeated that it did not stop its retreat northward until it was back in its own province.

The troops from Canton, however, pushed steadily into Kwangsi, scattering all opposition before them. After two weeks they captured Sunchow (Kweiping) and from then on it was clear sailing. At the end of June, the Kwangsi forces hastily evacuated Nanning and the Canton troops entered the city. The Kwangsi campaign was ended.

Kwangsi's defeat had been complete and the fighting was over in the South. This had changed the entire character of the Kuomintang, eliminating all influence except that of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who had emerged as a supreme leader. His prestige was higher than ever before. Many were jealous of him, but none dared openly question his authority. He had asserted the principle that the Central Government must be obeyed and he had enforced that principle by force of arms, utterly crushing those who attempted to oppose him. The Kwangsi faction had lost everything, even its own province. Kwangsi had had, for a time, an ally in Chou Hsi-cheng, Governor of Kweichow Province, but that commander had not lasted long. When he had offered

aid to Kwangsi, he found himself suddenly attacked from a totally unexpected quarter. Lung Yun, who was in control in distant Yunnan Province in the far South-west, had cooperated with the Government forces. He invaded Kweichow without warning, and ousted Chou from his capital at Kweiyang.

After the collapse of the Wuhan rebellion, the national revenues were collected in 22 provinces, a condition which had not existed for a decade previously. By his lightning-like campaign, Chiang Kai-shek had proved his power and shown that the day of *tuchun* politics in China was drawing to a close.

Upon the conclusion of the rebellion, Chiang issued another manifesto to the nation. This was a veiled warning to other recalcitrants who might threaten the National Government; it was also a refutation of the charge of dictatorship being made with increasing frequency by the Leftists, and it was another appeal for national unity for which there was evident need. At that time, he also declared that, as soon as the situation was stabilized, he would resign his office and carry out his long-frustrated ambition to go abroad.

The campaign against the rebels was successful, he pointed out, but while peace had been regained without much bloodshed, the nation had been hard hit as civil strife had occurred at a time when national unity was within their grasp. He felt that there was no particular glory in the victory over the Kwangsi faction, but they would never have dared to rebel, he said, but for the weakness of the Central Government. The support of the nation at large, was, therefore, urgently needed. In supporting the Central Government the people were indirectly protecting themselves, for without strong central authority feudalism would arise again and with it civil strife; the country would once more be plunged into turmoil. This was not a dictatorial government; it was a government by the Kuomintang, and therefore the Party must be strengthened. Those disorganizing cliques should be broken down.

His manifesto closed with the usual self-condemnation, and further mention of his projected resignation. This offer to withdraw was considered more or less equivalent to the action of a Prime Minister in asking Parliament for a vote of confidence.

Foreign observers in Shanghai, with valuable stakes in China, were nevertheless alarmed lest the Generalissimo should actually leave office. Coming on the heels of the triumph gained over Wuhan, Chiang's threatened resignation set people wondering. His apologies for "negligence and failure in taking preventive measures" that would have averted the war with Wuhan; and his professions of inability to cope with the difficulties he saw ahead were regarded by most foreigners as but the conventional modesty that was customary with Chinese leaders in similar circumstances. If the outlook was so gloomy as the manifesto seemed to anticipate, surely, they argued, there was the more reason that Chiang should stick to his post. He might be faced by criticism as a leader, they said, and had many antagonists as any man in his place would be bound to have, but he was, by general foreign consent, an able statesman, who had shown great skill in keeping together the many groups into which even the leaders of the Party were divided. On those lines, if on no others, there appeared to be plenty of work for him to do, which probably no one else could do so adroitly at that juncture in the country's affairs. To resign then, the observers concluded, was hardly to practise the principles which Chiang's manifesto preached.

As for Chiang, he paid scant attention to any of the criticisms being made against him. He was vigorously censured on account of the expedition against Wuhan; fault was found with his explanations for the drive; he was declared to have tried to make the Central Government too strong and thus had himself brought about the Wuhan rebellion. In the midst of all this Chiang remained aloof.

In the year 1929, an even more serious threat to the

security of the National Government than the Wuhan rebellion was the revolt of Feng Yu-hsiang. Feng is a remarkable man. The appellation of "Christian General" was conferred upon him by admiring missionaries who spread the report far and wide that Feng, upon embracing Christianity, had baptized all of his soldiers in the faith. He had grown by this time to be almost a legendary figure in a mist of strange stories. He was strong; he had a huge army at his command; he ruled over a vast region difficult to get at. In him Nanking recognized a very potent antagonist.

After the completion of the Northern Expedition, the National Government tried hard to satisfy Feng by giving him the position of Minister of War, a highly important appointment. During his sojourn in Nanking as War Minister, Feng developed an obstreperous attitude. He delivered forceful speeches and criticized everyone and everything, particularly the Army Commissariat, the Municipality of Nanking and the Ministry of Finance. He lectured on simple living when he was treated to an elaborate feast. Being unable to accustom himself to the mode of living in the metropolis, Feng resigned and retired to his northern preserves.

Upon his departure from Nanking, there commenced intrigues looking toward the possibility of concerted action between the Kwangsi Army and his troops, since both were definitely dissatisfied with Chiang Kai-shek, who was then at the head of the Government. Chiang had expected trouble from Feng; he had noted signs long before the Wuhan rebellion; he had made preparations for it. He knew that the National Government of China was not perfect, but it was the Government of China, and the peace and prosperity of all depended upon its strength. He had maintained its strength and was contemptuous of militarists who suffered from a *tuchun* complex.

When the Kwangsi leaders challenged Chiang's supremacy, Feng was ready to follow them, but he hoped first to acquire the undivided control of Shantung which would further strengthen his position. In the meantime, he took up an

attitude of watchful waiting until such time as the Japanese had evacuated their positions in Shantung. The retirement of the Japanese had been tentatively agreed upon as the result of negotiations with Nanking, but the Wuhan campaign had been concluded a little too soon to fit in with his plans. The field of fighting was then shifted to the far South and Chiang had gone to Changsha to direct operations. Feng thought that his time for action could no longer be delayed. On April 30, Sun Liang-cheng, one of his adherents, suddenly defied the National Government. Thus trouble from a new quarter began to loom threateningly on the clouded political horizon. A little later, Feng permitted his principal generals to nominate him "Commander-in-Chief of the North-western Army to Protect the Party and Save the Country." This decisive move was made on May 16. Within 20 hours his lieutenant, Sun Liang-cheng, sent his detachments into the field. These troops blew up a number of bridges along the Lunghai Railway. Three days later, bridges on the Peiping-Hankow line were also destroyed. All of Feng's troops were concentrated in the North, thereby setting up an effective barrier against invasion from the South.

Despite Feng's belligerent attitude, Chiang Kai-shek, with his hands already full with the campaign in the South, began the famous exchange of telegrams which were unbelievably long—possibly the lengthiest ever sent over a Chinese wire. In so doing he hoped to convince Feng of the necessity to cease the domestic strife and support the Government, and of the dawning of a new day for China when personal interests must be relegated to the background.

The crux of the whole thing, therefore, lay in the fact that Chiang demanded that the entire Chinese Army be unified, and that the commanders should submit to the authority of a central command. Feng, on the other hand, was determined to maintain the Kuominchun as a separate and private military unit, a principle regarded by Nanking as feudalistic and impossible. Both sides blandly denied preparations for war, though troop movements were constantly taking place, Nan-

king forces shifting northward and Feng's troops marching into Shensi. Nanking presumed that Feng intended to attack Shansi and take over Peiping.

Actual fighting was delayed, not only by the telegrams, but by the state funeral of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the period of which was regarded as a sort of truce by all parties. Chiang, after his visit to Changsha, had not gone personally to the southern front; he had directed Nanking troops from the Capital, leaving that part of the campaign to Chen Chi-tang in Canton and Chiang's own lieutenants. He felt that his presence was not needed in the South, inasmuch as Canton was now safe and the Kwangsi men were retreating westward. He, therefore, was able to participate in the burial of Dr. Sun.

The word-skirmish began with a brief and truculent telegram from Feng. He minced no words; he charged Nanking with trying to starve out the Kuominchun by withholding its pay. The reply Chiang sent is noteworthy, not only for its length, but for its phraseology and should in part, at least, be entered into the record as a unique document even in Chinese polite diplomacy.

"I deeply appreciate your message," Chiang began. "The multitude of rumours concerning the situation makes it necessary for us to find a fundamental solution to our problem. You have frankly given me your own opinions, and herewith I offer mine.

"Your military units are a part of the Central Army. The Central Government is not a government of any individual, it is a government of our Party. Your troops have not been receiving full appropriations recently because of extraordinary conditions; there is no favouritism. The men of the First Army Corps are mostly from the south and east; they have a high standard of living, and it would be difficult to discipline them effectively should their pay fall into arrears for any length of time. This is due to their environment and habits. They cannot, of course, be compared with the admirable North-western soldiers who are so widely famed for their strength and ability to stand up under terrific hardship.

Moreover, the divisions of your Army, as a result of your able administration and strict discipline, have been adequately fed and clothed, in many instances far better than other units, despite the unfortunate fact that they have not regularly received their pay. I am not the only one who has recognized your genuine merits, for it is due to these considerations that the Central Government appointed you Minister of War."

This was followed by a résumé in considerable detail of the efforts of the Government to bring all armies in China under one central authority. Referring to the Wuhan rebellion, Chiang pointed out that hitherto the finances of the Central Government had depended largely on the southern provinces, but now financial control was centralized and the appropriations could be remitted direct from Nanking, thus avoiding unequal treatment. Li and Pai, leaders of the Kwangsi forces, had similarly complained of the so-called partiality of Nanking, though they had received regular remittances and had in addition retained revenues to buy arms and ammunition. Their troops had not been paid because they themselves had withheld the money.

"You love your troops as your own brothers," said Chiang to Feng, "and must regard such evil practices as abominable. I believe that to realize political and military unity, it is not sufficient that appropriations for local authorities be equitable. Neither is it sufficient for the Government merely to enforce its own orders for such matters as uniforms, ammunition, discipline and education to be of one single standard. Of much more importance is unity of spirit and principle.

"The cause of our past struggles was that our armies were regarded as private property. When an army, which is maintained by the people, recognizes only an individual leader, and indulges in dreams of unification by force, thinking this is an act of patriotism, the result can only be disastrous."

The Government was a government of comrades in the Revolutionary Party, Chiang said, and it could not be utilized by any individual, nor could it be ignored. Chiang believed that salvation lay in unity, and without shouldering joint

responsibility China would never be able to reach the goal—peace.

This remarkable telegram then urged Feng to come to Nanking. "I understand," Chiang wired, "that it has been rumoured that if you come to Nanking you will be treated as a second Li Chi-shen, but I believe that you will not be misled by such tales. We had conclusive proof of the Kwangsi plan for rebellion, and when Li Chi-shen came to the Capital he was plotting with the rebels; his detention, therefore, was necessary. While I am a most imperfect man, since I entered the Kuomintang I have never sold out my friends, nor have I deliberately taken the life of a comrade. My actions are open to all; they can be verified. Li Chi-shen claimed to be a Revolutionist; unfortunately he plotted to destroy the Revolution. He was, perforce, punished.

"As for ourselves, in a public sense you are a Revolutionary leader while privately we are sworn brothers, and you are the elder brother. If I find that you have failed me, I shall have misplaced my confidence; I cannot face our comrades or lead them. If I should wrong you the world will condemn me."

Chiang went on to speak of the programme for the state burial of Dr. Sun and declared that he would go to Peiping to accompany the casket back to the Capital. His comrades, he said, had advised him in view of the tension to postpone the trip, as Feng would seize the opportunity to declare his independence. "To such rumours," Chiang said, "I answer by stating that rumours cannot in any way mar the trust we have in one another. Before I leave for Peiping I fervently hope you will come to Nanking to take charge of the Government; otherwise you must come to the Capital for the state funeral. If you come these rumours will die. If you fail to come, not only will denials of these rumours be of no avail, but the public will be alarmed."

The Kwangsi leaders, Chiang recalled, had declared that if and when Canton was captured, Feng would assume command in the North; the Kwangsi men had also stated that Feng

had allied himself with the faction against Nanking. These reports, Chiang said, he considered ridiculous. Feng could easily see the purpose of the rebels. "In your own telegram recently you enumerated in detail their crimes; is it possible that you have now fallen a victim to their plots?" At any rate, Canton had not been captured, the Kwangsi troops were retreating, the rebel chieftains were but fading shadows in Kwangtung.

There were other wild rumours afloat, Chiang continued. Feng was said to be advancing south to combine forces with rebellious leaders to re-capture Hankow. Feng was also said to be planning an attack on Shansi in order to take Peiping and Tientsin and extend his influence into Mongolia. "Such talk is utter nonsense and those who are intelligent and those who believe in you cannot credit it. I, personally, am not disturbed in any way by these lies."

A little later Chiang added, "I should like to say to you what I have said before, namely, in the event that such rumours become realities, inform me. Out of my consideration both for the public and yourself, I shall withdraw from the field to make my own position clear and safeguard our friendship. I absolutely cannot permit further warfare, which would plunge our people into deeper misery."

CHAPTER XVII

Chiang Strives To Avert War—Feng Yu-hsiang Under Suspicion—Another Appeal By Chiang—A Brusque Reply—Feng Dismissed From Party—His Military Lieutenants Repudiate Him—Yen Hsi-shan's Uncertain Attitude—Chiang Goes To Peiping—Feng Reinstated—China's Relations With U.S.S.R.—Chinese Eastern Railway Question—Northern Revolt Starts—Chiang Crushes Insurgents

FROM what has already been quoted, and from what will be quoted in this chapter, it is plain that the Generalissimo took every possible step to conserve peace and avoid war with Feng Yu-hsiang. To bellicose outbursts he replied calmly and politely, wishing Feng to come back into the fold without suffering too much loss of face. It will have been seen that in every crisis that overtook the country he sought to follow the Biblical injunction to turn the other cheek, as long as it appeared possible that any good would result, but when pleading and politeness were clearly ineffective, he became the resolute and grim soldier facing a military problem.

"In brief," continued Chiang in the telegram quoted, "you are suspected by the nation of having stored up arms and war materials to hold the North-west in defiance of the Government; you are also suspected of having shortened your lines of defence in order to attack Peiping at a moment's notice and to receive Soviet Russia's support in establishing a separate government; you are, in addition, suspected of refusing to come to the Capital because you had made a previous alliance with Kwangsi and were planning to attack Wuhan, precipitating further chaos in China. All such rumours, it is quite

needless to say, are not worth listening to, but there is no end to them and this is our greatest problem.

"A physician prescribes according to his patient's ailment. Therefore we can only hope that, as you are loyal to the Government, you will not remain in the North-west. Your presence here will quash all rumours and the nation will be certain of peace. Thus peace and prosperity depend upon ourselves. If you have not recovered your health you can recuperate in the Capital just as well as elsewhere. For the sake of the general situation and in the interest of the Revolution, it is necessary that you come here even if you are ill. You must not stay where you are on the mere excuse of poor health.

"As for myself, I will do what I said I would do; after the ceremonies for Dr. Sun, I shall resign."

This was followed by considerably more in similar vein and Chiang concluded with the declaration that he was waiting for Feng to come south as anxiously as "famine-sufferers wait for the rain-cloud." He promised that he would send the pay for Feng's troops and also send representatives to accompany him to the Capital. With this and the usual amenities, he wound up the message.

Hardly had the reverberations of this astonishing telegraphic broadside ceased to echo through the land than it was answered by actual explosions in the North. Sun Liang-cheng, Feng's chief henchman in the Kuominchun, as recorded in Chapter XVI, began his depredations by blowing up several bridges and wrecking a number of tunnels along the railway near Wushengkwan. Everyone waited. After a short period of silence, Chiang's barrage of words began to fall again.

"I have just received information," his next telegram to Feng ran, "from railway officials that troops originally stationed at Wushengkwan and Sinyang have withdrawn, and have destroyed several tunnels and bridges nearby with dynamite. Though wild rumours and speculation are rife here, no serious repercussion may be expected as long as we continue to maintain calm and presence of mind, wholly

unaffected by wild tales. I have even heard that foodstuffs and cars have been seized on the railway, but I have merely ordered an investigation to be made of such reports. There is absolutely no reason to anticipate an invasion of Honan by our troops now stationed in Hupeh; thus there exists no necessity for withdrawing Honanese troops. Should the report of the destruction of the railway bridges and tunnels prove true, it would confirm previous reports from the authorities of the Peiping-Hankow Railway to the effect that mines and explosives had been discovered near the bridges across the Yellow River and the Chang River, and also in other tunnels near Wushengkwan. This would make the situation highly dangerous, which I am certain is decidedly contrary to your own desires. Let us, therefore, have an immediate investigation of the matter so that normal conditions may be restored. Your officers should understand that they should not be disturbed by foolish rumours. Favour me with an early reply regarding the safety of the Party and the State in the North, the success of the Revolution, and the condition and welfare of the people."

A blunt, short-spoken warrior, Feng did not see fit to reply on a similar note to these well-phrased and conciliatory messages. He was brooding in his northern retreat, and when he did reply, he sent over a comparatively short, but highly charged, salvo. He said that the fate suffered by the patriot Li Chi-shen, who was arrested without warning in Nanking while there on a diplomatic mission at the request of the Government, had served as a warning to him. Knowing what to expect, he had no intention whatever of going to Nanking then or any other time. Why, he demanded, were Kuomintang Armies massing along his borders, gathering against him? As for the charges that he was secretly in league with Soviet Russia, he ridiculed them.

He added, as a kind of afterthought, that he was ill and could not think of travelling, and he did not relish being compared, even in a veiled manner, with the rebels Li and Pai of Kwangsi.

Apparently unwilling to be diverted from his peaceful trend of argument, Chiang made a soft answer to the wrath of the "Christian General." Feng had intimated that the Ministry of War in Nanking had been closed down; Chiang denied it. He admitted that the Ministry lacked a chief, and he confirmed the report that a number of documents had been removed from it, though police had discovered that this was the work of several disgruntled juniors on the staff.

Turning to Feng's military preparedness and detention of revenue, Chiang continued, "It is reported to me that you have been urged to lead some 500,000 troops against me. If this is so, the size of your Army exceeds the limit set down at the Disbandment Conference. You will, therefore, be guilty of what you yourself have charged against others, namely, military preparedness. Of course, I do not believe that you will resort to such rash action. Such an unwarranted move by your supporters only causes you to be misunderstood.

"The poverty of the land in the North-west, the lack of communications and the suffering of your soldiers have been matters of great anxiety to me, but I believe that you are also aware of the fact that the greatest financial handicap of the Government lies in the detention of national revenue by provincial authorities. You also know which provinces are remitting revenue to the Central Treasury and which are retaining it for their own use. While cutting off the revenue of the Government, you are at the same time expecting to receive your full share of the appropriations. In fact, the Government actually entrusted you with the portfolio of the War Ministry in the hope that the retention of Government revenue by military leaders might be prevented, and fairness might be assured in the distribution of funds among the many units, but you left the Ministry almost as soon as you came to it, and your short stay in the Capital made a definite apportionment of army funds impossible."

This message was a little sharper in tone than those sent previously, and its conclusion contained a thinly veiled threat. Chiang pointed to the danger of disintegration in the Party,

and urged Feng as a "faithful member" to avert the disaster before it was too late. Feng's subordinates, Chiang said, had without Feng's knowledge, uttered sedition and if Feng did not punish them before the Government took direct action, his name would "long remain under a cloud."

A few days after this telegram was sent, Feng was formally dismissed from the Party and from the posts he occupied in the Government. Following this excommunication, the State Council issued a punitive mandate against Feng. It was then that Chiang sent his last appeal to Feng, enumerating the latter's illegal actions, and suggesting that the only way out for him now was to retire from the field and go abroad, in which case Chiang would guarantee Feng's safety.

Feng's high misdemeanours, Chiang repeated, were those of allying with the Kwangsi rebels and entering the fray. He seemed to have seen through the Wuhan plots, but when the Kwangtung invasion was started he had made the mistake of expecting Canton to fall and political reorganization to follow. Chiang quoted a despatch received from Paris where Wang Ching-wei was living in temporary retirement. Wang had exclaimed, upon being informed of the wanton destruction of railway bridges and tunnels in the North: "Feng is rushing to destruction himself by allying with the contemptible Kwangsi clique! I can never again regard him as a friend."

Referring to Feng's plan to hold the entire North-west for his own personal advantage, Chiang declared that the authority of the Government was nation-wide, and those who opposed that authority could not hope to survive. He pointed to the horrible famine in the provinces of Shensi and Kansu, suggesting that these conditions, coupled with the then current Mohammedan unrest, would make it impossible for the wretched, starving masses to support Feng's huge Armies. (Even Chiang did not know the full extent of Feng's depredations at that particular time. The farmers of the North-west customarily stored grain against the years of famine which they expected, and these granaries had been systematically looted to feed the Kuominchun Armies, so that the vast North-

west was prostrate beneath the parasites, and there was nothing before it but misery and hunger and death.)

In conclusion, Chiang said to Feng: "There are but two courses open to you: either you obey or you revolt. If you awaken to the realities with your customary alertness and resolutely pull yourself out of your present evil environment, your mistakes will not affect your future and the situation is still not beyond repair. Therefore, if you wish to go abroad, I shall speak on your behalf to the Government so that you may go under full protection. China is an extensive country and the world itself is large."

The situation had, however, rapidly been growing more tense, and Chiang did not feel that these mild overtures to Feng were sufficient in the circumstances. He therefore reinforced them with a more decisive message to the officers of the Kuominchun itself. Although they had long been associated with Feng, said Chiang, that relationship could be recognized only as long as Feng remained a Revolutionary. Now that his sedition had become a matter of common knowledge, he had automatically repudiated his association with the Revolution, which virtually amounted to a cancellation of his past army record. Feng had plotted with the Kwangsi faction, Chiang reminded these officers, though he had covered up his plots by openly denouncing the rebels after the Government troops had captured Wuhan. Feng had attempted to stir up opposition to Nanking among his own officers by telling them that the Government ignored the sufferings of the soldiers in the Northwest and refused to remit pay, but perhaps the officers were not acquainted with the fact that since the conclusion of the Northern Expedition the revenues from the provinces of Shantung, Honan, Shensi and Kansu, and the income from the Peiping-Hankow and the Lunghai Railways had been withheld by Feng himself. In addition to the sums thus detained, the Government had regularly remitted \$500,000 a month to him. When the expedition against Wuhan was launched this monthly appropriation had been increased to \$1,500,000. Even at the time when the message was being sent, Chiang

asserted, the Government was remitting over \$500,000 a month.

Chiang declared openly in this message to the officers that Feng had been in close contact for some time with agents from Soviet Russia, though Feng had stoutly refuted these reports. In the end Feng's actions, Chiang predicted, would substantiate them. "We dread the Communists far more than we do the sweeping floods," he said. Feng's downfall was inevitable; therefore, if those officers did not care to stake their lives on Feng, they must act quickly.

All of Feng's plans, however, were suddenly wrecked toward the end of May when two of his most important subordinates, Han Fu-chu, now Chairman of Shantung Province, and Shih Yu-san, declared in favour of the Central Government. This defection was a heavy blow to Feng. Han Fu-chu's command set off eastward toward Shantung, and during the retreat suffered severe losses when attacked by Feng's men, but his *coup d'état* could not fail to affect the morale of Feng's Army. Feng was forced to give up for the time being his original plan of armed opposition. Thus ended the war of words between Chiang and Feng. The exchange of telegrams had undoubtedly strengthened the cause of the Government in the eyes of the people, as Feng had had the disadvantage of pleading his own case while Chiang eloquently expounded that of the nation.

The attitude taken by Yen Hsi-shan, head of Shansi, toward all these moves and counter-moves followed a rather tortuous course. For a long time no one, possibly not even Yen himself, seemed to know just where he stood. It gradually developed, however, that he had some sort of understanding with Feng, as a result of which he finally announced his intention to retire from politics and go abroad with Feng.

This led to one final exchange of telegrams, these being clothed in such high expressions of mutual admiration and good-will that their polite phraseology should not be entirely lost to a world in which such amenities are growing very few and far between. Chiang, noting a message from Yen to Feng, telegraphed to the former: "Your frankness is indeed unsur-

passed and highly gratifying. Huan-chang (Feng Yu-hsiang) may comply with your request. Should he carry out this engagement, not only will we guarantee his safety when he passes either through Shansi or Shanghai, but even I myself would be willing to follow him into exile in order that our original wishes might be fulfilled and the revolutionary spirit of love and frankness might be demonstrated."

To this Yen replied: "You have uniformly acted in a most magnanimous and liberal fashion toward Huan-chang and you have always shielded him. I deeply appreciate your fine spirit and unreservedly admire you. I have conveyed your message to Huan-chang so that he also may feel gratitude toward you. I am going to see him to-morrow to urge him personally to fulfil this engagement..." Yen also made the request that Chiang should not think of leaving China, as his retirement would only confuse the nation. If he (Yen) and Feng left, the nation would be peaceful.

Throughout, Chiang had been consistently exercising his ability as a negotiator in order to avert the impending clash with the Northern militarists. His patience, however, was rapidly becoming exhausted, and finally, toward the end of June, he suddenly announced from Nanking that he must take action against the rebel forces, but, as a final effort to assert the authority of the Government over these regional warlords, he decided to go directly to Peiping to confer with Yen Hsi-shan and Chang Hsueh-liang.

When Feng heard of the proposed trip, he decided that there was something in the background and forthwith issued a warning to the Legations in Peiping, enjoining them against giving any aid to the Government at Nanking. Even at that time there had occurred minor skirmishing in different sectors, and Feng's troops were slowly moving into Shansi.

Nevertheless, Generalissimo Chiang left Nanking by train and went directly to Peiping. A year had elapsed since he had been in the ancient Capital. Feng himself was nowhere in the vicinity, having made his headquarters in the town of Hwayin, far to the westward. Around him, during those



The Generalissimo, with General Sung Cheh-yuan to his right and General Yang Yung-tai to the left.

strained months, had gathered a motley array of Soviet agents, both Chinese and Russian, counter-revolutionaries, out-of-pocket politicians and a large number of malcontents. Feng remained there, but kept in close touch with Yen Hsi-shan at Taiyuan. He was supported by the Reorganizationists.

Chiang let it be known in Peiping that he had by no means forgotten the support Feng had given to the Revolution in the past, but the real Revolution in China was only just starting, he insisted. He stated then that Feng had "decided to go abroad and consequently the order for his arrest will be at once rescinded, and he will be given a special appointment to investigate conditions in foreign countries." For that purpose the Government was going to provide him with funds which would enable him to make an extended tour.

Chiang's presence in Peiping was considered by friends and enemies alike at that time as a sign of singular courage, for he had walked unprotected into enemy territory. It was, for him, a question of no alternative. Either he asserted his authority as the head of the State, or permitted himself to be reduced to the status of a regional warlord.

About the first of July, Chiang met Yen Hsi-shan and Chang Hsueh-liang in Peiping. Chiang urged Yen to withdraw his resignation, which had been proffered. Yen insisted that he must go abroad with Feng. When Chiang proved adamant, Yen suddenly became ill and remained in this convenient condition until the next move should be made—by someone else. It being, therefore, Chiang's move, he acted. The State Council in Nanking, without prior notice, cancelled the order for Feng's arrest, recalled his former services to the Revolutionist cause and publicly forgave him. Feng then ostensibly went into retirement. This left the command of the Kuominchun in the hands of three strong generals, Sun Liang-cheng, Sung Cheh-yuan and Liu Yu-fen. By this bit of juggling, Yen and Feng gave up the pretext of travelling abroad. Yen became the nominal leader of the Kuomintang in North China, but he was under the influence of the Reorganizationists and showed himself none too

enthusiastic about aligning himself closely with Nanking.

Having accomplished his purpose, for the moment at least, Chiang returned to the Capital. There were rebellions and campaigns ahead of him, and he anticipated them with the fatalistic philosophy of those who, having become great, instinctively know their enemies. Chance and his own courageous action of bearding the lions in their den, had for the nonce, gained him a short breathing space.

There were, however, other problems to engage Chiang's attention upon his return. Chief of these was the serious turn in the relations between Soviet Russia and China. Following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the new leaders of the country had, of their own volition, promised to give up their interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway in favour of China, confessing that these interests had largely been extorted from the Chinese by the former Czarist regime. The stupidity of the regime in power at Peking at that time practically nullified the effect of this act of restitution as it failed to notify prompt acceptance, but the Government headed by Chiang possessed no such timidity as that which characterized the Northern regime. It was felt that it was no more than right that China should have the railway. The Soviets, however, turned out to be givers of the type denounced in the old nursery rhyme; those who make a gift, and then demand it back. They now wished to keep the railway for themselves.

Among the primary aims of the Kuomintang's foreign policy was the determination to burst China's bonds and regain certain rights and privileges which properly were hers. The interests of the Soviets constantly clashed with those of the Kuomintang. The Party's interests, for that matter, clashed with those of any Power which might have imperialistic designs. The programme of abolishing the unequal treaties, however, was to be carried out by reasonable and proper procedure. It was a definite programme and, as regards Soviet Russia, there were a number of outstanding problems awaiting settlement. Chiang's break with the Communists two

years before had not served to improve the relationship of the two countries. To him, Communism was imperialism, a Red imperialism more dangerous than White imperialism because it was more difficult to cope with. He felt that the Soviets had no sincere intention of handing over the Chinese Eastern Railway to China; they were even attempting to tighten their hold on the railway.

China's move to regain control of the line was not unwarranted, of course, inasmuch as Russia had openly stated that she wished to give it back to her neighbour, but Chiang was unwilling to haggle. If the Soviet Government respected China's sovereignty and agreed to conclude treaties with China on terms of equality and reciprocity, China was ready to resume diplomatic relations with that country, previously so abruptly broken off, but, apart from the problem of the Chinese Eastern Railway, there were other Sino-Russian issues still unsettled, such as the status of Outer Mongolia and the question of Communist propaganda in China.

Chiang declared publicly at that time that any imperialist Power which attempted to interfere with the Kuomintang's revolutionary movement would meet with failure. He knew, however, that slogans and speeches would never carry China through; he knew that the unequal treaties could not be abolished by resort to arms. If China wished the Powers to respect her rights, she must build a strong and efficient Central Government and bring peace and prosperity to the nation. He was, therefore, determined to eliminate the Reorganizationists and unite all the cliques, for if all the Chinese were to stand together, China need not fear oppression.

The overtures made by Nanking to Moscow in this affair of the railway, however, met with rebuffs. The Soviets refused to discuss the matters in dispute, and on July 14, 1929, sent a virtual ultimatum to Nanking, making a number of demands in regard to details. This unexpected arrogance drew a retort from the Generalissimo to the effect that Nanking's rights could not be ignored; China was determined to abrogate the unequal treaties and win back her proper place in the family

of nations; she would not be humiliated. While China did not wish to quarrel with Russia, she was uniting in the fight against Communism lest the country and the people perish. Chiang cited the fact that, when the Soviet Embassy in London was raided by the British authorities and when France demanded the recall of the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, the Soviet Government had not dared to retaliate against such high-handed measures, but in this case the Soviets had sent an ultimatum to China in the belief that China was not able to defend herself. In this, Generalissimo Chiang said, the Soviet Government was badly mistaken.

Chiang informed the powerful Kuominchun in the North of the dangerous possibilities and said that it must bear a large share of the responsibility for the defence of the North-western frontier. He sent instructions to prepare the defences. There was no wish for a serious clash with the Soviets, but it was hoped at Nanking that the disgruntled Northern warlords would take sufficient interest in the situation to rally to the support of the National Government.

By the early autumn of 1929, the clouds of war were rolling up, high and black, across the horizon once again and Nanking lay in the shadow before the swiftly advancing storm. Wang Ching-wei, from self-imposed exile, had issued a Reorganizationist manifesto threatening to form a new government in Canton. Everywhere the "outs" were clamouring to displace the "ins" of the Central Government. There was also much opposition to the Generalissimo personally on the part of rival leaders. The real reasons for the growing threats were carefully cloaked in much verbiage, as usual, and one of the most frequent charges against the Nanking Government was that of corruption and inefficiency.

Instead of denying point-blank all such charges, Chiang recognized that there were grounds for many of the complaints, and himself joined in the general chorus of criticism directed against affairs at Nanking. He centred his attention chiefly on the practice by important leaders in the Government

of holding numerous concurrent positions, not only at Nanking, but also in the provinces.

A signal demonstration of Chiang's ability in dealing with a dangerous situation, was the case of Li Ming-sui, representative of the Government in Kwangsi, and prominent in the affairs of the Southern military chieftains. Foreseeing that Li was about to associate himself with the Reorganizationists and other recalcitrants, Chiang abruptly charged him with planning rebellion against Nanking. The revolt was being prepared in conjunction with other Kwangsi leaders, but the charge was worded in that extraordinary style found in few other places in the world outside China, of which Chiang was a master.

"I hardly believe that this can be true," Chiang wrote. "The fact that in the midst of extremely unfavourable and dangerous currents last spring you were able to distinguish between right and wrong and obeyed the Central Authorities, bears sufficient testimony to your loyalty and integrity. How can I possibly believe that at this juncture you are willing to discard your splendid record and follow in the fatal footsteps of Li Tsung-jen, Pai Chung-hsi and Chang Fa-kuei, thereby permanently severing yourself from the Party and the Government? You realize that the usual tactics of the Reorganizationists are to sacrifice others for the furtherance of their own interests, while they claim all the credit in case they are successful. They are the running dogs of the Communists, and include in their ranks traitors and agents of the Soviets. But judging from our intimate friendship, I am convinced that you will never associate yourself with these rebels. . ."

Li replied immediately in a conciliatory vein; his opposition melted away.

Nevertheless, events were moving swiftly, if quietly, toward a crisis. After the preliminary check given to the leaders of the Kuominchun revolt, matters might have simmered down to a peaceful conclusion had it not been for the Reorganizationist politicians. They had begun inciting Feng Yu-hsiang again, urging him to action. On the eve of the

National Independence Day, the North-western leaders, led by General Sung Cheh-yuan, demanded that Feng and Yen should retaliate against some recent expulsions from the Party and added that the Kuominchun generals were determined to make war upon Nanking. Messages were exchanged, and these were the first intimation to the Nanking Government that Yen had definitely joined in the North-western revolt, but the still cautious Yen did not entirely reveal his hand, probably waiting to see what would be the fate of the less prominent leaders.

Chiang did not hesitate; on the eighteenth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Republic and the second anniversary of Kuomintang rule, he attacked opportunists in an address at Nanking, declaring that for their own selfish gain they were willing to plunge the nation once again into chaos. The Sino-Soviet situation and the uprising of the Kwangsi clique were not nearly so serious as what Chiang characterized as the disappearance of those fine qualities of the Chinese race, honesty and a sense of responsibility.

"On this occasion," he said, "when the country is threatened with aggression from abroad and disturbance within, one is filled with mixed feelings of sorrow and self-reproach when the instructions bequeathed by our late Leader are recalled and the heroic sacrifices of the many martyrs and the sufferings of the people are remembered. Such thoughts leave one sleepless and without appetite and spur one to acts of patriotism in order that an era of peace may be attained."

Foreign aggression need not worry China, Chiang declared, nor need she fear that the internal disturbances could not be ended. What constituted the most dangerous menace to the nation was the fact that the traditional moral virtues of the people had nearly vanished. Everyone, he pointed out, had become an opportunist, trying to exist by cunning. Lethargy caused the people to look to a temporary blissful existence. They badly confused right and wrong, and each looked after his own interests, not the welfare of the many. He complained that they knew how to fight for power and privilege, but had no comprehension of national duty. They

were faithless toward one another and knew no shame. If this evil state of mind, he emphasized, were not eradicated altogether, it would take deeper root, and for national extinction China need not wait for foreign imperialistic aggression or Communist intrigue.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Chiang explained, had indicated that the finest way to serve the country and the Revolution was by the cultivation of benevolence, knowledge and courage. His fundamental maxim had been universal justice, for one must be just before one can be benevolent, learned or courageous; one must be just in order not to mistake laxity for benevolence, opportunism for wisdom, and selfish rivalry for courage. To propagate the principles of the Party, Chiang went on, the Chinese must not violate those teachings. They must realize that in order that the nation should not sink into oblivion they must follow faithfully those principles. As for those who wilfully misinterpreted the principles and stirred up trouble and called it class-struggle, or those who invented rumours to mislead the people and called their fabrications freedom of speech, thereby undermining the moral standards of the people and hastening the decline and extinction of the country and the race, he questioned their right to be called Revolutionists. He said that there was a proverb: "You can administer the law, but you cannot administer the people." The teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen were easily understood and known to the world. They were all-embracing. The general outline of the programme of political tutelage had been laid down by Dr. Sun. To carry this out, competent men were needed, and at that juncture when reconstruction was yet to be achieved, all men of talent were required for service.

"I would urge all to be courageous," Chiang concluded. "Also to cultivate and practise morality in order to acquire the virtue of benevolence and apply yourselves to the attainment of knowledge, so that we may all identify our interests with those of the Party and the Government and be ready to sacrifice ourselves for the welfare of the nation justly, unselfishly, and in defiance of hardships. Do not think of chances of success

or failure, glory or shame, but strive to overcome all obstacles to the independence of the Republic of China and the equality of our country in the family of nations. I myself will exert all energy for the attainment of that goal."

And then came swiftly the first clash between Kuomintang and Kuominchun. After all the words, after all the manoeuvring, there was suddenly war. The first fighting began in Honan on October 14, on the day that Chiang appointed Ho Ying-chin to high command. Nanking troops were attacked by Kuominchun forces and were pushed back toward the Yangtze. The fighting became serious and Feng's Army appeared to be on the verge of capturing Wuhan. Chiang then assumed command personally, and at the end of October he went to Hsuehchang in Honan.

The chief offensive by the Kuominchun was launched by cavalry in the direction of Loyang and Chengchow. Both cities were held by Government forces which were hard pressed. Loyang was occupied by the rebels. Early in November, the Kuominchun horsemen, as part of an attempted turning movement, captured Mihsien, about 20 miles southwest of Chengchow. The town was retaken by Nanking troops a few days later, and it then became obvious that the situation was rapidly changing in favour of the Government.

Reinforcements began pouring into Honan from the South, and the opportunity was taken to make several rapid attacks, all of which were successful. Tengfeng was captured by mid-November and Loyang was recaptured shortly after. One of the Kuominchun leaders suddenly appeared on the scene at this moment with a force estimated at about 30,000 men. He made a bold march across country with the intention of seizing Ichang on the Yangtze, but was driven off in the nick of time.

The recapture of Loyang, which was the result of a carefully planned surprise attack, was the decisive battle of the Honan campaign. The Kuominchun forces were compelled to retreat, abandoning arms, ammunition and a considerable

amount of silver. This success was rapidly followed up, and Shanchow was occupied at the end of the month. With the Northerners in full retreat, Generalissimo Chiang returned to Hankow. By December, the entire province of Honan had been completely cleared of Kuóminchun troops, and the rich region that the hungry militarists of the North had hoped to exploit had been saved for the Central Government.

This quick victory over the Kuominchun left Nanking a little dazed with its success, a success that had been won with hardly a struggle when all had expected a long and desperate campaign. Chiang, however, knew that he was not yet clear of difficulties. The victory would be meaningless, and thousands of soldiers would have died in vain, if the Government did not seize this opportunity to advance the work of reconstruction. There was also the knotty problem of political reform. The Reorganizationists were raising their voices louder than ever, charging, as has been mentioned, inefficiency and corruption at Nanking, and Chiang knew that in many cases the charges were only too true. With a candour that is not customary in China, nor in any other country for that matter among political leaders, Chiang declared at the conclusion of the Honan campaign that "no government can exist for any length of time without the support of the people and no people will forever tolerate a corrupt and inefficient Government."

CHAPTER XVIII

Ironsides Rebel—Defeated By Kwangtung Army—"Grey" General And Tang Sheng-chih Revolt—Rebels Promptly Suppressed By Chiang—Feng And Yen Denounce Chiang—Kwangsi Assists Northerners—Kwangtung Crushes Kwangsi—Desperate Fighting Against Northerners—Wang Ching-wei Goes To Peiping—Short-Lived "Enlarged Plenary Session" Formed—Chang Hsueh-liang Declares For Nanking—Final Crushing Of Northerners

AS ANY man who climbs from obscurity to eminence is certain to do, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had made enemies. They were numerous, some open, some covert; the Kuominchun might be routed for the time being, but there were others to harry the flanks of the Government. Of Chiang's ability, however, there could be no question, and it was not easy for anyone then to imagine Nanking without his leadership.

Prior to the Kuominchun revolt, a menace arose in a new quarter. There was another rebellion, this time staged by Chang Fa-kuei. It came at a time when Chiang was concentrating his entire attention on the Kuominchun in the North and, because Chang had bided his time and apparently chosen the right moment, for a period the rising appeared to have a good chance of success.

During the Kwangsi rebellion earlier in the year, Chang Fa-kuei, who had been relieved of his command after the Communist uprising at Canton in 1927, was recalled to the service by Generalissimo Chiang and was given command of the 4th division, which was the original Fourth Army Corps

that had won its title in the Northern Expedition of the "Ironsides." Chang took over the reorganized division, and supported the National Government both during the Kwangsi outbreak and the early stages of the Kuominchun rebellion. He was an ardent follower of Wang Ching-wei. He supported Nanking, not so much for love of the Government as because at that time he had received no orders to the contrary from Wang. In addition, much as he opposed Chiang's policies, he opposed the Kwangsi rebels still more.

At no time, however, had the Generalissimo deceived himself as to the value of his doubtful supporters, and much of his success in breaking down the plots against himself and the Government had been due to his ability to uncover and counteract the movements of subversive elements. He soon began to realize that the trust he had placed in Chang Fa-kuei had been misplaced. He, therefore, issued orders from Nanking instructing Chang to move his troops from Ichang in Hupeh to the Lunghai Railway.

Chang Fa-kuei interpreted this as a move preliminary to disarming his troops. He decided to defy Chiang and move his command south toward Canton where he hoped he could establish a new government under the leadership of Wang Ching-wei. This eventually led to a second punitive expedition of Nanking troops into South China to put down rebellion. The thing, to disillusioned observers, was becoming a monotonous routine.

On September 17, Chang Fa-kuei issued from Ichang a set of demands upon the National Government. One was that the National Congress should be reconvened. Another was that feudalistic and corrupt elements in the Party be completely eradicated. Last, but by no means least, he demanded that Wang Ching-wei be reinstated at the head of the Party and the Government.

This ultimatum met with a prompt reply from Nanking. Chang was dismissed from his command, and General Liu Chih was instructed to put down the revolt of the "Ironsides." Nevertheless, Chang stole a march on the Government. He

did not wait for trouble to come to him in Ichang on the Yangtze; he moved the "Ironsides" out on the long, war-torn road into the South again, and his passage from the river to Kwangsi took almost two months. His troops met very little opposition along the way, and this only in the form of small bodies of soldiers which they easily swept aside and disarmed. Liu Chih did not act quickly enough from his base at Hankow to forestall this move, and on the west, two Szechwan warlords, Liu Wen-hui and Li Chung-kung, made no effort to mobilize their forces against Chang. They might have checked his southern advance by attacking along the Hunan border, but they preferred to remain inactive in the remote Szechwan hinterland.

Chang's "Ironsides" arrived intact in Kwangsi in November, 1929, and continued to advance toward Kwangtung. Chiang Kai-shek, realizing the danger that threatened Canton, sent Ho Ying-chin to the southern city to take charge of operations there, and several divisions were despatched to Kwangtung as reinforcements.

Chang's drive toward Canton continued into December, and for a time it seemed probable that he would capture the city, but the Government troops went out to meet him, and in a series of minor clashes and skirmishes stopped his advance and turned his campaign into a retreat. The "Ironsides" retired back toward Kwangsi, badly beaten, and by mid-December they were forced to evacuate Wuchow, falling further back on Kweilin and Nanning. The Government troops followed, and in a final drive broke the back of the revolt and concluded the campaign early in January of 1930.

Chang Fa-kuei's rebellion, however, bred another, and in those months it seemed to the watching world that where one revolt was cut down two sprang up in its place. The trouble started with the mutiny and desertion of a body of troops under command of Shih Yu-san, then Chairman of Anhwei Province. This was too close to Nanking for comfort, for the mutiny itself actually occurred at Pukow, which is directly across the Yangtze river from Nanking. The mutineers, how-

ever, made no attempt to attack the Capital; they did not wish to try passages with the Generalissimo's crack divisions stationed at Nanking. These divisions had been receiving special training and when the mutiny was reported troops were sent across the river, but the mutineers had already fled toward the north.

This mutiny in itself was of little importance, but unfortunately it was regarded by Tang Sheng-chih as providing a suitable occasion to start a revolt on his own account. Tang was, like Chang Fa-kuei, a supporter of Wang Ching-wei, and since his restoration to command under the Generalissimo, he had been strengthening his position for some such eventuality. At the height of the campaign in the South, Tang, from his stronghold in western Honan Province, declared himself openly against the Government at Nanking. He announced that he favoured Chang Fa-kuei's demand to put Wang Ching-wei at the head of the Government and that he would support Chang in his revolt.

Generalissimo Chiang sent another expedition out, this time into Honan against Tang. After several days of heavy fighting, Tang's forces retreated toward the west, and at last were surrounded in rugged country. Several of the higher officers immediately found it advisable to change their minds about the rebellion. Tang, faced by the failure of other revolts against the Government, as well as his own, fled from the scene early in January, and his troops surrendered and were disarmed.

The new year, 1930, dawned with the prospects of at least temporary peace. The major and the minor rebellions of 1929 had been put down for the time being. In summing up on New Year's Day, Chiang Kai-shek sounded a call for fidelity and honour among the leaders of China and besought that the nation's traditional virtues and morality might be revived. It had proved a difficult task to seek for peace and at the same time struggle for national salvation. That was one of the points he emphasized. Rebellions, he asserted, had been crushed, but the constructive efforts of the Government

had by no means been crowned with success. What was more deplorable in the eyes of many who earnestly sought a way out for China, he said, was the general moral degradation of the leaders, with the resulting disappearance of much of the proverbial honesty of the people. This, it was felt, would destroy the nation, even if it were not confronted with the threat of imperialism and Communism. Chiang believed that lack of fidelity constituted a greater menace to the future of the nation than the economic and military aggression of outsiders.

"The most enduring and monumental result of the strenuous efforts of Dr. Sun Yat-sen," Chiang said, "has been the awakening, through his personality, of the undaunted spirit of the people from the lethargy into which they had degenerated, and the rousing of the masses to a keen enthusiasm in the struggle for the nation's welfare. So inspired, Revolutionists in the past made noble and memorable sacrifices. After the establishment of the Republic, however, our comrades, thinking that the Revolution had already been successfully concluded, gradually returned to their former state of indifference and sloth, which gave Yuan Shih-kai the chance to stage his imperial *coup d'état*. It was with the realization of this state of lethargy that Dr. Sun reorganized the Party and brought about rejuvenation and the subsequent success of the Northern Punitive Expedition, but what we have already accomplished is but a small part of what we have set out for ourselves. The more adverse the circumstances, the more should we strive to overcome them and conquer our environment."

The leaders, Chiang said, must be examples for the people. If they conducted themselves with virtue, honour, uprightness and honesty, the people would follow them and the services they could render would be invaluable. With co-operation, the nation could easily be lifted from its apathy, and obstacles in the way of the Revolution could be overcome. Execution of the reconstruction programme and attainment of permanent peace, he pointed out, would therefore depend upon united effort.

Lasting peace and national unification, Chiang said, were the guiding principles of the Government. Yet how far that Government was from its goal in the early days of 1930! A few disturbers of the much-sought peace, he recalled, had been crushed, but there were others roaming free. Four rebellions had been put down in the preceding 12 months. In the breathing space the Government, he said, had made a start in the work of reconstruction; there had been a drastic pruning of the Government staffs, strict economy had been enforced and a beginning had been made at the introduction of scientific and business-like methods of administration; the abolition of a large number of sinecures in the ministries had been ordered, but Chiang feared there was little or no time for peace-time efforts. War still threatened.

The "annual spring revolts"—as foreign observers had flippantly termed the sporadic outbreaks of Chinese militarists—were apparently in the offing once more. Even as early as February 10, 1930, the Presidents of the Five Yuan issued an appeal to the warlords that they should refrain from advancing their own interests at the expense of the nation at large. It was a fair indication that the Government anticipated a new rash of revolt with the arrival of spring in China.

Chiang reinforced this appeal with one of his own, for he saw incipient outbreaks brewing in the North. He wished to differentiate between rebellion and internal strife. "The main point," he said, "is that military men should place the welfare of the public above personal and private interests. Thus a true Revolutionist will distinguish clearly between the loyal and the rebellious, and between public and private desires. The most effective means of attaining peace and unity are the carrying out of the disbandment programme and the ending of internal strife. Unless demobilization is effected, those who control arms will not only defy the Central Authorities, but increase their respective forces and struggle among themselves, shattering all hope for peace.

"The distinction between rebellion and internecine warfare must be understood. Internal strife is war carried on

between rival militarists in a country without, however, directly challenging the Central Authorities; such, for example, were the conditions obtaining during the latter part of the Chou Dynasty, known to us as the 'Spring and Autumn' Period. On the other hand, coercion of the Central Government, ignoring its orders and laws and deliberately destroying authority and creating disorder may be properly called rebellion, and must be suppressed."

Whenever a rebellion was imminent, Chiang added, the Government exerted its power in an attempt to avert it, but once it had broken out, the Government was obliged to suppress it by force. It was incumbent on the Revolutionary Government to put down rebellions and stamp out reactionary and feudalistic elements in the country, he urged.

Notwithstanding Chiang Kai-shek's efforts for the maintenance of domestic peace, early in February, 1930, Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi suddenly issued a demand on Chiang, calling for his resignation. It seemed to be a case of "if you will get out, I will get out," for Yen promised to give up his command if Chiang complied. This demand, sent in the form of a telegram, opened another skirmish over the wires between Nanking and Taiyuan.

Chiang had no intention of resigning and replied to that effect, declaring that it was not an opportune time for wholesale resignations; he asked Yen to remain at his post and he, Chiang, would do the same inasmuch as he was determined to suppress all reactionary elements throughout the country. Yen remained unmoved and the telegraph keys continued to clatter.

By the middle of February, messages were still being bandied back and forth with neither side giving any indication of retreat, and Shansi troops, part of Yen's forces, were beginning to move south. When Chiang sharply demanded to know the reason for this troop movement, Yen blandly denied that it was he who was taking military action; it was Nanking which was forcing the issue. He followed this up, however,

with a more positive attitude when he declared to all who cared to listen that this was the time for a thorough reform of the Government and that there was absolutely no chance for a compromise with Nanking.

Chiang's answer was an ultimatum demanding that Yen remain at his post and carry out the disbandment of Shansi troops in accordance with previously issued orders. There was no pretence in this message that he considered Yen still loyal to Nanking. Chiang pointed out that elaborate military preparations had been made by Yen, and that Yen had even been reported to have issued orders for an advance toward Hankow.

Yen hastily replied with a soft answer, which amounted to an offer of submission to the wishes of the Central Authorities. This offer no one took seriously. The exchange of telegrams between Chiang and Yen, however, like the exchange of telegrams between Chiang and Feng, was regarded as a temporary victory for the Generalissimo. Chiang's last message had placed Yen on the defensive, and had Yen been wise he would have taken a leaf from the Book of History and, like the generals of ages past, have gone quietly into retirement.

In the midst of this word-battle, the chief of the so-called Second Central Executive Committee in Shanghai, Wang Lo-ping, was assassinated. The news of this crime burst like a bombshell in the midst of political bickering, and diverted all attention from the Northern situation. Wang had been a Leftist and a follower of Wang Ching-wei. The latter, when he was informed of his subordinate's death, issued a manifesto scoring Nanking in exceedingly bitter terms. The assassination was regarded as purely political, as the members of the Second Central Executive Committee were at that time suspected of conducting treasonable negotiations with the Northern militarists under Yen and Feng.

This was, however, merely a diversion from the undeniable fact that a serious anti-Nanking movement was afoot, and that Chiang had on his hands a major rebellion which would

test to the utmost his position and his strength. Yen, assisted by Feng, was in revolt and made no secret of it. Other and smaller pots were also simmering in the South, but the main threat came from North China. The situation had got well beyond the telegraph stage, and everyone knew it, though a few desultory messages continued to be exchanged.

The Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee opened in Nanking on March 1, 1930. Yen Hsi-shan, who was not present, still persisted in his stand regarding the illegality of the Third National Congress. He was in Taiyuan, and during the whole course of the session military preparations were going on at full blast under the direction of the Kuominchun.

The session proceeded calmly, however. Wang Ching-wei was expelled from the Party; officers were appointed to investigate the situation in the North; the employment of foreign experts and capital for the work of reconstruction in China was considered, as well as the disposal of disbanded troops, problems of local autonomy, economic reconstruction and the spread of education.

In the meantime, Chang Hsueh-liang urged Yen and Chiang to patch up their differences and avoid war. Yen remained adamant. There were desertions from Yen's camp to the cause of the National Government, and it was understood that Han Fu-chu in Shantung would support the Government.

An open rupture between the Government and the Kuominchun was rendered certain in the middle of March when more than 50 Northern leaders made public charges against Chiang, replete with historical comparisons citing the most overbearing of China's ancient emperors. These charges came to the rescue of the embarrassed Yen, who was now definitely out in the open against Nanking, but who up until that time had been in a state of vacillation. Feng went to Tungkwan to assume command of the North-western Army (the Kuominchun.) The leaders who had made charges against Chiang next urged Feng, Yen and Chang Hsueh-liang to take the

field at the head of an expedition against Nanking. Yen did not hesitate long. A few days later his troops took over all the Government institutions in Peiping and forces were despatched southward.

Generalissimo Chiang received the news of this alarming situation in the North calmly. He explained that Yen's various declarations were merely a cloak to conceal his real designs, and he denied that Government troops were being concentrated at Tehchow and Tsangchow for an invasion of Hopei Province. He even went so far as to say with considerable nonchalance that it augured well for the Revolution since all the reactionary elements had finally got together, thereby bringing about a condition that would enable the Central Authorities to "crush them at one blow."

The Government, Chiang explained a day or two later, would for the present adopt defensive tactics and had no intention of launching a punitive expedition. To emphasize this decision, he left Nanking and went to Fenghua, his native place. The public, taking note of all these curious moves, came to the conclusion that, since the Northern militarists were known to be jealous and suspicious of one another and united only in their opposition to Chiang, Nanking was quietly waiting for a split in the ranks of the rebels.

Yen assumed supreme command of the rebel forces on April 1. Among the deputy commanders was Li Tsung-jen, who had organized his forces again in South China—at Kweilin, Kwangsi. Opposing lines were forming up rapidly. Yet Nanking still viewed the approaching crisis without overmuch alarm and speculated on the possibilities of revolt in the Kuominchun ranks bringing the rebellion to an end. Returning to Nanking from Fenghua, Chiang declared that the suppression of the rebellion was not as important as a complete reorganization and radical improvement of the political, military and Party machinery, for if the Government could achieve real progress in the constructive programme "the reactionaries will die a natural death." He also referred briefly at that time to a revival of student demonstrations

throughout the country which were directed against the Government, and also against the British and the Japanese, and he promised that the students would be dealt with severely if they continued their agitation.

During April, Chiang travelled considerably. He went on a tour of inspection of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway area, including Hsuehchow where the Government Armies maintained their chief aviation headquarters with an imposing concentration of the latest model bombers. He proceeded from that sector up the river to Hankow for a similar inspection. He also went to the town of Kweiteh on the Lunghai Railway about the end of April and established his headquarters there. He spent the subsequent time directing the disposal of troops and construction of defences. This entailed considerable travelling, as the Government front extended along a line spread out over a large area, and Chiang did most of his inspections with the aid of a plane, moving from one sector to another on the average of twice a day.

The Generalissimo was determined to fight out the issue and would entertain no suggestion that the civil war be wound up by negotiating a compromise with Feng or Yen. The "model army," which had been receiving intensive training for months at Nanking, was called up early in May and was destined for the Hsuehchow front. It was a newly-organized and well-equipped force, a division comprised of four battalions of engineers besides artillery, cavalry and infantry units. Nanking authorities at that time claimed that this division was the best-trained and equipped Chinese body of soldiers ever to take the field in the history of the nation. Additional units were receiving similar training and equipment in Kiangsu and Chekiang for use in emergency.

The Northerners had been encouraged by Chiang's announcement of a defensive policy, for they construed this as an indication of weakness. Their attitude was that they had nearly everything to gain and very little to lose if they attacked. They were desperate from long months of privation in a barren land and, at least, made no heroic gesture about it;

they said, "If we go forward we get rice and bread, but if we retreat we get only grass and roots." The men actually sang this as a sort of marching song; these hordes of soldiers from famine-stricken Shansi and Kansu were fighting for food and nothing else, notwithstanding the fact that their leaders were attempting to urge them on with shouts of "Down with Chiang Kai-shek." The Northerners, therefore, began an offensive. Their vanguard moved out toward the south, and before anyone realized that an actual movement had begun rebel troops were entering Anhwei Province. This was an ill-advised advance, however, for it was in the centre of Chiang's line, and his crack troops made short work of the invaders. They were deftly turned, driven back across the Anhwei border and pushed north into Shantung.

The Government forces were making slow, but steady, progress in the early part of the summer. Shih Yu-san—that volatile and agile general who had changed sides so many times that count had been lost, but who was now opposed to the National Government—and his Army were surrounded by Nanking troops; there had been clashes in which Shih's men had suffered heavy casualties and many prisoners had been taken. Shih sued for peace, but the offer was rejected and the Government troops penetrated into his lines.

On the important Lung-Hai front, the war was also going in favour of Nanking. There had been a noticeable slackening in the enemy's resistance. That was significant to Chiang, for his objective was not so much to capture cities or gain ground as to eliminate the enemy as a fighting force. The Northerners had lost considerable strength, and the fighting was being prolonged because they were now on the defensive.

Nanking knew, though, that the Northerners had made a series of political alliances with a number of reactionary cliques on a number of widely separated fronts. Furthermore, by emphasizing the sectional differences between the North and the South, the rank and file of the Kuominchun men had been spurred on to fight desperately, working in co-

operation with guerilla bands behind the Nanking lines, which harassed the Government forces constantly by sudden raids.

About the first of June, the Kwangsi troops allied with the Northerners began an advance. Under the command of the three Kwangsi chiefs who had caused Chiang so much trouble for years—Li Tsung-jen, Pai Chung-hsi and Chang Fa-kuei—an army of 30,000 troops crossed the frontier into Hunan and, pushing rapidly north, occupied Changsha, the provincial capital, within a week's time. But these warlords were not destined to preserve unity. Chang and Li almost immediately disagreed with each other in respect to the formation of a new government in the province, each wanting for himself and his followers the greater number of political offices. Chiang Kai-shek regarded this split as a favourable opportunity for a counter-attack. His hands were full in the North, and he could not spare the men. For the time being he was in a quandary. It was settled by asking Canton to put an expedition into the field against the Kwangsi forces and to recapture Changsha. Kwangtung and Kwangsi, traditional enemies, were at each other's throats again.

The Canton troops marched against the Kwangsi forces, routed them in a series of short, sharp engagements early in July, and Chang Fa-kuei's "Ironsides" collapsed. After the liquidation of the Kwangsi forces and the "Ironsides," the Northerners had redoubled their efforts to establish a firm position, and fighting, particularly along the front where Shansi troops were entrenched, became severe in July. The rebels had brought up much heavy artillery and shelled the Government lines with disastrous results for the latter. The Shansi men, determined to break the Government front, made a series of attacks on a large scale and for a time threatened to burst through by sheer weight of numbers, infantry hurling itself recklessly against a veritable wall of machine guns that took a heavy toll. The Kuominchun troops were well armed, if not well provisioned; they were experienced gunners and the Government lines suffered severely under a rain of high explosives for days on end, being forced to stand to

in order to repulse grim assaults during brief interludes between the barrages, when "Big Sword" units and grenadiers came against them in furious waves. The casualties were heavy on both sides, but few distinct gains were made anywhere by anyone until Chiang's forces laid siege to the city of Pochow. In a bitter attempt to raise the siege, Feng sent three crack divisions to Pochow, but after a particularly vicious engagement his troops were routed and Pochow was taken.

Yen Hsi-shan finally led the expected invasion of Shantung Province. Fu Tso-yi advanced on Tsinan, capital of Shantung, which was held by Han Fu-chu and the First Route Army of the Government. Han was not prepared to defend the city on such short notice, however, and put up no fight. He evacuated toward the end of June and Fu Tso-yi's troops entered Tsinan. In mid-August the city was retaken with hardly a struggle and Yen's troops hastily retreated. The retreat became a disastrous rout when these harried men reached the mighty Yellow River, which was then in flood. Unable to make an orderly crossing, they were thrown into such confusion that, under a relentless bombardment, they fled wildly, many were drowned in the swirling river, many were taken prisoner, equipment was abandoned indiscriminately and a broken force finally made its precarious way back into the North again.

This major victory was the occasion for congratulations all round at Nanking, and China began asking, with some reason, "Is the war finally over?" Chiang had delivered crushing blows to the Kuominchun forces along the Lunghai, Pinghan and Tsinpu fronts;* Tsinan had been retaken and the retreating Northerners were being pursued. The fighting had been going on for several months and Nanking offered peace to the North, to the forces of Yen and Feng. Peace and even unity were once again glimmering faintly on the dark horizon,

* The Lunghai Railway, the Peiping-Hankow Railway and the Tientsin-Pukow Railway.

though the rebels were still stubbornly resisting, declaring to the world that the Government of China was a dictatorship and that the Government was responsible for plunging the country into the whirlpool of civil war. There were few signs of compromise on the part of Yen and Feng, who were apparently determined to carry the fight on to the finish. They had, though, suffered repeated reverses; Nanking was slowly advancing, gathering in more and more territory. As is always the case in internecine strife, it was the people who suffered most, and their condition at that time was truly deplorable, harassed as they were by continuous fighting, marching and counter-marching, the general horrors of war, plus famine and flood.

The Central Government issued a mandate to the Kuominchun at the end of August in the hope of averting further suffering for the people. This was to the effect that officers and men alike would be honourably treated if they wished to come over to Nanking, surrendering their arms. They were offered a chance to save themselves before it was too late. Nanking wanted the arrest and delivery of the higher rebel officers; if these men could be forced to relinquish their commands and surrender their bases, unity would be at hand and the feudalistic regime in the North would be quickly overthrown.

When the Nanking mandate was issued granting amnesty to officers and men in the Northern forces, Yen and Feng redoubled their attempts to consolidate their position as best they could. Meanwhile, Wang Ching-wei arrived in Hongkong from Europe. He was still steadfastly opposed to Nanking, and he immediately got in touch with these Northern leaders. They seized upon his return with great joy, urging him to go to Peiping and help to organize an opposition government. On various pretexts, possibly due to the uncertainty in his own mind as to the merits of the plan, Wang delayed, and did nothing at all for a time. He finally did go to Peiping by steamer though at that time the fortunes of war were turning against the rebels.

When Wang arrived in Peiping he formed a cabal with half a dozen of his followers and supporters and established what was called the "Enlarged Plenary Session" of the Kuomintang. This little group of men proceeded without delay to organize an opposition government to bolster up the waning military fortunes of the Northerners. At the end of August, Wang went to the seat of Yen's administration at Taiyuan in Shansi, where it was decided to place Yen at the head of a State Council in Peiping. Others in this "government" included such leaders as Feng Yu-hsiang, Wang Ching-wei, Tong Shao-yi, and Li Tsung-jen.

In September, the so-called State Council was officially inaugurated at Peiping, but, already the Shansi troops had suffered an overwhelming defeat in Shantung, and Yen left Peiping to see what could be saved from the wreck.

Chiang knew what was transpiring in the old Capital, and after the fall of Tsinan he prosecuted the campaign even more vigorously. Nanking troops advanced northward in a number of strong columns, following the railways. They met with few obstacles, occupying city after city along the way.

In the meantime, the heaviest pressure had been brought to bear upon Chang Hsueh-liang. Delegates from Yen and Feng and from Wang Ching-wei hung about him at Mukden for months, trying to persuade the Young Marshal to throw in his lot with Peiping. Their efforts were heavily supplemented by pressure from the Japanese. They threatened Chang with extinction if he joined Nanking. He defied them and on September 18, 1930, sent a telegram to Nanking assuring the Government of his assistance to bring the civil war to an end. Simultaneously, he sent troops from Mukden to advance upon Peiping from the north. The members of the "Enlarged Plenary Session" recognized that the end was near at hand. They fled precipitately from Peiping to the foreign concessions in Tientsin. By the close of September, Peiping and Tientsin were in the hands of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops, now working in full accord with Nanking. The Nanking forces continued their steady advance into the North, and by the first of October

had pretty well cleared out the last scattered bands of Northern troops in that particular region. Kaifeng fell, the rebels being driven out of the city. Nanking troops laid siege to Loyang, cutting off the retreat of the Northerners into Shensi and Kansu. Kuominchun leaders began coming over to the Nanking lines in ever-increasing numbers. Most of them were received without comment and given minor commands in the Nanking Armies. Others simply surrendered.

With the capture of Kaifeng the line of battle, hitherto divided on two fronts, was merged, and the Government forces advanced quickly against Chengchow, occupying that important centre without any difficulty. The territory south of the Yellow River was all taken over by Nanking, and the doom of Yen and Feng was sealed. Even at that early date, work was started on the rehabilitation of the war-torn areas, and refugees were concentrated in camps. Wandering, disorganized bands of Northern troops were disarmed and set to work on reconstruction projects. The campaign was over, Peiping was under control.

Six months of the bloodiest war since the Taiping Rebellion fought in China were ended. The slaughter had been terrific. Of the Northern forces, which numbered about 600,000 during the intense fighting (400,000 of the Northwestern Army under Feng and 200,000 of the Shansi Army under Yen), approximately 150,000 had been killed or wounded. Nanking troops had suffered 30,000 killed and 60,000 wounded. The land lay devastated. It was a high price that had been paid once again for peace. Chiang remained triumphant.

CHAPTER XIX

Chiang's Policy Of Toleration—Question Of Provisional Constitution—Plenary Session Of Central Executive Committee—Chiang Denounces Local *Tangpu*—Split With Hu Han-min—Hu's Resignation Accepted—National People's Convention—Chiang's Inaugural Address—Record Of National Government—A Vote Of Confidence—"Spring Revolt" At Canton—Chen Chi-tang Disarms Government Troops—Shih Yu-san Starts Short-lived Revolt

CHINA had hoped that the punitive expedition against the Northerners would constitute the prelude to a permanent peace and the laying of a firm foundation of national unity. During the fighting, Nanking had received gratifying support and assistance from the people—a change of attitude that came as something of a surprise when it was recalled that at the start of the whole trouble enemies had sprung up like weeds on all sides. Nanking, wishing to retain this support, desired to contrive means of giving realization to the people's wishes and aspirations after the campaign had been concluded.

The most important task that lay ahead of the Government, in the Generalissimo's opinion, was the promulgation of a Constitution during the period of political tutelage whereby the Kuomintang would share the Government with the people. This could only be accomplished by convening, as soon as possible, a Kuomintang Congress and making preparations for a People's Convention. The Kuomintang had, following the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in respect to the procedure for the reconstruction of the country, temporarily fixed upon the system of one-party government in the hope that a democratic

government might eventually be realized. A People's Convention had been expressly called for in Dr. Sun's Will, and it should have been called much earlier. Chiang was apprehensive, however, that, at the moment when national unification was within his grasp, as the feudal militarists still had considerable power, some of them might be able to dominate elections, buy over politicians and give rise to general complications hampering national reconstruction. He was determined, first of all, to eliminate independent militarists, although his efforts in that direction had aroused revolt throughout the country and these rebellions had cost Nanking dearly.

The Northern rebellion having been finally put down, he felt that the day of the Chinese warlord was drawing rapidly to a close; it was the twilight of the politicians, mandarins, rebels and outcasts who had been throwing the nation into turmoil and striving to undermine the Kuomintang. In the new day to come, there would be hope for the unification of political thought in China and opportunity for the restoration of peace. The Generalissimo held the view that the time was ripe for the National Government to show its appreciation of the support given by the people during the Northern Expedition and other domestic troubles by permitting their participation in national affairs. Chiang also favoured a policy of moderation in dealing with the defeated armies, and he lost no time in urging the convocation of a National Congress of the Kuomintang as soon as the hostilities were over; this was regarded as a distinctly conciliatory measure, since the disgruntled Reorganizationists had hitherto questioned the legality of the Third Congress and had failed to support it. He wanted a general amnesty to be granted to the Northern politicians and leaders. Several measures suggested by Wang Ching-wei in regard to national policy were tactfully included in a recommendation made at that time by Chiang on the subject. He was anxious to take all possible steps toward unity by drawing former enemies into the Nanking fold.

Chiang was, of course, somewhat over-optimistic when,

following the victory over the North, he declared that in spite of the fact that practically every reactionary faction in the country had combined against Nanking, none would be able to escape ultimate extinction. "After this," he said, "there can never rise in the future any militarists who dare destroy unity and revolt against the Kuomintang and the Government!"

Chiang together with some members of the Kuomintang believed at the moment that national opinion should be sounded, and plans should be made to restore the nation's political power to the people, so that they might assume joint responsibility for the building of a new China on the basis of the Three People's Principles. The Constitution itself, however, was still a plan; nothing had been done. The date for its promulgation had not even been fixed in the general programme for a political tutelage; the question awaited the deliberations of a People's Convention. There would have to be a conference for the drafting of the nation's Constitution. It was felt that it might be necessary to enact and adopt before the permanent Constitution a Provisional Constitution (*yo-fa*) applicable during that period. The sooner, then, the People's Convention was convened, the better.

When Chiang returned to Nanking from the front he had a definite plan in mind embodying five post-war tasks for the Government. These were complete eradication of Communism and banditry, the rehabilitation of national finances, the evolution of a clean and efficient administration, economic development, and execution of the district autonomy system.

Chiang outlined these five points in a statement on October 10, 1930. Within a few days, Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yu-hsiang and Wang Ching-wei, leaders of the collapsed Northern rebellion, had accepted his programme and had even offered to retire.

Little time was wasted in calling together the Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee that had been proposed. Meeting in mid-November, it considered the revision of the Government's Organic Law, reorganization of Nanking's administration, convocation of a People's Conven-

tion; reduction of district Party offices and allotment of land in the Capital for the construction of foreign legations.

Before the opening of the session, Chiang delivered an address to the Central Kuomintang in which he gave a warning to Party leaders. His references to the manner in which certain elements in the Party were abusing their privileges, were outspoken. Nor was the rebuke untimely. If, he said, during the previous few months, one factor of popular unrest in China had stood out more strongly than another, it was the growing intensity of feeling against the high-handed, anarchical methods of local committees of the Kuomintang in many parts of the country. They had driven recruits into the Communist ranks.

He stated that it was his firm conviction that, with the conclusion of the Northern Expedition against the Kuominchun, permanent unification of the nation was practically assured, but, in view of the complicated and unfavourable conditions, domestic and foreign, with which the country was then beset, it was clear that China had still to face and overcome many obstacles before her object could be attained. He considered it to be of imperative importance that all in the Central Party should take up their responsibilities resolutely and revive the zest and spirit which they had displayed during the early revolutionary days, so that a strong and compact Party organization might be brought into being to weather the storms which it had still to encounter.

Chiang declared that he had been convinced that the key and watchwords for the conduct of all his comrades in the Party were "Be Men of Virtue," and "Self-effacement." It was the lethargy and incompetence of the lower Party headquarters that caused the main shortcomings of the Party itself. Party members not only did not inspire respect and confidence among the people, but had also become the objects of general dislike and hatred. Not until they had changed their outlook on life could they shoulder and fulfil their responsibilities. To remedy the situation, rigid rules of conduct, he urged, would be necessary.

The Party had been daily talking of purity in political administration, Chiang recalled, but one met everywhere with cases of corruption; while the public was being daily exhorted to abide by the laws and observe Party discipline, cases of violation of such discipline and laws were to be found everywhere. Who, therefore, if not the Central Party leaders, should take upon themselves the responsibility of enforcing law and order?

In the second place, all of these leaders must, in Chiang's opinion, distinguish clearly between their public and private affairs. In the performance of public duties, Party leaders had generally refrained from correcting the mistakes of their colleagues. A few Party leaders had even belittled the importances of laws and ordinances, and did not scrupulously observe them.

"Others have adopted the attitude," Chiang remarked, "that, having rendered meritorious services in political or military activity, they should be given a free hand in the discharge of their duties, and the Central Authorities should in no instance interfere with them. All of these show a lack of clear conception of public duty. Suffering as I have been from my shortcomings, as well as from the fact that I did not have the privilege of joining the Party at an early stage, I have myself in the past not infrequently asserted my own views to the detriment of the public. No one realizes more than I do my own blunders. What I mention here is the result of a self-examination of my own past conduct and may, therefore, be looked upon as an act of self-confession."

The fighting was over, and the year drifted on to a close. November and December were quiet months. On January 1, 1931, Chiang Kai-shek issued another important message to the nation in which he urged his fellow countrymen to devote all their energies during that year to the promotion of education and the development of agriculture. He declared that these were of the utmost importance to China, and that failure to develop education and agriculture was among the principal causes of the unstable conditions.

In recent years, he added, there had not only been no progress in the field of education but, worse still, there had been a total lack of discipline among students. He expressed the hope that in the future the people would pay more attention to the education of their children and do what they could to assist the Government to remedy educational defects.

As for agriculture, he was glad that China's social structure in rural districts had not fallen into decay despite the terrible conditions that had prevailed for the past 30 years. This he attributed to the patience and industry of the farmers, who formed the great mass of China's population. He regretted, however, that so many Chinese farmers had left their farms for large industrial centres, because that involved a decrease in the ranks of those engaged in China's fundamental economic activity.

An event of crucial importance in the history of the Kuomintang occurred early in 1931. Although the year had started quietly, quite suddenly, Hu Han-min, at that time President of the Legislative Yuan and one of the guiding lights of the Party, resigned from office.

While this came as a shock to the country, Nanking had foreseen a Chiang-Hu split for some time. Chiang had won his fight against the Northerners. He had duplicated his military successes in the field of politics. Thereafter things moved swiftly to a climax, for Hu Han-min decided openly to oppose a variety of Kuomintang policies. He began to criticize, severely and publicly, the financial and foreign policies of the Government. His particular demand was that the predominance of the Kuomintang over the Government should be acknowledged. Chiang's rebuke to the Party had been very distasteful to him. Hu had definite ideas as to the means by which China could be saved from the evils that afflicted her, and these ideas were, in many cases, in direct opposition to those of Chiang.

It was inevitable that sooner or later an open break would develop between these two powerful and determined men

over the question of the Provisional Constitution. Chiang wished to broaden the popular base of the Government during the period of political tutelage by moving in the direction of constitutional, or representative, government under temporary legislation which would provide for a gradual delegation of political authority through local autonomy. Hu insisted upon the absolute control of the affairs of the nation by the Kuomintang.

This quarrel came to a head late in February when Chiang, Hu, Sun Fo, Tai Chi-tao and others met at Tangshan outside Nanking to discuss the Constitution. During this conference, Hu advanced his own views, but was consistently opposed by the majority. Becoming angry, he and Chiang exchanged hot words, and Hu, seeking to force the issue, threatened to resign unless his own views be given consideration and accepted. Declining to accede to this, the Central Executive Committee accepted Hu's resignation early in March and appointed Lin Sen in his place.

Discussing this crisis shortly afterward, Chiang asked: "What are Hu's intentions when he arbitrarily rejects the right of the People's Convention to discuss the Constitution? Is it not clear that without it the Legislative Yuan would alone have the authority to make or unmake laws? If this were to be tolerated, the spirit of the People's Convention would be entirely lost and the sacrifices made in the last few years in vain. We are astonished that, fair as he is, Hu should wilfully bar the way to this goal. He has now resigned, and it is sad that one who has served the Party so long and faithfully should do this thing, for it is a grave mistake."

Chiang had, personally, held the opinions of Hu Han-min in respect. The greater part of the amnesty regulations, for instance, had been revised in deference to Hu's views. The Central Authorities had originally planned to hold a People's Convention at an earlier date, but the plan had been abandoned because Hu opposed it on the grounds that the time would be inadequate for preparations. To Hu the Government had looked time and again for advice when important issues arose. His insistence that the question of a Provisional Con-

stitution should not be brought before a People's Convention, however, was so strongly disapproved by Government leaders in general, that several had even proposed that impeachment proceedings be brought against him. Hu's resignation had come as a blow to those who admired his statesmanship, but the issue was one of such significance that they had not hesitated to allow him to go.

This split between Hu and Chiang gave rise to the usual crops of political rumours; among others it was whispered that Hu had actually been imprisoned at Tangshan. Chiang took the bull by the horns in this case. He denied all allegations, and after discussing them at some length, said: "It should be realized that, theoretically, no member of the Revolutionary Party may enjoy absolute freedom of personal movement. All our actions and utterances are subject to constant regulation and restriction; few leaders had personal freedom in the broader sense of the term. It is for the freedom of the country and the nation, and not for personal liberty, that we are striving. Should individuals insist upon their full liberty it would be almost impossible for the nation to attain the coveted status of equality with other nations. Hu himself has emphasized that officials and Party members cannot claim such a privilege. A Revolutionist is subject to constant discipline and regulation. He must obey the orders of the Party and abide by the laws. Not only is it incumbent upon him to sacrifice his liberty for the sake of the Revolution, it is perfectly within the right of the Party or Government to restrict, whenever circumstances demand, the personal liberty of any individual. This principle is applicable to all regardless of their position, their past record, or the nature of the responsibility with which they are entrusted."

Hu had been a life-long follower of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and had a clear grasp of the Leader's teachings. He had, Chiang recalled, often exhorted his comrades to obey such teachings and sacrifice their liberty to attain national freedom. The question of whether Hu was really enjoying freedom of personal movement was "therefore of no great importance." The

writings and talks attributed to Hu were still being published in the Chinese Press at that time, and that in itself was held sufficient to refute current rumours. "In order to avoid misunderstanding as well as to disarm his critics," Chiang added, "Comrade Hu is planning to make his permanent residence in the Capital; this is also in accord with the wishes of the Government, for it is only in this way that his excellent reputation may be preserved intact."

One of the chief reasons for the incessant civil strife in China in the previous two decades, Chiang explained, lay in the fact that responsible political leaders, once they resigned, invariably proceeded to take up residence in the foreign settlements of Shanghai and Tientsin or at Hongkong from which havens they might incite and fan disorders if they so chose. Even when they themselves were sincerely desirous of living peacefully in retirement, they were occasionally led into new movements, which at times resulted in public unrest. As a result, many of these men forgot their fine Government records, and some even sank into irrevocable ruin and complete loss of prestige. Such unfortunate examples were common enough. While deploring the actions of certain former comrades, Chiang was especially anxious, he said, about Hu. Hu had a long record with the Party, the hard-earned result of several decades of struggle that had not been easily achieved. "We are really loth to see such a long record as Comrade Hu's wrecked in a single day," said the Generalissimo. "For the sake of the public and in his own interest, therefore, we are devising measures to preserve him from ruin. In the opinion of the Government and of Hu himself, it is best that he should not leave Nanking..."

Though it was clearly desirable, from every point of view that Hu Han-min should remain in the Capital, a great deal of bitter criticism of the Government and of Chiang was forthcoming from his supporters. The principle of restriction of personal liberty among Party leaders was conceded by most, but Hu's followers were shocked that the principle should be applied to Hu Han-min himself.

In spite of Hu's opposition, the People's Convention was opened on May 5, 1931, at the Central University in Nanking. Some 447 delegates were present, including nearly 50 members of the Central Executive Committee, councillors of the Government, departmental ministers, and a number of special dignitaries such as the Panchen Lama of Tibet. Chang Hsueh-liang also attended.

Ritual is very important in Chinese public life, even today. This first People's Convention under the Kuomintang went through the standard rites at the opening session. Invariably they consist of homage to the national flag and the Kuomintang banner, bows to the portrait of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and the reading of Dr. Sun's Will and Testament. The preliminary ceremonies completed, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek delivered an inaugural address.

Approximately 300,000 officers and men had died for the People's National Revolution, and the number of wounded had been at least double that, he pointed out. Those losses, Chiang said, were a part of the price that China was paying for peace and national unity. Outbreaks of rebellion, one after another, had delayed the calling of the Convention, but now that unity had been achieved the nation would embark upon the period of political tutelage in accordance with the programme of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Touching upon current political theories—Fascism, Communism and Liberal Democracy—Chiang declared that the nation must evolve its own political system in accordance with China's ancient customs and traditions, instead of importing foreign institutions of government. China was struggling toward the realization of democracy, the sovereignty of the people. The Chinese people must receive political training, especially in view of the past disappointing experience in the matter of constitutional government.

As for national reconstruction, Chiang explained that it had been delayed by successive rebellions under the warlords; these had used up the funds needed for rehabilitation, and had discouraged investment of foreign capital in the country.

Despite these adverse circumstances, real progress had been made. There was, for instance, the record of highway construction; in 1926 China had had but 2,000 kilometres of modern roads, while in 1930 there were 51,000. Since the suppression of the October rebellion there had been added the achievements of *likin* abolition and the attainment of tariff autonomy.

The outstanding purpose of the People's Convention, the Generalissimo asserted, was to consolidate peace and establish national unity, as well as to map out concrete plans for reconstruction. China's handicaps included unemployment and under-production; there was a serious lack of educational facilities for the people, as well as a lack of efficiency in industry. The railways were inefficient and more lines were needed; more shipbuilding works were required, more shipping lines, but first of all there was the necessity of the Convention to inaugurate a period of constitutional government to restore power to the people.

At the first regular session the resolution for the adoption of the Provisional Constitution was introduced by Chairman Chiang Kai-shek. He explained that with the National Government entering upon the period of political tutelage, it was necessary to enact and decide upon a Provisional Constitution which would be binding upon the Government and the people. He pointed out that the draft which had been drawn up was in complete accord with the bequeathed teachings of the late Leader and expressed the hope that all the delegates would give the proposal their fullest consideration. Consequently, the Provisional Constitution was adopted on May 12, and promulgated on June 1. It will remain in force until the Constitution (*hsien-fa*) which is now in draft form is adopted at the Second People's Convention to be held in November, 1937.

A national education programme was proposed by the Government during the Convention, and after a lively discussion it was, in the main, adopted. The Government, before the close of the session, presented a voluminous account of

its stewardship. This contained the fundamentals of national reconstruction as laid down in the political philosophy of Dr. Sun, and emphasis was placed on the necessity of the Chinese people devoting themselves to solid and practical work, rather than leisurely lip-service. An outline of the functions of the Legislative Yuan was given, correcting a number of popular misconceptions regarding that body; it was definitely subordinate to the Central Political Council in the matter of law-making. In fact the Government itself was no more than the highest executive organ of the Kuomintang. The Government was carrying out the policies set forth in the declaration of the First National Congress. In its domestic scheme, the Government was centring its efforts on the establishment of district autonomy. The abolition of unequal treaties with the foreign Powers was being sought.

One of the achievements of the Convention was the adoption of a resolution that it should accept on behalf of the people the entire body of teachings bequeathed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, giving the complete and formal sanction of the nation to his political creed. The same session also adopted the general political report submitted by the National Government, this act constituting a virtual vote of confidence.

The stay of Hu Han-min in Nanking had unfortunate consequences. He had been suspected of activities in the South which smacked of revolt, and the Government had hoped by his remaining at Nanking, to forestall any such eventuality. At the close of the People's Convention, however, and with little or no warning, Chen Chi-tang at Canton suddenly took the initiative. He disarmed all troops stationed along the East River, these troops being loyal to Nanking.

There was a pregnant pause for a few days. Then Sun Fo and Eugene Chen arrived in Hongkong where they met and conferred with Wang Ching-wei, Tong Shao-yi, Chou Lu and other Southern leaders. The result of this conference was the despatch from Canton, whither they later repaired, of a telegram demanding the immediate retirement of General-

issimo Chiang Kai-shek from his position. Chiang was charged with having given authority to various Communist leaders, employing in the Government enemies of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and imprisoning Hu Han-min. This ultimatum was the opening gun in the Southern revolt.

The root of the split once more lay in the hostility towards Chiang and his intimate supporters. This was a poor basis for a rebellious movement. Allegations of nepotism and autocracy were not likely to impress the people who were disposed to weigh the merits of rival parties in the light of actual achievements. Whatever might be said against the Nanking Government, it could hardly be denied that, under Chiang, it had more nearly approached the appearance of a Central Government than any which had been set up in China in recent years. It had gone a long way in creating the outward verisimilitudes of an administration in being, as even its enemies admitted. It had met challenges to its authority and overcome them, partly by force and partly by astute political arrangement. It had defined and attempted to tackle the major problems of reconstruction. In particular, however halting, its efforts in the previous months to cope with the prime issue of bandit-suppression had not been entirely barren. Unless the contentions of Canton could carry more weight than that given by mere personal grievance, Canton seemed at that moment to be rendering a poor service to China.

In this dispute between Nanking and Canton, the group which was assembled in Canton was made up of individuals whose records were certainly no better than those of the men they hoped to unseat. Once again, Chiang faced both a political and a military crisis. For six years since he had stepped upon China's stormy political stage as a real leader, he had, at every turn, encountered the rivalry, not only of the opponents of his Party, but also even of his colleagues and associates. For the struggle of power in China was rarely ideological; it was always the movement across a continent of vast armies to the support of single individuals, each one of whom regarded himself, and was acknowledged by his

followers, as the only saviour who could lead the millions of China from the chaos of warfare to the stability of peace.

Chiang replied to the Canton ultimatum at the end of May by bluntly stating that their action constituted an act of rebellion against the National Government. Reminding the Southerners that it was he who had organized the Whampoa Cadets who were mainly responsible for the success of the expedition which had left Canton in 1926, he called attention to the fact that the dispute between himself and Wang Ching-wei had always been over the question of co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communists; Wang favoured such co-operation and Chiang did not.

The rebels, however, were determined to see the thing through. They bought over what was left of the "Ironsides"—it was reported for \$500,000. Friendly relations were established with the Kwangsi leaders who had only recently been crushingly defeated by the Government. Chen Chi-tang was dissatisfied with the funds placed at his disposal by Nanking, and though he had been nominally under orders from the Central Government, he now ousted the Governor of Kwangtung Province, Chen Ming-shu, and put himself in charge. The Canton group then proceeded to organize a Central Executive Committee and from this to form a Southern "government" with headquarters at Canton. The action of this little group of men, holding no mandate and inspired only by their own bitterness, met with a prompt response from the Nanking authorities. Holding an emergency session, the Central Executive Committee in the National Capital issued a personal appeal to the disgruntled politicians at Canton, urging them to sink their differences for the sake of the nation which was threatened by the Communist menace in the central provinces.

Sun Fo had associated himself at that time with the Southern faction. In a message, sent to him by Chiang late in May, can be found an indication of the Generalissimo's attitude toward the rebellion. Sun Fo had signified his intention, before leaving Nanking for Canton, of bringing about a

compromise and peaceful settlement of the quarrel. Chiang believed that Sun Fo had thrown in his lot with the rebels through force of circumstances and not of his own free will.

Chiang expressed astonishment that the Southern leaders had demanded that he should abandon the posts and responsibilities entrusted to him by the Party and the State. It had been by the orders of Dr. Sun Yat-sen that he had taken such a prominent part in the Revolution. One could not take from another that which one had not given.

Why, if Sun Fo thought he (Chiang) had betrayed the trust imposed upon him and should quit his posts to "expiate" his "offence," did he not submit such a recommendation to the Party through the usual procedure, for it was a matter for the Party to decide? Instead of resorting to this, however, Sun Fo had, Chiang pointed out, allowed himself to be used by reactionaries and Communists, and was then bent on action calculated to threaten national unity. The law and the discipline of the Party and the State must be upheld.

During the previous years, he continued, all projects and reforms of national importance were carried out in accordance with orders of the Party, and there was none that had not had Sun Fo's approval. That he should now be filing unreasonable criticisms of policy in the shaping of which he himself had taken an active part, Chiang said, was a shock to Nanking. These contradictions were puzzling, and if affairs called for modification they could be effected by proper procedure. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Chiang added, had declared that "the National Revolution has not yet been completed; therefore all comrades should continue to strive toward that end." Chiang held the view that to devote oneself to the Revolution was a duty and not a right, a duty which one could not evade.

His peace overtures, however, had very little effect on Canton. The Southern leaders refused to listen to suggestions, and the situation rapidly grew more and more tense.

First blood, however, was drawn, not in the South but in the North. The cause of it was an outbreak by Shih Yu-san, would-be warlord, sometime adventurer, and fickle follower of

Nanking. Shih, taking advantage of the dissension in Canton, the Communist troubles, and the growing menace of the Japanese in Manchuria, decided that the time was ripe to enlarge his own sphere of influence. He waited until July, then began to detain the rolling stock along the Peiping-Hankow Railway.

Chang Hsueh-liang met the threat by an immediate strengthening of the garrisons along the railway, and at the same time he appealed to Han Fu-chu in Shantung as a personal friend of Shih to use his influence in inducing the rebel to abandon the revolt. Negotiations, however, proved fruitless, and about the middle of July the first clash occurred between Government troops under Chang Hsueh-liang and those under Shih. Promptly, Shih issued a manifesto denouncing Chiang Kai-shek and pledging loyalty and support to Canton.

Within three days Chang Hsueh-liang had an organized expedition on the march against Shih, and Nanking had sent troops north. Honan provincial forces were drawn into the fighting and within ten more days Shansi troops joined the move against Shih. The rebel leader was immediately placed in an embarrassing position, being practically surrounded. After a few skirmishes, the rebels began a hurried retreat toward the Tientsin-Pukow Railway line, and after another week, early in August, Shih suddenly decided that he had had enough. He announced his "retirement," and the revolt ended as abruptly as it had begun.

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